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I. Introduction 
 
On the eve of the 21st century, human rights became a crucial element 
in foreign policy and scientific research. This was directly related to 
the increased media attention on atrocities committed by State agents 
in different countries such as Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Chile, or Cambo-
dia. Symbolic figures such as former dictators Pinochet, Pol Pot and 
Miloević attracted international public attention to large-scale human 
rights violations. In 1998, the detention of General Pinochet in Lon-
don fostered the discussion of the human rights topic in Latin Amer-
ica. However, within the struggle against international terrorism in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, the significance of 
human rights has been fundamentally questioned in international poli-
tics. In this context, the present study intends to reconstruct the human 
rights policy of an intergovernmental body, the Organization of 
American States (OAS), during the most horrific period of recent 
Latin American history in regards to human rights. 
After World War II, human rights gained importance as a result of 
the experiences of war and above all in light of Hitlers genocide car-
ried out by the German National Socialists.1 As a result, the post-war 
Nuremberg trials against war criminals set a precedent by including 
the offense of crimes against humanity. This inclusion constituted a 
milestone in international law concerning human rights and also influ-
enced the emerging human rights systems. While human rights had 
developed into an important basis for the current condition of nations 
in the Western Hemisphere during the last 200 years, those rights were 
formalized for the first time in the Charter of the United Nations in 
1948. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted the 
same year. Based on the natural right philosophy from the Middle 
Ages, authors such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jacques 
Rousseau articulated these rights, which constituted the legal funda-
ment of Western society. From the enlightened natural right theory of 
the 18th century, human rights were regarded as natural, derived from 
                                                 
1  See Thomas Buergenthal  International Human Rights: Past and Future, Failures 
and Accomplishments, in: David A. Johnson (Ed.)  Internationalizing Human 
Rights and Humanizing International Law: Domestic Issues and Global Perspec-
tives, Buffalo, NY 1990, pp. 3-4. 
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the human dignity of mankind, inalienable and imprescriptible rights 
of the individual, and not dependent on State recognition.2 
In addition to these general foundations mentioned above, several 
international and regional organizations set a commonly accepted 
series of norms, which the signatory States in general terms adopted to 
organize their human rights policy. In the beginning, the rise of the 
East-West conflict between the victorious countries of World War II 
overshadowed these declarations, which were downgraded to series of 
principles of secondary importance. The Western States  above all 
the United States and Western Europe  dedicated themselves to mar-
ket economy and to a democratic basis order. In contrast, the Eastern 
bloc that emerged around the Soviet Union was based on a Socialist 
economic and social system. A conceptual antagonism arose between 
individual rights, favored by the Western democracies, and collective 
rights highlighted in Socialist Eastern Europe. 
Within the United Nations, a classification into generations gradu-
ally emerged. At the end of the 20th century it was common to distin-
guish the following three categories of human rights: The first genera-
tion of civil and political rights, which guaranteed the individual rights 
of the person (right to life, freedom, personal security, freedom of 
belief and religion, equality before the law etc.) and political participa-
tion (right to vote and eligibility). The latter clearly hints at the sup-
posed close relationship between human rights and representative 
democracy, and thus indirectly with a free market economy. The sec-
ond generation refers to social, economic and cultural rights, which 
represent a commitment to ensure collective welfare particularly in 
regard to socioeconomic matters (for example the right to work and 
social security). The third generation of human rights stresses the right 
                                                 
2  See Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa  Los derechos como normas universales Juris 
Gentium, in: Organización de Estados Americanos (Ed.)  Derechos Humanos 
en las Américas, Direitos Humanos nas Américas, Human Rights in the Ameri-
cas, Homage to the Memory of Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches, Washington, 
D.C. 1984, pp. 2-6. Also protagonists of Spanish origin contributed to the human 
rights idea, for instance Francisco de Vitoria, Fernando Vásquez or Fray Bar-
tolomé de las Casas. See Fernando Murillo Rubiera  América y la dignidad del 
hombre, Madrid 1992; Mauricio Beuchot  Los fundamentos de los derechos 
humanos en Bartolomé de las Casas, Barcelona 1994. There are also older 
sources of the church, which refer to such rights. See James Muldoon  The 
Americas in the Spanish World Order. The Justification for Conquest in the Sev-
enteenth Century, Philadelphia 1994, pp. 78-95. 
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to solidarity and self-determination of peoples as well as the rights to 
development and environment. The latter generation also evolved 
from the requests for development and the failed discussion on a New 
International Economic Order during the sixties and seventies.3 
Mainly despots of the Third World used the right to development as 
an argument to counter foreign accusations of human rights violations 
of the first generation. 
In a similar manner, the Western capitalist world and the Socialist 
Eastern bloc did not only differ in their opinions regarding social sys-
tems and economic models, but also in relation to the interpretation of 
human rights. The two International Rights Covenants of the UN, 
adopted in 1966, contain the categories of the first two generations. 
Those international conventions also document the distinctive concep-
tions of human rights in East and West. In the course of the East-West 
conflict, a dispute on the comprehension of human rights arose: While 
the Western democracies upheld the traditional individual rights as 
their ideal, the States of the Socialist Eastern bloc referred to the hu-
man rights of the so-called second generation, which includes social, 
economic and cultural rights.4 The droits libertés, the rights of the 
individual against the State, constitute the classical human rights. 
While the rights to life, to personal security, and freedom belong to 
the basic human rights of the first generation, socioeconomic human 
rights are considered to be part of Socialist thought. Socioeconomic 
human rights extend the individual rights to defend the person against 
the State to rights that direct demands to the State. For example, the 
right to life converted into the right to an existence minimum and the 
right to freedom of opinion was re-interpreted as the right to educa-
tion. 
In regards to the social and economic situation, the second genera-
tion of social, economic and cultural rights appears to be important 
particularly in the case of Latin America. From this, the question 
arises as to what extent the battle between protagonists of the individ-
ual and the collective rights also took place within the frame of the 
OAS and in the context of Latin America. From a broader perspective 
                                                 
3  Gerhard Stuby  Universalismus versus Partikularismus, Die Menschenrechte der 
dritten Generation, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzei-
tung Das Parlament, B 46-47/98, November 6, 1998, p. 33. 
4  For the first time, these rights were formulated in the so-called Mexican Revolu-
tion (since 1910/11) as well as in the Russian Revolution of 1917. 
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the question remains as to whether the realization of the social and 
economic rights in Latin America actually is a necessary precondition 
to guarantee individual rights. Merely the questioning of the priority 
of individual rights just a few years before would have been con-
fronted with the accusation of sympathy with Communist thoughts, 
while the insistence on the pre-eminence of the rights of the person 
now has been challenged by protagonists of the so-called cultural rela-
tivism. From a simplified view, cultural relativism regards the persis-
tence on the Western Christian human rights of the individual as Euro-
centrism, which is not applicable to the problems and cultures of de-
veloping countries. However, besides Europe and North America, 
Latin America has typically been classified as a region in whose cul-
tural self-comprehension of human rights has roots of Western origin, 
unlike other developing regions in Africa or Asia. Therefore, the ar-
gument of different traditional patterns used by the cultural relativism 
plays a less important role in Latin America  it concerns more a 
question of priority between civil and political rights and economic, 
social and cultural rights. Furthermore, although many treaties at-
tempted to fix the interdependence and ties of the two first genera-
tions5 of human rights, the concrete human rights policy has always 
remained determined by matters of precedence. 
In the course of the reorganization of the post-war world, and also 
as a consequence of the beginning East-West conflict, twenty Latin 
American States and the United States created the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in 1948.6 While the creation of the OAS did 
not mark the first attempt at inter-American cooperation, it is certain 
that the creation of the OAS gave a new quality to inter-American 
relations. Since 1889/1890 there had been Inter-American Confer-
ences, which since 1910 had been organized by the Pan-American 
Union (PAU). The establishment of Pan American relations meant a 
decisive shift from Bolivarism that favored a Latin American political 
community7 toward a North-South American cooperation. 
                                                 
5  The American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man and the American Con-
vention on Human Rights undertake an attempt to establish such interdependence 
between both rights generations. 
6  José Luis Ramírez León  La OEA, los países latinoamericanos y la democracia 
en el hemisferio, in: Síntesis, Madrid, No. 21, Julio-Diciembre 1993, p. 194. 
7  In fact, the author prefers to interpret Bolivarism as many Latin American 
scholars do: the quest for a pan-Latin American nation. This differs from the cur-
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During the late 19th century, a type of antagonism developed be-
tween virtual bolivarismo and Pan Americanism. While the former 
favored a Latin American solidarity and a reliance on Great Britain as 
a guarantee power and was mostly directed against the omnipotent 
US, the hemispheric approach of Pan Americanism theoretically 
sought to integrate North and South America and supported US-Latin 
American trade relations as its initial main goal.8 It will be of interest 
to keep in mind this broad perspective of the contrasting concepts of 
Latin American unity and the inter-American system, respectively. 
The binding Charter of the Organization of American States 
marked a historical step towards the institutionalization of inter-
American affairs.9 In addition, the character of the Pan American rela-
tions that initially focused on trade issues was extended to political 
and military spheres. The decision to name it an Organization rather 
than a Union was made by an eleven-to-ten vote, and was derived 
from the conviction that the latter would suggest too much a sort of 
superstate. In contrast, alternative notions such as Association or 
Society were considered as too weak.10 
The new inter-American system was based on the OAS Charter in 
addition to a military pact adopted in 1947. This pact, the Treaty of 
Reciprocal Military Assistance (Treaty of Rio) preceded the creation 
of the OAS and was motivated by security policy concerns.11 This 
                                                                                                         
rent that views Bolívar as the father of Pan Americanism since by some he is 
considered to have favored also the participation of the US. See John Edwin Fagg 
 Pan Americanism, Malabar, Florida 1982, pp. 12; 127-129. 
8  See O. Carlos Stoetzer  The Organization of American States, Westport, Con-
necticut/London 1993, 2nd edition (1st edition 1969), pp. 6-15. 
9  Here, the author somewhat disagrees with the expert on OAS history, O. Carlos 
Stoetzer, who describes the creation of the OAS rather as a codification of the al-
ready existing principles and institutions. See Stoetzer, pp. 29-31. Grossman calls 
the Pact of Bogotá the coronation of Pan-American procedures since the First 
Inter-American Conference in 1889/1890. Claudio Grossman  Het beginsel van 
non-interventie in de Organisatie van Amerikaanse Staten vanuit een Latijns-
Amerikaans gezichtspunt, Dissertation, Amsterdam 1980, p. 127. In this regard, 
see: David Sheinin  Rethinking Pan Americanism: An Introduction, in: David 
Sheinin (Ed.) Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs, Westport/London 
2000, p. 3. 
10  Fagg, p. 78. 
11  The Treaty of 1947 later became the model for the North-Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO). Stoetzer, p. 29. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Reciprocal Assis-
tance also referred to human rights in the considering-part. Hernán Monteale-
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security element indicates that the goals of the OAS were also related 
to security politics in the Americas. In fact, US scholars have pre-
vailed in terms of research on the organization. The OAS, as a sort of 
hemispheric complement at the North-South level to the transatlantic 
alliance between the United States and the Western democratic States 
of Europe, can be interpreted as a supplementary element to US secu-
rity endeavors within the arising East-West confrontation. Besides the 
transatlantic defense pact institutionalized in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the United States sought to tie its southern 
neighbors to them as well.12 So, the OAS primarily presented an inter-
American instrument for the US to react to expanding Socialism and 
through which the influence of the USSR in developing Latin Ameri-
can countries could be contained. Correspondingly, Cubas máximo 
líder Fidel Castro described the OAS depreciatorily as the Colonial 
Office of the United States.13 Farer portrays the OAS as a gentle-
mens anti-Communist club14 and Booth calls it a vehicle for con-
taining communism.15 Further, Drekonja-Kornat considers the crea-
tion of the OAS as the inclusion of Latin America as a subsystem into 
the imperial order of the United States.16 Sheinin provides a more 
moderate, but thanks to its irony, a fairly matching characterization of 
                                                                                                         
gre  Cuatro perspectivas de los derechos humanos en el sistema interamericano, 
in: Organización de Estados Americanos (Ed.)  Derechos Humanos en las 
Américas, Direitos Humanos nas Américas, Human Rights in the Americas, 
Homage to the Memory of Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches, Washington, D.C. 
1984, p. 56. 
12  On April 4, 1949, the NATO treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. The fact that 
many international organizations took their headquarters in the US capital also 
demonstrates the power relations of the post-war era. Other institutions located in 
Washington  like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the Inter-
American Development Bank (founded in 1959)  can be added. However, the 
OAS could take over the offices of the Pan American Union that already existed 
in Washington. 
13  See Yuri Gvozdev  Under the Cover of Inter-American Solidarity, Moscow 
1983, p. 20. 
14  Tom J. Farer  The Grand Strategy of the United States in Latin America, New 
Brunswick 1988, p. 92. 
15  Booth refers to the anti-Communist declaration adopted by the 1954 OAS meet-
ing in Caracas. John A. Booth  U.S. Influence in Central America, in: Robert E. 
Biles (Ed.)  Inter-American Relations. The Latin American Perspective, Boul-
der/London 1988, p. 28. 
16 Gerhard Drekonja-Kornat  Grundmuster lateinamerikanischer Außenpolitik, 
Vienna 1986, p. 9. 
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the Pan American idea manifested in the OAS: Pan Americanism has 
always been U.S. led, the friendly face of U.S. dominance in the 
hemisphere.17 
Considering these critical perspectives, the fact that Latin Ameri-
can countries agreed on participating in this system might initially 
appear surprising, especially when the history of inter-American af-
fairs is taken into account. Since the end of the 19th century, inter-
American relations  in this case specifically the relationship between 
the US and Latin America  had been determined by economic, politi-
cal and military interventions of the US in Latin American countries.18 
The best example of this is the famous Monroe Doctrine of 1823. 
Such US doctrine was officially directed against European interfer-
ence in the hemisphere  but there are clues to conclude that it was in 
fact aimed at Russia  and was later notoriously misinterpreted as the 
fundamental document of beginning US imperialism in Latin Amer-
ica. Following the Monroe Doctrine there was, among other events, 
the Platt Amendment (after the US-Spanish war on Cuba in 1898), the 
Roosevelt Corollary (1904/1905) and Dollar Diplomacy under US 
president William H. Taft (1909-1913). Each of these caused angry 
reactions in Latin America, as the policies focused on the US right to 
intervention and financial control in the region. Consequently, the so-
called Calvo and Drago Doctrines emerged in Latin America, which 
forcefully defended national sovereignty and targeted interventions in 
domestic affairs. 
From this historical perspective, it appears that Latin American 
countries developed a deep distrust towards their too-powerful north-
ern neighbor. As a result of this special relation, a greater determina-
tion evolved within Latin American nations to stick to the noninter-
vention principle in order to contain the influence of the US.19 On the 
                                                 
17  David Sheinin  Rethinking Pan Americanism: An Introduction, in: David 
Sheinin (Ed.), p. 1. 
18  Kryzanek provides an introductory and bibliographic overview over the devel-
opment of US interventionism in the region. Michael J. Kryzanek  Intervention 
and Interventionism, in: David W. Dent (Ed.)  U.S.-Latin American Policymak-
ing. A Reference Handbook, Westport/London 1995, pp. 397-423. 
19  From a historical perspective, the recognition of the nonintervention principle 
by the United States was the precondition or equivalent for the Latin American 
agreement to security policy and ideological cooperation. Walther L. Bern-
ecker/Hans Werner Tobler  Staat, Wirtschaft und Außenbeziehungen Latein-
amerikas im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Handbuch der Geschichte Lateinamerikas, edi-
Chapter I 16
other hand, the unfortunate experience of Latin American efforts to 
align with the United States in the unsuccessful League of Nations 
also contributed to the general atmosphere under which the foundation 
of the OAS took place. Latin America found itself in an awkward 
position with the political and economic superpower of the United 
States, since post-war Europe was gathering more US attention than 
any other region at that time. Consequently, the Latin American gov-
ernments sought an inter-American alliance to outline economic sup-
port from the US to Latin America.20 Yet, as in 1947 when the States 
were only able to agree on an inter-American defense pact, the foun-
dation of the OAS a year later was based on the US desire for an inter-
American organization for collective security. The Latin American 
countries agreed to create the OAS as an anti-Communist instru-
ment21 because the US accepted the nonintervention principle and the 
Southern States were eager for the US promise to provide economic 
assistance.22  
                                                                                                         
ted by Walther L. Bernecker/Raymond T. Buve/John R. Fisher/Horst Pietsch-
mann/Hans Werner Tobler, Volume 3: Lateinamerika im 20. Jahrhundert, edited 
by Hans Werner Tobler/Walther L. Bernecker, Stuttgart 1996, p. 119 (Transla-
tion by the author). Former Commission member Claudio Grossman provided a 
far-reaching history of law on the nonintervention principle and the OAS with his 
dissertation prepared during his exile in the Netherlands: Claudio Grossman  
Het beginsel van non-interventie in de Organisatie van Amerikaanse Staten 
vanuit een Latijns-Amerikaans gezichtspunt, Diss., Amsterdam 1980. 
20  After World War II, Latin American nations still assembled a community of 
countries predominantly shaped by the production and export of raw material. 
Hence, an organization with the United States also promised to advance a possi-
ble Latin American access to the highly lucrative US markets. 
21  In 1953, a US National Security Council report called for a ...greater utilization 
of the Organization of American States as a means of achieving our objectives, 
which will avoid the appearance of unilateral action and identify our interests 
with those of other American states. Doubtless, the US invasion in the Domini-
can Republic in 1965, later on declared as an OAS operation, qualified as such a 
utilization. A Report to the National Security Council, by the Executive Secre-
tary on: United States Objectives And Courses Of Action With Respect To Latin 
America, Top Secret, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1953, p. 3 (National Security 
Archives, NSA files). 
22  US willingness to accept the nonintervention principle legally traced back to the 
Seventh International Conference of American States that took place in Montevi-
deo in 1933. Stoetzer, p. 21. Further, the Latin American emphasis on noninter-
vention could also be explained by the information that leaked in 1944 concern-
ing an intervening competence of the forthcoming UN Security Council. Ibid., p. 
25. 
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These quid-pro-quo elements23 of the OAS  US anti-Commu-
nism,24 US economic assistance and the nonintervention principle for 
Latin America, respectively  should not be underestimated as factors 
of the organizations human rights policy.25 
After the adoption of the Treaty of Rio in 1947, the Charter of the 
Organization of American States was signed in 1948 at the Ninth In-
ternational Conference of American States in Bogotá. The OAS Char-
ter, or the Pact of Bogotá, which entered into force in 1951, was 
amended four times until the early 1990s. The Charters amendments 
were the result of a perceived weakness of the OAS structure and of 
its articulation in regard to the fundamental principles of the organiza-
tion: regional solidarity, collective security, nonintervention, as well 
as democracy and human rights.26 Regarding the principles of nonin-
tervention and human rights, it is fair to expect a conflict of objec-
tives. Article 18 of the amended Charter of 1967 (Article 15 of the 
original Charter) states: No State or group of States has the right to 
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the inter-
nal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle pro-
hibits not only armed force but also any form of interference or at-
tempted threat against the personality of the State or against its politi-
                                                 
23  See: Viron P. Vaky  The Organization of American States and Multilateralism 
in the Americas, in: Viron P. Vaky/Heraldo Muñoz  The Future of the Organiza-
tion of American States, New York 1993, pp. 9/10. 
24  Ronald F. Docksai writes that the OAS Declaration of Caracas in 1954, which 
excluded Communist interference in the continent, constituted the multinationali-
zation of the Monroe doctrine and the compatibilization with the OAS. Gregorio 
Selser  El Documento de Santa Fé, Reagan y los derechos humanos, Mexico 
City 1988, p. 32 (Introduction by Ronald F. Docksai). 
25  According to Brock, the economic factor was the most important aspect of the 
US strategy that led to the creation of the OAS. He stressed that the US did not 
want an economic cooperation but the securing and the institutionalization of its 
economic dominance in Latin America. Naturally, the economic component can-
not be left out, but in general, the author tends to prioritize security policy factors 
leading to the creation of the OAS. Lothar Brock  Entwicklungsnationalismus 
und Kompradorenpolitik, Die Gründung der OAS und die Entwicklung der Ab-
hängigkeit Lateinamerikas von den USA, Dissertation, Meisenheim am Glan 
1975, pp. 119/120. However, it is fair to look at the scientific zeitgeist: During 
the 1970s, theories based on economic imperialism were en vogue. 
26  The human rights issue had come up before: In 1936, at the Inter-American 
Conference for the Consolidation of Peace in Buenos Aires, and at the Eighth In-
ternational Conference of American States in Lima (1938). Stoetzer, p. 244. 
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cal, economic and social events. During the first decades, the OAS 
scrupulously focused more on the nonintervention principle, but since 
the creation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 
1959, this principle has been continuously challenged, though it often 
served as an argument for repressive regimes. 
In 1965, at the OAS Special Conference in Rio de Janeiro, the 
Member States, following US president John F. Kennedys Alliance 
for Progress, sought to focus on social and economic development in 
the region. One of the main objectives of such a program was the con-
tainment of the emerging Communism. In 1967, the Third Inter-
American Special Conference in Buenos Aires adopted a structural 
reform of the organization in the Protocol of Buenos Aires. This pro-
tocol entered into force in 1970, and to the present day still determines 
the organizational structure of the OAS to a great degree. In this pro-
tocol, the General Assembly replaced the Inter-American Conference 
as the plenary organ of the OAS. Likewise, three councils with far-
reaching executive duties were created: the Permanent Council, the 
Inter-American Council for Social and Economic Affairs, and the 
Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture. In 1985, 
the second large-scale reform took place at the Special Meeting of the 
General Assembly in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia. The adoption of 
that amendment occurred during a time of notable political develop-
ment shaped by the beginning of the re-democratization process, espe-
cially in several key South American nations. The Protocol of Cart-
agena de Indias integrated and more specifically, strengthened the 
concepts of nonintervention and representative democracy as essential 
goals of the OAS (Article 2 of the amended Charter). In 1991, the 
General Assembly in Santiago de Chile limited the nonintervention 
principle by prioritizing democratic values and a year later, the Proto-
col of Washington was approved, which reiterated the organizations 
commitment towards representative democracy.27 
Since the entry-into-force of the Protocol of Buenos Aires of 1967, 
the Organization of American States has been divided into the organ-
izational structure included in the appendices. This structure, accord-
ing to article 53 of the Charter, mandates that the General Assembly as 
plenary organ constitutes the highest organ of the OAS. Representa-
                                                 
27  Scott Davidson  The Inter-American Human Rights System, Aldershot (Eng-
land)/Brookfield (US) 1997, pp. 2. 
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tives from all Member States compose the Assembly, which possesses 
an extraordinarily broad mandate to observe the activities of the or-
ganization. The General Assembly meets once a year for a short time. 
A Special Meeting can be convened by a two-third majority of the 
Member States, if the circumstances are necessary. In reference to 
article 53 a) of the Charter that awards decisions on general actions 
and politics of the OAS to the General Assembly28, Davidson finds 
that the competence of the highest OAS organ in the field of human 
rights appears to be all-embracing.29 The Meeting of Consultation of 
Foreign Ministers was created to enable short-term meetings if prob-
lems of urgent nature and of common interest of the American States 
arise. The Permanent Council can also convene such a Meeting of 
Consultation by request of some Member States.30 Among the three 
councils of the OAS, the Permanent Council is the one which exe-
cutes the most important functions. Though the Permanent Council is 
subordinated to the General Assembly and the Meeting of Consulta-
tion of Foreign Ministers, it nevertheless constitutes a high-ranking 
organ composed by persons with diplomatic status, and which is re-
sponsible for preparing the meetings of the General Assembly. This 
organ also works as the executive organ of the General Assembly and 
the Meeting of Consultation regarding the implementation of their 
decisions.31 At first sight, the Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council might not appear to be an organ that deals with human rights, 
but the OAS Charter, the American Human Rights Declaration, the 
American Convention on Human Rights and its Additional Protocol 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights do refer directly and indi-
rectly to economic, social and cultural rights as enforceable human 
rights.32 The Inter-American Council for Education, Science and 
Culture also is a high-ranking representative organ of the OAS. Its 
task is not only to promote friendly relations and mutual understand-
                                                 
28  Furthermore, the General Assembly has the power to determine the structure and 
functions of the OAS and to consider each matter, which corresponds to the 
friendly relations between the American States. Thomas Buergenthal/Richard E. 
Norris  The Inter-American System, Binder 1, Booklet 2 (7/89), The Charter of 
the OAS, p. 21. 
29  Davidson, p. 5. 
30  Buergenthal/Norris, p. 23 (Articles 60, 61 and 64 of the OAS Charter). 
31  Davidson, pp. 5/6. 
32  Ibid., p. 6. 
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ing among all peoples in the Americas, but also to pursue the goal to 
broaden the cultural awareness of the people in the Americas and to 
affirm the dignity of the individual. Further, this council shall prepare 
the peoples of the Americas for the tasks of progress and strengthen 
their dedication to democracy, peace and social justice. Here, it be-
comes evident that the activities of the Council are closely linked to 
the broad field of human rights  from the civil and political to the 
economic, social and cultural rights.33 
Through the entry-into-force of the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 
1970, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
was elevated from an autonomous entity to a main organ of the or-
ganization. As a result of this, it was established that main functions of 
the IACHR were to be the promotion, observance and protection of 
human rights. Furthermore, the Commission is designed to serve as a 
consultative organ to the OAS in related matters. The IACHR has also 
represented an organ of the Convention as a result of the entry-into-
force of the American Convention on Human Rights in 1978/1979. 
The General Secretariat is a central and permanent organ with seat in 
Washington, D.C. The Secretary General who is elected for a period 
of five years presides over the Secretariat. He can be re-elected once 
and has the competence to attend all meetings of the OAS but doesnt 
possess the right to vote. However, his position is not equal to that of 
the post of the UN Secretary General.34 The Special Organs of the 
Organization of American States constitute intergovernmental entities 
created by multilateral treaties that were incorporated into the frame of 
the OAS by article 130 of the Charter. Those organs deal with techni-
cal matters of common interest. The organizations, which have a di-
rect relation to the OAS, are the following: the Inter-American Com-
mission of Women, the Inter-American Institute of Children, the Inter-
American Institute for Indigenous People, the Pan-American Institute 
for Geography and History, the Inter-American Institute for Agricul-
tural Sciences, the Pan-American Health Organization and the Pan-
American Office of Sanitary. It is of interest for the human rights sub-
ject that in a broader sense these institutions have been incorporated 
into the OAS structure as organs of the organization. 
                                                 
33  Ibid. 
34  Stoetzer, pp. 76/77. 
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In order to be able to understand the relationship between claims 
made by States and the reality of the protection of human rights in 
Latin America, it is necessary to first consider what is understood to 
be the State in Latin America and what its impact has been on human 
rights. In North America, the democratic structure of the British colo-
nies led to the development of independence. The colonies began an 
autonomous life: A self-administration came into being; self-
governance structures arose as well as an independent jurisdiction. 
One could speak of a taking-over of the human rights ideal with the 
fight for independence.35 The Declaration of Independence of the 
United States of America, proclaimed on July 4, 177636, required inal-
ienable rights like the right to life, freedom and prosperity.37 This Dec-
laration of Independence formed the fundament for the US Constitu-
tion, which represented the sovereignty of individuals and a limitation 
of the power of the State through a written catalogue of human 
rights.38 
In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon research on the State role, the State 
in Latin America has been extensively investigated.39 Unfortunately, 
common research on Latin American history, particularly regarding 
pre-Colombian societies and the consequences of colonial heritage for 
Latin America in the 20th century, has often been undertaken by social 
scientists who frequently failed to employ due empirical methods to 
support their conclusions. Consequently, their research often ignored a 
wide range of regional developments present in Latin America. How-
                                                 
35  Ludger Kühnhardt  Die Universalität der Menschenrechte, Studie zur ideenge-
schichtlichen Bestimmung eines politischen Schlüsselbegriffs, Munich 1987, pp. 
89. 
36  The United States Declaration of Independence (1776), in: Walter Laqueur/Barry 
Rubin (Eds.)  The Human Rights Reader, New York/Ontario, second and re-
vised edition 1989, p. 107. 
37  Historians view John Lockes Second Treatises on Civil Government (1680) as 
the intellectual basis of the Declaration. Felix Ermacora, Menschenrechte in der 
sich wandelnden Welt, Volume III: Amerika, from: Österreichische Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Vol. 608, Veröffentli-
chungen für das Studium der Menschenrechte, No. 3, Vienna 1994, p. 371. 
38  The constitutions of Virginia (1776) and Massachusetts (1780) can be regarded 
as the first written systematic human rights catalogues. Ermacora, p. 371. 
39  In Great Britain and the United States, research on the role of State in society was 
mostly neglected because of the States loss of influence after the bourgeois revo-
lution. See: Atilio A. Boron  State, Capitalism, and Democracy in Latin Amer-
ica, Boulder/London 1995, p. 97.  
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ever, beginning in the 1980s, historians began working intensively on 
19th century sources and revising previously held notions. In general, 
it is important to emphasize that this work does not intend to explore 
the different currents of the recent debate, but to mention some pat-
terns of the theory on the state, but without extensively referring to the 
current discourse.40 
According to a major current of conventional research, the coloni-
zation of Latin America resulted in the formation of an authoritarian 
and hierarchical State based mainly on patterns derived from the 
Spanish mother country.41 In independent Latin America, it is argued 
that these old forms of thought and Catholic-Iberian traditions of be-
havior prevailed.42 Liberal and positivist characteristics formed the 
                                                 
40  For an overview over the recent debate see Horst Pietschmann  Überlegungen 
zur Staats- und Nationsbildung in der spanischen Welt, ca. 1766-1830. See also 
Horst Pietschmann  Der Weg Lateinamerikas in die Krise des 20. Jahrhunderts, 
in: G. Kohlhepp (Ed.)  Lateinamerika, Umwelt und Gesellschaft zwischen Krise 
und Hoffnung, Tübinger Geographische Studien, Vol. 107, 1991 pp. 3-25; Horst 
Pietschmann  Kolonialgeschichte und die Ursachen der Unterentwicklung La-
teinamerikas, in: Theo Ginsburg/Monika Ostheider (Eds.)  Lateinamerika vor 
der Entscheidung, Frankfurt/Main 1984, pp. 13-37. 
41  In general, despite numerous differences, the area of the subcontinent colonized 
by the Spaniards possessed several common homogenous attributes: A primarily 
white elite of Spanish origin, the shared Catholic belief and a three hundred years 
lasting government and administration by central organs of Spain. Inge Buisson  
Probleme der Staatenbildung im spanischen Südamerika (1810-1830), in: Jürgen 
Elvert/Michael Salewski (Eds.)  Staatenbildung in Übersee, Die Staatenwelt La-
teinamerikas und Asiens, from the series: Historische Mitteilungen, Im Auftrage 
der Ranke-Gesellschaft, Vereinigung für Geschichte im öffentlichen Leben e.V., 
edited by Michael Salewski and Jürgen Elvert, supplement 2, Stuttgart 1992, p. 
11. 
42  Ludger Kühnhardt  Stufen der Souveränität, Staatsverständnis und Selbstbe-
stimmung in der Dritten Welt, Bonn/Berlin 1992, pp. 128/129, 132/133. Mols 
observed a hypostatization of State idea and State claim in Latin America since 
the 16th century. Further, he concluded that the Latin American State was not a 
social creation among social creations but an everything else subordinating 
agency for the organization of human existence, which was over-exalted into 
mythical spheres and had a priori competence for everything. Mols, p. 186. 
Likewise, Norbert Lechner called the dealing with the over-exalted State esta-
dolatría, a sort of idolatry of the State. Mols explained this phenomenon as a re-
sult of the mystification of the State, which had been maintained during the cen-
turies and affected the different political orientations. The Latin American State 
allegedly was in the beginning a Catholic Leviathan; Marcos Kaplan also de-
scribed it as Leviathan criollo. Manfred Mols, Begriff und Wirklichkeit des Staa-
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Latin American thought of the 19th century, although it became one of 
eclectic nature through European and North American influence. This 
traditional interpretation focused on the Spanish Empire and a metro-
politan perspective is for the most part employed in the political sci-
ence, and is no longer tenable as a proper or complete explanation for 
the development of the Latin American State.43 Newer historical re-
search results focus on the role of the antagonism between cities and 
the newly evolving State in Latin America. Since the 16th century, 
towns in many parts of Latin America rose up against the colonial as 
well against the independent capital cities. The cities sought to 
broaden their influence and to secure sovereignty against the main 
metropolis, which strove to maintain territorial cohesion by employing 
etatism. In addition to this internal disagreement, the conflict between 
centralists and federalists prevalent during the 19th century led to a 
permanent questioning of the likelihood of constitutional continuity in 
Latin America.44 
The original constitutional system of Latin America  with the ex-
ception of Marxist-Leninist Cuba  is mainly based on principles simi-
lar to the Constitution of the United States: a republican State model, a 
democratic-parliamentary and presidential system and a single State 
form of government. The respect of human rights is guaranteed by the 
constitution although there exists an apparent difference between con-
stitutional guarantees and reality.45 During the gradual adaptation of 
the European-North American State model, much remained façade in 
                                                                                                         
tes in Lateinamerika, in: Akademie für politische Bildung, Zum Staatsverständnis 
der Gegenwart, Munich 1987, pp. 186/187. Still helpful is Eisenstadts study: 
Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt  The Political Systems of Empires, New York 1963. 
43  Pietschmann holds that a historian must reject the idea that the current States 
emerged from the old Spanish Empire in a complicated process during the wars 
of independence, through the intervention of a sort of deus ex machina. Horst 
Pietschmann  Los principios rectores de Organización Estatal en las Indias, in: 
De los Imperios a las Naciones: Iberoamérica, edited by Antonio Annino, Luis 
Castro Leiva, François-Xavier Guerra, Zaragoza 1994, pp. 78, 84. For instance, 
the Creole elite that led the independent wars also fought inner struggles and 
competed with each other. 
44  See: Ibid.; Horst Pietschmann  Actores locales y power central: La herencia 
colonial y el caso de México, in: Relaciones, Estudios de Historia y Sociedad 73, 
Winter 1998, Vol. XIX, pp. 53-83; Ludger Kühnhardt  Stufen der Souveränität, 
p. 225. 
45  See: Ermacora, pp. 118/119. However, the concept of nation preceded the 
emphasis on human rights in Latin American constitutions. 
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respect to human rights; it merely evolved the appearance of an exist-
ing constitutional rule of law.46 Correspondingly, several authors ac-
centuate the Spanish heritage as a key factor, which followed the 
Mediterranean tendency to evade from the law while paying lip 
service to it; a phenomenon that was often referred to as obedecer sin 
cumplir (obeying without complying).47 
In democratic societies, the monopoly of executive power is usu-
ally attributed to the State. However, in Latin America it is necessary 
to also take into consideration the position of the military. Through 
their identity-establishing role during the wars of independence, the 
armed forces generally represented one of the few stable pillars in 
Latin American societies besides the church and the bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, the military began a tradition of intervention with its 
increasing influence during the removal of oligarchic regimes in the 
                                                 
46  Mols, p. 197. 
47  Edmund Gaspar  United States-Latin America: A Special Relationship? Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research/Hoover Institution of War, 
Revolution and Peace; AEI-Hoover policy studies 26, Washington, D.C. 1978, p. 
10. Margaret Crahan also saw the historical roots as basis for the phenomenon of 
clientelism and exclusive structures in the Latin America of the twentieth cen-
tury. Margaret E. Crahan  The State and the Individual in Latin America: An 
Historical Overview, in: Margaret E. Crahan (Ed.)  Human Rights and Basic 
Needs in the Americas, Washington, D.C. 1982, pp. 23-45. Likewise, Wiarda 
stated that the influence of French enlightenment and of Rousseaus thoughts on 
the Latin American constitutions resulted in power concentration in the executive 
and an emphasis on group rights over individual rights. Howard J. Wiarda  The 
Democratic Revolution in Latin America. History, Politics, and U.S. Policy, New 
York 1990, pp. 32/33. Accordingly, Horst Pietschmann stressed that the selective 
implementation of the law in force and the over-accentuation of the juridical po-
sition of collective organs towards individual rights was willingly traced back to 
the Iberian heritage of Latin American States. Horst Pietschmann  Die staatliche 
Organisation des kolonialen Iberoamerika, Teilveröffentlichung zum Handbuch 
der lateinamerikanischen Geschichte, Stuttgart 1980, p. 9 (Translated by the 
author). See also: Horst Pietschmann  Conciencia de identidad, legislación y de-
recho: algunas notas en torno al surgimiento del individuo y la nación en el 
discurso político de la monarquía española durante el siglo XVIII, in: Dulce et 
decorum est philologiam colere, Festschrift für Dietrich Briesemeister zu seinem 
65. Geburtstag, edited by Sybille Große and Axel Schönberger, Berlin 1999, pp. 
535-554. Crahan provided another interesting contribution to this topic. See Mar-
garet E. Crahan  The State and the Individual in Latin America: Some Implica-
tions for Human Rights, Woodstock Theological Center, Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C., October 1979. 
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1930s and 1940s.48 With its professionalization, the armed forces de-
veloped an identity of that of a superior guardian of political order in 
the course of the emerging nationalism of the 20th century.49 Accord-
ingly, the military possessed a major influence and intervened numer-
ous times in the political matters of the States, in effect violating the 
principle of separation of powers and often depriving the State of its 
monopoly of power.50 
Similar to the State concept discussed above, etatism also played 
an important role in the 20th century; for example, through the popu-
larity of the theories of dependence during the 1960s and 1970s. The 
motley collection of theories that fell under the term dependencia 
identified the origins of structural socioeconomic under-
development in Latin America as the result of the conquerors and later 
representatives of the industrialized countries. These theories under-
valued internal factors, and placed the main responsibility on the State 
for overcoming dependence. According to the structuralist camp, pub-
lic measures should originate progress in the developing countries 
through a sort of developmental Keynesianism, using State interven-
tion to stimulate the economy. In the course of the development 
strategies developed during the post-war era, the approach of the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) also regarded the 
State as the decisive actor able to initiate progress. Notwithstanding, 
this Cepalismo failed due to the weakness of the State in Latin 
America. The failure of these development polices was also a result of 
the persisting antagonism between city and State, since the centralized 
State did not effectively carry out a decentralized development policy. 
On the one hand, it was only the centralized State that had the ability 
to mobilize resources for development. However, these resources were 
                                                 
48  Bernecker/Tobler, p. 65. 
49  Horst Pietschmann  Der Weg Lateinamerikas in die Krise des 20. Jahrhunderts, 
pp. 17/18. 
50  Peter Waldmann  Nachahmung mit begrenztem Erfolg. Zur Transformation des 
europäischen Staatsmodells in Lateinamerika, in: Wolfgang Höpken/Michael 
Riekenberg (Eds.)  Politische und ethnische Gewalt in Südosteuropa und La-
teinamerika, Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2001, pp. 19/20. Under the so-called Doc-
trine of National Security, from a geopolitical perspective the State was regarded 
as a living organism whose interests and goals were above those of its citizens. 
Nikolaus Werz  Die ideologischen Wurzeln der Doktrin der nationalen Sicher-
heit in Lateinameirka, in: Hans Werner Tobler/Peter Waldmann (Eds.)  Staatli-
che und parastaatliche Gewalt in Lateinamerika, Frankfurt/Main 1991, p. 177. 
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used to exacerbate the conflict and further enabled the national elites 
to control their resources in the countryside. 
Frequently, this conflict was interrupted by interventions of the 
military. As the only authentic socially permeable institution and si-
multaneously mechanized and supported through external forces and 
the central State, the armed forces saw themselves as guardians of the 
nation. As the only institution with nationwide influence, the military 
frequently took power from local or regional interests and with the 
support of national elites. According to its national mission, the mili-
tary also justified its use of brute force since opposition was inter-
preted as chaos and the dominance of regional interests. Interestingly 
enough, during the 19th century the human rights situation in Latin 
America appeared to be healthier than that in the 20th century. 
Mols insists on considering the development background and the 
international context when discussing the role of the State in Latin 
America.51 Likewise, Ermacora seeks the reasons for human rights 
violations committed by the State in the wealth and land distribution 
in Latin America. It is important to take economic data into account, 
including questions of distribution and general economic systems, to 
understand the gap between the realization and reality of human 
rights.52 Frequently, the reason for the discrepancy between constitu-
tional claim and actual respect for human rights in Latin America is 
explained by the denial of fundamental economic, social and cultural 
rights to the majority of the population.53 The very reason for massive 
human rights violations, which affect the main part of the population, 
is the lack of a real democratic form of State and the huge gap be-
tween the ruling class and the ruled people.54 Accordingly, human 
rights are often only valid for a small upper class; the rights of the 
                                                 
51  Mols, p. 209. 
52  Ermacora, pp. 192/193. 
53  Ermacora, p. 22. Under the pressure of the proprietors, the State power seeks to 
maintain the economic conditions and counters those with violence who push for 
a change of the system. In Latin America, terrorism has sometimes become a sys-
tem. (Translated by the author), Ermacora, p. 192. 
54  Ermacora, p. 192. In contrast, Kriele defends the priority of civil and political 
rights and is convinced that these rights do not constitute an obstacle for the im-
plementation of economic, social and cultural rights but rather a promotion func-
tion for the latter. Martin Kriele  Derechos Humanos y división de poderes, in: 
Josef Thesing (Ed.)  Estado de Derecho y Democracia, Una Compilación, Kon-
rad-Adenauer-Stiftung/CIEDLA, Buenos Aires 1997, p. 156. 
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lower classes are usually denied.55 As a result, Ermacora speaks of a 
negative dialectic of human rights, which is supported by an etatist 
political ideology. The primate of the State stands before the primate 
of the human being. This negative dialectic results in a dramatization 
by the forces that fight against the existing socioeconomic conditions. 
Finally, Ermacora admits to a historical failure of human rights in 
Latin America up until the end of the 1980s.56 
In Latin America, the theoretical discourses on individual rights 
versus socioeconomic conditions, as mentioned above, had been dis-
cussed since the 19th century. They became elements of escalating 
confrontations since the 1960s  the guerrilla inspired by Marxism-
Leninism justified its struggle through the supposed conquest of an 
extreme social inequality. The often deeply unjust distribution of 
wealth and land led or contributed to the formation of revolutionary 
groups that called for armed resistance against the ruling elites. The 
violence of the guerrillas, which saw the armed resistance as a solu-
tion against unjust economic conditions and political repression, how-
ever, also resulted in human rights violations. The advent of Marxism-
Leninism during the 1960s caused a human rights situation described 
as a continuous struggle (lotta continua), especially in the case of 
Cuba and Nicaragua.57 During the 1960s, military strategists of the 
Brazilian Escola Superior da Guerra developed the Doctrine of Na-
tional Security as a response to the guerrilla threat. Subsequently, this 
doctrine served as a theoretical justification for numerous military 
dictatorships in the region. The doctrine constitutes an etatist ideol-
ogy, which affects the human rights thought. This strategy, outlined 
by the Brazilian Gilberto Cuoto, regarded order and silence as the first 
duties of the civilian. If necessary, human rights too were required to 
be subordinated under this primacy. Accordingly, the Doctrine of Na-
tional Security led to the declaration of states of emergency and siege 
and was used as a standardized justification for numerous human 
                                                 
55  Ermacora, p. 362. Interestingly, this statement of the conservative Ermacora 
matches exactly with the Marxist criticism on the bourgeois human rights con-
cept. 
56  Ermacora, pp. 362/363. 
57  Ermacora, pp. 225, 194. 
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rights abuses.58 The state of siege often became the permanent consti-
tutional condition in Latin America. Though almost all parties paid 
lip service to human rights  mostly as a result of international pres-
sure  the reality was shockingly different.59 
Since the establishment of the military regime in Brazil in 1964, 
the authoritarian ruling system became an attractive alternative for 
many armed forces in Latin America. The military evaded from con-
stitutional limitations and ascended to a supreme State institution. 
Military regimes in Peru (1968), Ecuador (1972), Chile (1973), Uru-
guay (1973) and Argentina (1976) all followed the Brazilian example. 
Central America witnessed a more traditional form of military rule 
and dictatorship, and then sank into bloody civil wars during the 
1980s. The armed conflicts between mainly leftist guerrillas and au-
thoritarian military governments contributed to a spiral of violence 
and counterviolence.60 
In the mid- and late-1980s, the majority of Latin American coun-
tries returned to democratic rule: Ecuador in 1979, Argentina in 1983, 
Uruguay in 1984, Brazil in 1985, and Chile in 1990. Likewise, the 
bloody civil wars in Central America ended in the early 1990s: in 
1990, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua handed power over to the conser-
vative opposition after losing the elections; and in 1992, a peace treaty 
concluded the civil war in El Salvador. In 1996, the civil war parties 
in Guatemala finally concluded a peace agreement. 
In this inquiry, the human rights record of leftist guerrilla move-
ments is not considered, because they rarely evolved into a govern-
ment; with the well-known exceptions of Cuba (since 1959) and Nica-
ragua (1979-1990). This limitation of the governmental human rights 
policy leads to the question of how to deal with the responsibilities of 
regime enemies: To which extent are guerrilla movements committed 
to national and international human rights standards and the interna-
tional humanitarian law? This question is significant because it reveals 
a gap in the historical research efforts conducted on human rights pol-
icy, which have mostly been focused on governmental human rights 
                                                 
58  In light of this ideology, human rights are applied in a discriminative manner. 
Only the good, which means those loyal to the system, shall enjoy them en-
tirely; the bad or the enemies of the system are not allowed to refer to them. 
(Translated by the author). Ermacora, pp. 195/196. 
59  Ludger Kühnhardt, Die Universalität der Menschenrechte, pp. 37/38. 
60  Ermacora, pp. 285, 310. 
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records. The example of the guerrilla of the FMLN in El Salvador 
illustrates how a rebel organization with Marxist ideology became an 
international recognized warfare party in the Salvadoran Civil War. 
The FMLN reached its recognition through the formal acceptance of 
human rights.61 In spite of the relevance of this question, it is the hu-
man rights policy of the intergovernmental Organization of American 
States, its Human Rights Commission and the respective Member 
States that is the exclusive subject of this investigation.62 In this re-
spect, nongovernmental human rights organizations in Latin America 
and the United States are also considered due to their decisive catalyst 
function since the early 1970s. 
Since the early seventies, the emergence of Latin American mili-
tary dictatorships was accompanied by an increasing interest of inter-
national human rights organizations dedicated to publicizing human 
rights violations in this period.63 The situation in Chile after the coup 
of 1973 serves as an example of the evolution of human rights groups 
and their connections. Kathryn Sikkink speaks of a genesis of human 
rights networks, which evolved as a reaction to the massive abuses of 
authoritarian regimes.64 In regard to the interactions of national and 
international human rights groups, there has been a significant change 
during the last three decades. Sikkink divides the development of hu-
man rights organizations into three periods: first, the emergence of 
these groups between 1973 and 1981; then, a phase of consolidation 
and formation of new groups (ca. 1981-1990) and the last decade of 
the 1990s. Clearly, Sikkinks division of time periods coincides with 
the chronology of this work. The period of investigation can be ex-
plained by two institutional events in the inter-American system: in 
1970, the Protocol of Buenos Aires, which amended the OAS Charter, 
entered into force and thereby elevated the Inter-American Commis-
                                                 
61  See Klaas Dykmann, El Salvador  Die Menschenrechte im Visier, Hamburg 
1999, pp. 10. 
62  However, the OAS Human Rights Commission actually dealt with the topic: By a 
reference to its legal basis, the Statute, the Commission declared itself incompe-
tent to inquire abuses committed by terrorists (see chapter II. 3.). 
63  Ermacora, p. 364. See Kühnhardt, p. 26. 
64  Kathryn Sikkink  The Emergence, Evolution, and Effectiveness of the Latin 
American Human Rights Network, in: Elizabeth Jelin/Eric Hershberg (Eds.)  
Constructing Democracy. Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin 
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sion on Human Rights to a main organ of the organization. In addi-
tion, at the General Assembly session in Santiago de Chile in 1991, 
the Member States agreed on a historically sensitive reduction of the 
nonintervention principle in the Americas that had been used by many 
governments to defend themselves against human rights complaints. 
Besides the theoretical and historical considerations, it is also nec-
essary to mention the legal frame of human rights protection in the 
inter-American system. In general, international law is regarded as a 
highly politicized area, within which human rights represent an even 
more sensitive issue. Traditionally, States are only subject to interna-
tional law if they commit themselves by ratifying binding treaties and 
by international customary law. The lack of international enforcement 
institutions presents yet another obstacle to enforcing even ratified 
international laws.65 Moreover, the fragmentary nature of international 
law in general and in regard to human rights in particular is signifi-
cant.66 As is the case with any international treaty, human rights trea-
ties pass through three phases: signing, ratification and entry-into-
force. Additionally, reservations or concerns identified by the States at 
the signing or ratification must be mentioned. According to article 27 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, after the rati-
fication and entry-into-force the concerned party to a treaty cannot 
avoid the application of binding law through a reference to the na-
tional constitution. Nevertheless, the controversy between monism 
and dualism is present, particularly in regard to international human 
rights. While monists recognize national and international law as a 
                                                 
65  The European Union and particular the European Community have developed the 
most evolved international enforcement mechanism to date since the European 
Court for Human Rights and the Commission united and thus form a unique hu-
man rights instrument. 
66  Of course, in the last years of the 1990s there have been developments that could 
lead to a more binding position of international human rights. Besides the ap-
proval of the statute of the International Criminal Court and the work of the in-
ternational tribunals on war crimes for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, the case 
of General Pinochets detention in London between 1998 and 2000 as well as the 
trial against former dictator Miloević at the tribunal in The Hague contributed to 
an increasing optimism towards a more enforceable international law. Neverthe-
less, the author still assumes that it will be very difficult to reach a point where 
some day international law will be regarded as binding as national law  espe-
cially in regard to the developments in the international relations after the terror-
ist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US. 
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single continuous legal system, the protagonists of dualism divide 
both in two different legal orders.67 Here, the incorporation of interna-
tional into national law is of particular concern. If the legislator re-
fuses to transform international into domestic law, the concerned law 
is not binding, though article 27 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 
requires it to be so.68 In summary, it can be stated that international 
law in general and in regard to human rights in particular cannot refer 
to an established general enforcement mechanism. In spite of this fact, 
human rights systems have evolved in Europe and the Western Hemi-
sphere that have been able to work quite effectively. 
The OAS Charter includes several conflicts regarding the men-
tioned goals: On the one hand, there seems to be a discord between the 
task to promote human rights and the nonintervention principle (Arti-
cles 15-17), on the other hand a controversy exists between human 
rights and Article 16, which awards the Member States the right to 
shape freely the social, economic and cultural life in their societies. 
Article 13 of the Charter of 1948, however, limits the rights of the 
State to freely choose its social system by mentioning the following 
binding preconditions: respect for the individual rights and meeting 
the principles of universal morality. Nevertheless, neither these indi-
vidual rights nor the notion of universal morality were specified.69 
In the beginning of the post-War period, there was a heightened 
focus on the contractual codification of human rights. Since the early 
1970s  the period of this investigation  a dynamic began, which 
attempted to realize the actual protection of fundamental rights. Fifty 
years after the creation of the OAS and the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the subject of human rights has 
increasingly gained importance. During the 1970s, the issues that led 
to an intensified debate on basic rights in the OAS were primarily the 
                                                 
67  Regarding the dualism in international law, four questions must be considered: 1) 
Is the international law binding?; 2) Internal effect: Has the international law 
been transformed into national law?; 3) Direct effect: Is the international law jus-
ticiable?; and 4) Has there been a precedence? 
68  See Thomas Buergenthal/Harold G. Maier  Public International Law, from the 
Series: In a Nutshell, 2nd edition, St. Paul 1990, pp. 3-15, 115-141. 
69  Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, Suscrita en la Novena 
Conferencia Internacional Americana, Bogotá, Marzo 30  Mayo 2, 1948, in: 
OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 (español), pp. 2-5. See Nacimiento, p. 
78, footnote 101; p. 79. 
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military dictatorships in South America and in the 1980s the armed 
conflicts in Central America. Nevertheless, the Organization of 
American States was often criticized  above all in the US, but also in 
Latin America  for its general lack of efficiency, particularly in the 
period covered by this inquiry.70 While generally Latin Americans too 
regarded the OAS as somewhat ineffective, it was mainly the pre-
dominance of the United States within the system that constituted the 
principal source of dissatisfaction with the work of the OAS. In this 
context it is of primary interest to review the human rights policy of 
the OAS, which was designed to accomplish the treaties and declara-
tions existing in the inter-American system. 
In general, an analysis of the human rights policy of the OAS in 
Latin America raises a vast number of questions. In consideration of 
the anti-Communist objective and the principle of nonintervention, it 
might be expected that within the OAS system there was only little 
margin for an effective human rights policy. However, human rights 
did not play a negligible role in the Organization of American States.71 
In 1959, an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was 
founded. Consequently, since 1948/1959, the Organization of Ameri-
can States created a human rights system, which developed certain 
type of self-dynamic. The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights interpreted its powers very broadly and as a result embarrassed 
several Member States of the OAS. For this reason this investigation 
begins with an analysis of the most important OAS entity for human 
rights: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). 
Among the questions to be discussed, the following can be men-
tioned: 
How was the human rights apparatus of the OAS organized? How 
did the core body of the OAS in terms of human rights, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, develop  financially, insti-
tutionally, and politically? In which way did the political main organ 
                                                 
70  Unfortunately, the role of the OAS was made more difficult in the decades of 
the 1970s and 1980s since it also reflected the weakening status of Latin Amer-
ica, and it was no secret that it had decreased relative to the rest of the world. 
Stoetzer, p. 200. 
71  Not only the OAS Charter mentioned human rights  though briefly , but the 
American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, adopted in 1948 as well. In 
fact, the American Declaration preceded the Universal Human Rights Declara-
tion. 
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of the OAS, the General Assembly, react to the Commissions ac-
tions? How was the human rights policy implemented, propagated and 
justified? Why and how did human rights in the OAS become an im-
portant topic on the inter-American agenda since the beginning of the 
1970s? What was the organizations reaction towards the military 
regimes in the 1970s? How did the Organization of American States 
and the Human Rights Commission act during the Central American 
civil wars in the 1980s? Could the period between 1970 and 1991 be 
subdivided in phases? 
Furthermore, four questions of general nature shall serve as the 
more abstract central theme of this inquiry: In consideration of the 
difficult cultural localization of the region in terms of human rights 
between universalism and cultural relativism, is it possible to put the 
Latin American human rights reality into the usual theoretical patterns 
of international human rights as regards customary argumentation 
categories? Was the human rights policy of the OAS a success or must 
it be considered a failure? Furthermore, did the United States instru-
mentalize the subject of human rights in the OAS? Finally, from a 
broader historical perspective it shall be inquired if human rights had a 
particular function for the virtual antagonism between Bolivarism and 
Pan Americanism: Did human rights play a part in this silently sim-
mering field of force established between two conflicting concep-
tions? 
In addition, it is reasonable to reduce the approach of this inquiry 
to a manageable degree. As the title indicates, the present work limits 
the analysis on Latin America  this excludes the English-speaking 
Caribbean States, Suriname, Haiti but the United States as well.72 In 
general terms, a gender perspective will not be specifically discussed 
because it would require the involvement of a much more theoretical 
field, as would the inclusion of the rights of refugees or children.73 
Furthermore, the rights of indigenous people or of ethnic groups, re-
spectively, cannot be subject of investigation within the frame of this 
                                                 
72  An analysis of the realization of human rights in the United States would be of 
great interest  especially since contradictions between US human rights policy at 
the domestic level and in the foreign policies applied in Latin American countries 
could be demonstrated. However, no doubt, such an effort would be beyond the 
scope of the topic of the present investigation. 
73  See Rebecca J. Cook  Human Rights of Women. National and International 
Perspectives, Philadelphia 1994, particularly pp. 3-36. 
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study, though this problem is relevant especially in countries such as 
Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru or in Central America.74 This work mainly 
focuses on general human rights situations in particular countries and 
does not deal with individual cases, with a focus on the following 
examples: For the 1970s, the Chilean and Argentine cases are of inter-
est and also, the impact of Carters human rights policy on the OAS. 
For the 1980s, the focus is mostly on Central America and the OAS 
performance in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Panama and El Salvador, re-
spectively.  
The scientific research on human rights, human rights policy, and 
human rights violations is very extensive. It can be divided into politi-
cal, juridical, philosophical and historical approaches, all fields which 
can never be completely separated.75 Given the different concepts of 
human rights within the East-West-Conflict, there also exist numerous 
variations on these approaches. In regard to human rights and human 
rights violations in Latin America, the majority of research is from the 
legal or political science field. From the political science point of 
view, most case studies are based on the socioeconomic context and 
models of government in the respective countries. It must be empha-
sized here that the historical school of political science, which mainly 
refers to history by focusing on its relevance today, has been the pre-
vailing doctrine throughout the United States. A recommendable vol-
ume on the history of human rights law in the Americas is available 
by the deceased Austrian expert on international law, Felix Erma-
cora.76 
                                                 
74  In the niches of South Americas human rights policy stands the autochthonous 
population. (Translated by the author). Ermacora, p. 289, See pp. 307-309. 
However, this situation appears to have changed in the 1990s. 
75  For example, see: Mervyn Frost  Constituting Human Rights: Global Civil 
Society and the Society of Democratic States, London 2002; David P. Forsythe 
(ed.)  Human Rights and a Comparative Foreign Policy, Tokyo 2000; Harold 
Hongju Koh/Ronald C. Slye (Eds.)  Deliberative Democracy and Human 
Rights, New Haven/London 1999; Jack Donnelly  International Human Rights, 
2nd edition, Boulder/Oxford 1998; Heiner Bielefeldt  Die Philosophie der Men-
schenrechte, Grundlagen eines weltweiten Freiheitsethos, Darmstadt 1998. 
76  Felix Ermacora  Menschenrechte in der sich wandelnden Welt, Volume III: 
Amerika, from: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-
Historische Klasse, Vol. 608, Veröffentlichungen für das Studium der Menschen-
rechte, No. 3, Vienna 1994. See also: Fernando Iniciarte/Berthold Wald (Eds.)  
Menschenrechte und Entwicklung, Im Dialog mit Lateinamerika; Bibliotheca  
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In addition, the human rights policy of the United States has been 
subject to a multitude of works, in particular devoted to the admini-
strations of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and Ronald Reagan (1981-
1989).77 Nevertheless, in regard to the human rights policy of the 
Reagan administration many analyses neglect the consequences of the 
OAS policy. In addition, there were some representatives of existent 
Socialism who criticized US human rights policy as hypocritical.78 
The relationship between the United States and Latin America, and 
between particular regions or countries of the subcontinent, has been 
investigated especially in relation to the human rights field.79 A great 
preponderance of literature from North American origin is to note. It 
is important to mention that there is only little inquiry regarding the 
international and bilateral relations of Latin American States; this 
becomes even more obvious in respect to the human rights issue.80 
Until the 1970s, the US dominance toward Latin America also influ-
enced the majority of scholarly work on Latin American foreign pol-
icy  mostly from a US perspective. Bernecker/Tobler hold that the 
research on Latin American foreign relations is more accurately con-
verted into studies on US foreign policy toward Latin America. In 
contrast, in Latin America there has long been a prevailing focus on 
foreign policy studies from a perspective of diplomatic history, juridi-
cal aspects or geopolitical concerns. The reason usually used to ex-
plain this was the fact that Latin America has historically been the 
                                                                                                         
Ibero-Americana, Veröffentlichungen des Ibero-Amerikanischen Instituts Preußi-
scher Kulturbesitz, edited by Dietrich Briesemeister, Vol. 39. 
77  See in the respective chapters. 
78  Mikhail Savin  US Crusade Against Human Rights, Moscow 1986 (Russian 
version 1983); Vladimir Bolshakov  Human Rights. American Style, Moscow 
1984; Vladimir Bolshakov This Whole Human Rights Business, Moscow 1982 
(Russian version 1980); Jan Horák  Los Estados Unidos y los derechos hu-
manos, Prague 1979. 
79  See John A. Britton  The United States and Latin America: a selected bibliogra-
phy, Lanham 1997; Gaddis Smith  The last years of the Monroe doctrine, 1945-
1993, New York 1994; David W. Dent (Ed.)  U.S.-Latin American Policymak-
ing, A Reference Handbook, Westport, Connecticut/London 1995. 
80  See Jeanne A. K. Hey  Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American 
Foreign Policy, in: Third World Quarterly, 18 (1997) 4; Dieter Nohlen (Ed.)  
Demokratie und Außenpolitik, Opladen 1991; Jennie K. Lincoln/Elizabeth G. 
Ferris  Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, Boulder 1984. 
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receptor and not a creator of foreign policy.81 In accordance, the bibli-
ography on the OAS and on the inter-American human rights system 
has largely been dominated by studies applicable to the diplomatic-
juridical approach. 
There are some standard works about the Organization of Ameri-
can States that were typically written during the earlier decades of the 
OAS. Wilson/Dent adequately observed that the academic research on 
the organization between 1975 and 1988 was meager and highly criti-
cal.82 The second edition of O. Carlos Stoetzers volume, which in-
cludes a discerning analysis of the US role in the OAS, is a highly 
critical standard work.83 
In general, the evolution of the inter-American system for the pro-
tection of human rights, particularly regarding the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, is satisfactorily discussed. Notwith-
standing, according to the traditional diplomatic-juridical methodol-
ogy, it should be noted that the authors  who often worked in the 
field of human rights in the OAS system  limit their studies to a de-
scriptive, mainly legal analysis with very little critical discussion.84 
                                                 
81  Walther L. Bernecker/Hans Werner Tobler  Staat, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und 
Außenbeziehungen Lateinamerikas im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Handbuch der Ge-
schichte Lateinamerikas, Vol. 3: Lateinamerika im 20. Jahrhundert, edited by 
Hans Werner Tobler, Walther L. Bernecker, Stuttgart 1996, pp. 83/84. Neverthe-
less, the author would not completely share this point of view, since many for-
eign ministry archives have not been used for prolific historical research. 
82  A survey on the literature on the OAS can be found in: Larman C. Wilson/David 
W. Dent  The United States and the OAS, in: David W. Dent (Ed.)  U.S.-Latin 
American Policymaking. A Reference Handbook, Westport/London 1995, pp. 
30-33. Also See these bibliographies: David Sheinin  Eclectic Ideal: Bringing a 
Positivist Order to the Literature of Pan Americanism, in: David Sheinin (Ed.)  
Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs, Westport/London 2000, pp. 213-
218; David Sheinin  The Organization of American States, Oxford 1995; Tho-
mas L. Welch/René Gutiérrez  The Organization of American States, A Bibliog-
raphy, Washington, D.C. 1990. 
83  O. Carlos Stoetzer  The Organization of American States, New York 1993, 2nd, 
revised edition. 
84  See, for example: Jo M. Pasqualucci  The Inter-American Human Rights Sys-
tem: A Force for Positive Change in the Americas, in: David Sheinin (Ed.)  Pan 
Americanism in Inter-American Affairs, Westport/London 2000, pp. 195-212; 
Scott Davidson  The Inter-American Human Rights System, Aldershot/Vermont 
1997; Thomas Buergenthal/Dinah Shelton  Protecting Human Rights in the 
Americas, Cases and Materials, Kehl/Strasbourg/Arlington 1995, 4th and revised 
edition; César Sepúlveda  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
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Besides aspects like juridical differences and distinctiveness, com-
parative studies on the systems of human rights protection in Europe, 
America and in the United Nations are quite helpful.85 In relation to 
the human rights policy of the OAS there are some recommendable 
works, in which juridical studies are the most prevalent. 
These research endeavors mainly focus on juridical aspects of the 
evolutionary process of the human rights issue at the OAS or depict 
particular cases. However, there are some decent works, which go 
beyond a mere stocktaking: Schreiber, LeBlanc, Schoultz, Farer, 
Forsythe, the contributors of a book on the system edited by Har-
ris/Livingstone, and specifically Medina Quiroga, have all analyzed 
the OAS human rights performance.86 With the exception of Farers 
investigation that is rich of substance and based primarily on his per-
sonal experience as member and chairman of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, this research does not specifically 
investigate institutional aspects of the OAS human rights policy. 
While Medina Quirogas standard work on the inter-American human 
                                                                                                         
(1960-1981), in: Israel Yearbook of Human Rights, Volume 12, Jerusalem 1982; 
Héctor Gros Espiell  LOrganisation des États américains (OEA), in: Karel Va-
sak  Les dimensions internationales des droits de lhomme, Manuel designé à 
lenseignement des droits de lhomme dans les universités, UNESCO (Ed.), Paris 
1978; Héctor Gros Espiell  Le Système interamericain comme régime régional 
de protection internationale des droits de lhomme, in: Recueil des Cours de 
lAcademie de droit international 145 (1975). 
85  For example, A. Glenn Mower, Jr.  Regional Human Rights, A Comparative 
Study of the West European and Inter-American Systems, New York/Westport, 
Connecticut/London 1991; A. Glenn Mower Jr.  The United States, the United 
Nations, and human rights. The Eleanor Roosevelt and Jimmy Carter Eras, from 
the series: Studies in Human Rights, Number 4, Westport/London 1979. 
86  David J. Harris/Stephen Livingstone (Eds.)  The Inter-American System of 
Human Rights, Oxford/New York 1998; Tom J. Farer  The Rise of the Inter-
American Human Rights Regime: No longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, in: Hu-
man Rights Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 1997; David Forsythe  Human 
Rights, The United States and the Organization of American States, in: Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1991); Cecilia Medina Quiroga  The Battle Of 
Human Rights; Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London 1988; Tom J. Farer  The Grand Strategy of the 
United States in Latin America, New Brunswick 1988; Lars Schoultz  Human 
Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America, Princeton 1981; Law-
rence J. LeBlanc  The OAS and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
The Hague 1977; Anna P. Schreiber  The Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights, Leyden 1970. 
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rights system is an outstanding contribution, even her study is almost 
exclusively based on official OAS documents and does not refer to 
further sources. 
Methodological difficulties do not only come as a result of differ-
ent types of sources used, but also from the literature, which comes 
from many scientific disciplines. The literature includes legal treatises, 
as well as studies from the political and social sciences. The numerous 
other possibilities to approach the subject are striking. The topic could 
be examined extensively at least from the following perspectives: 
history of mentality, history or philosophy of law, social sciences, 
history of institutions, of diplomacy, of ideas, or history of events. In 
general, this work follows an interdisciplinary approach, since the 
discipline of history can be complemented ingeniously through re-
search results of the social, political and legal sciences. From a meth-
odological perspective, the fact that the author of this thesis is Euro-
pean could be looked upon as an advantage. Since he belongs neither 
to Latin America nor to North America, the author supposedly has a 
more objective perspective in view of the common resentments be-
tween the United States and Latin America. 
This work begins the analysis with chapter II, which specifically 
addresses the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by dis-
cussing the history of law and institutions. This chapter creates a basis 
for the understanding of the following two chapters, which use an 
approach based on the history of events and diplomacy, referring to 
the conclusions drawn in chapter II. Accordingly, the human rights 
policy of the OAS described in chapters III and IV will be more com-
prehensive to the reader due to the institutional background of the 
inter-American human rights system provided in the previous analy-
sis. 
In an attempt to answer the questions raised above, the author had 
the opportunity to research in the OAS Columbus Memorial Library, 
the IACHR library, the Library of Congress, the National Security 
Archive (Washington, D.C.) and the Foreign Ministry archive in San 
Salvador. The author also reviewed material in the Foreign Ministries 
and National Libraries in Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires, the 
library of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Institute of Human Rights (both in Costa Rica) as well as in 
the libraries of certain human rights entities such as the Vicaría de la 
Solidaridad (Chile), the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Argentina) and 
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the Institute of Human Rights of the Central American University 
(IDHUCA, El Salvador). The author was also granted access to sev-
eral IACHR files.87 While as with any historical inquiry, the findings 
will include some imprecisions, minor omissions, and even misinter-
pretations. It is the authors intent, however, to present a research en-
deavor that is the first pioneering effort to understand the historical 
dimension of the OAS human rights policy by reference to sources 
hitherto unrevealed. 
In accordance, a subdivision of the sources utilized for this inquiry 
into three categories seems reasonable: First, official documents and 
publications of the Organization of American States and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights provide a general outline of 
the topic. Second, the correspondence of the IACHR as a new field of 
sources will provide, above all, a new perspective on the Commission 
itself. It is necessary to reiterate that the second category of sources is 
potentially fragmentary by nature. It must be taken into consideration 
that documents released in the future, such as those still classified at 
the US State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Latin 
American Foreign Ministries or at the Organization of American 
States itself, may relativize or even contradict the findings presented 
in this investigation. The third category of sources consists of expert 
interviews conducted by the author between July 1999 and October 
2000. 
Methodologically, the interviews used here complement other 
available material. However, the risks that exist with the use of oral 
sources must also be taken into account. The selection of the inter-
viewed persons mainly depended on their involvement in OAS human 
rights matters. Principally, former members and lawyers of the Com-
mission and former OAS diplomats were among the persons inter-
viewed, as were representatives of governments and human rights 
groups. Naturally, the question of the interviewees availability was a 
determining factor for the interviews conducted. The method that was 
applied represents a mixture of qualitative and quantitative interview 
techniques. There were several leading questions, a sort of interview 
guide, which served as an orientation for the direction of the inter-
                                                 
87  Unfortunately, these files do not provide a very organized structure: its conserva-
tion must be described as somehow random, which always seems to be the case 
with archives. 
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view, but then the interviews were generally speaking, not bound to a 
strict catalogue of questions due to the qualitative approach. Unlike 
the common quantitative method, the interviews allowed for a certain 
flow of topics that mainly depended on the interlocutor. A topic as 
sensitive as that of the human rights policy of a still existing institu-
tion always raises the possibility of potentially false statements, omis-
sions or modifications that may affect the information content of the 
oral source. In addition, through their formation and profession, the 
interviewed persons usually were very eloquent and had extensive 
interview experience. This sometimes enabled them to respond to 
certain sensitive questions with rhetoric statements, thereby avoiding 
revealing confidential or potentially uncomfortable information. Fur-
thermore, the majority of the interviewed persons were above the age 
of 60 or 70, which created a situation that presumably influenced the 
interview situations.88 Another factor that affects the accuracy of these 
interviews is the weakness of human memory to recall the past after 
many decades, and the selective perception of past events. This in-
cludes the risk that situations are actively or passively memorized in a 
way, which differs from the way in which the actual events occurred. 
Considering all this criticism, however, the interview material indeed 
does provide valuable information and findings, which would not be 
available had the research been limited exclusively to written 
sources.89 
In conclusion, from the historical perspective, the subject of the 
human rights policy of the OAS in Latin America has not been ad-
dressed previously. Since no comprehensive historical source studies 
                                                 
88  While seeking to elicit useful information, the author at the same time felt the 
need to pay the due respect to his interview partners appropriately. Another factor 
that affected the interview situation is the language issue: The author is a native 
speaker neither of English nor Spanish. Certainly, this also constituted another 
potential of difficulties concerning misunderstanding of nuances, for example. 
89  See Valerie Raleigh Yow  Recording Oral History, A Practical Guide For Social 
Scientists, Thousand Oaks (USA)/London/New-Delhi 1994; Paul Thompson  
The Voice of the Past, Oral History, Oxford/New York 1988, 2nd edition (1st 
edition 1978); Eva M. McMahan/Kim Lacy Rogers (Eds.)  Interactive Oral His-
tory Interviewing, Hillsdale, New Jersey 1994; Lutz Niethammer (Ed.), with 
Werner Trapp  Lebenserfahrung und kollektives Gedächtnis. Die Praxis der O-
ral History, Frankfurt am Main 1980; Armin Scholl  Die Befragung als Kom-
munikationssituation, Zur Reaktivität im Forschungsinterview, from the series: 
Studien zur Sozialwissenschaft, Vol. 109, Opladen 1993. 
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about the OAS human rights policy are available that go beyond the 
evaluation of official OAS documents and reports, the present investi-
gation is designed to fill this gap of research. Therefore, it is intended 
that the present effort, which outlines developments, asks more sys-
tematized questions, and relies on source material unknown up to 
now, will lay the ground for further research and debates on these 
problems. 
 
 
II. The Institutional Evolution of the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights 
 
International, supranational or multilateral organizations constitute a 
singular phenomenon in the 20th century in part because of their role 
in creating an institutional structure intended to address international 
human rights.1 It is helpful to distinguish between those institutions in 
which Member States transfer national competencies and powers to 
the multilateral organization or intergovernmental organization. In 
contrast with the increasingly supranational European Union, the OAS 
has historically been an organization of nations without many oppor-
tunities for any sort of far-reaching mandate or binding competence.2 
In practice, this means that the Organization of American States has 
been highly dependant on its Member States, the majority of which 
were not prepared to transfer any national competence to the organiza-
tion in general, much less in cases regarding an issue such as human 
rights. Moreover, the geographic proximity of the OAS headquarters 
to influential centers of power, both international and US, indicates 
the potentially weak level of organizational independence the OAS 
faces.3 
                                                 
1  Although there are some precedents in the 19th century like the Danube River 
Commission, an institution that explicitly refers to international human rights law 
is a historically new occurrence of the post-World War II period. 
2  The UN and the OAS are organizations wherein there is a broad competence and 
little binding competence: except for Security Council resolutions under chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, nothing imposes new legal obligations to Member States. 
The European Union is on the opposite side, since Member States actually trans-
ferred competence to the institutions, allowing these to bind the States  within 
specific domains  without their consent. It is the binding character of acts, and 
not the breadth of competence that makes an organization supranational or not. 
Furthermore, the difference between the EU and the OAS as regards its partici-
pants self-comprehension is vividly reflected in the signs of the OAS and the 
EU, respectively: While the EU is represented by twelve stars of equal size, the 
OAS badge is formed by the banners of each Member State. As the flag demon-
strates sovereignty and national pride, the OAS symbol already shows the basic 
fundaments of its character. 
3  Besides the White House and US Congress, the OAS complex can be found next 
to the US Departments of State and Interior, the Federal Reserve Bank, the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. Not far away from Washingtons government district, the Pentagon and the 
Central Intelligence Agency are located. In the early 1970s, the IACHR had its 
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The first part of this chapter deals with the evolution of the inter-
American system of human rights and the development of the juridical 
position of human rights within the OAS. Besides considering the 
main documents  the OAS Charter, the American Declaration of 
Rights and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on Human 
Rights  this section will emphasize the legal position of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). This historical 
discussion of the institutional setting of the IACHR will broaden the 
institutional understanding, and will lead to new findings in respect to 
the human rights policy of the OAS. In this context, the subject will be 
addressed from the perspective of a cultural scientific and institutional 
history, with an analysis following the approach similar to the sociol-
ogy of organizations.4 Furthermore, the Commissions views on hu-
man rights topics as well as its activities are described in order to give 
a better idea of the institution. Finally, a brief overview will be pro-
vided with respect to the IACHRs relations both with the OAS organs 
and the Member States. 
II. 1. The Development of the Juridical Position of Human 
Rights in the Inter-American System 
Marco Tulio Bruni Celli, a former member of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, describes the evolution of the inter-
American system of human rights protection as occurring in four 
phases: first, the adoption of the OAS Charter and the American Dec-
laration on Human Rights in 1948; secondly, the creation of the 
IACHR in 1959; third, the consolidation of the system characterized 
by the adoption and entry-into-force of the Convention (1969/1978), 
the creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979) and 
the recognition of the Courts competence by some of the Member 
                                                                                                         
offices in the OAS Premier Building in Washington, D.C.s downtown I Street. 
Since 1983, the Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
has been lodged in the OAS Building in F Street, between 18th and 19th St. The 
fact that such important international and US agencies are very close to the 
IACHR and the OAS lead to the assumption that there might have been an inter-
active influence potential. 
4  See Reinhard Blänkner  Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Geschichtswissen-
schaft und Theorie politischer Institutionen, in: Gerhard Göhler (Ed.)  Die Ei-
genart der Institutionen, Zum Profil politischer Institutionentheorie, Baden-Baden 
1994, p. 102. 
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States; and finally, the fourth stage marked by the institutional and 
normative developments of the system since 1980. This last phase in-
cludes the first judgements and Advisory Opinions of the Court, the 
extension of the Commissions powers, and above all the international 
codification of human rights in the regional system. The latter was 
constituted by the adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Ameri-
can Human Rights Convention, concerning economic, social and cul-
tural rights (Protocol of San Salvador 1988) and the abolition of the 
death penalty (1990). Likewise, the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture (1985), the Inter-American Convention on 
Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994) and the Inter-American Con-
vention on Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará, 1994) have been 
important steps within the inter-American human rights system.5 
To these four phases described above, a fifth phase should be in-
cluded; characterized by the refinement or sophistication of the human 
rights system. This phase began after 1991 and emphasized new areas 
such as womens rights, rights of indigenous people, and childrens 
rights. Likewise, the reports of the Inter-American Commission in-
cluded chapters on international humanitarian law, in the Commis-
sions Report on Colombia of 1998, for example. Another phenome-
non of the 1990s, which had already begun in the early eighties, was 
the question of how to address human rights violations of the past. 
This problematic issue still remains as part of the history of Latin 
America, and is characterized by the apparent dialectic between truth 
and justice on the one hand and reconciliation and a new beginning on 
the other. At the same time, this item revealed the chronic weakness of 
the juridical systems  another serious problem in respect to human 
rights. In general, the Commissions interaction with the governments, 
which at least were formally democratic, turned out to be more diffi-
cult and often human rights complaints were dismissed just because 
they came from these formally democratic nations.6 This was one rea-
                                                 
5  Marco Tulio Bruni Celli  Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Derechos 
Humanos. Discurso del 29 de mayo de 1995 en el Seminario de la Fundación 
Konrad Adenauer, en Quito; in: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Ed.)  Serie de Pu-
blicaciones sobre Política Economía Derecho, 1995, No. 2: Marco Tulio Bruni 
Celli, Alfred de Zayas, Julio Prado Vallejo; Derechos Humanos y Administración 
de Justicia, Quito/Ecuador, pp. 59/60. 
6  Interviews. 
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son that led the Commission to focus mainly on cases, which contrib-
uted to the legalization of its publications because the individual cases 
from democratic States were often highly sophisticated.7 This fifth 
phase, however, will not be addressed in this discussion.  
The basic OAS document, the Charter, which was approved in 
Bogotá in 1948, is based on the purposes of strengthening peace and 
security in the hemisphere and promoting representative democracy 
and the cultivation of the nonintervention principle. Nonintervention 
was considered as a binding legal obligation and human rights a mere 
issue of principles.8 In practice, different interpretations could be ob-
served: some Member States approved a binding effect of the Charter, 
while other governments merely accepted the Charter as a set of ori-
enting guidelines.9 Although it constituted one of the organizations 
principles, the original OAS Charter mentioned human rights only 
marginally and in a very general manner in its preamble and in articles 
3 (j) and 16. Kokott is surprised by this fact: first, the OAS document, 
unlike the UN Charter, does not include an organ to protect human 
rights (Human Rights Commission). In fact, since the conference of 
Bogotá in 1948, human rights had become the hobbyhorse of Latin 
American States.10 However, the Charter of 1948 represented a weak-
ened version. A text that assigned a stronger position to human rights 
had been refused with a reference to the limitation of national sover-
                                                 
7  In contrast to prevailing violations of the 1970s and 1980s such as massive mur-
der, torture and disappearances, the 1990s increasingly witnessed cases on more 
sophisticated topics like economic issues. 
8  See David Harris  Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American 
Achievement, in: Harris/Livingstone (Eds.), p. 5; Medina Quiroga, p. 51. In 
1985, the nonintervention principle was even reaffirmed. AG/RES. 782 (XV-
0/85): Reaffirmation of the Principle of Nonintervention, in: OEA/Ser.P/XV.0.2, 
2 April 1986, Volume I, Fifteenth Regular Session, Cartagena de Indias, Colom-
bia, December 5-9, 1985, pp. 44/45. 
9  Davidson, pp. 7/8. An example for such a guideline perspective could be found at 
the 1960 session of the OAS Council to honor the IACHR members. See: 
OEA/Ser.G/II C-a-388 (Protocolar), 13 octubre 1960, Acta de la Sesión Protoco-
lar celebrada el 13 de octubre de 1960: En honor de los miembros de la C.I.D.H., 
pp. 7, 14. See also: OEA/Ser.G/II C-a-373, Acta de la sesión Ordinaria, celebrada 
el 8 de junio de 1960, p. 38. 
10  Juliane Kokott  Das interamerikanische System zum Schutz der Menschenrech-
te. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 92, Ber-
lin/Heidelberg/New York/London/Paris/Tokyo 1986, p. 11. 
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eignty.11 The Uruguayan proposal to establish a system of multilateral 
interventions to defend human rights had been rejected by a great ma-
jority. Mexico, in particular, was uneasy about more emphasis on hu-
man rights than on nonintervention in the Charter due to its proximity 
to the United States and its historical experience of losing national 
sovereignty (and even territory).12 
The OAS Charter also made a reference to socioeconomic rights. 
Article 29, section A, names material well being and spiritual growth 
together with conditions of freedom, dignity, and equality of opportu-
nities and economic security. Moreover, section B of that article states 
that work is a right and a social duty. This article shows that human 
rights of the second generation entered into the Charter. Indeed, the 
First Committee approved that article, but it added a limiting explana-
tion, which decisively weakened its efficacy.13 
In general, in 1948, the American States did not agree to risk sub-
mission to binding treaties concerning the protection of human rights. 
The formulation of the articles, however, did leave open the possibil-
ity for the advancement of the system. At the time of the preparation 
of the OAS Charter, the States preferred to let each Member State 
guarantee human rights at the national level instead of awarding this 
competence to a supranational organ.14 Accordingly, Schreiber con-
cludes: 
Several articles of the O.A.S. Charter contain references to hu-
man rights but the records of the Bogotá Conference generally indi-
cate that they were not intended to create a system of international le-
                                                 
11  Kokott, p. 13. Above all Mexican delegates rejected a strong mentioning of hu-
man rights. See ibid., footnote 49. 
12  Above all the Mexican subcommittee insisted not to install human rights as a 
subject of treaty obligations. On the other hand, Brazil favored the mentioning of 
human rights in the Charter. Anna P. Schreiber  The Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, Leyden 1970, p. 18. See Medina Quiroga, pp. 37, 38. 
13  Section (b) of the article does not imply that the state must give work to all, but 
that it must bring about adequate economic conditions in order that all person 
must work. See Schreiber, p. 21. 
14  Typical for this basic attitude was the title of an agenda point for the 10th Inter-
American Conference in Caracas (1954): Human Rights  Measures tending to 
promote human rights without detriment to national sovereignty and the principle 
of nonintervention. (OAS, Consejo, Acta de la sesión extraordinaria celebrada el 
10 de noviembre de 1953, OEA/Ser.G/II (C-a-136), p. 1201; Schreiber, pp. 
22/24. 
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gal protection of human rights. The statesmen who drafted these arti-
cles took care to exclude the possibility that they might be interpreted 
to incorporate the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man into the Charter.15 
As mentioned above, at the discussions on the American Declara-
tion in 1948 the delegations of Uruguay and Mexico represented the 
two advocates of opposite opinions: While Uruguay did not want to 
delegate the responsibility for human rights matters to the competence 
of the individual States, Mexicos delegation due to its conviction not 
to interfere in inner affairs between State and citizen, refused to create 
a binding human rights protection and a corresponding institution. In 
order to emphasize its point, Mexico underlined that human rights 
protection was an area that already existed in the national constitu-
tions.16 
The American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, which 
was approved at the same time as the Charter, was not legally binding. 
The proposal to incorporate the Declaration into the OAS Charter was 
brought down by a six-to-fifteen vote.17 In addition to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, that document 
counts as one of the first international human rights declarations with 
a universal comprehensive character. Article XXVIII is of interest: 
The rights of man are limited by the rights of others, by the security 
of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare and the ad-
vancement of democracy. This article could provide an argumenta-
tive basis for revolutionary guerrilla movements that longed for gen-
eral welfare of the poor, as well as for right-wing military regimes 
who wanted to (re-) establish national security by all means although 
declaring their actions as measures for advancing democracy18. 
                                                 
15  Schreiber, p. 17. 
16  Grace Nacimiento  Die Amerikanische Deklaration der Rechte und Pflichten 
des Menschen, Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 
127, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, Barcelona, Budapest, Hongkong, London, 
Milan, Paris, Santa Clara, Singapore, Tokyo 1997, pp. 67/68. 
17  David Forsythe  Human Rights, The United States and the Organization of 
American States, in: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1991), p. 77. 
Nacimiento, p. 68. 
18  Revolutionary guerrilla movements have not been regarded as subjects of inter-
national law. Not even international soft law would be concerned, although they 
might be concerned in terms of humanitarian law. 
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The recipients of the normative provisions of the Declaration have 
been the Member States. The human rights declaration did not differ-
entiate between the first and second generation of human rights, but 
did contain far-reaching rights of the second generation. It is impor-
tant to note that a broad interpretation of those rights is included in or-
der to avoid the interpretation that these rights be considered self-
executable.19 For example, the right to work was modified to read the 
duty to work. Article XI shows the limitation of socioeconomic 
rights, since it conditions the realization of the right to health, com-
bined with nutrition, clothes and shelter to the available resources.20 
This Declaration has served as a source of inspiration and guide-
lines in particular for the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights.21 Nevertheless, LeBlanc concludes that ...the Declaration 
places the burden on the individual as regards the exercise of the so-
called rights, not on the state.22 Likewise, in regard to the provisions 
of the Declaration and the American Convention on Human Rights, 
Crahan considers economic, social and cultural rights more as the du-
ties of the individual than of the State.23 However, the inter-American 
legal instruments do provide provisions to observe womens rights 
considering the right to equality before the law and to nondiscrimina-
tion.24 The Declaration includes an article on the special protection of 
                                                 
19  Human rights obligations formulated as non self-executable can only be imple-
mented through the adoption of domestic norms that clarify the means of execu-
tion of the obligation. In the case of the vaguely formulated second generation 
rights of the Declaration, although there are rights to work, education, health and 
social security, only domestic measures can give these rights any effect in practi-
cal terms. More important, no domestic judge can be asked to rule in favor of 
such rights without invading the competence of the other branches of govern-
ment, particularly the law-making faculties of the legislative branch. Therefore, 
roughly, non self-executable rights are deprived of effects in the domestic order, 
and cannot be claimed against the states by individuals or groups. 
20  See LeBlanc, p. 37. 
21  Kokott, p. 14. 
22  LeBlanc, p. 39. 
23  Margaret E. Crahan  The State and the Individual in Latin America: Some Im-
plications for Human Rights, Woodstock Theological Center, Georgetown Uni-
versity, Washington, D.C. October 1979, p. 36. 
24  See Declaration, article II; Convention, article 1 and 24 as well as Declaration, 
article XVII; Convention, article 3. Cecilia Medina  Womens Rights as Human 
Rights: Latin American Countries and the Organization of American States 
(OAS), in: Myriam Díaz-Diocaretz/Iris M. Zavala (Eds.)  Women, Feminist 
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women during pregnancy, the nursing period and of children.25 Never-
theless, the Commission did not focus on womens rights. Moreover, 
the argument that the OAS Inter-American Commission on Women 
(CIM) should handle womens rights instead of the IACHR is not very 
convincing, since the CIM was not composed of independent indi-
viduals like the Commission but of government representatives.26 
Besides the Charter and the American Declaration of 1948, the 
American Convention and its Additional Protocols represent the sec-
ond relevant element in the inter-American system of human rights 
protection. Resolution VII of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation in 
1959 did not only create the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, but also appointed the Inter-American Juridical Committee to 
prepare a draft of a human rights convention. The draft was finished in 
1965 and transferred to the Second Specialized Inter-American Con-
ference in Rio de Janeiro in November 1965. The Conference decided 
to transmit the draft convention for an evaluation. After several delays 
 provoked by questions such as if a regional human rights convention 
would make sense in view of the International Pact on Civil and Po-
litical Rights of the UN27  the historic Special Conference in San José 
of 1969 approved the American Convention on Human Rights, the so-
called Pact of San José.28 According to its article 74 (2), the Conven-
tion entered into effect in July 1978 after the deposit of the eleventh 
instrument of ratification of a Member State. The Convention is in-
spired by the European Human Rights Convention, but also relies on 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular 
                                                                                                         
Identity and Society in the 1980s. Selected Papers, Amsterdam/Philadelphia 
1985, p. 75. 
25  Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, in: F.V. García-
Amador (Comp.)  Sistema Interamericano a través de tratados, convenciones y 
otros documentos, Volumen I: Asuntos Jurídico-Políticos, Washington, D.C. 
1981, p. 521 (Article VII). 
26  Cecilia Medina  Womens Rights as Human Rights, p. 74, see also pp. 75/76. 
27  Referring to the general sense of regional systems of human rights protection, 
Bruni Celli points out that this certainly could lead to confusion, but that regional 
systems also had an advantage: Through its higher degree of homogeneity and a 
certain extent of ideological conformity, similar culture and development, they 
might be more efficient in the regional context. Bruni Celli, pp. 60/61. 
28  Davidson, pp. 30/31. The IACHR participated in the Conference as Technical 
Advisory Agency. See Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights 
 Final Act, San José, Costa Rica, November 7-22, 1969; OAS Official Records, 
OEA/Ser.C/VI.18.1 (English). 
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in regard to the formulation of the rights catalogue. The American 
Convention is much more extensive than most of the international 
human rights instruments. It contains 82 articles and codifies more 
than two dozen particular rights. It includes more far-reaching rights 
than the European Convention or the UN Civil Rights Covenant, but 
Buergenthal doubts if there is even a single country in the Americas 
that respects all of them. This fact did not hinder the Member States 
from depositing the necessary instruments of ratification  most of 
them without reservations  notwithstanding the fact that the de 
jure and de facto conditions in at least some of the ratifying countries 
should have prompted a larger number of reservations.29 However, 
the entry-into-force of the Human Rights Convention was preponder-
antly reached only through the endeavors of the US administration of 
President Jimmy Carter.30 Carter took advantage of the presence of 
many Latin American heads of state in Washington attending the sign-
ing celebration of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977. On that occa-
sion, Carter convinced some presidents to sign and ratify the Conven-
tion and they did so later.31 Accordingly, one of the reasons for the en-
try-into-force was that the Carter administration emphasized the role 
of human rights in its foreign policy. On the other hand, Latin Ameri-
can States seemingly ratified the Convention in the belief that it would 
merely serve as a kind of an international law decoration, while the re-
spective governments expected to continue shaping domestic policy in 
their own way.32 
Since the entry-into-force of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, there has been a dual structure of human rights protection in 
the inter-American system. On the one hand, there were States that 
were committed to the Convention as Members. On the other hand, 
the OAS Charter was binding for the rest of the Member States. The 
                                                 
29  Thomas Buergenthal  The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human 
Rights, in: Anuario Jurídico Interamericano 1981 (OAS 1982), pp. 105-109, 80-
81. In: Thomas Buergenthal/Dinah Shelton  Protection Human Rights in the 
Americas. Cases and Materials, Kehl/Strasbourg/Arlington 1995, 4th updated 
edition, p. 42. 
30  Still in 1977, LeBlanc estimated the possibility of an entry-into-force of the Con-
vention as unlikely. LeBlanc, p. 23. See chapter III. 2. 
31  Interviews. 
32  Interviews. For a view of 1960, see: OEA/Ser.G/II C-a-373, Acta de la sesión 
Ordinaria, celebrada el 8 de junio de 1960, p. 38. 
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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was responsible for the 
supervision of compliance by both groups of States. The members of 
both instruments for the protection of human rights in the inter-
American system  the Commission and, since 1979, the Court  were 
elected by the General Assembly. While all Member States voted for 
the Commission members, the judges of the Inter-American Court for 
Human Rights could only be elected by the States that were parties 
and belonged to the Convention.33 
In 1988, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights, regarding economic, social and cultural rights  the 
Protocol of San Salvador  was approved by the General Assembly in 
that Central American country. On June 8, 1990 the General Assem-
bly also approved a second Additional Protocol to the Convention to 
abolish the death penalty. While the Protocol of San Salvador entered 
into force in late 1999 by Costa Ricas deposit of the last ratification 
needed, the Additional Protocol to abolish the death penalty is not yet 
in force. In 1990, Canada became a Member State of the OAS  a his-
torical shift that also affected the organizations stand on democracy 
and human rights. Naturally, the financial resources of the tradition-
ally democratic North American country provided more protection for 
human rights as well. In 1991, the General Assembly in Santiago de 
Chile approved resolution 1080 that limited the nonintervention prin-
ciple. On December 14, 1992, the Protocol of Washington was ap-
proved: with the approval of two-thirds of the OAS Members, Article 
9 of that protocol includes the possibility to exclude Members States 
from the OAS in which democratic governments have been over-
thrown by violence.34 
This brief summary of the constitutional achievements concerning 
human rights within the inter-American system already shows that it 
matured slowly but unstoppably. The most famous and controversial 
stage began in the early 1970s. This was also the time when the Inter-
                                                 
33  See American Convention on Human Rights, Articles 36 and 53. Thomas Buer-
genthal  The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in: T. 
Meron (Ed.)  Human Rights in International Law, pp. 451-454, Oxford 1984, 
Vol. II, in: Buergenthal/Shelton, p. 51. Costa Rica proposed the distinguished 
human rights expert Thomas Buergenthal to become judge of the Court. Al-
though his country, the United States, was not party to the Convention, his repu-
tation all over the hemisphere led to his election. 
34  Buergenthal, in: Buergenthal/Shelton, pp. 43/44. 
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American Commission underwent a significant development and be-
came a highly controversial institution within the inter-American sys-
tem. 
At the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas in 1954, a 
discussion on the creation of a human rights commission began. How-
ever, several delegations rejected this proposal with the argument that 
such a commission would present a risk for solidarity in the hemi-
sphere and threaten the nonintervention principle.35 Finally, in 1960, 
the Inter-American Commission was established as an autonomous 
entity after the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in 
Santiago de Chile had agreed on its creation in 1959.36 The creation of 
the Commission, which was described by Sepúlveda  doubtlessly not 
in a depreciating tone  as an accident37, derived from the political 
atmosphere in the region characterized by instability and a growing 
awareness of the connection between human rights and the mainte-
nance of democracy.38 Among the concrete reasons for the changed 
mood were the Cuban Revolution of January 195939 and the subse-
quent invasion attempts in the region40, in addition to the human rights 
                                                 
35  Schreiber, pp. 25/26. 
36  OAS, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Actas y 
Documentos, OEA/Ser.F/III.5 (Washington: Pan American Union), p. 308-309, 
in: Schreiber, p. 27. Already before the formation of the OAS, the Inter-
American Juridical Committee had proposed to create an Inter-American Consul-
tative Commission on Human Rights functioning as a suborgan to the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council. LeBlanc, p. 43. 
37  César Sepúlveda  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1960-
1981), in: Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Volume 12, Jerusalem 1982, p. 47. 
Medina Quiroga, p. 67. 
38  In addition, Farer mentions the lack of controversy in the experience with the 
European Commission as a reason for the creation of the Commission. Tom Farer 
 The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, 
Not Yet an Ox, in: Harris/Livingstone, p. 34. 
39  David J. Padilla  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Or-
ganization of American States: A Case Study, 9 American University Journal In-
ternational Law & Policy 95 (1993), reprinted in: Buergenthal/Shelton, p. 293. 
See Karel Vasak  La Commission Interaméricaine des Droits de lHomme, Paris 
1968, p. 21. Forsythe, p. 82. 
40  In April 1959, a Cuban invasion was crushed down in Panama. In June, Nicara-
guan officials complained an unsuccessful invasion on their territory as well. 
During the same month, four hundred exile Dominicans marched from Cuba into 
the Dominican Republic. Schreiber, p. 28. See Informe Anual presentado por la 
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situation in the Dominican Republic.41 Ironically, the Meeting of Con-
sultation also addressed the nonintervention principle. Thus, the ses-
sion favored human rights but without limitations to nonintervention. 
Further, the Cuban delegation wanted the human rights issue to be 
elevated onto the OAS agenda.42 Cubas government was expelled 
from the organization in 1962 when the United States pushed through 
a resolution, which interpreted Cubas Socialist model as incompatible 
with the OAS principles. However, the State of Cuba officially re-
mained an OAS Member, but in the following years its government 
refused to cooperate with the IACHR at all, arguing that through its 
expulsion from the OAS it would not recognize the Commissions 
competence for human rights matters in Cuba. The situation in the 
Dominican Republic played a decisive role for the creation of the 
IACHR as well. The government of the Dominican president Trujillo, 
which was accused of human rights violations, threatened to attack 
Cuba and also charged Venezuela with complicity. In contrast, Cuba 
and Venezuela required excluding the Dominican Republic from the 
OAS due to its lamentable human rights record. Additionally, an as-
sassination attempt against the Venezuelan president Rómulo Betan-
court occurred in June and was attributed to the Dominican Repub-
lic.43 As a result of these tensions, the Conference of Santiago was 
convened in August 1959.44 
At the meeting in the Chilean capital in 1959, Cuba and Venezuela 
advocated a strong position in regard to a collective condemnation of 
all dictatorships.45 The Venezuelan president Betancourt  also regard-
ing the situation in the Dominican Republic  stated that the protec-
                                                                                                         
CIDH a la Asamblea General correspondiente a 1974, OEA/Ser.G, 
CP/doc.399/75, 9 enero 1975, p. 2. 
41  Stoetzer, pp. 45/46. See César Sepúlveda  The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights of the Organization of American States, 25 Years of Evolution 
and Endeavour, in: German Yearbook of International Law, Volume 28, 1985, p. 
67. 
42  Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Santiago de Chile 
1959, Doc. 1 Rev. 5, 27 agosto 1959, Vol. I, p. 10. For an overview concerning 
the context in which the Meeting took place, See: Félix Fernández-Shaw  La 
Organización de los Estados Americanos (O.E.A.), Una nueva visión de 
América, Madrid 1963, 2nd edition, pp. 490-497. Schreiber, p. 87. 
43  LeBlanc, p. 46. 
44  See also Medina Quiroga, pp. 54-58. 
45  LeBlanc, p. 47. 
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tion of human rights did not constitute interference in domestic affairs 
of American States. Although the majority of Member States opposed 
the so-called Betancourt Doctrine favoring democracy and human 
rights46, the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in 
Santiago approved a two-part resolution concerning human rights. The 
first part of this document required the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee to prepare a draft document regarding an American Con-
vention on Human Rights and an Inter-American Court for Human 
Rights. While this part was approved unanimously, several States 
voted against the second paragraph of the resolution, which called the 
OAS Council to establish an Inter-American Human Rights Commis-
sion.47 The voting was preceded by debates on the powers of the new 
organ and conflicts of goals concerning the nonintervention principle. 
Medina Quiroga correctly summarizes that [t]he OAS had made it 
clear that it had no desire to create a body that would interfere in any 
                                                 
46  David W. Dent  The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine. A Reference Guide to 
U.S. Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean, Westport/London 1999, p. 
375. 
47  Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System; Alder-
shot/Brookfield, USA/Singapore/Sydney 1997, pp. 15/16. 15 Member States 
voted for the second part of the resolution as well. Brazil, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Mexico and surprisingly also Uruguay gave a negative vote, while Bolivia 
and the United States abstained. The Mexican representative voted against the es-
tablishment of the Commission by justifying the negative vote with the argument 
that a higher organ than the OAS Council should legitimize such an institution. 
Brazil referred to similar explanations. In contrast, the delegates of Venezuela 
and Peru proclaimed that the nonintervention principle should not serve as a de-
fense argument for tyrannies. Merely the Dominican Republic rejected out of un-
derstandable reasons the formation of the Commission a priori. Schreiber, pp. 29, 
38. LeBlanc, however, emphasizes that the United States only accepted the 
Commissions establishment with a reservation, which was explained with the 
countrys federal structure that would not allow acceding to multilateral conven-
tions in relation to the protection of human rights. LeBlanc, p. 48. Schreiber in-
terprets the position of the United States in 1959 as a first change because it sup-
ported a Convention on Human Rights and did not oppose the creation of a Hu-
man Rights Commission on principle. Above all, the Dominican Republic and 
the United States resisted, though both States opposition was reasoned differ-
ently: The Dominican Republic refused a Human Rights Commission because 
such an institution obviously was directed against the Trujillo regime. In contrast, 
the US delegation did not oppose the Commissions Statute categorically; its 
concerns focused more on particular paragraphs. Finally, LeBlanc summarizes, 
the US objections were decisive for the final version of the Statute. LeBlanc, pp. 
48/49. 
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way with the domestic affairs of the Member States.48 Likewise, 
Stoetzer states that the ...governments shied away from giving the 
commission such wide powers, since it obviously could lead to viola-
tions of the principle of nonintervention.49 
Finally, after the submittal of a number of drafts to the Member 
States, the OAS Council approved the Commissions Statute after the 
right to individual complaints  which had been incorporated in the fi-
nal draft of the preparing committee  was taken out of the document. 
The right to individual petitions50 was one of the most controversial 
subjects.51 Though many Latin American governments decided not to 
vest the new Commission with the power to handle individual peti-
tions, it was the pressure of the United States, especially in the case of 
several Central American States, that assured resistance against the in-
clusion of this right.52 Accordingly, Ball emphasized in comparison to 
Europe, the newly created Commission was quite innocuous. More 
important than what the Commission could do was what it was not au-
thorized to do.53 
According to Davidson, the creation of a Human Rights Commis-
sion as an autonomous entity by a conference resolution should 
serve to maintain the political neutrality and the general autonomy of 
the new institution. If the Commission were established as a subsidi-
ary organ of the OAS Council, it would have lacked independence and 
the necessary impartiality to realize its tasks.54 Nevertheless, the 
Commission had always depended on the budget provided by the 
mother organization as well as on political will to let it function. This 
                                                 
48  Medina Quiroga, p. 70. 
49  Stoetzer, p. 117. 
50  The US delegate opposed individual petitions because those would have meant 
protection of human rights, while the conference resolution of Santiago only 
awarded the Commission the task of furthering respect, of a promotion of the 
basic rights. Schreiber, p. 36. 
51  In the OAS Council, there was an opposition against the creation of the IACHR 
with the result that the draft Statute of the latter was modified three times within 
nine months. LeBlanc, pp. 48/49. One of the major factors impelling many gov-
ernments to oppose the right of petition may have been the fear that it would ex-
pose the gap between constitutional guarantees and practical application which 
existed in many American States in matters pertaining to human rights. Schrei-
ber, p. 39. See Introduction. 
52  Schreiber, p. 38. 
53  Mary Margaret Ball  The OAS in Transition, Durham 1969, p. 376. 
54  Davidson, p. 16. 
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was the case before and after the Commissions elevation to become a 
principal organ of the OAS. However, before the reform of the Char-
ter in 1970, the OAS Council possessed the competence to elect the 
Commission members, to modify its Statute, and to approve the 
IACHRs budget. After the entry-into-force of the Protocol of Buenos 
Aires in 1970, the General Assembly was vested with these tasks. In 
practice, most of these powers did not influence the decisions of the 
Commission. The small budget affected the Commissions autonomy 
more than the potential powers of the OAS Council. Also, the OAS 
Council did not invoke its right to modify the Statute of the IACHR to 
hinder or influence the Commissions work. In contrast, many amend-
ments of the Statute awarded the Commission broadened its func-
tions.55  
The Commission had its legal fundament in its Statute of 1960 
(amended in 1965), its rules of procedure of 1961 (amended in 1967) 
and the American Declaration until the entry-into-force of the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights.56 Article 2 of the Statute of 1960 
defined human rights by a reference to the American Declaration of 
Rights and Duties of Man of 1948. Hence, the normative orientation 
of the Commission was based simply on a non-binding declaration.57 
At the creation of the Commission, the problem of priorities of rights 
was left out. This meant that there was no reference to particular rights 
of the American Declaration. In spite of this fact, at its first session the 
Commission members decided to focus particularly on a small group 
of rights, which were seen as of fundamental importance. Due to a his-
torical perspective, some individual rights were prioritized; among 
those the right to life, liberty, and freedom of opinion.58 
According to Article 9 of the Statute of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights of 1960, the latter had tasks and powers as 
follows: 
a)  To develop an awareness of human rights among the American 
peoples 
b)  To make general recommendations to the governments in order to 
                                                 
55  Schreiber, pp. 41-43. 
56  Nacimiento, p. 95. 
57  Kokott, p. 21. 
58  Article 20(a) of the IACHR Statute  then with another number  orders the 
Commission to pay special attention to certain civil rights. 
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adopt measures favoring human rights within the frame of the re-
spective national constitutions 
c)  To prepare studies and reports, which the IACHR considers ap-
propriate for the realization of its duties 
d)  To urge governments of the Member States to provide information 
in regard to human rights related measures 
e)  To serve as an advisory body to the OAS in human rights matters 
 
At its first session, the Commission members concluded that the 
IACHR had the competence to direct specific common and individual 
recommendations concerning human rights violations to the OAS 
Member States. Likewise, the Commissioners decided to prepare stud-
ies and reports, which dealt with human rights situations in countries 
where widespread abuses took place. Although the Commission re-
ceived numerous reports from individual persons, it found that it did 
not have the competence to make decisions regarding these petitions.59 
Its Statute authorized the IACHR to elaborate and approve its own 
regulations and rules of procedure without consultation with the po-
litical bodies of the OAS.60 Since 1960, the Commission had worked 
on its regulations. Several regulations merely repeat provisions of the 
Statute while others concern matters such as the duties of the chair-
man, the distribution of reports and studies or the establishment and 
work of the subcommittees but then also provisions regarding the on-
site observations. In the beginning, the Commission usually set up a 
sub commission composed of the chairman and the vice chairman, a 
third member and a substitute member. Previous to the Commission 
sessions, this sub commission examined the petitions received and 
prepared the work program for the IACHR meeting in cooperation 
with the Secretariat.61 This standing sub-commission worked when the 
Commission was not in session and submitted recommendations to the 
                                                 
59  OEA/Ser.L/V/II.1, Doc. 32, March 14, 1961: Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights  Report on the work accomplished during its first session. Octo-
ber 3-28, 1960, pp. 9/10. See Kokott, pp. 21/22. 
60  Christina Cerna  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Its Or-
ganization and Examination of Petitions and Communications, in: Har-
ris/Livingstone, p. 69. 
61  CIDH  Informe sobre la labor desarrollada durante su vigésimoprimer período 
de sesiones, 7 al 17 de abril de 1969, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.21, Doc.27l, Original: 
español, 20 febrero 1970, p. 15. 
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entire Commission. Other subcommittees could be established in the 
OAS headquarters or in the territory of each OAS Member State; the 
latter with the permission of the concerned government. The most im-
portant regulations concern the procedures regarding the petitions.62 
As the Commission could prepare its own regulations, the members 
agreed that an absolute majority should constitute a quorum.63 
Its exemplary performance during the political crisis in the Do-
minican Republic64 in the early- and mid-sixties (in particular during 
the crisis in 1965) resulted in the Commission being held in high es-
teem in the region. The activities of the IACHR, especially during the 
on-site observations in the Dominican Republic, contributed to a 
widespread acceptance of the need to legally enshrine the de facto 
practices of the Commission. Yet at the Eighth Meeting of Consulta-
tion of Foreign Ministers in 1962, Resolution IX had sanctioned the 
Commissions practice, which obviously was based on a very broad 
interpretation of its mandate.65 According to the broadening of the 
IACHRs Statute that took place at the Special Conference in 1965, 
the Commissions powers were extended to investigate petitions that 
concerned certain fundamental civil and political rights.66 Those rights 
are defined in article 9bis.67 
                                                 
62  LeBlanc, p. 55. 
63  Regulations of the IACHR, Article 20, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 17 Doc. 26, May 2, 
1967. AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79) Statute of the IACHR, Article 17, 1. In its Regula-
tions of 1967, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights agreed to take 
decisions by an absolute majority vote of the Commission members, except in 
cases of procedure where a simple majority was sufficient (Article 23, Regula-
tions). Regulations of the IACHR, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.17 Doc.26, May 2, 1967; in: 
General Secretariat OAS, Washington, D.C. 1972  La Organización de Estados 
Americanos y los Derechos Humanos, Actividades de la CIDH 1960-1967, Hu-
man Rights Yearbook 1960-1967, p. 615. 
64  See, for instance, V. Shiv Kumar  US Interventionism in Latin America. Do-
minican Crisis and the OAS; New York 1987, pp. 93-108. 
65  Kokott, p. 23. 
66  LeBlanc, pp. 27/28. 
67  The following rights of the American Declaration enjoyed priority: 
 Art. I Right to life, liberty, and security of the person 
 Art. II Right to equality before the law 
 Art. III Right of freedom of religion and belief 
 Art. IV Right of freedom of investigation, opinion, expression and distribution of 
ideas 
 Art. XVIII Right to a fair process 
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Accordingly, the Second Inter-American Special Conference in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1965 abolished the Commissions lack of compe-
tence to handle individual petitions. Individual complaints will not be 
discussed here due to their mostly juridical character.68 The Confer-
ence in 1965 had been convened by Guatemalas request. That Central 
American country sought to discuss inter alia the strengthening of 
democracy as well as a better protection of human rights in the 
Americas.69 Through the approval of Resolution XXII, the OAS Spe-
cial Conference of November 1965 extended the competence of the 
IACHR, followed by a reform of the Commissions Statute. Not 
merely the promotion but also the control and observance of human 
rights were named as the organs tasks. Kokott judges that the exten-
sion of powers reached at the Special Conference even exceeded the 
Commissions requests.70 Clearly, it was mainly the activities of the 
IACHR that contributed mostly to its exceptionally positive image and 
led to the expansion of powers in its Statute.71 
In April 1966, at its 13th period of sessions in Mexico City, the 
Commission adopted the extensions of its Statute expressed in article 
9bis. The Commission assigned itself with two procedures: a new pro-
cedure in relation to the handling of the mechanism of individual peti-
                                                                                                         
 Art. XXV Right to protection against arbitrary detention 
 Art. XXVI Right to a due process of law 
 Nevertheless, Commission member Dunshee de Abranches rejected to include 
the right to vote in 1973 since it would constitute a political matter outside the 
IACHRs competence. IACHR  Report on the Work Accomplished by the 
IACHR at its Thirty-First Session, (October 15-25, 1973), OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 31 
doc. 54 rev.1, 12 June 1974, Original: Spanish, p. 65. 
68  On the Commissions procedures concerning individual petitions, see Andrés 
Aguilar  Procedimiento que debe aplicar la Comisión Interamericana de Dere-
chos Humanos en el examen de las peticiones o comunicaciones individuales so-
bre presuntas violaciones de derechos humanos, in: Human Rights in the Ameri-
cas , Homage to Carlos Dunshee de Abranches, pp. 199-216; Atilio N. Molteni  
El derecho de petición y el sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos 
humanos, in: ibid., pp. 188-198; Medina Quiroga, pp. 145-151. 
69  Davidson, p. 17. 
70  Kokott, p. 23. 
71  Instead of listing these powers [in the new Statute, K.D.] in formal fashion, 
there follows an informal analysis of commission capabilities that is derived less 
from the Statute and regulations than from an examination of what it actually has 
done. Bryce Wood  Human Rights and the Inter-American System, in: Tom J. 
Farer (Ed.)  The Future of the Inter-American System, New York 1979, p. 124. 
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tions and the old procedure, which referred to the general observation 
function derived from the Charter. Although the Member States did 
not intend to do so, the Commissions interpretation resulted in a dual 
procedure which allowed the Commission to distinguish between 
general and individual cases in regard to investigations of human 
rights situations in Member States of the OAS.72 Consequently, the 
Commission decided to be empowered to investigate individual and 
general cases, to which different regulations applied, respectively.73 
The handling of a general case did not require the exhaustion of do-
mestic remedies, as it was the case in relation to individual petitions.74 
In many cases, this dual procedure became a decisive technical-
methodological advantage. The distinction became an important fac-
tor: Many accused governments argued with the regulations that ap-
plied to individual cases when they referred to an IACHR report on 
the general situation in a Member State. 
Resolution XXII of 1965 requested the Commission to pay special 
attention to the articles I, II, III, IV, XVIII, XXV and XXVI of the 
American Declaration. The following tasks and competences were 
mentioned in the new article 9bis of the Statute: 
 
a)  To observe human rights in particular regarding rights mentioned 
above 
b)  To study all available information, to request information from 
each government of the American States, and to prepare recom-
mendations. 
c)  To transmit an Annual Report to the Inter-American Conference 
or the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers. 
d)  To verify if the domestic procedures and remedies in each Mem-
ber State have been exhausted before applying paragraphs a) and 
b) 
                                                 
72  Davidson, pp. 18/19. Harmen van der Wilt/Viviana Krsticevic  The OAS Sys-
tem for the Protection of Human Rights, in: Raija Hanski/Markku Suksi (Eds.)  
An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights. A Textbook, 
second, revised edition (1st edition 1997), Turku, Åbo (Finland) 2000, p. 372. 
73  A dispute developed within the Commission on the distinction between individ-
ual and general cases. See: IACHR Report on the Work Accomplished by the 
IACHR During its Twenty-Eighth Session (Special), (May 1 through 5, 1972), 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.28 doc. 24 rev.1, 24 August 1972, Original: Spanish, pp. 17-21. 
74  Kokott, p. 69. 
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However, the Commission did not present its first Annual Report 
before 1970. The exhaustion of domestic remedies75 was not strictly a 
categorical obstacle for the admissibility of a petition: The Commis-
sion occasionally accepted a case that did not comply with this re-
quirement if the legal system of the concerned State was seen as not 
granting the necessary juridical standards as expected. 
The amendment of the Statute took up the thought of the second 
draft of 1960, which at that time had been rejected as too far-
reaching.76 Article 53 and the following of the Rules of Procedure of 
1967 standardized a jurisdictional procedure of individual petitions, 
which initially was limited to the rights emphasized in article 9bis (a) 
of the Commissions Statute. According to these articles, each person 
could bring a violation of the mentioned rights before the Commis-
sion. At this, the complainant did not need to be affected individually, 
so it represented a popular complaint procedure. In combination with 
Article 53 of the Rules of Procedure of 1967, Article 9bis of the Stat-
ute of 1965 essentially confirmed the existing practice of the Commis-
sion that had gone beyond its actual competence. The adoption of the 
local remedies rule in Art. 9bis (d) shows how the Commission devel-
oped juridical characteristics.77 
After the extension of powers in 1965, the IACHR continued 
working as an organ to promote human rights, and also assumed ex-
ecutive functions regarding the investigation of human rights viola-
tions.78 The acceptance of the broadening of the Commissions man-
date towards the individual petition right by the majority of the OAS 
Member States was undoubtedly a significant step in regard to their 
change in basic attitude.79 The US perspective toward human rights 
                                                 
75  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79) Statute of the IACHR, Article 20 c). 
76  Kokott, p. 24. The first draft Statute had included seven independent Commission 
members without any other professional duties and at least ten months lasting 
sessions per year. Moreover, that draft Statute would have enabled individuals 
and private groups to send petitions directly to the Commission. This was ex-
traordinary as traditional international law only regarded States and international 
organizations as subjects of international law. Ibid., p. 18. 
77  Kokott, p. 24. 
78  In combination with the acceptance of individual petitions...[the Commission, 
K.D.] obtained features of an organ with jurisdiction. Kokott, p. 25 (Translation 
by the author). See Karel Vasak  La Commission Interaméricaine des Droits de 
lHomme, Paris 1968, p. 59. 
79  Davidson, p. 18. 
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protection in the inter-American system underwent an alteration dur-
ing the years that followed. After a slight change in 1959, it was above 
all the civil rights movement in the US that followed and which con-
tributed to a changed atmosphere through its influence in Congress. 
The latter permitted the Kennedy administration to express a desire to 
strengthen human rights at an international level as well. Later on, this 
found expression in the US support for Resolution XXII at the Second 
Inter-American Special Conference as well as through the signing of 
both UN human rights covenants of 1966.80 
In 1967, as a consequence of its reputation, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights was considered a candidate for the 
Nobel Peace Prize.81 In the same year, the Member States approved a 
structural reform of the OAS with the Protocol of Buenos Aires. In 
short, the main reason for the Special Conference of Buenos Aires in 
1967 was the regional dissatisfaction with the efficiency of the OAS 
institutions in reference to the handling of economic and political 
problems in the hemisphere.82 Although the conference was not very 
successful in addressing these issues, at least by a number of changes 
it did manage to equip the organization with a more efficient institu-
tional structure. Davidson finds that the elevation of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights from an autonomous entity 
to an explicit main organ of the OAS constituted the largest altera-
tion effected by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. This change provided 
the Commission with a legal basis and gave it a precise constitutional 
status within the OAS system.83 Until 1970 a simple conference reso-
lution could have abrogated the Commission, but now it represented a 
main organ of the organization.84 
                                                 
80  In 1965, the United States was in the forefront of the movement to expand the 
Inter-American Commissions powers, and this support probably brought with it 
the votes of several other countries. Schreiber, pp. 55/56. 
81  Letter from Manuel Bianchi to Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches, Confidential, 
June 29, 1967 (IACHR files). 
82  The Buenos Aires reform was the product of Latin Americas desire to obtain 
economic assistance and cooperation from the United States. Álvaro Tirado Me-
jía  The O.A.S. and Colombia, Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogotá 
1998, p. 183. 
83  Davidson, pp. 20/21; Kokott, p. 25. See Medina Quiroga, pp. 85-88. 
84  After the entry-into-force of the Protocol of Buenos Aires, an abolition of the 
IACHR would have required a change of the OAS Charter. This would create the 
necessity to consider the special rules on the change of international treaties. See 
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Several authors believe that the elevation of the Commission to an 
OAS main organ also effected the incorporation of the American Dec-
laration of Rights and Duties of Man of 1948 into the OAS Charter.85 
This argument is based on the fact that the Commissions Statute re-
fers to the Declaration. In fact, in 1978 the General Assembly eventu-
ally approved the new Statute of the IACHR by explicitly declaring 
that for non-members of the Convention, human rights were those de-
fined by the Declaration.86 This is of importance because the Ameri-
can Declaration lacked the compulsory element that a convention 
would have possessed. Through the incorporation of the Commis-
sions Statute including the reference to the Declaration into the OAS 
Charter, the document of 1948 was elevated in its value.87 
After 1970, in regard to the concerned rights, an unclear situation 
appeared: A legally binding catalogue of rights to be protected could 
only be reached with a dodge, by a double reference to article 150 of 
the Charter, article 2 of the IACHRs Statute and article 2 of the 
American Declaration.88 According to article 51 of the amended Char-
ter, the IACHR constituted an organ of the Organization of American 
States. Article 112 appointed the Commission to promote the obser-
vance and protection of human rights on the continent and to serve as 
a consultative organ to the OAS. Further, that article included a com-
ment that an Inter-American Convention on Human Rights would de-
fine structure, competence and procedures of the Commission as well 
as those of a corresponding organ charged with human rights. Several 
authors hold that the language used in article 51 and 112 included the 
suggestion that after the entry-into-force of the Human Rights Con-
                                                                                                         
Kokott, pp. 25/26; Thomas Buergenthal  The Inter-American System for the 
Protection of Human Rights, in: Anuario Jurídico Interamericano 1981 (OAS, 
1982),  in: Buergenthal/Shelton, p. 40. 
85  Davidson, p. 21; Farer  The Grand Strategy, p. 70; Kokott, p. 26. 
86  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79): Estatuto de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, in: OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2, 2 julio 1980, Volumen I: Actas y Documentos,  
Textos certificados de las resoluciones, p. 92. 
87  Nacimiento discusses the binding character of the American Declaration and pre-
sents authoritative law, international customary law, general legal principles as 
explanation models to derive a binding function from the Declaration. Finally, 
Nacimiento concludes that a compulsory character of the American Declaration 
can be interpreted if the document is awarded a dynamic and potentially law cre-
ating effect. See Nacimiento. 
88  Kokott, p. 26. 
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vention a new Commission should be established. Nevertheless, article 
150 stated that the present Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights should continue to observe the respect of human rights. This 
situation led to interpretations, which saw the need to create another 
Commission after the entry-into-force of the American Convention.89 
Consequently, as a result of the entry-into-force of the Convention, the 
status of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was dis-
cussed at the 1978 General Assembly of the OAS. Finally, the meet-
ing decided to transfer the subject of the legal character of the IACHR 
in regard to the new juridical situation to the Permanent Council to 
study the case.90 
The IACHR eventually became an organ of both the Declaration 
and the Convention after the American Convention on Human Rights 
entered into force in 1978.91 Additionally, the amended Charter of 
1967 included a long list of economic, social and cultural principles. 
Together with the American Convention, those principles also af-
fected the competence of the IACHR.92 
In short, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
shifted from an autonomous entity  a role which had provided it a 
certain scope within the OAS  to an organ sui generis: Subse-
quently, its political independence was strengthened by its elevation to 
a main organ of the organization.93 After the entry-into-force of the 
                                                 
89  Medina Quiroga, pp. 87/88, particularly pp. 113-115. 
90  The Commissions chairman, Aguilar, and its Executive Secretary, Vargas Car-
reño, mentioned privately their satisfaction with this decision toward the US 
delegation. Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., to all American Republic Dip-
lomatic Posts Priority, Info RUDCT/AMEmbassy London Priority 6818, Subject: 
OASGA Summary: July 1, 1978; July 3, 1978, p.  3 (NSA files). 
91  OEA CP/RES. 253 (343/78): Transition from the present Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights to the Commission provided for in the American Con-
vention on Human Rights, in: IACHR  Ten Years of Activities, p. 394. See 
Davidson, pp. 21, Kokott, p. 26. Finally, by transforming the legal status of the 
Commission and Statute, the revised OAS Charter has also significantly strength-
ened the normative character of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties 
of Man. Davidson, pp. 21-23. 
92  By giving the Inter-American Commission a role in the implementation of these 
Standards as they apply to the States parties to the American Convention, article 
42 provides the legal foundation for an Inter-American system for the protection 
of economic, social, and cultural rights, which could have far-reaching conse-
quences. Buergenthal, in: Buergenthal/Shelton, p. 53. 
93  Kokott, p. 27. 
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American Convention on Human Rights, the IACHR became an organ 
of the latter as well. The new Statute of the Commission, approved in 
1979 at the Ninth General Assembly in La Paz, Bolivia, clarified in 
Article 1 that the IACHR should serve as single organ with two differ-
ent procedures for the Charter and the Convention. According to Arti-
cle 1 (2), the Statute protected human rights for the Member States 
that had ratified the Convention from the latter.94 The definition of 
rights for the OAS Members, which were not part of the American 
Convention, was made by a reference to the Declaration of 1948. 
In conclusion, there were two main elements which enabled the 
very creation of the IACHR (1959), the extension of its powers 
(1965), and its elevation to an OAS main organ (1970). These ele-
ments were first, the officially recognized reputation of human rights 
and later on of the Commission itself, and secondly, the naïveté of 
several governments expressed in the thought that such an institution 
would not dare to expose actual violations, at least not those of the 
Members that considered themselves as important. Besides the broad-
ening of the legal position within the OAS system and the extension of 
the Commissions powers, it is of particular interest to review the in-
ternal and institutional development of the IACHR. 
II. 2. An Institution for the Protection of Human Rights: 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
The title of this book, which refers to the human rights policy of the 
OAS, suggests that this organization made policy with or because of 
human rights. Considering the fact that human rights are fixed in na-
tional constitutions, as well as the OAS Charter and the American 
Declaration and Convention on Human Rights, it should be assumed 
that exclusively juridical bodies deal with those rights. Of course, hu-
man rights is sometimes an extremely sensitive issue, therefore, hu-
man rights policy is a quite well known term. This leads to the contro-
versial nature of human rights in the inter-American system. Due to 
this nature, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) was initially created for the promotion, and not the ex-
pressed legal realization, of human rights. The creators of the Com-
mission did not explicitly entitle it to make policy, but they did not 
                                                 
94  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79) Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Article 1. 
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exclude policy making from its tasks either. Accordingly, the IACHR 
interpreted its mandate to require an active promotion of human 
rights. Understandably, this caused resentment on the part of several 
Member States that had favored simply non-confrontational promo-
tion at a lower level. At first glance, the Commissions Statute and 
Regulations as well as the Declaration and the Convention seem to es-
tablish clear legal guidelines for the IACHR. However, the practical 
need to interpret these provisions converted the Commissions busi-
ness into sometimes highly political decisions.95 Thus, the insistence 
on the formal competence of the Commission, which declared it a le-
gal institution, must be viewed in relative terms. In fact, the IACHR 
has always made political decisions based on juridical instruments. 
In historical terms, there have often been natural predecessors to 
most contemporary political institutions.96 The IACHR is an exception 
to this rule, partially due to the fact that in general, human rights 
gained significant importance at the supranational level only after 
1945. Thus, the international protection of human rights represents a 
specific phenomenon of the post-war era. In many ways, the OAS 
Human Rights Commission was a type of institutional anomaly con-
sidering the organizations strong priority for national sovereignty and 
nonintervention. The OAS as an organization of sovereign States ap-
proved the Commissions Statute and financed its work, but this did 
not prevent the IACHR from accusing some of the same Member 
States of human rights abuses.97 Although the emergence of the topic 
                                                 
95  See César Sepúlveda  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the 
Organization of American States, 25 Years of Evolution and Endeavour, in: 
German Yearbook of International Law, Volume 28, 1985, p. 85. 
96  Gerhard Göhler  Politische Institutionen und ihr Kontext, Begriffliche und kon-
zeptionelle Überlegungen zur Theorie politischer Institutionen, in: Gerhard Göh-
ler (Ed.)  Die Eigenart der Institutionen, Zum Profil politischer Institutionenthe-
orie, Baden-Baden 1994, p. 21. 
97  Bryce Wood  Human Rights and the Inter-American System, in: Tom J. Farer 
(Ed.)  The Future of the Inter-American System, New York 1979, pp. 120/121. 
David Forsythe  Human Rights, The United States and the Organization of 
American States, in: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1991), p. 66. 
Sepúlveda, p. 47. Gómez adds: International or regional organs for the protec-
tion of human rights tend to be prisoners of the unending paradox of having been 
created and being nourished directly by the subjects they are meant to control. 
Verónica Gómez  The Interaction between the Political Actors of the OAS, the 
Commission, and the Court, in: Harris/Livingstone, p. 173. 
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itself and the establishment of human rights organs in international or-
ganizations were a common post-war tendency, the creation of a hu-
man rights agency by traditionally strict defenders of national sover-
eignty in Latin America seems to be surprising regarding the ques-
tionable human rights practice of various authorities. Nevertheless, in 
the beginning, the majority of the Member States actually were con-
vinced that such a commission would not dare to interfere in their in-
ternal affairs.  
At first sight, the irony of the Commissions existence may be ex-
plained by a comparison. The role of the Commission in the inter-
American system is like the one of a criminal prosecutor who is not 
only created but also financially sponsored by the potential delin-
quents.98 Consequently, one of the standardized strategies of defense 
of the States where human rights violations were common was to re-
mind the IACHR that its mere existence as well as its work was sup-
ported by the accused State.99 The respective governments cited the 
simple fact that human rights violations in a State could be publicized 
as a proof of the existence of freedom of opinion and the free atmos-
phere in their countries. 
In the beginning, the Commission was created as an organ with 
the simple task to further the respect and promote those rights. Not-
withstanding, the Commissioners were able to expand the weak pow-
ers of the IACHR in the following years and finally made it  at first 
                                                 
98  As Tom Farer, former member and chairman of the Commission, puts it: How 
could these conservatively dressed, middle-aged gentlemen, nominated and 
elected by the regions regimes, be harshly indicating various of their electors? 
Tom J. Farer  The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No longer 
a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, in: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 
1997, p. 511. Furthermore, a statement made by the Chilean Representative at the 
OAS regarding the Commissions criticism on his governments referendum to 
approve the Constitution of 1980, clearly shows the contradictions: ¿Con qué 
derecho un organismo de encuesta, que depende de una entidad internacional in-
tegrada por Chile, se permite formular cargos en forma oblicua en contra de un 
proceso tan exclusivamente reservado a la soberanía interna, como un plebiscito 
constitucional? Declaración del Embajador Pedro Daza sobre actuaciones de la 
C.I.D.H. y su Presidente, 1980. 
99  For example, the Chilean Representative, Mario Calderón, called his government 
unique because of its high level of cooperation with the IACHR and other or-
ganizations. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2, 3 noviembre 1980, Volumen II, Parte II, Noveno 
Período Ordinario de Sesiones, La Paz, Bolivia, del 22 al 31 de octubre, 1979, 
Primera Comisión, p. 17. 
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de facto, later legally  an authentic institution for the protection of 
human rights.100 If the Member States had known how this new insti-
tution would develop and how influential its work on human rights 
would be, it is likely many would have preferred not to create such a 
commission  some of the accused States might even have opted for a 
postnatal abortion of the unwanted child they had carried in 1959.101 
Although the OAS Member States did not successfully cut back 
the Commissions role but rather expanded it, as seen in the previous 
chapter, there were other obstacles for the IACHRs work. Probably 
one of the most influential factors for the Human Rights Commission 
was its financing. The percentage of the OAS budget spent for needs 
of the IACHR  save some minor exceptions  grew constantly be-
tween 1960 and 2000. Besides the principle expenditure for the staff 
salaries, the main expenses were the costs for on-site observations. 
The Commissioners themselves only received honorariums.102 The 
evolution of the Commissions financial resources can be divided in 
different phases. Between 1970 and 1977, steady growth at a moderate 
level continued as in the decade before. During the years of the Carter 
administration (1977-81), the budget was expanded, while the years 
from 1981 to 1988, the budget was stabilized and even temporarily re-
duced. From 1989 onwards, the IACHRs budget was increased, and 
this practice continued into the last decade. 
Interestingly enough, while the budget of the Commission con-
tinuously grew, the overall budget of the OAS underwent different 
developments.103 To this end, a former official of the Commission 
emphasizes the paradox between the decreasing OAS budget and the 
increasing resources and staff of the IACHR.104 This was due to the 
increasing importance of the human rights issue and the reputation the 
                                                 
100  Moral interdependence of neo-Iberian as well as Anglo Saxon elites, moral lead-
ership mostly by officials of the Inter-American Commission and Court plus the 
representatives of certain smaller states, and occasional US influence all pushed 
the declaratory regime toward strong promotion and weak protection at the same 
time. Forsythe, p. 96. 
101 See Tom Farer  The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No 
Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, in: Harris/Livingstone, p. 35; Christina Cerna 
 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Its Organization and Ex-
amination of Petitions and Communications, in: Harris/Livingstone, p. 69. 
102  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79), Statute of the IACHR, Article 13. 
103  See Budget Table, Annex. 
104  Interviews. 
Chapter II 70
Commission developed during the years. But the growth of the Com-
missions budget was also a result of the fact that it was more respon-
sive to political pressure from the US government and its financing 
than the other political organs of the OAS. In accordance, the major 
contributor to the OAS, the United States, provided additional money 
specifically to the IACHR, especially during the Carter administra-
tion.105 It was no longer functional for the US foreign policy to invest 
in the general competence of the OAS since these funds would most 
probably be used in unpredictable ways by the political organs (where 
the US was highly outclassed and out-voted). That was not the case 
with human rights, since it was a focused type of activity it could be 
and still is highly dependent on aid from the US to function. 
During the 1970s, the Commission received a continuously grow-
ing budget. In 1974  a crucial year for the Commission because of 
the transcendental Chilean case  Executive Secretary Luis Reque de-
plored the reductions proposed by the Program-Budget Subcommittee 
and called for a partial or entire restoration of the budget originally re-
quested by the IACHR.106 Subsequently, between 1974 and 1976 the 
Kennedy Amendment initiated by US Senator Edward Kennedy re-
sulted in an increase of the IACHR budget to the amount of 
$102,000.107 In 1975, the Chilean representative criticized the 
amendment as a hitherto unknown attack on the organizations auton-
omy.108 Unlike other OAS entities, the Commission had a quite good 
reputation in Washington, D.C.109 As a result, the US earmarked a cer-
tain amount of its OAS payment for the IACHR. Although the Chilean 
protest probably derived mostly from hypocrisy, article 118 of the 
                                                 
105  The Commission also received other donations, for instance a $7,500 contribu-
tion from France in 1991. Memorandum from Edith Márquez Rodríguez, to 
James B. McCeney, Treasurer of the OAS, September 5, 1991 (IACHR files). 
106  IACHR  Report on the Work Accomplished by the IACHR at its Thirty-Second 
Session (April 8-18, 1974), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.32 doc.31 rev.1, 20 February 1975, 
Original: Spanish, p. 58. 
107  Executive director Luis Reque thanked Senator Kennedy for his efforts to 
strengthen the Commission. Letter from Luis Reque, Executive Secretary of the 
IACHR, to US Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Washington, D.C., November 12, 
1975 (IACHR files). 
108  OEA/Ser.G, CP/ACTA 180/75, 19 de noviembre 1975, pp. 28-37 (here: p. 35). 
See Wood, pp. 143/144. 
109  David Forsythe  Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy. Congress Reconsid-
ered, Gainesville (Florida) 1988, pp. 133; 19/20. 
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OAS Charter determines the budgetary autonomy of the organization. 
In technical terms, the diplomatic demand by the US might be consid-
ered as a sort of unilateral imposition. US Congress tied the allocation 
of ...special funding to the I.A.C.H.R. as a gesture of support for hu-
man rights within the O.A.S. The Permanent Council of the organiza-
tion approved the special contribution from the United States to the 
IACHR on October 5, 1976. Eventually, in 1976, the Program and 
Budget Committee of the organization accepted the United States of-
fer to make up the 15 percent that had been deducted previously.110 
The Commission duly thanked the US government for their financial 
support.111 
As a matter of fact, the financing of the OAS depended mainly on 
the US, which contributed two thirds to the OAS budget. Therefore, 
the increased budget of the Commission could be interpreted as the 
political will of the US to strengthen the Human Rights Commission 
in particular. This is of importance because the OAS  especially in 
the United States  has always been criticized for its high costs for 
programs that were considered highly bureaucratic and hardly effec-
tive. In addition, the OAS staff was steadily reduced while the Execu-
tive Secretariat hired new personnel and received more resources. 
This clearly hints at the US position towards the OAS and the 
IACHR: the OAS was seen as an expensive, not very effective but 
necessary institutional link with Latin America, while conversely the 
Commission was perceived as helpful and effective. Moreover, the fi-
nancial support for the IACHR helped improve the reputation of the 
entire organization. Furthermore, the United States saw the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights as a cheaper and more po-
litically useful instrument to implement its human rights policy. Such 
a policy carried out unilaterally by the US would have caused harsh 
criticism but this was avoided because of the multilateral approach.112 
                                                 
110  Letter from Charles Moyer, Executive Secretary ad-interim, to Andrés Aguilar, 
Chairman, Washington, D.C., December 8, 1976 (IACHR files). 
111  Letter from Andrés Aguilar, Chairman of the IACHR, to Henry A. Kissinger, US 
Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., November 30, 1976 (IACHR files). 
112  Uruguays government, for instance, held that the US pressured the IACHR to 
visit Uruguay and spoke of interventionism. República Oriental del Uruguay, 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores  Los Derechos Humanos en Uruguay, re-
spuesta del Gobierno al Informe de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos 
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The most important increase in the budget took place in 1977 
when US president Carter proclaimed his human rights policy. The 
US provided more financial contributions to the IACHR ...because 
the Commission was so seriously under-funded...113 In 1977, the new 
Executive Secretary of the Commission demanded more money for 
on-site observations, new resources and more staff members. In ac-
cordance, he requested additional $274,600 for 1978, and $248,600 
for 1979.114 Notwithstanding, the IACHR budget for the fiscal year 
1978 was raised to $894,000 and for 1979 to $837,600. This meant an 
increase of 160 percent in comparison with the previous two-year 
budget.115 The extraordinary rise of its financial resources enabled the 
Commission to hire another five lawyers. Further, the IACHR estab-
lished a specialized library and documentation center. In 1977, the 
IACHR Secretariat was equipped with a computer system.116 Eventu-
ally, thanks to the financial support of the US government, the Com-
mission obtained an important logistical improvement through a mod-
ern data system. This meant a significant advantage, especially in con-
sideration of the extraordinary large number of cases handled by the 
Commission since the mid-seventies.117 Due to the increasing staff, 
the Commission also needed larger offices.118 The enlargement of the 
                                                                                                         
Humanos, de fecha 24 de Mayo de 1977, Montevideo, Setiembre de 1977, pp. 
14/15. 
113  Department of State, INR Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights, 
No. 6, May 23, 1977, p. 3 (NSA files). The Brazilian government complained 
about this unilateral action. 
114  Palabras pronunciadas por el Secretario Ejecutivo de la CIDH, Dr. Edmundo 
Vargas Carreño, ante la Comisión de Programa-Presupuesto, el día 12 de octubre 
de 1977 (IACHR files). 
115  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1977, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43 doc. 21, 20 
April 1978, Original: Spanish, p. 11. 
116  Letter from Alejandro Orfila, Secretary General of the Organization of American 
States, to Andrés Aguilar, Chairman of the IACHR, Washington, D.C., July 12, 
1977 (IACHR files). 
117  Further, new Wang Word Processing work stations were installed in 1983. 
Memorandum, from David Padilla, to: Staff of the IACHR, Washington, D.C., 
March 6, 1983. In 1988, the old Datapoint system was replaced by a new Com-
puter system. Memorandum, from Edmundo Vargas Carreño, to the IACHR per-
sonnel, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1988. In 1992, finally an internal commu-
nication computer network was installed (IACHR files). 
118  Letter from Edmundo Vargas Carreño to Andrés Aguilar, OAS Memorándum, 8 
de noviembre de 1977 (IACHR files). 
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Secretariats staff required even more additional financial resources. 
Also, money was spent on fellowships, exchange programs and semi-
nars in Europe, the organization of congresses and seminars all over 
Latin America, and particularly on on-site observations and other 
travel expenses of lawyers and members. By the end of 1983, the 
IACHR Secretariat moved to the OAS Building on Washington, 
D.C.s F Street, a few blocks from the White House, where it has been 
located until today. But besides these mainly administrative improve-
ments, the most important advantage of the increased financial re-
sources was that it enabled the Commission to undertake more on-site 
observations.119 
In the 1980s, the withholding of US funds to the OAS during the 
Reagan administration exceedingly damaged the organization and the 
human rights system.120 While US president Reagan was in office, the 
Commissions budget did not grow significantly and did not experi-
ence the constant and proportional rise of the foregoing years and the 
years following 1989. In 1989/1990, the resources of the IACHR were 
again expanded, this time by the Bush administration. The percentage 
of the OAS Regular Fund attributed to the IACHR fell from an aver-
age of 1,73 percent (1978-1981) to an average of 1,67 percent during 
the Reagan years (budgets for 1982-1989). 
The development of the number of staff lawyers in the Executive 
Secretariat probably provides a more comprehensive view of the fi-
nancial situation. Before the Carter administration took office, the Se-
cretariat had six attorneys. Between 1978 and 1981, the number of 
lawyers grew from six to 10 due to the increased budget. In contrast, 
in 1982, there were still ten professionals, but between 1983 and 1987 
the number was reduced to six. In light of the Reagan years, this 
shows that the IACHR did not have the resources to hire new staff 
members, and it was forced to dismiss some lawyers. The IACHR 
complained about the reduction of annual meetings, its incapacity to 
prepare more reports, to handle more individual cases, and to conduct 
on-site investigations. Likewise, the next years witnessed frequent ob-
jections brought up by the IACHR chairpersons who deplored the re-
                                                 
119  IACHR  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
1978, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47 doc. 13 rev. 1, 29 June 1979, Original: Spanish, p. 12. 
120  Forsythe, p. 86. 
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duced staff.121 Consequently, chairwoman Gilda Russomano requested 
two new lawyers to compensate for the lack of the Secretariats staff-
ing capacities.122 Her request was heeded: in December 1987, two va-
cancies were filled. As an illustrative agenda point, in 1989 chairman 
Valladares Lanza proposed to undertake a critical self-evaluation of 
Commissions activities in a period of financial difficulties.123 In 
general, the IACHR budget in the 1980s did not leave much space to 
hire new lawyers. Further, unfortunate events such as the nomination 
of staff lawyers to take over government positions demonstrated that 
the Commissions Secretariat had to struggle with personal shortcom-
ings. This must have affected the Commissions work at that time. 
Besides the budgetary question, it is important to discuss the 
members who were part of the Commission in order to provide an 
overview of the personnel of the IACHR. Article 3.1. of the Statute al-
lowed the governments of the OAS Member States to nominate own 
candidates as well as nationals of other countries belonging to the or-
                                                 
121  See Annual Report of the IACHR 1984-1985, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66 doc. 10 rev. 1, 
October 1st 1985, Original: Spanish, p. 18. In 1985, chairman César Sepúlveda 
expressed his worries about the planned reductions to the IACHR budget. Letter 
from César Sepúlveda to Edmundo Vargas Carreño, Bonn, June 4, 1985; Letter 
from César Sepúlveda to Secretary General João Baena Soares, Bonn, June 1, 
1985. As a result, the IACHR cancelled the Rómulo Gallegos fellowship program 
in 1984 and 1985. In 1986, Sepúlvedas successor, Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, had 
to deplore that of the reduced staff  at that time, nine lawyers worked at the Se-
cretariat  one died in an accident, another was named Vice Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and a third was promoted to an important post in the General Secretariat 
and finally, a fourth attorney retired. Palabras del Dr. Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, 
Presidente de la C.I.D.H. en la sesión del 68° período de sesiones de la CIDH, p. 
4 (IACHR files). 
122  Due to a budgetary cut of the OAS, the Commission lost four positions (two law-
yers and two administrative posts) between 1981 and 1987. In late summer of 
1987, Chairwoman Russomano and the Executive Secretary met with OAS Sec-
retary General Baena Soares to discuss the financial calamities of the IACHR. 
Baena Soares, however, distracted hopes that he could help the Commission in 
times of serious financial problems of the organization. Discurso de la presidenta 
de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos  Humanos, Dra. Gilda M.C.M. de 
Russomano, ante la Comisión Preparatoria del Décimoséptimo Período Ordinario 
de Sesiones de la Asamblea General, el día 23 de septiembre de 1987; Letter 
from Gilda Maciel Correa Russomano to George McKenzie, Chairman of the 
Program-Budget Committee, Permanent Council, April 1, 1987 (IACHR files). 
123  Letter from Leo Valladares Lanza, to Edmundo Vargas Carreño, Tegucigalpa, 
March 8, 1989 (IACHR files). 
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ganization. Each government could propose up to three nominees, 
while at least one of the candidates was required to be of a different 
nationality than the proposing State. The seven members of the 
IACHR must all be of different nationalities.124 While the Member 
States occasionally presented up to three candidates during the 
1960s125, several governments proposed only one own nominee for the 
IACHR in the subsequent decades.126 According to Sepúlveda and the 
reviewed files, a sort of lobbying among the OAS Member States for 
their own candidate was the usual technique.127 
The Meeting of Consultation of 1959 determined that seven Mem-
bers should be elected to form the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. The conference did not provide an explanation for this 
number, but it seems to be a proof that the Commission should not be 
created as an intergovernmental institution.128 Further, an enlargement 
of the Commission would certainly have complicated the difficult de-
cision-taking processes to an unbearable extent. Reportedly, this 
small-group dynamic permitted the members to get to know each 
other well.129 
It was designed so that the seven members of the IACHR should 
be elected as individuals and not as representatives of their corre-
sponding governments that had to propose them. They should rather 
represent all Member States and act in the name of the Organization of 
American States. Since the adoption of its new Statute in 1979, it was 
the Commission and not its individual members which represented all 
                                                 
124  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79), Statute of the IACHR, Articles 3 and 7. 
125  In 1968, the governments of Brazil, Chile and Mexico obviously cooperated in 
regard to the proposal of Commission members: all three States presented the 
Brazilian Carlos Dunshee de Abranches, the Mexican Gabino Fraga and the 
Chilean Manuel Bianchi as their candidates. All three candidates were elected  
also thanks to the trilateral alliance. 
126  LeBlanc holds: This is not to say, however, that the Council has been forced to 
choose from among less qualified individuals: political considerations could be 
expected to influence the outcome of the elections no matter how long the list of 
nominees would be. LeBlanc, p. 59. 
127  The established praxis is that the ministry of foreign affairs of the country con-
cerned seeks support in advance for the candidate, so that he may be presented to 
the General Assembly with the probability of success. Sepúlveda, p. 53. 
128  In contrast, the European Human Rights Commission was composed of a repre-
sentative from each Member State. 
129  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
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Member States.130 The members were not required to take an oath and 
there were no regulations until 1979 which would have prohibited 
their participation in governmental activities. This could feed the as-
sumption that the impartiality of the members was not institutionally 
assured. For LeBlanc, however, there was no sign that the Commis-
sion as a whole did favor or discriminate any particular government.131 
However, this statement to some extent should be revised after analyz-
ing the Commissions activities during the 1980s. 
Since 1960, it is set up so that six months before new elections the 
OAS Secretary General requests the representatives of the Council, re-
spectively since 1970 those of the Permanent Council, to present their 
candidates. In case of death or resignation of a Commissioner, the 
Commissions chairman is obliged to immediately inform the Secre-
tary General who then imparts to the governments. Subsequently, the 
latter must propose a new nominee within a month. Then, the vacancy 
is not filled if there are less than six months until the next regular elec-
tions.132 For example, a month after Commissioner Carlos A. Dunshee 
de Abranches died in August 1983, Prof. Dr. Gilda Maciel Corrêa 
Meyer Russomano was elected to succeed her deceased Brazilian 
compatriot as a Commission member. 
Since the adoption of the new IACHR Statute in 1979, the mem-
bers of the Commission have been elected for a period of four years 
with the possibility of one re-election.133 During the 1960s and 1970s, 
this limitation to the re-election was not applied yet, which explains 
the long terms of office of some members.134 Although there are some 
provisions in the IACHR Statute of 1979 that offer the possibility of 
depriving a Commissioner due to his/her inappropriate behavior, such 
a measure has not been used yet.135 
                                                 
130  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79) Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Article 2. 2. 
131  LeBlanc, p. 51-53. It is necessary to know that LeBlancs inquiry ends in the 
mid-seventies. Also Nacimiento states that since its creation the IACHR has em-
ployed an objective and systematic procedure, which not only served to control 
the human rights situations in a State but also to guarantee the protection of the 
individual. Nacimiento, p. 104. 
132  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79), Statute of the IACHR, Article 11. 
133  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79), Statute of the IACHR, Article 6. 
134  See Appendix. 
135  See Medina Quiroga, pp. 120/121. 
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Furthermore, the Commission elected a chairman and since the en-
try-into-force of the new Statute in 1980, a first and second vice 
chairman. Since 1980, the chairmans term was limited to a year in of-
fice  also a result of the experience with unsatisfying long-term 
presidencies in the 1960s and 1970s. The chairperson presides over 
the Commission, leads the sessions, and represents the IACHR before 
all other OAS organs and other entities.136 In 1985, the regulations 
were modified with regard to internal discussions. One new aspect 
was the prohibition of participating in a discussion, an investigation, 
or decision-making process if the considered members were nationals 
or permanent residents of the State that was generally or specifically 
regarded by the Commission, or if the members were accredited to or 
in charge of a special mission. Also if they were acting as diplomatic 
agents on behalf of the concerned State or if ...they have participated 
in any capacity in a decision concerning the same facts on which the 
matter is based or have acted as an adviser to, or representative of, any 
of the parties involved in the decision.137 This new regulation appar-
ently derived from the experience with certain members during the 
previous years. 
The work of the Commissioners is only a part-time job, though an 
unusually progressive draft statute of 1959 assigned full-time mem-
bers. This could be interpreted either as a weakness or an advantage 
for the Commission. The fact that the members only met for a few 
weeks  according to article 15 of the Statute, eight weeks  at ordi-
nary and extraordinary sessions during a year leads to the assumption 
that those sporadic meetings must have influenced the interpersonal 
communication structures. At the few meetings, there might have been 
the problem to feel and adjust the relations between the members until 
the communication was normalized. On the other hand, it might be 
concluded that the professions and different impressions gained by the 
Commissioners in their countries and elsewhere helped them to view 
the reality not only from an isolated Commissions perspective. The 
rare meetings could also have been an advantage and the normal life 
outside the IACHR a refreshing factor for the Commissions func-
tioning.138 
                                                 
136  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79), Statute of the IACHR, Article 14. 
137  Medina Quiroga, pp. 121, 122. 
138  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
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The Commission members were in the most cases extraordinarily 
busy personalities who worked as attorneys, diplomats or business-
men. Therefore, the very tense timetables, including urgent meetings 
and decisions outside the Commission, might have had negative af-
fects due to the required amount of attention and to the receptivity and 
patience of the Commissioners. Certainly the members of the Com-
mission were people used to working under stress and time pressure, 
but the question must be raised if the tight timetable did not constitute 
a problem for the decision-making processes in such a sensitive field 
as human rights. For certain situations, the necessary sensitivity could 
have been disregarded due to the density and lack of time of the 
Commissions sessions, which sometimes went from early in the 
morning to late at night.139 
According to former IACHR member Farer, the meetings of the 
Commission were extremely polite. He compares the conversation 
procedure with the English parliamentary style. Understandingly, 
Spanish was the prevailing language during the Commission sessions. 
In the first decades, the dominance of Spanish was not a serious prob-
lem for non-Latin Americans because overall the US Commissioners 
and the Brazilian members understood Spanish. Conversely, some 
Latin American members had problems speaking or even understand-
ing English.140 The euphemistic terminology entiende el inglés (un-
derstands English) that appeared on several curriculum vitae of Latin 
American nominees actually merely served to circumscribe the factual 
lack of a workable proficiency in English. Likewise, in the 1980s 
there were members from the Caribbean who did not speak any Span-
ish  obviously, this must have complicated the discussions and the 
decision-making process in which the Commissioners sometimes ar-
gued on small items such as adjectives.141 
                                                 
139  Interviews. 
140  During the interview with Dean Farer, the author was particularly interested in 
the forms used by the Commissioners because American English usually is per-
ceived as a very direct, even undiplomatic language. In contrast, Latin Ameri-
can Spanish has the reputation  especially in diplomacy  to tend to circum-
scribe issues and employ infinite polite phrases. Farer, however, liked the mutual 
treatment during the Commission sessions  with diplomatic politeness  while 
he preferred ...to tell the truth in the most blunt way, and the Commission re-
ports are very blunt. Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 
30, 1999. 
141  Interviews. 
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It is necessary also to examine the Commissioners background: 
From which professional and social origin were the majority of the 
Commission members? In the 1970s and 1980s, the members of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights came mainly from the 
big Member States of the OAS. This is not surprising since the num-
ber of experts in human rights matters in the Central American or the 
Caribbean States was rather small. However, during the 1980s, more 
representatives of small countries became members of the IACHR. 
A sort of unofficial regional quota was established that ensured that 
there was a Commission member from Central America and later also 
from the Caribbean. All members possessed an academic degree, the 
most were jurists with a doctoral degree.142 However, the few mem-
bers who did not enjoy a juridical education showed a particular inter-
est in questions of international relations and international law within 
their disciplines  mostly political science and diplomacy. Many 
Commissioners taught law as college professors or continued to work 
in the diplomatic service. The overwhelming majority of the Commis-
sioners were, at the time of their elections, older than 40 years, and in 
many cases over 60 or 70 years. Thus, each Commissioner brought a 
large life experience from different fields, and most likely a more con-
servative attitude considering that stereotypically, an older person is 
often more old-fashioned set in their ways. In addition, among the 
Commissioners were an ex-president, Prof. Rómulo Gallegos from 
Venezuela,143 and several former ministers. The curriculum vitae of 
the Commissioners include substantial listings of national and interna-
tional prizes and awards for their professional or academic achieve-
ments. 
All of these aspects lead to confirm that the members generally fit 
the Statutes requirements. These provisions requested persons of 
high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human 
                                                 
142  It should be mentioned that the academic title of a doctor in each State has a 
different rank. For instance, lawyers are usually called doctor in Latin America 
though they did not present a doctoral dissertation. 
143  According to Tirado Mejía, Gallegos was elected as the Commissions first presi-
dent in 1959 because former Colombian president, Eduardo Santos, had to refuse 
the Commissions chairmanship for personal reasons. Álvaro Tirado Mejía  The 
O.A.S. and Colombia, Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogotá 1998, p. 
252. 
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rights to become Commissioners.144 However, the members dedica-
tion to human rights was quite different.145 As former Commissioner 
Farer points out, the membership was a commitment, not a job.146 
From 1960 until 1991, only three women were elected to become 
Commissioners, and only Gilda Russomano from Brazil was elected 
Chairwoman. The dominance of men is reflected in the entire organi-
zation and makes a comparison with the social structures in the Mem-
ber States inevitable. The question as to which extent the male per-
spective of this boys club influenced the Commissions decisions in 
regard to womens rights, or the special implications of human rights 
violations against women, is debatable.147 It is obvious that at least in 
certain situations, the majority of the male Commissioners lacked sen-
sitivity to the special conditions under which women experienced re-
pression. This is reflected in the marginalized mentioning of gender-
specific abuses in the IACHR reports. The fact that women are differ-
ently and particularly affected by human rights violations  socially as 
mother, wife148, and concretely as victim of sexual violence and rape  
is not expressed in the reports reviewed for the period of the present 
investigation. This unawareness can be explained by the dominant 
male perspective of the Commission, but also with the perception of 
womens rights as luxury rights, which were considered to be impor-
tant only in times where massive and systematic violations ceased. In 
sum, Medina concludes that between 1960 and 1994, the IACHR did 
                                                 
144  AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79), Statute of the IACHR, Article 2. 1. 
145  Interviews. 
146  Interview with Dean Tom J. Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
147  It is always necessary to distinguish between human rights of women and 
womens rights. In general, women are differently affected by human rights vio-
lations than men. Besides typical violations like murder, torture, forced disap-
pearance, women often suffer rape, sexual encroachment and sexual degradation 
and were therefore particularly affected by state and para-state terror. In addition, 
women were attributed an extraordinary difficult social role after the disappear-
ance or definitive death of their relatives. In their roles as mother, wife or daugh-
ter, women found themselves in the position to care about broken relatives, 
which meant a particular difficult task because it set them  besides the immedi-
ate burden  also under social pressure. 
148  There are some exceptions, however. For instance, the Argentine Report did 
mention the psychological and social consequences of disappearances for the vic-
tims wives and children. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights  Re-
port on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49 doc.19 
corr.1, 11 abril 1980, Original: Spanish, new edition 1999, p. 137. 
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not regard the plight of women in the hemisphere sufficiently impor-
tant to deal with the issue  neither in relation to its promotional nor 
its supervisory performance.149 
Besides the prevailing male composition of the IACHR during 
these years, another characteristic shared by most members of the 
Commission was their social background. The majority descended 
from relatively wealthy families. This raises the question as to what 
extent the social-cultural background of the Commissioners affected 
their ability to perceive and judge the reality of the needy. Certainly, it 
must have been very difficult for a person with a background of eco-
nomic comfort and security to completely seize the situation of the 
poor majority of the population that had to fight for survival every 
day.150 The mentioning of the economic, social and cultural conditions 
or rights in the IACHR reports is subject of chapter II. 3. 
It is relatively difficult to make out the political orientation of the 
Commission members and their potential influence on the decisions of 
the IACHR because the minutes of the proceedings are not only con-
fidential OAS documents but restricted exclusively to the Commission 
members. In general, the Commissioners could be described as con-
servative-moderate and divided into the categories center-right and 
center-left. The fact that governments proposed the candidates ensured 
that no real extremists were elected. On the other hand, and this 
should always be taken into account, the candidates chosen by the 
governments usually did not completely differ in opinion from the lat-
ter. Although the Commissioners formally served in their personal ca-
pacity and not as representatives of their respective governments, this 
requirement lost some validity in reality. The fact that a seven-
member entity was more vulnerable to the influence of the govern-
ments of big Member States must be considered as well.151 For in-
stance, former Commissioner Farer described the Commission of 
                                                 
149  Cecilia Medina  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
Women, with Particular Reference to Violence, in: The Role of the Nation-State 
in the 21st Century. Human Rights, International Organizations and Foreign Pol-
icy. Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr, edited by Monique Castermans-
Holleman/Fried van Hoof/Jacqueline Smith (SIM), Dordrecht (Netherlands) 
1998, pp. 117, 124. 
150  Of course, the author himself is not able to perceive the reality of the poor people 
entirely because of a different Sitz im Leben (place in life). 
151  Kokott, p. 33. 
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1976 as composed of members, deriving from the national establish-
ment and selected by their governments, who found it difficult to 
condemn governments and easily rationalized special measures 
adopted by States152: The members themselves were people whose 
moderation, respectability, and sensibility to the OAS tradition of 
live and let live seemed confirmed by the very fact of their nomina-
tion.153  
In accordance, the Commission members can be divided into dif-
ferent groups: traditionalists, progressive activists and irresolute 
members. Individuals that maintained a traditional Latin American 
human rights diplomacy, which meant not to blame governments 
openly, usually confronted the progressive activists that were deter-
mined to criticize States publicly, if necessary. The third group of 
waving members mostly decided upon a case-to-case basis, which 
preponderantly also depended on the other groups ability to convince 
them. In the 1970s, the activist faction was able to dominate the 
IACHR and therefore succeeded in improving the reputation of the 
Commission. Unfortunately, the Commission of the 1980s cannot be 
described as dominated by successful activists with regard to the visi-
ble and challenging Central American conflicts. The fact that the per-
formance of the IACHR in the foregoing decade had provided the 
Commission highest respect at the regional and international level was 
not especially advantageous for the institution in the Central American 
civil wars of the 1980s. The apparent interest of the US not to expose 
the human rights issue in these conflicts or even to use it for its pur-
poses might also have found expression in the IACHRs handling of 
the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran cases. In contrast, it was also the 
United States that strengthened the Commission during the 1970s  
even before the Carter administration took office. 
In short, the governmental influence on the members was in some 
cases substantial while in other cases of less importance, but in gen-
eral, it did not necessarily constitute the major problem for the 
IACHR. Nevertheless, it would be naive to expect only independent 
and impartial personalities in the Commission as required by the Stat-
ute. For instance, after the coup in his country in 1973, the Chilean 
                                                 
152  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
153  Tom J. Farer  The Grand Strategy, p. 92, emphasis in the original. 
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member abandoned his impartiality.154 Further, the Salvadoran mem-
ber Francisco Bertrand Galindo served at the same time as ambassador 
of his country to Guatemala  making it unlikely that he could act as 
an independent individual as required by the Commissions Statute.155 
Bertrand Galindo, who was one of the most controversial members in 
regard to his integrity, was elected before the new Statute of 1979 en-
tered into force.156 The modification of the Commissions Statute in 
1980 considered the exercise of any function or position which could 
affect the independence or impartiality of a Commissioner as incom-
patible with the membership.157 This was clearly directed against 
members who also served as representatives of their governments. 
Another example is the Brazilian Commissioner who was presented 
by the military government. In fact, he dissented on many critical 
resolutions. Also, Mexican Commission member Gabino Fraga fre-
quently held that the IACHR was an international and by no means a 
supranational organ; therefore the word of a government should 
weight more.158 
Although several members integrity was not entirely ensured, the 
Commission as a whole did show a remarkable degree of impartiality 
during the 1970s and with limitations also in the 1980s. The fact that 
many Commissioners were conventional in their methodology and 
also with their political convictions, gave the Commission a certain 
reputation of seriousness in the more traditional diplomatic environ-
ment and enabled it to improve its good reputation. 
                                                 
154  Interviews. 
155  Interestingly, it was also the then Permanent Representative Bertrand Galindo 
who sent the invitation to the IACHR for the on-site investigation in El Salvador 
that took place in 1978. See: Christina Cerna  The Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights: Its Organization and Examination of Petitions and Communi-
cations, in: Harris/Livingstone, p. 71. 
156  Interviews. 
157  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1980-1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 
rev. 1., 16 October 1981, Original: Spanish, p. 10 (Article 8 of the new Statute). 
Moreover, Article 10 provided sanction options if Article 9 was not respected. 
AG/RES. 447 (IX-0/79): Estatuto de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, in: OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2, 2 julio 1980, Volumen I: Actas y Documentos,  
Textos certificados de las resoluciones, p. 94. 
158  See, for instance: IACHR Report on the Work Accomplished by the IACHR Dur-
ing its Twenty-Eighth Session (Special), (May 1 through 5, 1972), 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.28 doc. 24 rev.1, 24 August 1972, Original: Spanish, p. 17. 
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In summary, the Commission was constituted by preponderantly 
male and mainly conservative personalities who  save some excep-
tions  did professionally regard human rights as an important issue or 
in some cases even as a personal commitment.159 Generally, the dy-
namic or, respectively the lack of activism within the Commission de-
termined its performance during the 1970s and 1980s. 
On the whole, the US Commissioner potentially had a crucial po-
sition in the IACHR due to the importance of the United States in the 
OAS; as former Commissioner Tom Farer states: The American is 
always elected. Accordingly, a Commission without a US American 
member would presumably have less prestige, and with the US mem-
ber it demonstrated the US commitment to the system.160 For the pe-
riod of this investigation this meant that Robert Woodward, Tom J. 
Farer, Bruce McColm and John Stevenson were entrusted with the 
important responsibility of giving the Commission authority. If the 
Commissioner of US origin was weak, less informed or less interested 
in human rights matters, this also affected the functioning and above 
all, the impact of the IACHR and its activities. 
In general, Robert Woodwards membership (1972-76) was help-
ful but less influential for the whole Commission. Woodward, who 
served as US Ambassador to Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile and Spain 
between 1954 and 1965, supported the decisions by the activists 
Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga from Uruguay and the brilliant Venezue-
lan diplomat Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley. Woodward described himself 
as interested but as Commissioner more supportive of the dynamic 
group around Aguilar than pioneering.161 
In contrast, Woodwards successor, the international law expert 
Tom J. Farer, became one of the most influential Commission mem-
bers during its prominent period. He provided a quite critical ap-
proach. Due to his comments, Farer, who served between 1976 and 
1983, formed a dynamic trio together with the Commissions chair-
man, Andrés Aguilar, and the Costa Rican member Volio Jiménez, 
supported by the Chilean Executive Secretary Edmundo Vargas Car-
reño. Farer introduced the topic of economic, social and cultural rights 
                                                 
159  Accordingly, regarding the implied institutional threat of the Commission to treat 
the governments not too harshly, Bryce Wood concludes: The IACHR is no 
pussyfooting or whitewashing organization. Wood, p. 128. 
160  Interviews. 
161  Interview with Robert Woodward, Washington, D.C., December 6, 1999. 
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to the Commission reports. He was nominated by the Republican Ford 
administration. Despite his differences with the then Secretary of 
State, Henry Kissinger, he gained support of the State Department.162 
The fact that the Democratic Carter administration supported Farers 
re-election seems to contradict the simple assumption that all Com-
missioners were merely representatives of their governments. Farer, 
however, had an impact on the Commissions work because he was 
dedicated to the issues, as were Aguilar and to some extent the former 
Costa Rican Minister of Education and the Presidency, Volio Jiménez. 
This impact found expression in the recognition of the Commissioners 
who elected Farer to become the first chairman of the IACHR with US 
citizenship. During his term as a member but especially as head of the 
Commission, Farer published several critical articles on the situation 
in Latin America that provoked harsh replies by the concerned gov-
ernments.163 Farer responded to one critical comment on his perform-
ance that the Commissions task to expose discrepancies between con-
stitutional rights and the reality in OAS countries would lead to un-
just, ill-informed, even malicious criticism.164 
When Reagan became US president in 1981, the support for hu-
man rights matters in general, and for institutions that blamed allied 
right-wing governments for their abuses in particular, diminished. 
Farer stated that ...our relations with the Reagan administration peo-
ple were not amicable...165 and he himself was quickly seen as an ob-
stacle for the new foreign policy approach of the US government.166 
This tendency was manifested in the nomination of one of the few 
non-lawyers to become Farers successor.  
Bruce McColm, a journalist and human rights activist at the con-
servative Freedom House, did not have such an impact as did his 
                                                 
162  Interview with William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs 1974-1977, November 9, 1999, Washington, D.C.; Interview 
with Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
163  For example, see: Declaración del Embajador Pedro Daza sobre actuaciones de la 
C.I.D.H. y su Presidente, 1980; See: OEA/Ser.G/CP/ACTA 455/81, 6 de mayo 
1981, Consejo Permanente  Acta de la Sesión Ordinaria celebrada el 6 de mayo 
de 1981. 
164  Tom J. Farer, Statement on Pedro Dazas declaration, 1980. 
165  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
166  Reportedly, the Reagan administration sought to oust Farer as Commissioner as 
early as in 1981. 
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predecessor. McColm, member from 1984 until 1988, focused mainly 
on human rights abuses committed by the left-wing Sandinista gov-
ernment in Nicaragua. His concentration on events in Nicaragua might 
have contributed to the negligible covering of the massive abuses in El 
Salvador. McColm could be described as integer though there were 
critics who called him disparagingly Reagans candidate. McColm 
himself ascertained that the US authorities assured him to act inde-
pendently and without any obstructions of the Reagan administra-
tion.167 While there are voices confirming that McColm had an au-
thentic human rights commitment, for Farer he was an inappropriate 
candidate and ...a right-wing ideologue on matters in Latin Amer-
ica168 Likewise, Bonner criticized his nomination as an affront to the 
organization and cited the New York Times that saw him as a po-
lemicist who has dealt almost exclusively with the sins of the left.169 
In any case, the reading of his articles on Central America feeds the 
impression that he perceived the situation in the isthmus from a Cold 
War perspective.170 Moreover, McColms young age he was 33 years 
old when elected  might have affected his acceptance by the older 
Commissioners. Although McColm was a capable human rights activ-
ist, the fact that the Reagan administration proposed him and the fact 
that he was not a lawyer weakened the important impact of the role of 
the US Commissioner at that time. He did not seek to serve for a sec-
ond term, probably a sign of his position in the IACHR.171 
McColms successor, John Reese Stevenson, president and princi-
pal partner of the New York based law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, as 
well as special advisor of several US delegations, had served as the 
principal lawyer for the State Department. For a former US diplomat 
to the OAS, Stevenson had a great dignity and an immense moral 
weight.172 Stevenson could be described as an honest person with in-
terest in regards to human rights. But the argument with which he 
                                                 
167  Interviews. 
168  Interviews; Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
169  Raymond Bonner  Weakness and Deceit. U.S. Policy and El Salvador, New 
York 1984, pp. 247/248. 
170  See, for instance, R. Bruce McColm  Central America: The Larger Regional 
Scenario, in: Walter F. Hahn (Ed.)  Central America and the Reagan Doctrine, 
Lanham/London 1987, pp. 1-27. 
171  Interviews. 
172  Interviews. 
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withdrew from the Commission, his age, and the health problems he 
suffered, contributed him maintaining a more subordinated role.173 
The fact that neither McColm nor Stevenson became chairman of the 
Commission supports the thesis that both did not act in a way that 
gave members sufficient confidence to consider awarding them the 
chairmanship. 
The composition of the Commission during the years of this inves-
tigation shows that besides the United States, there were nationalities 
that have almost always been represented: Venezuelans, Brazilians, 
and Mexicans (until 1985). Former Commissioner Tom Farer speaks 
of a tradition that certain countries, above all the United States, will 
always have a member on the Commission.174 For Argentina, the 
situation was different, since after the end of Genaro Carriós term in 
1976, the Argentine military government did not provide a new candi-
date to the Commission. However, since the redemocratization in 
1983/1984, there has been an Argentine Commissioner. Furthermore, 
as mentioned above, always one Central American member was 
elected  later on this unwritten regional quota was extended to the 
Caribbean. 
In 1972, the new members Andrés Aguilar, Genaro Carrió and 
Robert Woodward joined the Commission, resulting in a new compo-
sition that would further shape the Commissions dynamic. Report-
edly, the first dominant bloc consisted of Aguilar, Carrió, Jiménez de 
Aréchaga with the able support of Woodward. Andrés Aguilar had an 
incomparable impact on the Commission because he was truly com-
mitted to the cause of human rights.175 In 1976, US law professor Tom 
J. Farer replaced his compatriot Woodward. Subsequently, two main 
                                                 
173  Stevenson resigned in May 1990. He explained his decision with his age and his 
responsibility as director of the National Gallery of Arts, which would require his 
full engagement. Letter from John R. Stevenson, to Leo Valladares Lanza, 
Chairman, Washington, D.C., May 24, 1990 (IACHR files). Such a choice of pri-
orities by a Commissioner might express a certain lack of commitment to human 
rights despite the highly commendable nature of his latter professional engage-
ments. 
174  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
175  In a letter, Aguilar acknowledged to be touched (conmovido) by a testimony. 
This example illustrates Aguilars commitment and compassion with victims of 
abuses. Letter from Andrés Aguilar, August 8, 1984 (IACHR files). 
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currents prevailed on the IACHR: an activist faction and a more tradi-
tionalist-legalist group.  
According to several sources, in the second half of the 1970s, 
Farer and Aguilar, supported by Volio Jiménez, were a dynamic group 
within the Commission. The Christian Democrat Andrés Aguilar, 
former Minister of Justice (1958-1962), was a diplomat from the 
Venezuelan elite with excellent contacts all over Latin America. Agui-
lar176 is unanimously named as the most important and influential 
member and chairman of the IACHR from the 1970s and beyond.177 
Commissioner Farer stated that after his own election, he became 
Aguilars protégé.178 Farer describes Volio as a typical academic 
politician from the upper-middle class in Costa Rica, who was dedi-
cated to rule of law and democracy. Further, he saw Volio Jiménez as 
soft-hearted, especially when he had to visit prisons. According to 
Farer, this group of activists, set up by Aguilar, Volio and himself, had 
to convince two other members who were considered not to be strong 
personalities. Similarly, a former IACHR lawyer holds that Farers 
and Aguilars intellectual weight and dynamism occasionally imposed 
or attracted Volio and the Colombian Monroy Cabra.179 However, 
Farer remarks that Volio changed his attitude concerning the Central 
American conflicts during the 1980s when he ...became obsessed 
with the Sandinistas.180  
In any case, Aguilars activism, courage and intelligence led the 
Commission and practically neutralized dissenting opinions by reach-
ing a majority vote. These dissenting opinions were notoriously 
brought up by the Brazilian member181, law professor Carlos A. Dun-
                                                 
176  Aguilar served also as a member of the UN Human Rights Commission in Ge-
neva and later on at the International Court of Justice. 
177  Interviews. 
178  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
179  Interviews. 
180  As stated by Farer. Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 
30, 1999. See: Nestor D. Sánchez  Revolutionary Change and the Nicaraguan 
People, in: Hahn (Ed.), pp. 107/108. 
181  For instance: IACHR Report on the Work Accomplished by the IACHR during 
its Twenty-Fifth Session (March 1 through 12, 1971), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.25 doc. 41 
rev., 3 November 1971, Original: Spanish, p. 28; IACHR Report on the Work 
Accomplished by the IACHR During its Twenty-Eighth Session (Special), (May 
1 through 5, 1972), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.28 doc. 24 rev.1, 24 August 1972, Original: 
Spanish, p. 22, 26/27. Nevertheless, Chairman Jiménez de Aréchaga was appar-
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shee de Abranches, who was considered to be a fierce defender of 
governments.182 Dunshee de Abranches, who served as the Commis-
sions chairman between November 1978 and May 1979, was con-
nected to the Brazilian upper class and was known as conservative and 
as a strong advocate of the non-intervention principle.183 However, 
Farer states that Dunshee de Abranches lacked a strong personality 
and had a more defensive character.184 On the other hand, Dunshee 
apparently was a legalist and thereby somehow contributed to the 
cause of human rights as well  but not as a progressive activist, more 
as a juridical purist. Furthermore, the former Guatemalan Foreign 
Minister and Ambassador to the United States, Carlos García Bauer, 
IACHR member between 1976 and 1979, was considered to be part of 
a minor right-wing faction within the Commission that like Dunshee 
followed a pro-government tendency.185 The Salvadoran Ambassador 
to Guatemala, Francisco Bertrand Galindo, was a member whose im-
partial dedication to human rights was questioned. He was elected into 
the Commission before the October coup of 1979 ousted the dictator-
ship of General Romero.186 His election was intended to prevent the 
election of a former staff lawyer of the IACHR Secretariat, Roberto 
Alvarez, who was regarded as too liberal or even as a leftist among 
authoritarian Member States. In order to accomplish a sort of equilib-
rium in relation to the Commissions composition, Bertrand Galindo 
became a candidate of the right. Galindo had served as OAS Repre-
sentative for the Romero regime and in other public functions. Not-
withstanding, the United States opposed his nomination and unsuc-
                                                                                                         
ently annoyed by Dunshees dissenting opinions and wanted to leave them out of 
the documents since they were not obligatory. Letter Justino Jiménez de Aré-
chaga to Carlos Dunshee de Abranches, Montevideo, February 5, 1974 (IACHR 
files). 
182  IACHR files. 
183  Interviews. 
184  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
185  In 1969, Dunshee de Abranches as well as the Guatemalan member García Bauer 
were delegates of the delegations of Brazil and Guatemala at the Special Confer-
ence on Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica. At that meeting, the American 
Convention on Human Rights was drafted and approved. 
186  See: Annual Report of the IACHR 1979-1980, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 50, Doc. 13 rev. 
1, 2 October 1980, Original: Spanish, p. 18. 
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cessfully voted for Alvarez.187 Once, Bertrand Galindo described him-
self indirectly as a representative of the traditional Latin American 
right-wing fraction.188 In at least one instance, Bertrand Galindo 
clearly did not completely comply with the confidentiality correspond-
ing to IACHR members.189 Farer, who describes Galindo as a servant 
for the famous fourteen families of the Salvadoran oligarchy, believes 
that he ...was the only man...who completely betrayed the integrity of 
his position.190 In addition, there are accusations that Bertrand 
Galindo informed Pinochet on the IACHR activities and denounced 
Aguilar, Farer, and Vargas Carreño.191 In 1982, Chairman Tom Farer 
complained about the lack of trust in some Commission members: 
                                                 
187  Interviews. Farer remarks that the US should never have acquiesced Galindos 
election because of El Salvadors government at that time. This shows his distrust 
of Galindos position as well as his belief in the influential power of the US re-
garding the Commissioners election. Interview with Dean Farer, Denver, August 
30, 1999. 
188  OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2, 13 noviembre 1981, Volumen II, Parte II: Décimo Período Or-
dinario de Sesiones, Washington D.C., del 19 al 27 de noviembre de 1980, Pri-
mera Comisión, p. 92. Bertrand Galindo referred to a journalists description 
without commenting it. 
189  In 1980, he informed the Salvadoran government how to deal with the Argentina 
Report at the General Assembly. See: Ministry of Foreign Relations of El Salva-
dor, to Amb. Dr. Ernesto Arrieta Perralta, OAS Permanent Representative, San 
Salvador, September 9, 1980 (from the Salvadoran Foreign Ministry files). The 
letter includes a transcript of Bertrand Galindos comments on how to handle the 
Argentine report during the 1980 General Assembly. Another comment indirectly 
supports the suspicions brought up against his integrity as an IACHR member: 
With respect to the IACHR Annual Report for 1985 and the section on El Salva-
dor, the Salvadoran Foreign Ministry mentioned that there was no knowledge 
about the contents of the report. Probably, it could be interpreted that in the 
foregoing years there were figures about the Commission reports provided by the 
Salvadoran Commissioner, but this merely remains a speculation. See: Memo-
randum, from Guillermo Antonio Meléndez, Director of International Organisms 
and Treaties, to: Lic. Carlos Adrian Velasco, General Director of Foreign Policy, 
Subject: Temas de Importancia para El Salvador durante la XV Asamblea Gen-
eral de la O.E.A., San Salvador, November 7, 1985, p. 5. In conclusion, it cannot 
be proven that Bertrand Galindo openly violated Article 9, 3) of the Statute, 
which urges the IACHR members to ...maintain absolute secrecy about all mat-
ters which the Commission deems confidential. Statute of the IACHR, Article 9, 
3. See Regulations, articles 4 as well as 19 a) and b). 
190  Interview with Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999.  
191  Interviews. Probably, there might have been a connection between some Com-
missioners behavior and the amendment of the IACHR Statute in late 1980: the 
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Since it is o[b]vious that several of our colleagues cannot be trusted, 
in the future it will be necessary to terminate sessions whenever any 
significant number of these members who understand what the word 
gentleman means must leave. César and Andrés must receive a full 
account of the disgraceful behavior you witnessed.192 
 
This harsh comment indicates that Farer trusted César Sepúlveda, 
Andrés Aguilar, and the recipient of this letter, Vargas Carreño. Fur-
thermore it demonstrates that there had been distrust and certain inci-
dents that led to such a fierce statement. Seemingly, the persons 
whose integrity was doubted were the Salvadoran Commissioner Ber-
trand Galindo and most likely, the Brazilian Dunshee de Abranches. 
However, no Commissioner has ever been ousted by a vote of no-
confidence from the other members. This might be explained by the 
different factions within the Commission, and also with the antici-
pated internal quarrels that presumably would have paralyzed the 
Commissions work, or at least temporarily hampered its decision-
making processes.193 
Furthermore, the Mexican Gabino Fraga is depicted as a conserva-
tive member who stuck to the famously strong Mexican position on 
non-intervention.194 He was reportedly a dominant member but not 
very pro-active. Fragas succeeding compatriot, César Sepúlveda, 
shared this stand on national sovereignty and the non-intervention 
principle. Farer describes Sepúlveda, Commissioner between 1980 
and 1985, as one of the most influential members. Sepúlveda was a 
stronger supporter of the Sandinistas than the other Commissioners 
were, and he did not agree when the IACHR discussed Mexico and its 
electoral problems.195 According to the IACHR files, Sepúlveda, who 
                                                                                                         
amendment broadened the provisions of the paragraph regarding the incompati-
bility with the  IACHR membership. 
192  Letter from Tom Farer to Edmundo Vargas Carreño, New Jersey, March 10, 
1982 (Spelling error in the original, IACHR files). 
193  Another factor for not publicly expelling a member could have been the threat of 
a bad publicity because a troubled Commission would not have been able to pre-
sent its findings as self-assured as necessary. 
194  Farer points out that Fraga ...was old and quiet, he was about 80 years old. He 
came from the conservative side of the Mexican Revolution. Interview with 
Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
195  Interview with Dean Tom J. Farer, Denver/Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
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served as Mexican ambassador to West Germany at that time, was a 
very active member and chairman. 
The Colombian member Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, judge of 
the Colombian Supreme Court, has typically been described as a con-
servative Commissioner but nevertheless a human rights activist. Elsa 
Kelly, the first Argentine Commissioner after the end of the dictator-
ship in 1983, belonged to the Radical Civil Union (Unión Cívica 
Radical), which governed that South American country between 1983 
and 1989. She had previously served as Vice Foreign Minister of Ar-
gentina. Kelly, who was comparatively young when elected, report-
edly came more out of the activist tradition.196 
Oliver Hamlet Jackman, the Barbadian Commissioner and former 
Ambassador to the United States, the United Nations, and the OAS, 
had already proved his stand on human rights as OAS Representative 
of his country before he entered the IACHR. For instance, Jackman 
was one of the few ambassadors who vehemently criticized the ex-
traordinarily weak General Assembly resolution on the Commission 
reports in 1980. In 1989, he became the first chairman of the IACHR 
from a Caribbean State. Leo Valladares Lanza, Commission member 
in the late 1980s and the IACHRs chairman in 1990-1991, was a 
Honduran law professor, diplomat and a Christian Democrat.197 The 
Venezuelan member Marco Tulio Bruni Celli was a professor of Po-
litical Science, and served as ambassador to the United Nations and 
the International Labor Organization as well as his countrys Vice 
Minister of Interior. At the time of his election in 1987, Bruni Celli 
was also a member of the Venezuelan House of Representatives. He 
served as chairman of the IACHR between 1992- 1993. 
This brief and fragmented analysis  preponderantly based on the 
IACHRs correspondence, the Commissioners curriculum vitae, and 
interviews  shows that the heterogeneous compositions of the Com-
mission almost naturally urged the need of leading figures. In fact, 
there were dominant factions within the Commission whose ability to 
convince nonaligned members eventually determined the IACHRs 
decision-making. In any case, during the 1970s it is clear that the fac-
tion of Aguilar, Farer, and Volio dominated the Commissions ses-
                                                 
196  Interviews. 
197  Valladares served as adviser to the Honduran Foreign Ministry during the Conta-
dora Group negotiations. 
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sions. Also, the influence of the Executive Secretary at that time, Ed-
mundo Vargas Carreño, helped to gain the necessary votes for a deci-
sion supported by the dynamic trio. The intensive correspondence 
between Vargas Carreño and Aguilar corroborates this. Unlike the 
communications between other members and the Executive Secretary, 
Aguilar and Vargas used a less formal form (in Spanish: tutear), 
which seemed to express a close personal relation.  
On the other hand, there were some members who were described 
as pro-government and some were even suspected to act at least peri-
odically as agents of their governments.198 Among those were the Bra-
zilian Dunshee de Abranches, the Chilean Bianchi, and the Salvadoran 
Bertrand Galindo. Nevertheless, it was above all Andrés Aguilars ex-
traordinary leadership that helped the Commission gain its prestige 
during the second half of the 1970s. At the end of 1979, Aguilar re-
signed as the Commissions chairman because of prior commitments 
and ...in view of the programs and activities the Commission was to 
carry out during 1980...199 Without any doubt, this meant that if not a 
weakening, at least a discontinuity in the guidance of the IACHR, 
which had been chaired by Aguilar between 1974 and 1978, from June 
1979 until December 1979, and again in 1985. 
During the 1980s, there were also several renowned members 
elected to the Commission. But the performance of the Commission 
during this time was less important in comparison with its role in the 
1970s. According to Farer, there was an intra-institutional problem in 
the IACHR in addition to regional and international factors that will 
be discussed in Chapter IV. The Commission of the 1980s, as Farer 
points out, lacked the fruitful dynamic which had enabled the 
IACHRs crucial work in the seventies.200 However, another former 
member of the IACHR found a real congeniality between the mem-
bers when he began to work on the Commission. He further remarks 
that there were four persons among the Commission members who 
were more of activists, and three with a more traditional-legalistic atti-
tude. The Commissioners Russomano, Monroy Cabra, and a third 
                                                 
198  See A. Glenn Mower  Regional Human Rights. A Comparative Study of the 
West European and Inter-American Systems, New York/Westport/London 1991, 
p. 84. 
199  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1979-1980, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50, Doc. 13 
rev. 1, 2 October 1980, Original: Spanish, p. 26. 
200  Interview with Dean Tom J. Farer, Denver/Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
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member belonged to the latter group that routinely employed and 
sometimes perhaps even exploited the argument of not to deal with a 
case because of the requirement of the exhaustion of domestic reme-
dies.201 
The Commissioners in the 1980s were indeed capable but maybe 
not as courageous and fortunate as that dynamic group of the 1970s. 
Furthermore, the IACHR of the 1980s could not count with the deci-
sive support by its most important patron: the US. Moreover, the civil 
wars in Central America in the course of the revived Cold War did not 
present as black-and-white a situation as did the right-wing dictator-
ships of the Southern Cone in the 1970s. A plausible proof of the lack 
of dynamism could be the Executive Secretarys role: While Vargas 
Carreño formed part of the activist and progressive group of the late 
seventies and early eighties, he could not build such a dynamic with 
the Commissioners of the eighties (see chapter IV). 
In this connection, an important factor for the Commissions work 
was the support by an effective Secretariat. Usually, the research ef-
forts rather neglect the significance of the Executive Secretariat, but 
above all the lawyers of the Secretariat have been those who did the 
daily work, prepared the reports, and enabled the Commission to 
maintain its effectiveness.202 However, in the beginning of the 
IACHRs work, the Secretariat was of less importance. Until 1965, the 
IACHR did not even possess its own Secretariat but used the one of 
the Division of Codification of the PAU. In 1966, however, a separate 
Secretariat of the Commission began its work.203 Until 1977 when the 
Carter administration began to strengthen the IACHR, the perform-
ance of the Commission mainly depended on the Commissioners. This 
is not surprising since there were only a few lawyers in the early sev-
enties.204 However, a former Commissioner even holds that an activist 
and more belligerent attitude on the part of some young staff lawyers 
opposed the more staid and reflective point of view of the older 
Commissioners, which led to a sort of positive equilibrium in the 
IACHR.205 In this regard it is essential to reiterate that it was the 
                                                 
201  Interviews. 
202  See Schreiber, pp. 62-63; David Harris  Regional Protection of Human Rights: 
The Inter-American Achievement, in: Harris/Livingstone (Eds.), p. 19. 
203  Stoetzer, p. 119. 
204  Interviews. 
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Commissioners who were responsible for the political decisions, while 
the staff of the Secretariat did the daily work. 
A phenomenon that occurred during the 1970s as well as in the 
1980s was the problem of adequate personnel. In general, many of the 
lawyers were sent to the Commission from the General Secretariat.206 
In addition, some members tried to use their position to propose law-
yers from their countries.207 This generated a problem, as some of 
these attorneys did not possess the necessary knowledge in human 
rights matters and often did not professionally support the Secretariat. 
Interestingly, the attorneys with US nationality were hired through a 
competition. The fact that the 1970s and the 1980s continued to wit-
ness the contracting of lawyers who did not get hired through compe-
tition by proving their competence and adequacy for the work in the 
Commissions Secretariat, affected the budget as well. Moreover, the 
lack of competence of the staff attorneys also led to some administra-
tive shortcomings that in one case had potentially far-reaching conse-
quences.208 
Between 1970 and 1975, in addition to the Executive Secretary 
there were two capable lawyers working in the Secretariat.209 Besides 
the lack of basic human rights understanding, the inappropriate staff 
members did not show a personal interest or a dedication to the sub-
ject, which seemed to be necessary to overcome institutional obsta-
cles. One could distinguish between professionals who were truly en-
gaged and did not care about the time spent on working on cases and 
those lawyers who considered their profession more like a 9 a.m.-to-5 
p.m. administrative commitment. Furthermore, some lawyers who 
                                                 
206  Interviews. 
207  For instance, Gabino Fraga, the Mexican Commissioner, and the Salvadoran 
member Bertrand Galindo proposed attorneys to become staff member. Letter 
from Gabino Fraga to Edmundo Vargas Carreño, Mexico City, March 8, 1978; 
Letter from Francisco Bertrand Galindo, Ambassador of El Salvador to Guate-
mala, to Edmundo Vargas Carreño, May 19, 1980; Letter from Edmundo Vargas 
Carreño to Francisco Bertrand Galindo, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1981 (IACHR 
files). 
208  See Chapter III. 2. 
209  Commissioner Farer described his impression when he first entered the Secre-
tariats third-class offices in 1976: I went in, dim lights, institutional green 
walls, and a sense of somnolence, sleepiness, nothing going on; depressing. Al-
most no lawyers... Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 
30, 1999. 
Chapter II 96
were transferred by political and personal contacts within the OAS 
meant not only a handicap for an efficient performance of the IACHR 
but also a potential threat to the need for confidentiality due to their 
political affiliations. Moreover, inappropriate staff members could not 
easily be fired and continued to belong to the IACHR Secretariat as a 
sort of ballast.210 This does not mean that the concerned lawyers were 
completely useless, but the fact that they did not work as efficiently as 
one might expect did at least affect the Commissions budget. In 1977, 
however, the Commissions chairman Aguilar emphasized that the se-
lection of the technical and professional staff members was a very 
sensitive matter because it could affect the impartiality and objectivity 
of the IACHR. On the other hand, Aguilar stated that a candidates 
work experience with national human rights organizations without po-
litical activity would be considered as a recommendation.211 
Likewise, Vargas Carreño informed Chairman Aguilar of the need 
to adequately fill the professional posts requested in the Commissions 
budget.212 This demand to hire qualified staff lawyers was reiterated 
in February 1978.213 Furthermore, in a 1978 booklet, Commissioner 
Farer requested the ...authority to select and manage its staff... for 
the IACHR.214 The insistence on the adjectives adequate and quali-
fied indirectly confirms that in the foregoing years there had been at 
least some attorneys at the Secretariat that lacked such qualifications. 
Furthermore, in 1978 Executive Secretary Vargas Carreño informed 
Secretary General Alejandro Orfila in a confidential memorandum 
that one of the Secretariats lawyers did not have the sufficient skills 
                                                 
210  Interviews. 
211  ...hay que tener una gran prudencia en esta materia [selection of personnel, 
K.D.], para evitar que se cuestione la imparcialidad y objetividad de la Comisión 
con el pretexto de que el personal de secretaría está integrado, en su mayoría, por 
personas pertenecientes o vinculadas a partidos o movimientos políticos de 
oposición a determinados gobiernos, sobre todo si estas personas pueden ser cali-
ficadas como activistas. Letter from Andrés Aguilar, Chairman of IACHR, to 
Charles Moyer, Executive Secretary ad-interim, IACHR, Caracas, August 30, 
1977 (IACHR files). 
212  Letter from Edmundo Vargas Carreño to Andrés Aguilar, OAS Memorándum, 8 
de noviembre de 1977 (IACHR files). 
213  IACHR files. 
214  Tom J. Farer  The United States and the Inter-American System: Are There 
Functions for the Forms? The American Society of International Law, Studies in 
Transnational Legal Policy No. 17, Washington, D.C. 1978, p. 73. 
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and therefore had to leave after his trial period.215 In fact, the con-
cerned attorneys contract was not extended. Nevertheless, since the 
second half of the 1970s, the Commissions Secretariat was equipped 
with some excellent lawyers, though some low-level attorneys contin-
ued to work for the IACHR as well. 
In combination with the fact that some Commissioners tended to 
favor or even to protect their governments, those lawyers who were 
not entirely capable meant a potential threat to the IACHRs function-
ing. Especially during the 1970s, there were several suspicions regard-
ing the confidentiality of particular lawyers.216 Of course, as in every 
institution, there have also been internal conflicts. However, it is al-
most impossible to measure the real effects of these conflicts on the 
output of the institution.217 However, it is fair to say that some lawyers 
were outstanding personalities and later on became high officials of 
their corresponding governments.218 Furthermore, there have been at-
                                                 
215  Letter from Edmundo Vargas Carreño to Alejandro Orfila, OAS Memorándum, 
Confidencial, 31 de marzo de 1978. Two weeks before, Vargas proposed to test 
that lawyers skills by letting him prepare the preliminary report on human rights 
in El Salvador. Letter from Edmundo Vargas Carreño to Carlos Dunshee de 
Abranches, Washington, D.C., March 14, 1978 (IACHR files). 
216  For instance, in 1979, two NGOs expressed their concern about an Argentine 
lawyer in the IACHR whose father was Argentine military attaché in Washing-
ton, D.C. and therefore feared a threat to confidentiality. Letter from the Interna-
tional League for Human Rights (ILHR) and the Lawyers Committee on Human 
Rights (LCHR) to Edmundo Vargas Carreño, January 23, 1979. In Vargas re-
sponse he assured that the concerned lawyer was contracted for work at the 
Commissions library: and that he was no longer stationed in offices of Secre-
tariat and therefore there was no possibility of compromising the Commissions 
integrity or the confidentiality of communications. Letter from Vargas Carreño to 
ILHR/LCHR, Washington, D.C., January 24, 1979 (IACHR files). At the 1991 
General Assembly, Vargas spoke of three accusations concerning an alleged lack 
of confidentiality: in two occasions it proved to be the responsibility of govern-
ment officials, and in one case it was a Commission member. 
OEA/Ser.P/XXI.0.2, 6 abril 1992, Volumen II, Parte II, Vigésimoprimer período 
ordinario de sesiones, Santiago, Chile, Del 3 al 8 de junio de 1991, Primera Co-
misión, p. 192. 
217  For instance, in 1986/87 two staff lawyers clashed. The question must be: To 
which extent did such a confrontation affect the Secretariats work? Further, two 
lawyers had difficulties with the administrative personnel, which resulted in sev-
eral memoranda issued by the secretaries and the concerned attorneys. 
218  Former staff attorney (1978-1982) Edgardo Paz Barnica became Foreign Minister 
of Honduras in 1982 and Guillermo Fernández de Soto has served as Colombian 
Foreign Minister. 
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torneys who also thought beyond the daily task to handle petitions, 
which were published in various articles.219 
In 1984, the Commission underwent an internal investigation due 
to accusations of an anonymous person who had blamed one of the 
IACHR lawyers of making case files disappear and then having them 
destroyed  mainly cases dealing with Nicaragua. Although, the 
charges lacked substance, this caused some trouble and cost the Secre-
tariat time and patience.220 
Further, the role of the respective Executive Secretaries was of 
significant importance. The functions of the Executive Secretary were 
to direct, plan, and coordinate the Secretariats work; to prepare a 
draft work schedule for each session in consultation with the chair-
man; to advise the chairman and members; to present a written report 
on the Secretariats activities to the Commission at the beginning of 
the sessions; and finally to implement the Commissions and the 
chairmans decisions.221 Accordingly, the Executive Secretary had the 
duty to point the Secretariats way ahead. 
In accordance with the Commissions Statute, the Executive Sec-
retary should be a person of high moral character, nominated by the 
Secretary General after consultation with the IACHR. In addition, the 
post should be filled with a person of ...recognized competence in the 
field of human rights...222 However, the post of the Executive Secre-
tary has always been filled according to political considerations and 
not necessarily due to a particular knowledge or experience of the 
candidate in the human rights field. In contrast, the post of the Assis-
tant Executive Secretary usually was occupied by a person with ex-
perience in this area  Charles Daniel Moyer, David J. Padilla and 
Domingo E. Acevedo, all acted as Assistant Executive Secretaries and 
sometimes as Acting Executive Secretaries. They all possessed this 
experience and were considered as career employees of the OAS, 
comparable to career diplomats who are not expected to be politicians. 
                                                 
219  This seems to be a somehow surprising fact in consideration of the willingly used 
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The Bolivian Luis Reque served as Executive Secretary from the 
very beginning of the Commission in 1960 until March 1976, when he 
resigned because of internal and external pressure (see chapter III. 1.). 
In October 1973, Reque traveled to Chile only a few weeks after the 
coup détat had taken place. With this visit he initiated the Commis-
sions most transcendental performance. Though the background of 
his trip to Santiago is not entirely clear, the mere fact that Reque ven-
tured to visit Pinochets Chile allows to state that he showed the nec-
essary courage and activism in this case. In contrast, his successor, 
Emilio Castañon Pasquel, a Peruvian bureaucrat, did not fulfill the po-
sitions mandate as expected. According to Farer, Castañon Pasquel 
was ...not a man to get his hands very dirty in the work of the Com-
mission. For a former lawyer at the Secretariat, Castañon was a dis-
aster: an authoritative bureaucrat who did not see himself as execu-
tive director but felt he was president of the Commission.223 Unlike 
his predecessor, Castañon did not dare to challenge the important 
OAS organs; he acted more cautiously and less effectively than Re-
que. His traditional style did not match the necessities of the Commis-
sion members, so they asked Secretary General Orfila to substitute 
Castañon with a personality who suited the Commissions desires and 
needs.224 Orfila heeded the Commissioners complaints and fired 
Castañon, who had only served as Secretary for a few months.225 Nev-
ertheless, the announced change was accompanied by a declaration 
which stressed the methodological differences with the Commission 
members that led to Castañons resignation. In the course of his re-
tirement, there had been rumors that the leaving Executive Secretary 
had opposed Chairman Aguilars efforts to reach an excessive 
budget for the IACHR, for which Aguilar had invented projects.226 
In any case, Castañons comments at his departure caused some irrita-
tion among the Commission members.227 
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After Castañons withdrawal, the staff lawyer and US citizen 
Charles Moyer became Executive Secretary ad-interim. Comparable 
to the unwritten rule that a US citizen presides the World Bank and a 
European heads the International Monetary Fund, it is also a custom 
that no US citizen will become Secretary General of the OAS or Ex-
ecutive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. Accordingly, the strong predominance of the United States in 
the OAS could not find expression by a US citizen filling a decisive 
post, because it would have caused protests by Latin Americans. Due 
to this fact, it could have been difficult for the Secretariat and the en-
tire IACHR to maintain its firm position towards authoritarian regimes 
during the time that Charles D. Moyer served as interim Secretary. Al-
though Charles Moyer, who entered the IACHR Secretariat in 1970, 
was an excellent lawyer with remarkable leadership qualities  proven 
by his performance as Executive Secretary of the Court since 1980  
his nationality and therefore the supplement ad-interim might have 
weakened the Commissions position. In addition, at that time he re-
portedly did not possess the capacity to draft in Spanish. Undoubtedly, 
this must have affected the daily work of the Secretariat. During the 
period of Castañons withdrawal  officially in January 1977, but the 
Peruvian went for vacations in December 1976228  and the appoint-
ment of the Chilean Edmundo Vargas Carreño in September 1977, the 
Commissions Secretariat suffered difficulties of institutional strength 
or even legitimacy due to the provisional leadership. On the other 
hand, however, the fact that Moyer was not only exceptionally capable 
but also above all very familiar with the Commissions work was also 
regarded as an advantage. 
During the period of Moyers term, Aguilar proposed the Chilean 
Edmundo Vargas Carreño to head the Secretariat. Both had met before 
in Venezuela, where Vargas Carreño taught law after having left Chile 
under the rule of General Pinochet. His Christian Democrat contacts 
helped Vargas get a job in Venezuela. Although it could be seen as 
quite unusual to propose an exiled Chilean, Orfila eventually agreed 
with Aguilars proposal, and Vargas was accepted by the Commission 
                                                 
228  Letter from Charles Moyer to Andrés Aguilar, Washington, D.C., December 8, 
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and became Executive Secretary in September 1977.229 There are dif-
ferent versions as to whether or not OAS Secretary General Orfila 
immediately supported Vargas appointment and work, or whether he 
was initially reluctant.230 Unlike Moyer, who was very familiar with 
the IACHRs functioning and its daily work, Vargas must have spent 
some time getting informed about the structure, decision-making 
processes, and relations among the Commissioners. Accordingly, dur-
ing the first months of his term, the new Executive Secretary invested 
more time in learning about the IACHRs operation than leading it 
with the needed high efficiency that the Secretariat later carried out 
under his leadership. Farer describes Vargas as very capable and intel-
ligent and a personality who was able to make the necessary distinc-
tion between important and unimportant facts231  an ability that was 
probably of tremendous significance during a period in which the Se-
cretariat was confronted with thousands of petitions. David Padilla, 
who closely worked with Vargas for almost ten years, acknowledges 
the Chileans important role in a number of key developments.232 
Farer saw him as the eighth member of the Commission, and an-
other former IACHR lawyer describes Vargas arrival at the IACHR 
as the advent of a new day.233 
Vargas Carreños term at the head of the IACHR Secretariat in-
cluded the Commissions most famous period between the years of 
1977 and 1981. In 1984, he was confirmed as Executive Secretary 
with the support of the entire Commission.234 According to conversa-
tions with the author, several people familiar with Vargas Carreños 
performance as Executive Secretary mentioned that he was particu-
larly interested in Chile, also because the Christian Democrat Vargas 
was considered to be a part of the Chilean exile opposition against the 
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Pinochet regime.235 Nevertheless, Vargas reportedly still maintained 
the best relations with the Chilean diplomatic establishment.236 The 
Chilean developed close contacts with human rights NGOs, academic 
institutions and international organizations.237 Furthermore, he used 
the Christian Democrats network in Latin America. Occasionally, 
Vargas Carreño was attacked personally as Luis Reque had been be-
fore.238 Since the negative Chilean referendum on president Pinochets 
continuity in power in 1988, Vargas Carreño expected to obtain a high 
post in the new democratic government. After Chiles transition to 
democracy began, he reportedly was more engaged in Chilean affairs 
and less committed to the Secretariats work.239 Farer remarks that 
Vargas Carreño himself began to lose interest since he was preparing 
to return to Chile. Consequently, without a dynamic and engaged Ex-
ecutive Secretary ...the Commission will always lose momentum.240  
In May 1990, Secretary General Baena Soares designated Edith 
Márquez Rodríguez to the post of the Executive Secretary, officially 
replacing Vargas Carreño.241 She had been Venezuelan alternate rep-
resentative to the OAS until she took over her new functions. Never-
theless, it took longer than expected until Márquez Rodríguez actually 
headed the IACHRs Secretariat. Thus, Assistant Executive Secretary 
Padilla continued the interim administration, and so maintained the 
functioning of the IACHR Secretariat, which remained without a 
strong leadership. Finally, a woman was in a leading position in the 
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IACHR. Unfortunately, Edith Márquez was considered an inappropri-
ate personality for the post.242 
The IACHR files indicate that the engagement of Assistant Execu-
tive Secretary David Padilla compensated for a lack of efficient lead-
ership in the Secretariat. There is reason to believe that he saved the 
Commission during the period between 1989 and 1991 from falling 
into insignificance. In a speech, IACHR chairman Valladares Lanza 
especially thanked Dr. Padilla for taking over the Secretariats leader-
ship during a particularly difficult moment, and for having accom-
plished his tasks with special dedication and efficiency.243 The 
widespread recognition of Padillas executive functions during the 
transitional phase that lasted longer than officially recorded found ex-
pression in some appreciative comments by OAS representatives.244 
Finally, the collaboration between the seven Commissioners and 
the Secretariat staff certainly played an important role for the 
IACHRs performance. In general, there was a three-category hierar-
chy at the IACHR: first, the Commissioners, second, the lawyers, and 
third, the administrative personnel of the Secretariat. The relations be-
tween the Secretariats attorneys and the Commission members are 
usually described as follows: the Commissioners saw themselves as 
very important people  the Commission  while they regarded the 
staff lawyers merely as daily workers but not decision-makers. Like-
wise, according to a former member, some Commissioners felt like 
                                                 
242  Márquez was also assigned as Secretary of the Arbitrary Tribunal of the so-called 
Bryan-Suárez Mujica Commission to deal with the murder case of Orlando Letel-
ier. This must have diminished her engagement with the IACHR Secretariat. 
However, due to the fact that her term almost is not covered by the period of this 
study, the author tends to exclude any further judgment. However, he generally 
suspects conscious or unconscious reservations against a woman as head of the 
Secretariat  possibly this fact has influenced some judgements made to the au-
thor. 
243  Presentación del Informe anual 1989-90 de la C.I.D.H. por el presidente de la 
Comisión, Dr. Leo Valladares Lanza, p. 3 (from the IACHR files). 
244  OEA/Ser.P/XX.0.2, 17 mayo 1991, Volumen II, Parte II, Vigésimo período ordi-
nario de sesiones, Asunción, Paraguay, Del 4 al 9 de junio de 1990, Primera Co-
misión, pp. 197, 198. 
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gods and treated the staff attorneys like minions.245 Further, some 
of the lawyers had trouble with the administrative personnel.246 
A former Commission member described tensions that origi-
nated by the fact that the staff was responsible for the daily work of 
the IACHR, while the Commissioners had to take political responsi-
bility for the cases and reports.247 According to several interviews, the 
author concludes that many Commission members, as they were on 
the top of the IACHRs chain of command, often showed a sort of 
pride, commonly described as typical Latin American and often per-
ceived as arrogance and patriarchal conduct. This behavioral pattern is 
based on a hierarchical understanding of society and professions that 
can still be experienced in certain parts and milieus of Latin America, 
where the social structures are such that the upper class members ap-
pear to have an arrogant and despising attitude towards those who are 
perceived as less important  particularly in diplomatic affairs. Natu-
rally, this was not always the case, but the few members that acted this 
way inevitably contributed to a deteriorating atmosphere in regards to 
the cooperation between Commissioners and staff lawyers. Further-
more, the age gap between staff and members also contributed to this 
kind of difficulties. 
In addition, the typical bureaucratic-legal formalism of the Latin 
American diplomatic caste might have constituted an obstacle for the 
IACHR performance. While typically US citizens enjoy the reputation 
of acting relatively rapidly and without too many formalities, some 
Latin American members need to underline the corresponding forms 
could be regarded as a delaying factor for the Commissions work  at 
least in theory.248 In reality, nevertheless, the IACHR was appropri-
                                                 
245  Interviews. 
246  According to the IACHR files, these tensions are mainly proven with regard to 
the mid-eighties. 
247  Interviews. 
248  For example, a comparison between formal and informal letters written in Eng-
lish and in Spanish, with Latin American and US American recipients and au-
thors, clearly shows that US Americans tended to express themselves directly and 
without unnecessary formalities. On the other hand, Latin Americans saw them-
selves forced to employ the typical diplomatic phrases before coming to the 
point. This rhetoric behavior pattern could also be observed during the General 
Assembly sessions. Interestingly, it appears as an indicator of a US ambassadors 
knowledge or sensitiveness for Latin American issues if he or she used compara-
ble introductory forms like the Latin American diplomats. 
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ately polite and formal but at the same time not necessarily slow. Ac-
tually, in many urgent cases the decision-making processes were sur-
prisingly short although the aforementioned considerations should be 
taken into account. However, in contrast to the slow-working diplo-
matic apparatus of other OAS organs, the Commission suffered less 
from the handicap of bureaucratic formalism since the majority of its 
members obviously understood the basically urgent nature of certain 
human rights situations. It was certainly different to comply with the 
provisions to approve a project on the creation of a new working unit 
for a local office, for instance, than to wait weeks or months to cor-
rectly deal with all formalities of a petition concerning a person who 
was exposed to daily torture or even soon to be killed. In spite of this 
fact, many cases took years in processing. 
After this analysis of the institutional factors and personal aspects 
within the Commission and its Secretariat, a review of the main activi-
ties and the relationship between IACHR and the OAS Member 
States, as well as its role within the organization, will provide a deeper 
understanding of the institution, often called the conscience of the 
hemisphere. 
II. 3. From an Exclusively Juridical Organ to a Highly Political 
Institution: The Positions and Activities of the IACHR 
Bryce Wood names three key terms regarding the Commissions per-
formance: visits, reports and the public.249 The first question to ad-
dress is what type of activities the IACHR should carry out. 
The major reason for the Commissions foundation was to pro-
mote human rights. It is interesting to look at the difficulty in estab-
lishing priorities between the promotion and the protection of basic 
rights. Since the Commission came into existence, there has been a 
question of priorities between informing about the existence and func-
tion of human rights protection on the one hand, and actual human 
rights protection on the other hand. In other words, the question arose 
as to which activity should take precedence. This unnamed competi-
tion affected the Commissions radius of actions at least until the mid-
1970s. In general, fellowships, radio and television programs, semi-
nars and symposia as well as competitions and publications were de-
                                                 
249  Wood, p. 126. 
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signed to contribute to a consciousness for human rights in the coun-
tries of the hemisphere. The Commission sought to create a better dif-
fusion and education concerning human rights. The agenda point 
Teaching and Dissemination of Human Rights was included in the 
IACHRs General Work Program in 1971.250 A year later, the IACHR 
decided that the dissemination of knowledge of human rights and its 
protections was one of the most important tasks of the Commission.251 
In 1973, the fellowship program Rómulo Gallegos was established 
in honor of the Commissions first president. In addition, a competi-
tion on human rights helped to create a broader understanding for 
those rights. The Commission organized seminars  the first one was 
on the liberty of unions.252 The Commission also prepared informative 
booklets on its work, written in an understandable language. It pre-
pared a handbook for bar associations, special institutions on human 
rights, trade unions and press associations in order to provide informa-
tion about the functioning of the human rights system.253 Beginning in 
1977 and with financial support during the Carter administration, the 
IACHR carried out and co-sponsored numerous seminars and confer-
ences on human rights topics all over Latin America. In May 1984, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held an internal semi-
nar on the Commissions practice for processing communications al-
                                                 
250  IACHR  Report on the Work Accomplished by the IACHR during its Twenty-
Sixth Session (October 27 through November 4, 1971), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.26, Doc. 
37 rev. 1, 29 March 1972, Original: Spanish, p. 47. 
251  IACHR  Report of the Work Accomplished by the IACHR During its Twenty-
Ninth Session, (October 16-27, 1972), OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 29 doc. 40 rev. 1, 28 De-
cember 1972, Original: Spanish, p. 45. 
252  Informe Anual de la CIDH correspondiente a 1973, OEA/Ser.P AG/doc. 409/74, 
5 marzo 1974, Original: español, pp. 149, 150. Informe Anual de la CIDH 1972, 
OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.305/73 rev.1, 14 marzo 1973, Original: español, p. 85. 
253  IACHR  Report on the Work Accomplished during its Twenty-Third Session, 
April 6 through 16, 1970, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 Doc. 27 (English), 11 December 
1970, Original: Spanish, pp. 30-32. In 1971, the Commission considered whether 
to approve the agenda point Study of the Human Rights in the Americas as a 
resolution in order to obtain more publicity and attention but finally decided to 
keep it as a regular Annual Report Chapter. IACHR  Report of the Work Ac-
complished by the IACHR during its Twenty-Fifth Session (March 1 through 12, 
1971), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.25 doc.41 rev., 3 November 1971, Original: Spanish, pp. 
40/41. 
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leging human rights violations.254 Moreover, in its Annual Report for 
1983-1984, the Commission judged the teaching of human rights, be-
ginning with lessons in the primary and secondary schools, as neces-
sary in response to past violations and persisting abuses in the re-
gion.255 
In spite of these efforts, the Commissions existence and work 
were widely unknown in the hemisphere until the mid-seventies. For 
example, the IACHR dealt with a case of the persecution of a unionist 
in El Salvador that dated back to 1970.256 The fact that no cases in-
cluding gross violations of human rights were sent to Washington 
leads to the assumption that, in this case, the Commission was either 
unknown among the victims in El Salvador or that they considered the 
IACHR to be useless as organ of the OAS, because it represented an 
(inter-) governmental institution.257 This unawareness of the Commis-
sions mandate changed in the aftermath of the coup in Chile in 1973. 
The Chilean case shows that the initial petitions directly sent to the 
IACHR mainly dealt with cases of students, professors or other mem-
bers of social groups with a higher education. The cases that concern 
lower-class victims were primarily provided by NGOs. It is a common 
notion that the human rights debate was initiated by the educated mid-
dle-class in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina that had strong ties to 
Europe and North America.  
In the years before the early- and mid-seventies, the Commissions 
work  except in the cases of the Dominican Republic, Cuba and the 
Salvadoran-Honduran war  was more limited to areas such as educa-
tion, distribution of information about human rights and the elabora-
tion of distinguished human rights doctrines. It is fair to say that the 
latter was the intention of the OAS Member States in 1959 when they 
                                                 
254  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1983-1984, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.63, doc. 10, 
24 September 1984, Original: Spanish, p. 19. 
255  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1983-1984, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.63, doc. 10, 
24 September 1984, Original: Spanish, pp. 144/145. 
256  Informe Anual de la CIDH 1972, OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.305/73 rev.1, 14 marzo 
1973, Original: español, p. 67. 
257  Accordingly, Farer assumed that ...until the late sixties most human rights viola-
tions were committed against poor people who had no idea of international insti-
tutional redress. And in those days there were not many national human rights 
organizations. So, there was no connection between the victims, on the one hand, 
and the Commission, on the other, no mutual awareness. Interview with Dean 
Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
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agreed on an institution to promote human rights. The Commission 
developed ambitious topics like Human Rights at the level of School 
Children or the development of science and technology and human 
rights.258 These items were certainly important but not necessarily a 
priority in view of the gross human rights violations occurring at that 
time. These initiatives also demonstrated how dependent the Commis-
sion was on cases submitted to it. Particularly in the early years, the 
IACHR reports were of a fragmentary nature. The situation in some 
Member States where human rights violations occurred could success-
fully appear less grave due to the fact that no cases were sent inde-
pendently to the IACHR and that an abusing government itself sub-
mitted information on legal measures regarding human rights.259 This 
lead to the ironic situation that not only massive human rights viola-
tions in a country failed to be covered by the reports but that further 
the government in question appeared as a sort of human rights cham-
pion because of the submitted human rights laws.260 In several occa-
sions, the IACHR emphasized that the description of the cases derived 
from the received petitions and did not necessarily constitute a judg-
ment of the Commission.261 This was a mostly unsuccessful attempt to 
demonstrate the IACHRs impartiality and seriousness because the ac-
cused governments usually did not pay much attention to this type of 
detail. 
Before 1973, however, the IACHR was not very effective in view 
of the violations throughout the region. The Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights had its successes in the 1960s when it played a 
                                                 
258  Human Rights at the level of School Children, prepared by Mrs. Angela Acuña 
de Chacón, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.4 Doc. 22 (English), April 23, 1962, Original: Span-
ish; Informe Anual Presentado por la Comisión Interamericana a la Asamblea 
General Correspondiente a 1974, OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc. 399/75, 9 enero 1975, 
Original: español, pp. 96/97. 
259  See Tom Farer  The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No 
Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, in: Harris/Livingstone, p. 32. 
260  Many governments had sent their law decrees, which touched the human rights 
issue, to the Commission in order to be mentioned positively for their progressive 
legislation and exemplary cooperation with the human rights organ. Nevertheless, 
many of those governments used to violate human rights occasionally or system-
atically  so these laws just were used for public relations goals. 
261  For instance: CIDH  Informe sobre la labor desarrollada por la Comisión In-
teramericana de Derechos Humanos en su trigésimoquinto período de sesiones, 
(del 20 al 30 de mayo de 1975), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.35 doc. 45 rev.1, 28 noviembre 
1975, Original: español, pp. 6, 42. 
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pacifying role during the crisis in the Dominican Republic and the set-
tlement of the so-called Soccer War between El Salvador and Hon-
duras in 1969. In addition, the Commission helped to draft the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights that was signed in 1969. Besides 
these successful performances, the Commission was not as aloof about 
serious human rights violations as the political main organs of the 
OAS, but it did not become a controversial human rights defender un-
til the coup in Chile in 1973. Likewise, former Commissioner Farer 
pointed out that before 1973, the Commission had ...a very low pro-
file; it was not a very consequential institution.262 The available cor-
respondence of the IACHR before 1973 mainly consists of polite dip-
lomatic notes and cordial letters and does not include many controver-
sial items. During an IACHR session in Colombia in October 1973  
the military had already seized power in Chile  the Colombian For-
eign Minister, Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, denounced the lack of po-
litical will to name gross violations and thereby described adequately 
the prevailing mood in the OAS towards human rights when he said 
America has fallen into the error of valuing human rights as a subject 
for amicable conferences and not as a permanent code for the eras of 
juridical normality or of domestic or international turbulence.263 With 
this statement, human rights expert Vázquez Carrizosa impressively 
identified the political circumstances under which human rights were 
seen and the IACHR was founded and perceived. 
Returning to the three main aspects in the work of the IACHR 
mentioned above, the Commissions reports are of particular interest, 
since they constitute its principal written sources. In general, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights published two sorts of re-
ports: Special Reports and since 1970, an Annual Report.264 The Spe-
                                                 
262  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. This was 
also a result of the lack of knowledge on the Commission in the hemisphere. 
263  IACHR  Report on the Work Accomplished by the IACHR at its Thirty-First 
Session, (October 15-25, 1973), OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 31 doc. 54 rev.1, 12 June 1974, 
Original: Spanish, pp. 2, 4. 
264  Waldmann correctly remarks that neither the reports of the UN or OAS Human 
Rights Commissions, nor those prepared by the International Commission of Ju-
rists or Amnesty International do comply with scientific requirements: the exis-
tent indices do not meet with the criterions of information gathering nor with re-
gard to its reliability and completeness the demands of serious scientific research. 
Peter Waldmann  Staatliche und parastaatliche Gewalt: Ein vernachlässigtes 
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cial Reports mostly dealt with particular countries but occasionally 
also with special topics. The first Annual Report was presented in 
1970, although the Special Conference had already required it in 1965. 
In 1970, the Commission discussed how to organize the Annual Re-
port. The alternatives were to categorize countries, regions or the 
rights of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man.265 In 
fact, the form and content of the reports underwent various stages of 
development throughout the years and decades. In the beginning, in 
1971, the Commission opted to structure the report by rights and not 
by countries.266 In reference to the Annual Reports structure, the 
IACHR approved some standards in 1972, but those were modified 
various times.267 After its approval, the Commission usually sent the 
Annual Report to a working group of the OAS Permanent Council, 
which transferred it to the General Assembly. The Annual Reports of 
the early 1970s possessed a very general nature and contained be-
tween 32 (1970) and 154 (1973) pages. This general approach was de-
rived from the few cases sent to the IACHR, whereby it considered it 
useful to provide statements on the broader situation of the different 
rights groups in addition to the case descriptions. 
The Commissions handling of individual cases always took into 
account the safety of victims and witnesses. For instance, to inform a 
person about the decision taken or to receive information from the 
corresponding government, sometimes the IACHR sent a letter with-
out the letter head of the Commission from a place in Virginia or 
Maryland.268 Since 1976, the IACHR Reports did not inform on pend-
                                                                                                         
Forschungsthema, in: Hans Werner Tobler/Peter Waldmann (Eds.)  Staatliche 
und parastaatliche Gewalt in Lateinamerika, Frankfurt/Main 1991, p. 28. 
265  IACHR  Report on the Work Accomplished during its Twenty-Fourth Session, 
October 13 through 22, 1970, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.24 Doc.32 (English) Rev. Corr., 5 
April 1971, Original: Spanish, p. 36. 
266  IACHR  Report of the Work Accomplished by the IACHR during its Twenty-
Fifth Session (March 1 through 12, 1971), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.25 doc.41 rev., 3 No-
vember 1971, Original: Spanish, p. 8. 
267  Standards for the Drafting of the Annual Report, in: IACHR  Report of the 
Work Accomplished by the IACHR During its Twenty-Ninth Session, (October 
16-27, 1972), OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 29 doc. 40 rev. 1, 28 December 1972, Original: 
Spanish, pp. 48/49. 
268  See, for example, Letter from Andrés Aguilar, to Luis Reque, Caracas, July 18, 
1975 (IACHR files). 
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ing cases due to a resolution adopted by the General Assembly.269 Ac-
cording to the Commissions Regulations, article 51, the IACHR as-
sumed accusations to be true if the concerned government did not 
provide any response or commentary on the case. In some cases, this 
procedure was effective because it pressured governments to be more 
responsive. In general, many individual cases were sent to or received 
by the Commission at the same day. This allows the assumption that 
these petitions were provided to the IACHR by local or international 
human rights organizations. 
Since 1974, and with the exception of the 1976 report, the Annual 
Reports became more extensive and thereby mirrored the emergence 
of dictatorships, which also increased attention on human rights viola-
tions. The Commission included a separate chapter dealing with the 
situation in particular countries. The Annual Report of 1980-1981, 
however, was structured differently than foregoing reports since it ex-
clusively dealt with various human rights of the American Declaration 
and the Convention on Human Rights. This meant that the report did 
not include a special chapter on the situation in any Member State.270 
However, the 1981-82 Report returned to the old form, which caused 
criticism by authoritarian regimes.271 Consequently, the 1982-83 Re-
port again dropped the chapter dealing with specific Member States 
but in the subsequent years, the Commission returned to the old form 
of its Annual Reports  also a result of the democratization that had 
taken place in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. In 1988, the Commis-
sion decided that once a year the Secretariat should supply summary 
information on the human rights situation for each of the Member 
States.272 
In contrast to the short documents of the early 1970s, the late 
1980s Annual Reports contained more than 300 pages; the report for 
                                                 
269  AG/RES.246 (VI-0/76), in: IACHR, Annual Report 1977, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40, 
Doc. 5 corr.1, 7 de junio de 1977, Original: Spanish, p. 1, in: Nacimiento, p. 118. 
270  Nevertheless, the report named Chile in several occasions to give an example of 
the most serious human rights violations in the hemisphere. Medina Quiroga, p. 
294. 
271  See: OEA/Ser.P/XI.0.2, 4 diciembre 1984, Volumen II, Parte II, Undécimo Perí-
odo Ordinario de Sesiones; Castries, Santa Lucía, Del 2 al 11 de diciembre 1981; 
Actas y Documentos, Vol. II, 2a parte, Primera Comisión, pp. 65-69. 
272  CIDH  72nd Session, Draft Agenda of the Seventy Second Period of Sessions, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 72, Doc. 2, 14 March 1988, Original: Spanish, p. 2. 
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1990-1991 had 554 pages. As in several occasions before, in the end 
of the 1980s, the Commission felt obliged to include a statement on 
the nature of its observations in regard to particular countries because 
the reports were still of a fragmentary nature: The Commission made 
clear that the section on countries did not provide an overall and 
complete description of the human rights situation in a Member State 
but more an update of the period covered by the Annual Report.273 
This generated a difficulty for the reports to satisfy the need of a 
general overview of the human rights situation in the Member States 
despite of the Commissions sometimes very limited sources. That 
problem constituted less of an obstacle for the Special Reports since 
those were mostly based on on-site visits. Some country reports, how-
ever, could only refer to material sent to the IACHR because the 
Commission did not receive the permission to conduct an on-site ob-
servation in the country. Usually, the Special Reports on particular 
countries began with an overview on the legal position of human 
rights in the concerned Member State. Subsequently, the reports dealt 
with the rights named in Article 9 a) of the IACHRs Statute. In gen-
eral, these studies regarded the situation of civil and political and in 
some cases of economic and social rights as well.274 As mentioned 
above, the best way to prepare such a country report was to conduct an 
on-site observation in the territory of the concerned State. 
The Commission interpreted its right to meet in each Member 
State as the implicit permission to visit every country of the inter-
American system.275 Initially, this interpretation was accepted without 
problems because the first countries affected were the Dominican Re-
public, Honduras and El Salvador  Member States that were consid-
ered to have less political weight. Later, this practice was formally ap-
proved. However, the IACHR still had to ask the government in ques-
tion for permission  sometimes, this requirement enabled the gov-
ernments to postpone the visit various times or indefinitely. Other 
States, such as Cuba, Paraguay and Uruguay, categorically denied 
                                                 
273  For instance: Annual Report of the IACHR 1989-1990, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77 rev. 
1, Doc. 7, 17 May 1990, Original: Spanish, p. 128. 
274  See: Tom J. Farer  The Grand Strategy of the United States in Latin America, 
New Brunswick 1988, pp. 75/76; Medina Quiroga, pp. 152-156. 
275  Regulations of the IACHR, Article 12, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 17 Doc. 26, May 2, 
1967. 
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such an investigation.276 As an experience of the first on-site 
investigation in Chile in 1974, the Commission prepared regulations 
regarding on-site observations in order to strengthen the IACHRs 
procedural frame concerning one of its most effective instruments.277 
As an on-site inquiry was an important factor for the relations between 
a Member State and the Commission, chapter II. 4. will address this 
item as well. 
In an interview with the author, former Commission member Farer 
described how he experienced the dynamic that evolved during the 
preparation of a report on an on-site observation. He pointed out that 
very early on the majoritys opinion was clear but the minority group 
tried to make some adjustments concerning adjectives. This procedure 
enabled the Commission to reach a consensus on the reports by main-
taining the majoritys report and adding some compromise modifica-
tions brought up by the minority.278 The first Special Reports on coun-
tries mainly dealt with Cuba. Until 1983, the IACHR issued the seven 
Special Reports dealing with Cuba. During the 1960s, there were Spe-
cial Reports on Political Refugees in America that also mainly re-
ferred to Cuba. This clearly indicated that the Commission somehow 
saw itself forced to report on Cuba. Besides the Cuban reports, the 
Special Reports were critical, although not all of them were as harsh 
as the Report on Nicaragua of 1978 or the Argentine Report of 1980. 
An important aspect for the Commissions work has been the rela-
tionship between the IACHR and human rights NGOs. The work of 
                                                 
276  While Cuba ignored the Commissions authority explicitly, Paraguay and Uru-
guay repeatedly employed strategies to delay an invitation  so their performance 
could be called a de facto categorical denial. 
277  See OEA/Ser.L/V/II.35, Doc.4 rev.1, October 15, 1975: Regulations regarding 
on-site observations. Moreover, in March 1975, Secretary Reque had urged to 
give the Commissioners a diplomatic status while conducting an on-site examina-
tion. Letter from Luis Reque to Andrés Aguilar, Washington, D.C., March 3, 
1975 (IACHR files). 
278  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. The ques-
tion of the Commissions ability to be an independent, positive force also arose in 
connection with its reports. As one person close to this bodys work noted, some 
reports have been watered down and, in some cases, the Commission may have 
been too timid to include in its recommendations, for example, a statement that 
a change in government was necessary. A. Glenn Mower  Regional Human 
Rights. A Comparative Study of the West European and Inter-American Systems, 
New York/Westport/London 1991, p. 85. 
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local groups and international NGOs can be described as the fuel 
that kept the machine of the Commission going. Initially, there were 
efforts to create a national human rights committee in each Member 
country but these endeavors were not very successful. The idea to 
found national human rights committees in the Member States was 
based on the thought that these committees could work closely with 
the Commission and thereby would constitute a sort of local sub 
commission. This demonstrates that the Commission was eager to act 
autonomously, which meant independently without cooperation with 
the few existing NGOs in the human rights field. In 1970/71, the 
IACHR was disillusioned because the idea of national committees had 
not been received favorably.279 Later, the following questions came 
up: Should those committees function as consultants for the Commis-
sion or advisors for the respective government? Which activities 
should those entities undertake and should they take place in coordina-
tion with the IACHR? Merely two groups were founded  in Costa 
Rica and Venezuela  and both worked only for a short time. Finally, 
the attempt to create committees linked to the Commission failed. One 
of the crucial problems was the financing.280 As a result, the IACHR 
agreed on the cooperation with already established institutions.  
In accordance, the main sources of information for the Commis-
sion were above all reports and documents prepared by the national 
and local NGOs. Since 1973, non-governmental human rights organi-
zations in Latin American countries as well as the international human 
rights NGOs gained considerable importance. Without their work, the 
IACHR would not have been able to work as efficiently as it did. The 
strength of those organizations was apparent during the 1980s, when 
the OAS and the IACHR lost support from the US. The establishment 
of the so-called human rights network was able to compensate for 
that loss of influence. During the 1980s, the international human rights 
community made human rights violations public. For example, the 
case of El Salvador did not provoke a Commissions report in the 
early 1980s though there occurred thousands of disappearances, mur-
ders and cases of torture. The human rights violations in Central 
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America were preponderantly brought to the attention of the interna-
tional community by the work of the mostly independent NGOs, be-
cause the lack of political support hampered the Commission to report 
on the human rights practice in countries like El Salvador. 
Already in the early years of the Commission, nongovernmental 
human rights organizations had asked to accredit observers to the 
IACHR sessions but due to the confidential character of those meet-
ings, the Commission refused that application.281 As this example 
shows, the Commission was aware of the risk to be blamed for impar-
tiality while naming particular NGOs as their principal sources.282 In 
its Annual Report of 1976, the IACHR expressed its support for pri-
vate international groups, which backed the Commission.283 In Janu-
ary 1978, the Commission discussed whether to include a reference to 
NGOs like Amnesty International or the Washington Office on Latin 
America in its Special Report on Uruguay. The Commissions chair-
man, Aguilar, stated that those organizations did not have the control 
and objectivity the IACHR had, which possessed precise norms since 
it was responsible to a superior organ.284 Accordingly, the IACHR re-
jected many proposals for projects directed to the Commission.285 The 
fact that many institutions and NGOs asked the Commission for col-
laboration or even support was not surprising, because of the famous 
reputation and the financial support by the Carter administration, 
which the IACHR enjoyed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
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Since 1974, Amnesty International (AI) directed questions, peti-
tions and other correspondence to the Commission, including many 
individual cases. In 1977, Amnesty International USA Director 
Stephanie Grant hoped to establish a consultative status for her institu-
tion at the IACHR.286 There also have been confidential information 
flows from AI to the Commission. Nevertheless, it seems surprising 
that the exchange of information between the IACHR and Amnesty 
International in 1978 was not as well established as one might sup-
pose.287 In 1979, Executive Secretary Vargas Carreño asked AI for co-
operation in regard to the forthcoming IACHR visit to Argentina.288  
Further, in 1983 the AI Secretary General offered to send the or-
ganizations regular publications to the Commission.289 It is surprising 
that the IACHR did not receive those documents before, in particular 
taking into account Amnesty Internationals work and reputation. In 
1988, AI Secretary General Martin mentioned that the last meeting be-
tween his organization and the IACHR had taken place in the last dec-
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ade.290 These fragmented sources indicate that there was a relationship 
to one of the most important NGOs but that it was not as close as one 
might suppose or others criticized. Consequently, a former IACHR of-
ficial holds that in the 1970s and 1980s, the most important contacts 
the Commission kept up were those with local groups rather than with 
international NGOs.291 Further, the fact that until the mid-1980s no lo-
cal human rights NGOs existed in countries like Guatemala, for in-
stance, affected the communication with the Commission.292 
In 1986, as in previous years, the Commission condemned attacks 
that were carried out on human rights organizations, as well as diffi-
culties that were originated by governments in the region. The Com-
mission stated its consistent policy ... to encourage the establish-
ment of human rights organizations as well as its support.293 In 
1987/1988, the Commission mentioned the human rights groups with 
which it had established close ties; among those the Vicaría de la 
Solidaridad of the Archdiocese of Santiago de Chile, Socorro Jurídico 
Cristiano Arzobispo Oscar Romero in El Salvador, and the Fed-
eración Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de Detenidos 
Desaparecidos in Venezuela. Further, the Commission maintained 
strong relations to Argentine NGOs: the Grandmothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), the Relatives 
of Detained and Disappeared.294 
In summary, the IACHR was to a certain extent dependent on the 
work of local, regional and international human rights NGOs. This in-
cluded the risk of operating with potentially biased information. How-
ever, the IACHR always tried to act impartially by applying its own 
standards. The IACHR reports did not simply take over provided in-
formation and if it did so, the documents used to indicate the source. 
In contrast to private human rights groups, the IACHR could also deal 
with human rights abuses at the diplomatic level in order to reach a 
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friendly settlement.295 A former chairman of the Commission speaks 
of a quasi-diplomatic role of the IACHR, which stands out against 
the NGO focus on publicity.296 This was a decisive advantage for the 
Commission, although it used the tool of publicity  the major and 
sole instrument of NGOs  as well. The Commission usually decided 
to publish its correspondence with a reluctant government in order to 
lay pressure on the latter. Further, the on-site observations always re-
ceived a high level of media interest. The annual General Assembly 
paid a lot of attention to the Commissions reports.297 Notwithstand-
ing, it is astonishing that during the time covered by the present inves-
tigation, the IACHR and its Secretariat never came close to a profes-
sional and optimum use of these high levels of publicity. 
One initial topic for the Commission, mainly an issue of the 
1970s, was the subject of ideological pluralism.298 In 1973, Latin 
American States succeeded in including the principle of ideological 
pluralism into the OAS Charter, which permitted the Member States 
to choose their own path to reach economic and social progress.299 In 
theory, this meant different political systems within the OAS, whose 
Charter explicitly refers to democracy as the only acceptable political 
system. Naturally, this effort was not only directed towards the 
chronic tendency of US interventions in countries with unacceptable 
governments but also an attempt for dictatorships to get away before 
the OAS with its deficiencies in democracy and human rights.300 The 
IACHR regarded those tendencies with concern as far as their impact 
on human rights.301 The chairman of the Commission, Jiménez de 
Aréchaga, favored the concept of representative democracy and 
warned of the consequences of the pluralism principle. The IACHR 
agreed on the interrelation between human rights and representative 
democracy and rejected the concept of ideological pluralism as in-
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compatible.302 Likewise, during the 1980s the Commission insisted on 
the (re-) establishment of representative democracy in the Member 
States. This was no new position, but it was a novelty that the Annual 
Report recommendations mentioned this request as the first point.303 
Although the principle of ideological pluralism was eventually estab-
lished as a part of the Charter after the reform of 1985304, in 1986 a 
particular General Assembly resolution on human rights and democ-
racy reiterated the interdependence between these items.305 In the 
General Assembly resolutions on the IACHR reports, the effective ex-
ercise of representative democracy was considered to be the best 
guarantee of human rights.306 
The Commissions advocating of representative democracy during 
the 1980s was also related to the increased influence of the Reagan 
administration that strongly supported democratization, although de-
mocracy was poorly defined. Furthermore, the shift to promote de-
mocracy was a result of a paradigm change within the discussion on 
State and society. Many of the former critics of dependent capitalism 
in Third World countries had suffered repression themselves and thus 
came to the conclusion that human rights, rule of law, and separation 
of powers were more than just a goal after a concluded State reform 
but actually a conquest of humanity.307 However, another explana-
tion will be argued here. The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights was always composed by mostly conservative members. The 
conservative tendency of the eighties, combined with the debt crisis 
and the troublesome and ideologically divided civil wars in Central 
America, led the Commissioners to opt for the lesser, as it were, of the 
three evils  a fragile democracy. This stand ensured that the IACHR 
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would be able to distance itself from right-wing dictators as well as 
from leftist insurgents. The question, nevertheless, is allowed whether 
the emphasis on democracy in any instance reflected the dominance of 
Reagans concepts of human rights, democracy and the socioeco-
nomic context (see chapter IV. 1.). 
Furthermore, a particular problem of the 1970s was the terrorism 
issue and its supposed connection with human rights. Dictatorships 
used to link both items in order to smooth down deplorable human 
rights records by legitimizing it with the terrorist threat. The first 
IACHR reports of the 1970s referred to the prevailing terrorism in the 
hemisphere. This approach of the Commission coincided at that time 
with the political organs of the OAS, which discussed terrorism as a 
main topic. The leading figure for elevating terrorism to a vital agenda 
point was the Brazilian member Carlos Dunshee de Abranches. In 
1970, the Commission adopted several resolutions condemning terror-
ism. Subsequently, the topic Terrorism for Political or Ideological 
Purposes as a Source of Violation of Human Rights was added to the 
IACHRs General Work program.308 Nevertheless, the Commissioners 
came to the conclusion that it would be inappropriate for the IACHR 
to draft a resolution on the General Assembly resolution on Interna-
tional cooperation for the prevention and repression of terrorism, as 
requested by Dunshee de Abranches. It decided that it was not in its 
competence and regarded the Inter-American Juridical Committee as 
the corresponding OAS body to prepare such a document. Further-
more, the Commission made an important statement in relation to the 
terrorism topic proposing to ...study the economic, social, political 
and cultural causes of terrorism in America, in order to prepare, in due 
course, a full and objective opinion of this serious problem. Subse-
quently, the IACHR decided to continue investigating the terrorism 
problem by inquiring as to the socioeconomic causes or origins of this 
phenomenon.309 This was a clear defeat for Dunshee de Abranches 
who was considered a pro-governmental member. To review the 
background of terrorism against the State meant to investigate the so-
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cioeconomic situation in the region that was in the majority of the 
cases characterized by high levels of social injustice. Here was a po-
tential risk for the Commission: by acknowledging the socioeconomic 
inequality and widespread unfair distribution of wealth and land, it 
could come to conclusions which indirectly supported the guerrillas 
justifications for their struggle. Further, it is necessary to make a dis-
tinction between the notions terrorists and guerrilla: In comparison 
with the more positive connotation attributed to the term guerrilla, a 
terrorist is clearly marked negatively. Therefore, the use of the 
Commissions terminology is relevant, because to call an insurgent 
movement guerrilla awarded it certain legitimacy, while terrorism 
has never been seen with any sympathy. Finally, the Commission did 
not investigate the roots of terrorism satisfyingly  but that was not its 
primary task.  
Nonetheless, in regards to human rights violations in the Member 
States, the Commissions Annual Report for 1970 called terrorism the 
most ostensible form of violence.310 In 1972, the Commission agreed 
to include a topic concerning the political crime and its relations to 
terrorism, proposed by Dunshee de Abranches.311 In the report of 
1973, however, the Commission confirmed that gross violations had 
taken place in the Member States in their battle against terrorists and 
guerrillas. Further, that report stated that terrorism and guerrillas had 
provoked the installation of de facto governments and insisted in the 
maxim Salus populi suprema lex esto. Notwithstanding, the IACHR 
document declared that the protection of the fundamental rights must 
also be secured under a state of siege.312 It is interesting to review the 
terms employed in the report: First, the Commission distinguished be-
tween terrorists and guerrillas, which might suggest that it consid-
ered the latter a more legitimate form of anti-government opposition. 
                                                 
310  Informe Anual de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos a la Asamblea General 
1970, OEA/Ser.P AG/doc. 128, 16 marzo 1971, Original: español, p.16. The re-
port stated: La forma más ostensible de dicha violencia [in the continents coun-
tries, K.D.] tiene como expresión el terrorismo, delincuencia masiva que tiende a 
instaurar un clima de inseguridad y angustia, con el pretexto de conquistar más 
altos niveles de justicia social en favor de las clases menos favorecidas. 
311  Informe Anual de la CIDH 1972, OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.305/73 rev.1, 14 marzo 
1973, Original: español, p. 78. 
312  Informe Anual de la CIDH correspondiente a 1973, OEA/Ser.P AG/doc. 409/74, 
5 marzo 1974, Original: español, pp. 27/28, 29, 30. 
Chapter II 122
On the other hand, the euphemistic expression de facto government 
is used  probably a proof for the strong governmental ties and con-
servative attitude of the Commission. On the other hand, the IACHR 
had to be careful with its language because calling a government re-
gime or even dictatorship would have meant a clear taking of posi-
tion and would surely have resulted in an outcry by the concerned 
government in power. In 1973  the coup in Chile had already oc-
curred  the Commission referred to the general situation of human 
rights in the region and stated that [t]he generalized employment of 
violent techniques in broad areas of our continent as a measure to try 
to impose transformations of the social or political order has generated 
situations of enormous tension, characterized through grave and fre-
quent violations of fundamental human rights.313 This extraordinary 
comment referred to violent techniques and thereby left the option 
to broaden the concept of violence also to anti-government groups or 
guerrillas. Further, it did not clearly indicate who was responsible for 
such a climate of violence  the armed forces, which seized power or 
guerrillas that indeed wanted to change the social or political order. 
One year later, the IACHR Annual Report found that [v]iolence con-
tinues to be a tool used by groups or organizations engaged in impos-
ing, by this means, their own political choices, or by government offi-
cials and agents, with the added problem that at times these individu-
als operate as paramilitary or para-police organizations.314 This was a 
more accentuated statement, naming government officials, and still 
maintaining the picture of the violence on both sides  by governmen-
tal forces and opposition groups. The Commission clarified that the 
governments could not consider themselves free from responsibility 
for those violent acts since it was its duty to guarantee the security of 
its citizens.315 This statement is of importance because it refused any 
excuse brought up by a government based on blaming the extremist 
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forces for the existing violence. In other words, the IACHR found it 
unacceptable to fight terrorism with State terrorism. Unfortunately, 
this sensitive issue indirectly could be used to defend the philosophy 
of the Doctrine of National Security because the State was called to 
suppress terrorism. However, it is important to emphasize that the 
Commission wanted to make clear that violent acts by extremists must 
be prevented by the government itself and above all that terrorist acts 
would never justify human rights violations committed by the State. In 
this instance, the Commission rejected the governments justification 
for its own human rights abuses, so it refused State advocated circum-
stantial relativism.316 
The statements regarding anti-government terrorism presented in 
the early 1970s constitute a proof for the unbiased perspective of the 
IACHR. In 1976, however, the IACHR presented a very short but ex-
ceptionally critical Annual Report. The 31-page document described 
the situation in the hemisphere as distressing because of the missing 
people, widespread torture in many countries, mistreatment of prison-
ers, etc. Further, the Commission stated that a state of siege should not 
serve as an excuse for the indefinite detention of individuals. Again, 
the IACHR mentioned terrorism and reiterated its stand on govern-
mental action on violence: It should be stated at this time that the 
States have not only the right, but the duty to take the measures to 
prevent acts of terrorism and violence. Accordingly, the governments 
could not act as ...simple spectators of the violence....317 Once again, 
this statement meant that the government had to prevent violence from 
either political direction and could not blame terrorism to justify own 
abuses, but the wording could also serve as for the ideologues of the 
Doctrine of National Security. In its 1977 Annual Report, the IACHR 
reiterated the conclusions and recommendations of the foregoing re-
port and described the concerning human rights situation in several 
countries as chronic. Further, the document stated that in certain 
countries, human rights laws did not help the victims because of the 
lack of independence of the judicial system or simply the repression of 
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all means of defending human rights.318 This position marked an-
other break with the traditional human rights diplomacy that had pre-
vailed until the early seventies. During the General Assembly debates 
on human rights matters and the IACHR reports, the Commission was 
not eager to discuss the supposedly close connection between human 
rights and terrorism.319 This was a strategy carried out by several au-
thoritarian regimes. 
In contrast, during the eighties, the terrorism issue still was on the 
OAS agenda but the fact that some of the insurgent movements, par-
ticularly in Central America, appeared legitimate or in the case of the 
Sandinistas even assumed power, changed the handling of the topic. In 
1985, the General Assembly adopted a resolution, which condemned 
terrorist methods and practices.320 The changes, which took place from 
the mid-eighties, were reflected in the Annual Report for 1990-1991 
where a reference to State terrorism was made. The subchapter named 
Chile since 1973, Argentina since 1976 and Nicaragua under Somoza 
as examples. Further, the report stated ...that the issue of violence and 
terrorism has from time to time been used, either blatantly or indi-
rectly, to justify human rights violations.321 This clearly shows how 
the situation had changed due to the prevailing wave of democratiza-
tion: with respect to past years, the Commission could openly address 
State terrorism without notoriously being lectured by outraged gov-
ernments. 
The reports of the 1970s and 1980s marginally touched womens 
rights.322 However, some country reports made references to the par-
ticular situation of women, like the reports on El Salvador (1978)323 or 
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Argentina (1980). In 1971, the Commission declared the use of abor-
tions to resolve economic problems in light of the demographic ex-
plosion as a gross violation of human rights.324 In 1985, however, one 
of the few female Commissioners, Elsa Kelly, declared to separate be-
tween her personal view and the Commissions position on abor-
tion.325 Former Commissioner Farer states that the issue of womens 
rights never came up, also due to the fact that the IACHR was more 
reactive in regard to cases. The Commission indiscriminately dealt 
with cases; it did not distinguish between male and female victims. 
Nevertheless, the IACHR visited some womens detention centers and 
prisons.326 In the course of the drafting of the Additional Protocol on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the American Convention on 
Human Rights, several minorities  handicapped and elderly people, 
children etc.  were considered, but not women.327 In general, it be-
came obvious that many international actors  also the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights  perceived womens rights as a sort of 
luxury rights.328 This means that those rights were not completely 
ignored, but its implementation or protection merely served as an aspi-
ration for the time when the other, fundamental civil and political 
rights would be realized. On the eve of the century, it was sympto-
matic that the Commissions Special Rapporteur on womens issues 
was a man. This can be easily explained because there were no 
women among the Commission members.329 As Medina correctly 
concludes, [p]romotion of womens human rights has simply not 
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happened at the level of the general human rights organ, that is to say, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.330 
Considering the previously mentioned ideological struggle be-
tween the first and second generation of human rights, the IACHRs 
position on economic, social and cultural rights is of particular impor-
tance.331 A former judge of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Héctor Gros Espiell, described human rights as an integral 
complex, unique and indivisible, in which the different rights were 
necessarily interrelated and interdependent.332 This was the usual defi-
nition for the connection between individual and socioeconomic rights 
but the following question comes up: How did the IACHR handle the 
issue in practice? The American Declaration mentions economic, so-
cial and cultural rights without separating them from civil and political 
rights.333 The American Convention, which was adopted in 1969 and 
entered into force in 1978, does explicitly include socioeconomic 
rights but in general terms: article 26 refers to those rights mentioned 
in the revised OAS Charter of 1967 and suggests achieving progres-
sively those rights.334 Already in 1968, economic, social and cultural 
rights witnessed some international publicity, particularly in regard to 
developing countries, when the International Conference on Human 
Rights in Teheran dealt with those rights.335 Former Costa Rican 
president Figueres provided a provocative but illustrative remark: In 
theory at least, you could even have a society juridically so constituted 
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that everybody enjoys civil rights and everybody is poor.336 Also in 
the inter-American system the question arose if economic, social and 
cultural rights had to be interpreted as rights or merely as goals.337 
While Latin Americans used to emphasize the binding character of 
those rights, the US hesitated to do so.  Though Carter put them on 
his human rights agenda, Reagan categorically rejected declaring the 
second generation of human rights as rights. 
In relation to economic, social and cultural rights, in 1970 the 
Commission vaguely mentioned that the guarantee of human rights 
would be ineffective without the dedication to a major improvement 
of the economic and social development. Likewise, the IACHR ur-
gently called for an agrarian reform in accordance with article 23 of 
the American Declaration. The Annual Report of 1970 included as its 
final recommendation to the General Assembly that all governments 
should adopt measures to strengthen the economic conditions of the 
peoples.338 In the same year, the Commission urged the Member 
States to ...adopt standards that meet the fundamental requirements of 
social justice.339 In the following year, the Commission again urged 
the Member States to improve the socioeconomic conditions and also 
called for an intensification of ...international cooperation in trade so 
that Latin Americas raw materials can obtain fair prices in the mar-
kets of the countries that import them.340 These remarks showed the 
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broader context, in which the Commission saw the human rights situa-
tion but at the same time it appeared somehow ingenuous to request 
such reforms in a report on human rights because the demand was di-
rected to the industrialized world. In 1971, Commissioner Dunshee de 
Abranches proposed to include a recommendation to the Annual Re-
port, urging the American governments and international cooperation 
...to assure for their peoples, especially in Latin America, the effec-
tive enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.341 This sug-
gestion mentioned the term rights and thus was more substantive 
than the merely abstract call for social justice. It is ironic that it was 
Dunshee de Abranches who came up with this proposal: While em-
phasizing the terrorist threat and supporting the governments whose 
principal interest was to keep the status quo, he actually demanded so-
cioeconomic rights. But who should concretely enforce them? In the 
period, in which he made the statement, to assure the effective en-
joyment of socioeconomic rights for many countries, in particular in 
Central America, would have meant a more or less radical change of 
their social systems. The historical definition for such a potentially se-
ditious development is Revolution  the last occurrence that Dunshee 
de Abranches would have welcomed. 
These statements were clear signs that the Commission was some-
how aware of the connection between individual rights abuses and the 
prevailing socioeconomic situation in the majority of Member States. 
Nevertheless, it did not dare to call the requested improvements 
rights  save some accidental exceptions, such as the one provided 
by Dunshee de Abranches. However, in its 1972 report, the Commis-
sion mentioned the right to work and a fair retribution (Article XIV of 
the American Declaration) and the right to social security (Article 
XVI) and named various Member States, in which those rights were 
not satisfactorily assured.342 During a 1973 Commission meeting, a 
message of Secretary General Galo Plaza was presented, in which he 
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doubted that social and economic development constituted a true pro-
gress without the respect for the rights of man and freedom.343 
In 1977, a General Assembly resolution requested developed 
States to support developing countries to participate in international 
trade by abolishing discriminatory and protectionist measures.344 An-
other resolution contained in the 1977 Annual Report demanded that 
each Member State should commit itself to ...the achievement of 
economic and social justice in its national and international rela-
tions.345 In 1978, Commissioner Tom Farer insisted on the idea that 
economic, social and cultural rights had to be taken into consideration 
for all matters and proposed to include data and statistics while refer-
ring to these rights. At a Commission session, member Monroy Cabra 
underlined the necessity of States with a higher development and in-
ternational organizations to cooperate with less developed States in 
order to improve the situation in those countries. In the Special Report 
on the situation of human rights in El Salvador of 1978, the Commis-
sion stressed the relationship between civil and political and eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights and denounced explicitly the viola-
tion of social and economic rights for the first time in a particular 
case.346 Even though it was a brief one, it was the first report that in-
cluded a chapter on economic, social and cultural rights.  
The El Salvador Report further referred to statistical material from 
the Inter-American Development Bank, so it based its findings on rec-
ognized economic data. However, as Farer remarks, he had to cau-
tiously approach the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights 
because of the more conservative attitude of his colleagues. Further-
more, Farer points out that his strategy was to include a chapter in the 
Annual Report, which linked violations of civil and political rights to 
the socio-economic conditions. Nonetheless, the Commission avoided 
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mentioning violations of economic, social and cultural rights.347 
Since 1979 the Commission exposed economic, social and cultural 
rights as part of the human rights concept. The Annual Report corre-
sponding to 1979-1980 underlined the relationship between individual 
rights abuses and marginalization of socio-economic rights. The 
document confirmed ...the organic relationship between the violation 
of the rights to physical safety on the one hand, and neglect of eco-
nomic and social rights and suppression of political participation, on 
the other. This relation was considered cause and effect at the same 
time: repression of socio-economic rights  especially in company 
with the neglect of political participation  created the kind of social 
polarization, which would lead to terrorist acts against and carried out 
by the government.348 In general, the report continued, the extreme 
mass poverty as a result of the unbalanced distribution of means of 
production was identified as the fundamental cause of terror. Further, 
the Commission described its careful handling of this sensitive issue 
since it was extremely difficult to find the appropriate indicators to 
measure socio-economic rights, which also touched one of the gov-
ernments main economic questions, to choose between consumption 
and investment, and thus ...between current and future generations. 
Also, the document acknowledged that economic and national defense 
policy were both closely connected to national sovereignty.349 In addi-
tion, the IACHR recommended that the governments should satisfy 
basic needs of its populations such as health, nutrition and education, 
arguing that [t]he priority of the rights of survival and basic 
needs is a natural consequence of the right to personal security.350 
Moreover, the Commission named life expectancy, infant mortality 
and illiteracy as useful indicators to measure the well being of popula-
tions. However, the report went further and stated that in consideration 
of the unequal distribution of wealth, ...an increase in national reve-
nues does not necessarily nor by correlation mean an improvement in 
those indices. This was possibly an indirect criticism of Chiles eco-
nomic policy. Finally, the document emphasized the duty of the de-
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veloped States toward the less developed countries and recommended 
fighting extreme poverty.351 This pathetic call for the implementation 
of socioeconomic rights was a result of the personal endeavors carried 
out by US Commissioner Tom Farer. He came up with the issue of so-
cial, economic and cultural rights and did not dare to call those 
rights. A comparison between Farers works on the topic, in particu-
lar in 1978, provides a striking similarity between his own view and 
the Commissions findings.352 At the same time, the claim for those 
rights also demonstrated that the Commission obviously abandoned its 
appearance as a merely juridical body and became an institution with 
quite political observations and attitudes. Although the IACHR had 
always been political, the issue of socioeconomic rights constituted a 
particularly illustrative topic. 
When Tom Farer became chairman of the IACHR in 1980, he in-
troduced a new item in the Annual Report dedicated to socioeconomic 
rights. At the General Assembly in 1980, Farer admitted that the issue 
of socioeconomic rights was somehow awkward for the Commission 
since it was difficult to find violations of those rights committed by 
the States. Furthermore, Farer called the Member States to take meas-
ures against the poverty in their countries.353 The 1980 General As-
sembly adopted a resolution, which called for the extension of the 
human rights concept towards economic, social and cultural rights. 
The document resolved [t]o share the Commissions concern in 
stressing the importance of economic, social and cultural rights in the 
context of human rights for the integral development of man...354 Ob-
viously, the resolution text employed a very general language and it is 
not difficult to realize that this statement fits in the typical tradition of 
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non-commitment phrases due to its non-binding character. In regard to 
the impact of these rights, their value can be compared with the one 
attributed to civil and political rights before 1973  just a protocollary 
matter of delightful intentions without any substantial obligations to 
the Member States. The subsequent General Assembly resolutions 
also confirmed that economic, social and cultural rights were human 
rights without specifying its impact on concrete measures to imple-
ment them.355 
Seemingly, the terminology used by the Commission could have 
been perceived by right-wing governments as Marxist thoughts. 
Moreover, the emphasis on basic needs also threatened conservative 
US politicians who had the reputation to be the crusaders for 
maintaining a Latin American status quo favorable for political and 
economic interests of the United States. It may be possible that this 
argument, used in 1979-1980, caused if not hostility, at least certain 
doubts about the Commissions usefulness and impartiality for the 
designated members of the Reagan administration that assumed power 
in January 1981. In its 1980-1981 Annual Report, the Commission 
recognized efforts to eliminate poverty under radically different 
political, economic and cultural systems: 
In turn, those efforts have produced spectacular results as has 
been shown in those countries that have expanded public health care 
services at the lowest level of society, that have tackled the problem of 
mass illiteracy systematically, that have undertaken comprehensive 
agrarian reform programs or that have extended the benefits of social 
security to all sectors of the population.356 
However, the report concluded that no system had been effective 
to fight poverty with a decisive success. Such a statement included an 
indirect reference to the social benefits of the Cuban and Nicaraguan 
systems  a risky maneuver, if one takes into consideration the atmos-
phere in the hemisphere at that time: Reagan proclaimed a new con-
servatism resulting in a revived Cold War, right-wing regimes in the 
Southern Cone were still in power, Central America was in agony, and 
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the debt crisis of 1982 was in sight.357 Nevertheless, the Commissions 
efforts to bring the topic on the organizations agenda succeeded in 
1982, when a General Assembly resolution requested the General Se-
cretariat to prepare a preliminary draft on an Additional Protocol to 
the American Convention on Human Rights, defining the economic, 
social and cultural rights. This encouraged the Commission to 
strengthen its endeavors in those rights.358 
In 1983, the Commission presented its seventh and last report on 
human rights in Cuba to date. The document was considerably critical 
concerning the situation of political rights but nevertheless mentioned 
significant progress in regard to economic, social and cultural rights. 
The 1983 report was quite appropriate and mentioned shortcomings 
and achievements as well.359 Because of its sympathetic tone while re-
ferring to socioeconomic accomplishments, the IACHR received 
harshest criticism by Castro opponents, particularly in the US.360 
The Commission report of 1983/1984 concluded [w]ork, health, 
education, suitable housing, and the like would flow necessarily and 
naturally as a result of the preservation of certain individual guaran-
tees and of the rule of democratic institutions.361 Nevertheless, the 
Commission emphasized its stand on individual guarantees and politi-
cal rights, which ...cannot be impaired, in any way, without attacking 
the dignity of the human individual. Accordingly, the Inter-American 
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Commission on Human Rights abandoned its practice to report on 
economic, social and cultural rights regardless of the political system 
in a Member State and decidedly turned to favoring democracy. Fur-
ther, the IACHR Report manifested again the close relationship be-
tween socioeconomic and civil-political rights, described as a 
whole, and said that ...the sacrifice of some rights for the benefit of 
others can never be justified.362 This was a strong statement but one 
may ask: How to handle this? As the author has stated in the introduc-
tion, it is his belief that in fact, priorities have always been decisive 
for the actual human rights policy. So, was this comment nothing 
more than just a rhetorical statement? It remains difficult to determine 
if the Commission was ingenuous enough to believe in a human rights 
policy based on the simple implementation of the interconnection of 
civil, political and socioeconomic rights or if it was merely a rhetori-
cal statement. 
In this context, the Commission referred to the American Human 
Rights Convention (1969) and the Inter-American Charter of Social 
Guarantees of 1948. In regard to economic, social and cultural rights, 
the Commission considered the Convention less as an instrument of 
protection and more as objectives of economic and social develop-
ment, or a sort of guide.363 Seemingly, this statement mirrored the 
prevailing opinion on constitutional rights in Latin America and was 
exactly the position taken by the Reagan administration, which con-
stantly refused to accept the term rights in reference to social and 
economic standards. In contrast, the Commission clearly defined its 
stand on the question of the position awarded to these rights: As 
human rights that they are, economic, social, and cultural rights ... 
cannot be considered as desirable goals but must be considered as re-
alizable imperatives.364 Whatsoever, the lack of precision, together 
with the general problem of dealing with these rights, led the Com-
mission to conclude the inoperability of Article 42 of the Convention 
in practice. That article obliges the Member States to forward its re-
ports to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and to the 
Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture, and also 
to the IACHR in order to enable the latter to monitor the promotion of 
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the mentioned rights.365 But apparently, the Commission had not in-
sisted very vigorously on the transmittal of such reports. In general, 
the IACHR discussed the problem of operability in regard to socio-
economic rights.366 A year later, in 1984/85, in regard to the drafting 
of an Additional Protocol on socioeconomic rights, the Commission 
agreed on the traditional trilogy of socioeconomic rights: work, educa-
tion and health, which was broadened by other rights mostly related to 
the former.367 Further, the Commission considered indicators like per 
capita income, industrialization of capital goods or private investment 
as important factors for the achievement of economic, social and cul-
tural rights. Nevertheless, it rejected to extend the rights catalogue to 
include these issues, because it was considered inappropriate.368 In 
1986, the Commission proposed to attribute the same system of pro-
tection as the one for civil and political rights to these three rights: 
trade union rights, the right to strike and freedom of education.369 In 
the same year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on human 
rights and democracy, in which it emphasized democratic principles 
and merely mentioned social justice instead of economic and social 
rights.370 However, a former Commissioner explains that beyond the 
legal work on the socioeconomic rights issue, the variety of philoso-
phies represented by the Commission members led the topic to be-
come secondary in its practical actions.371 
In 1989, the Commission agreed to include in its final press com-
muniqué a reference to the economic situation describing the external 
debt as ...main enemy of stability and consolidation of democracy in 
the continent.372 This was a strong statement, which clearly consti-
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tuted a political opinion and went beyond former postulations that de-
scribed the Commission as an exclusively legal body. The 
1990/1991 Annual Report referred to the conclusions drawn in the 
1980-1981 Report but emphasized the denial of political rights as 
source of violence, not the denial of socioeconomic rights.373 
In the course of the preparation of the Draft Additional Protocol 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Commission requested 
proposals from the Member States, but merely a few responded. This 
was an expression of the lack of interest in the issue among the gov-
ernments. The author suggests that the Additional Protocol on socio-
economic rights was an unsuccessful attempt to remedy the political-
economic structure problems by law because its contents did not per-
mit a rigorous implementation or even observance of the rights men-
tioned. 
With a reference to the economically lost decade of the eighties 
and the external debt, the Annual Report of 1991 stated that the eco-
nomic crisis in many countries hampered the implementation and ef-
fective respect for socioeconomic rights.374 The Commission Report 
even went further by demanding that the economic adjustments  
clearly a reference to the so-called structural adjustment programs of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)  must be organized without 
injuring the most needy and most vulnerable sectors ...those who 
have suffered most as a result of internal violence and recession.375 
Although the IMF was not mentioned by name, this was a very politi-
cal statement. According to a former IACHR official, there was a 
question of priority during the seventies: First, the bloodbath had to 
stop, then the second generation of human rights could be taken into 
consideration. Also other Commission members and officials spoke 
about the necessary priority of civil and political rights when butchery 
takes place.376 
However, the IACHR did not prepare any Special Report on the 
situation of economic, social and cultural rights in the region during 
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the period of this inquiry. Such a report would have seriously chal-
lenged the Commissions impartial stand because this rights area 
clearly affects the basic political mainstream and even political institu-
tions and the Member States. Therefore, it may have seemed reason-
able not to write such a potentially controversial document. 
In short, the issue of socioeconomic rights witnessed several 
phases within the Commissions work: Between 1960 and 1978, so-
cioeconomic matters were merely considered as goals and conse-
quently rather neglected377, but from 1978/79 onwards the term 
rights was used frequently and the IACHR repeatedly stressed the 
presumed interconnection between civil and political as well as eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights. Further, since 1978, the IACHR ac-
knowledged the nonobservance of socioeconomic rights, together with 
the neglect of political rights, as a main cause for violations of indi-
vidual rights. In the Annual Reports of the mid-eighties, however, the 
emphasis on economic rights diminished and was replaced by the as-
pect of representative democracy  seemingly a rather unconscious 
approaching toward the Reagan administrations stand on human 
rights and democracy. 
Furthermore, the IACHR worked diligently on the problem of 
forced disappearances, which it considered a difficult issue to deal 
with because of the crimes clandestine character. The General As-
sembly, however, adopted most of the Commissions recommenda-
tions in its resolutions. In 1983, for the first time, the Assembly de-
clared the practice of forced disappearances a crime against human-
ity as requested by the IACHR.378 The US had always opposed such 
a terminology because of the singular meaning of the expression, 
which derived from its mentioning in the Nuremberg tribunals against 
Nazi criminals. Finally, in 1983 the US accepted the term in order to 
pass the resolution. 379 
                                                 
377  See LeBlanc, pp. 169/170. 
378  AG/RES. 666 (XIII-0/83), Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, in: IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1983-1984, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.63, doc. 10, 24 September 1984, p. 17; AG/RES 742 (XIV-0-
84), in: Annual Report of the IACHR 1984-1985, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66 doc. 10 rev. 
1, October 1st 1985, Original: Spanish, p. 12. 
379  OEA/Ser.P/XIII.0.2, 14 noviembre 1983, Volumen II, Parte II, Décimotercer Pe-
ríodo Ordinario de Sesiones, Washington, D.C., del 14 al 18 de noviembre 1983, 
Actas y Documentos, Volumen II, Segunda Parte, Primera Comisión, p. 154. 
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In 1987-1988, the Commission studied the situation of minor chil-
dren of disappeared persons who were separated from their parents. 
This inquiry was mainly inspired by the Argentine case and the en-
deavors of the Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo, the Grandmothers who 
have been looking for their grandchildren whose parents had disap-
peared. Interestingly, in reference to the Argentine junta (1976-1983) 
the IACHR employed the expression military dictatorship  a notion 
with which the Commission usually did not work. There were two 
categories of adoptions: families who did not know about the disap-
pearance of the adopted child and those who formed part of or were 
somehow linked to the armed or security forces.380 In the course of the 
drafting of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances 
of Persons, the Commission turned to NGOs to take advantage of their 
experience with the phenomenon of disappearances.381 
Although the topic of indigenous rights is not discussed in this 
study, a remark made by the Commission appears to be of interest.382 
In regard to the celebration of the so-called Fifth Centennial of the 
Discovery and Meeting of Two Worlds, which meant Christopher 
Columbus arrival in the Americas, the Commission announced in 
1989 to contribute to this event by proposing the adoption of an in-
strument for the defense of the human rights of indigenous peoples.383 
This reflected the Commissions attitude toward the celebration and in 
regard to the title chosen for this event. In 1989, the General Assem-
                                                 
380  The ideological goal of this practice was  according to a statement of General 
Ramón Juan Alberto Camps, Chief of Police of the Province of Buenos Aires 
(1977-1978)  to avoid that the children of the disappeared grew up hating the 
armed forces and consequently creating a new generation of subversives. Annual 
Report of the IACHR 1987-1988, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.74, Doc. 10 rev. 1, 16 Sep-
tember 1988, Original: Spanish, pp. 332-335. 
381  Annual Report of the IACHR 1987-1988, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.74, Doc. 10 rev. 1, 16 
September 1988, Original: Spanish, p. 346. 
382  It is a striking detail that the OAS main library is called Columbus Memorial 
Library. Further, the Organization of American States honors Isabel the Catholic 
Queen of Spain who sent Columbus on his mission to India with a statute in front 
of the entrance of the main building  an eloquent symbol for the organizations 
self-comprehension. 
383  The Commission wrote the following: The fact that 1992 marks 500 years since 
the arrival of the Iberian conquerors on this continent offers a singular perspec-
tive for analyzing the historical elements that have shaped the problems suffered 
by indigenous populations. Annual Report of the IACHR 1988-1989, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76, Doc. 10, 18 September 1989, Original: Spanish, p. 243. 
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bly requested the IACHR to prepare a legal instrument concerning the 
rights of the indigenous peoples, for adoption in 1992.384 
Finally, the Commission worked decisively on the extension and 
codification of the inter-American human rights system and its legal 
instruments. The IACHR mainly contributed to the drafting of the 
American Convention on Human Rights of 1969. During the 1980s, it 
prepared the draft text of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the draft convention 
defining torture as an international crime. The latter was adopted by 
the General Assembly in 1985. In the mid-eighties, the IACHR 
drafted an Additional Protocol on the Abolition of the Death Penalty. 
This Additional Protocol also served to demonstrate the Commissions 
independence from the United States that has been a traditional advo-
cate of the capital punishment. Moreover, in 1989, the General As-
sembly resolved to recommend to the Commission that it study the 
necessary measures to improve the autonomy, independence and per-
sonal integrity of the juridical branch in order to guarantee proper in-
vestigations of human rights violations.385 In its 1988-1989 Annual 
Report, the Commission purposed a review of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, including a far-reaching reform, which was 
justified by the experience of the IACHR.386 This would have meant to 
grant the Commission legislative rights  undoubtedly an adventurous 
idea. In the subsequent Annual Report, the Commission again referred 
to this topic in order to improve the effectiveness of the inter-
American system. Maybe, this can be regarded as a reaction to the 
decadence of the Socialist Eastern bloc and as a foreshadowing of the 
resolution 1080 of Santiago. 
Another new topic that indicated the broadening of the Commis-
sions approach was to analyze Groups of armed irregulars and hu-
                                                 
384  AG/RES. 1022 (XIX-0/89): Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights, in: IACHR/IACtHR  Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights 
1989, Dordrecht 1993, p. 884. 
385  AG/RES: 1022 (XIX-0/89), in: Annual Report of the IACHR 1989-1990, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77 rev. 1, Doc. 7, 17 May 1990, Original: Spanish, p. 16. 
386  In addition, if the Commission deems it appropriate, it may decide to completely 
revise the Convention, using the opportunity to incorporate new rights, both indi-
vidual as well as collective, into the Convention, thereby perfecting the inter-
American system for the protection of human rights. Annual Report of the 
IACHR 1988-1989, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76, Doc. 10, 18 September 1989, p. 244. 
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man rights. This new item entered the IACHRs agenda due to the 
General Assembly resolution of 1990 proposed by Peru that dealt with 
Consequences of Acts of Violence Perpetrated by Irregular Armed 
Groups On the Enjoyment of Human Rights.387 
In summary, the IACHR decided to engage not only in the promo-
tion but gradually also in the protection of human rights. Further, the 
failure to found local agencies in the Member States resulted in a 
steady cooperation with national and also international human rights 
NGOs. Although womens right did not play an important role during 
the 1970s and 1980s, the topic of economic, social and cultural rights 
could gain some attention, particularly between 1978 and 1981. The 
Commission even contributed to the drafting of an Additional Proto-
col concerning the aforementioned rights. In general, the Commission 
initially decided to promote and protect human rights in the hemi-
sphere and gradually broadened its scope of issues. 
After this overview of the evolution of the IACHRs positions, it 
is of particular interest to review its relations with the OAS main or-
gans as well as toward the Member States. 
 
                                                 
387  In regard to this point, the Commission referred to the Geneva conventions and 
stated: Another situation in which the concept of irregular armed groups is 
used is when they take actions calculated to alter a social order that they perceive 
as being antidemocratic and unjust and that is perpetuated through the use of 
some form of violence. The recent history of the hemisphere has seen situations 
of this type, where subversive or insurgent groups have later gone on to be-
come the government, or have helped create the conditions for a change of gov-
ernment. Annual Report of the IACHR 1990-1991, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79 rev. 1, 
Doc. 12, 22 February 1991, Original: Spanish, p. 509. 
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II. 4.  The Conscience of the Hemisphere Versus the  
Unconscious: The Relations Between the IACHR,  
the OAS Organs, and the Member States 
 
You created us, you elected us, we are your agents to carry out the 
mandate, the human rights mandate that you have given us.388 
 
Former IACHR chairman Tom Farer on the relationship between IACHR and 
Member States 
 
The difference between the OAS and the IACHR budgets reveals the 
varying importance of the Commission and its mother organization. 
While the OAS had to cut back bureaucracy and reduce its staff from 
1,600 (1975) to barely 1,000 (1983), the Commissions financial re-
sources grew and during the 1980s did not receive the deep budget 
cuts such as the OAS Regular Fund. Clearly, this dynamic contributed 
to the rivalry between the ordinary OAS machinery and the IACHR 
(see chapter II. 2.). During the commemoration of the 25th anniversary 
of the Commissions creation, Sepúlveda remarked that ...the Com-
mission always found echo at the OAS and backing in all its organs, 
which always have provided support, sympathy and encourage-
ment.389 These very optimistic words do not address the great strug-
gles between the IACHR and some OAS organs.390 
                                                 
388  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
389  Sepúlveda said: ...la Comisión siempre ha encontrado eco en la Organización de 
los Estados Americanos, y respaldo en todos sus órganos, que le han prestado 
siempre apoyo, simpatía y alienta. Consejo Permanente de la Organización de 
los Estados Americanos, Acta de la Sesión Protocolar celebrada el 27 de sep-
tiembre de 1984, OEA/Ser. G. CP/ACTA 584/84, 27 Septiembre 1984, p. 17. 
390  At the 25th anniversary of the IACHR in 1984, diplomatic-political constraints 
apparently forced IACHR chairman Sepúlveda to stress the close relation with 
the OAS: ...the Commission is an emanation of the Organization of American 
States; we are intimately tied with it; we are an indissoluble part of it and this fact 
always inspires our way of thinking and our action. The success of the Commis-
sion, its efficacy, is the success and the efficacy of the very Organization. (...la 
Comisión es una enamación de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, con 
ella, estamos íntimamente vinculados, somos una parte indisoluble de ella y este 
hecho inspira siempre nuestro pensamiento y nuestra acción. El éxito de la Comi-
sión, su eficacia, es el éxito y la eficacia de la Organización misma. Translated 
to English by the author). OEA/Ser.G CP/ACTA 584/84, 27 September 1984. 
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As previously discussed, the IACHR was initially a rather unim-
portant part of the OAS and only later expanded to have an independ-
ent role. The success of the Commission and its effectiveness was not 
the result of the OAS efficiency but happened in spite of the organi-
zations inefficiency. Naturally, Sepúlvedas comments reveal the atti-
tude of the Commission towards the OAS at a time of serious budget 
cuts. In general, as Medina Quiroga points out, it is obvious that the 
political organs of the OAS did not want the IACHR to become an ob-
servatory body on behalf of human rights, but preferred it remain 
more a promotional and declaratory organ.391 
The Commissions scope depended on its allies within and outside 
of the OAS. From an institutional perspective, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the staff of its Secretariat were 
part of the OAS General Secretariat. Consequently, the IACHR was 
subject to the rules and regulations of the General Secretariat, as evi-
denced by the fact that many lawyers were sent to the IACHR by the 
General Secretariat.392 
According to several interviews conducted by the author, Secre-
tary General Galo Plaza generally supported the Commission, which 
did not have a very controversial role until the end of his term. In con-
trast, Plazas successor, the Argentine career diplomat Alejandro Or-
fila, was not only a controversial personality and generous party giver 
but he also witnessed the crucial years of the IACHR heading the 
OAS.393 Orfila was elected in 1975 and left the OAS disillusioned and 
accused of irregularities in 1984. While Orfila was a talent with public 
relations, he avoided articulating a decisive position on specific as-
pects and reportedly cultivated a low profile on divisive issues, such 
as human rights.394 The role of the former Argentine ambassador to 
                                                                                                         
Consejo Permanente, Acta de la Sesión Protocolar celebrada el 27 de septiembre 
de 1984. 
391  See Medina Quiroga, p. 90. 
392  Farer  The Grand Strategy, p. 72. See: Verónica Gómez  The Interaction be-
tween the Political Actors of the OAS, the Commission, and the Court, in: Har-
ris/Livingstone, pp. 176, 203/204. 
393  See Washington Post, April 15, 1984, p. A26. 
394  See Memorandum, From: Francis X. Gannon, OAS Consultant on Public Affairs, 
to: Their Excellencies, OAS Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observ-
ers, Subject: Report on Effect of OAS Activities on the U.S. Press and Public, 
May 23, 1984, pp. 8, 15. In 1980, Orfila himself wrote that North and South 
Americans believed that ...it would be wrong to presume that social justice in 
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Japan and the United States is a very difficult one to examine: some 
accused him of being corrupt and a friend of right-wing dictators 
while others considered him to be helpful for the IACHR.395 Though 
he was accused of supporting the Argentine junta, Orfila reportedly 
became a passive ally of the Commission. In contrast to pictures of 
Orfila smiling together with Pinochet and other dictators, he actually 
enabled the Commission to have many liberties and to work freely. 
The relationship between Orfila and the Commission could be de-
scribed as distant but to some extent supportive. This mutual respect 
and cooperation evolved over time, and was not necessarily present at 
the start.396 In 1980, the Commissions chairman, Tom Farer, thanked 
Orfila for his cooperation and support and repeated his judgment in an 
interview with the author.397 Also other interviewees corroborated that 
Orfila surprisingly was actually supportive.398 However, there were 
contrasting opinions both inside and outside the Commission. For ex-
ample, former Argentine Foreign Minister Oscar Montes remarked 
that Orfila tried to act impartially but was under pressure from the 
most dominant OAS Member, the United States.399 In regard to his 
stand on human rights, Orfila seemingly preferred to arrange private 
meetings and to settle problems diplomatically instead of openly chal-
lenging a dictatorial regime.400 However, despite his fondness of quiet 
diplomacy, Orfila became the most controversial Secretary General of 
the OAS who has been harshly criticized for his management style 
and personal performance as head of the OAS. Generally, there is rea-
                                                                                                         
the long run can be achieved at the expense of basic human rights. Alejandro 
Orfila  The Americas in the 1980s: An Agenda for the Decade Ahead, Lanham 
1980, p. 128. 
395  See Memorandum, From: Francis X. Gannon, OAS Consultant on Public Affairs, 
to: Their Excellencies, OAS Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observ-
ers, Subject: Report on Effect of OAS Activities on the U.S. Press and Public, 
May 23, 1984, pp. 24/25. 
396  Interviews. 
397  OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2, 13 noviembre 1981, Volumen II, Parte II, Décimo Período de 
Sesiones, Washington, D.C., del 19 al 27 de noviembre de 1980, Actas de las 
Comisiónes Primera, Segunda, Tercera y Cuarta. (Primera Comisión), p. 39. In-
terview with Dean Tom J. Farer, Denver/Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
398  Interviews. 
399  Interview with Admiral Oscar A. Montes, Foreign Minister 1976-1978, Buenos 
Aires, May 17, 2000. 
400  Interviews. 
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son to believe that he acted in various ways concerning human rights 
questions  in some occasions more sympathetic with authoritarian 
regimes, but generally passively supportive toward the Commission. 
At the beginning, there was some protest from the IACHR against 
the first orders from the General Secretariat401 but eventually, their 
struggle for competence was resolved and Orfila did not directly at-
tack the military regimes but he did not decisively influence the 
Commissions work either. For instance, in 1977, when the Commis-
sioners asked Orfila to substitute Executive Secretary Castañon, he 
agreed and after some reluctance, appointed Edmundo Vargas Car-
reño, nominated by the Commission, to become his successor. 
The relations between Orfilas successor, the Brazilian diplomat 
João Clemente Baena Soares, and the Commission reportedly were 
not very positive.402 A former Commission member holds that Baena 
Soares generally disliked the human rights issue and did not support 
the Commission.403 Baena Soares had served as representative at the 
OAS when the military government ruled in Brazil. Purportedly, 
Baena Soares did not support the Commissions work or the human 
rights agenda significantly. 
Along these same lines, the relationship between the IACHR and 
the General Assembly, the most important political organ of the OAS, 
is of particular interest. The first resolutions of the OAS General As-
sembly, clearly showed how the Member States judged human rights 
in the region: merely as a diplomatic decoration. Those resolutions 
thanked the Commission for its valuable work and approved the re-
spective Annual Report routinely, without discussing any particular 
complaint or case included in the latter.404 This was clearly a symptom 
                                                 
401  The IACHRs chairman Aguilar protested against an Executive Order (No. 75-
13) issued by the recently elected Orfila, which put the Secretariat of the Com-
mission under immediate dependence on the Assistant Secretary General. That 
order should guarantee the supervision and control of the Commissions Secre-
tariat. Aguilar stressed that the Secretariat also was subordinated under the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and expressed his hope that this dou-
ble dependence would not hinder the Commissions normal functioning. Letter 
from Andrés Aguilar, IACHR chairman, to Alejandro Orfila, Secretary General, 
Washington, D.C., October 17, 1975, p. 3 (IACHR files). 
402  Farer, in: Harris/Livingstone (Eds.), p. 60. 
403  Interviews. 
404  See: AG/RES. 53 (I-0/71), Promotion of the Observance of Human Rights in the 
American States, in: OEA/Ser.P/I-0.2, 30 September 1971, Volume II: OAS 
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of the Latin American unwillingness to interfere in domestic affairs of 
a country because of the potential for their own government to be 
blamed for similar violations as well.405 This gentlemens agreement 
was not seriously challenged until the mid-1970s. Once more, this re-
veals that only through the notorious disregard and underestimation of 
its importance could the IACHR maintain its paradoxical position 
within the OAS system. Indeed, the IACHR gained enormous prestige 
through its role in the Dominican Republic as well as through its me-
diating function in the border conflict between El Salvador and Hon-
duras in 1969. Until the mid-seventies, however, the Commission and 
its reports were ignored in a chronic manner by the political main or-
gans of the organization. Ramírez León suggests that the combination 
between the reference to the nonintervention principle and the shared 
interest of accusable military dictatorships and US goals led to the or-
ganizations failure to question the legitimacy of dictatorial re-
gimes.406 Nevertheless, since 1973, the IACHR quickly became the 
most controversial institution within the OAS. The action of the 
Commission in view of the coup in Chile in 1973 and the reported 
human rights violations under the Pinochet government helped the 
IACHR make its voice heard. The increasing importance of the 
IACHR and of the issue of human rights was also rooted in US en-
deavors to place more emphasis on basic rights (see chapter III.1.). In 
1975 and particularly in 1976, the efforts of the US to bring the human 
rights issue to the OAS agenda succeeded. Before 1976, there had 
never been a debate on the reports of the Commission during the Gen-
eral Assembly Meetings. Until that year, the General Assembly 
merely approved the Commissions reports without any discussion 
                                                                                                         
General Assembly, First Regular Session, San José, Costa Rica, April 14 through 
23, 1971, p. 53; AG/RES. 83 (II-0/72); AG/RES. 106 (III-0/73); AG/RES. 154 
(IV-0/74), and AG/RES. 192 (V-0/75) in: CIDH  Diez años de actividades, 
Washington, D.C., 1981, pp. 344-349. 
405  There was never a question about the possibility of the OAS punishing an indi-
vidual member, for most Latin American governments have always considered 
the level of respect for human rights an internal matter. Lars Schoultz  The 
Carter Administration and Human Rights in Latin America, in: Margaret E. Cra-
han  Human Rights and Basic Needs in the Americas, Washington, D.C. 1982, 
p. 321. 
406  José Luis Ramírez León  La OEA, los países latinoamericanos y la democracia 
en el hemisferio, in: Síntesis, No. 21, Julio-Diciembre 1993: El Apoyo Interna-
cional a la Democracia en América Latina, Madrid 1994, p. 196. 
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and disregarded necessary steps to take for the realization of the 
IACHRs recommendations.407 
The Commission had been isolated within the General Secretariat 
of the OAS and then had almost been ignored by the Permanent 
Council and the General Assembly. During the first 15 years of its ex-
istence, the chairman of the IACHR had not been invited to the meet-
ings of the OAS Council, or to those of the General Assembly (since 
1970), even though they dealt with the Commissions reports. In 1975, 
the IACHRs chairman, Andrés Aguilar, could not speak before the 
General Assembly because in a vote the delegations of the Member 
States denied his right to present the Commissions report. In 1976, 
Aguilar in the end did present the IACHR reports  despite a recom-
mendation of the General Secretariat to merely send an observer of 
the IACHR. This was despite the fact that since 1970 the IACHR rep-
resented one of the main organs of the organization.408 
Considering these circumstances, it seems understandable that the 
US Congress recommended for the US State Department to strengthen 
the IACHRs position. The Department of State proposed to create a 
human rights division within the OAS General Secretariat  compara-
ble to the Directorate for Human Rights of the European Council.409 
Furthermore, the new legislation approved by the US Congress in 
1974, which tied economic aid to human rights questions, elevated the 
IACHR not only nominally to a main organ of the OAS. In 1975, the 
Agency for International Development (AID) of the US State Depart-
ment considered a unilateral termination of AIDs work in countries 
with bad human rights records. Instead, the AID opted to strengthen 
leading international or regional institutions like the International 
Commission of Jurists or the IACHR.410 The new US foreign aid de-
crees that gave human rights a significant position converted the 
                                                 
407  Héctor Gros Espiell  LOrganisation des États américains (OEA), in: Karel Va-
sak  Les dimensions internationales des droits de lhomme, Manuel désigné à 
lenseignement des droits de lhomme dans les universités, UNESCO, Paris 
1978, p. 615. 
408  Wood, p. 130. 
409  Ibid. 
410  Department of State, Agency for International Development: Memorandum for 
Assistant Administrators and Heads of Offices, Subject: New Initiatives in Hu-
man Rights; Office of the Administrator Daniel Parker, Washington, D.C., Au-
gust 28, 1975 (NSA files). Only the ICJ and the IACHR are explicitly mentioned 
by name. 
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Commission into the role of an arbitrary since its reports and judg-
ments could convincingly influence the decision of the US Congress 
as to whether or not to provide financial support to a country. 
The US support for the human rights issue and the IACHR re-
sulted in high expectations for the General Assembly in Santiago de 
Chile in 1976. These circumstances and factors converted that meeting 
into a turning point for human rights in the inter-American system. 
Nonetheless, the resolution on the Commissions Annual Report 
stated that the situation of civil and political rights had not worsened 
compared to foregoing years. In 1976, Argentinas military dictator-
ship took power and used human rights abuses to maintain and con-
solidate power. Partially in response to this event, a year later, the 
General Assembly in Grenada spent more than three-quarters of the 
available time discussing the topic of human rights and terrorism. The 
adopted resolution that followed expressed only polite criticism.411 
This mirrored the appeasement strategy of the Assembly, especially 
given the very critical IACHR report for 1976.412 On the other hand, 
the resolutions on the Commission documents in 1978 and 1979 could 
be described as more explicit and critical, particularly in regard to 
naming specific countries. Although there were controversies about 
politics and jurisdiction in other OAS institutions, in no other organ 
than the IACHR ...does it equal the bitterness of the attack upon the 
fundamental attributes of the OAS.413 
The mere fact that the General Assembly met several times in 
countries whose hosts were known as having governments with prob-
lematic human rights records suggests the nature of the Member 
States relationship with the Commission and its general stand on hu-
man rights. The OAS Assembly met in Santiago de Chile (1976), Bra-
silia (November 1984), Guatemala City (1986), and San Salvador 
(1988). During the Carter Administration, however, Uruguays wish 
to hold the General Assembly in 1978 was refused mainly through a 
joint Venezuelan-US effort. However, the meetings in countries 
whose governments were criticized by the IACHR foster the conclu-
                                                 
411  AG/RES. 312 (VII-0/77): Informe Annual de la Comisión Interamericana de De-
rechos Humanos, in: CIDH  Diez años de actividades, Washington, D.C., 1981, 
p. 351. 
412  In 1976, the General Assembly further obliged the IACHR only to include infor-
mation on resolved individual cases and not on pending cases in its reports. 
413  Wood, p. 119. 
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sion that Member States preferred a dubious harmony instead of sin-
gling-out a Member. As holding General Assemblies served as recog-
nition of the concerned government, this was obviously in many in-
stances an action that contradicted with the Commissions criticism of 
that particular government. 
Nevertheless, since 1977/1978, the Carter administration was able 
to find some allies among the delegations at the General Assemblies. 
These combined efforts ultimately resulted in some extraordinarily 
critical resolutions. This was even more astonishing if the sacrosanct 
nonintervention principle is considered, which was extended to all 
means of interference, including diplomatic statements. In spite of 
this, Nacimiento accurately observes a step back in 1981, when the 
General Assembly adopted resolution 543, which again did not men-
tion any Member State by name. Instead, this document only provided 
some general comments on the Commissions work.414 Article 1 of 
resolution 543 sounds similar to the documents before 1975  not a 
single State was mentioned by name, and the document merely took 
note of the report and thanked the IACHR.415 Nacimiento explains this 
development due to the prevailing authoritarian rule in many Member 
States, which threatened their withdrawal from the OAS if a tougher 
resolution were adopted. The General Assembly resolutions, however, 
indirectly referred to this phenomenon by requiring democratic rule 
for the hemisphere.416 In addition, it can be suggested that the military 
governments were indeed a majority at that time but they were en-
couraged by the new-elected US president Reagan, whose election had 
brought a bit of alleviation to the pressure placed on authoritarian rul-
ers in the region. In comparison, the composition of the General As-
sembly during the late-seventies did not represent a democratic club 
either, but Carters dedication to human rights and to strengthen the 
IACHR occasionally did make a difference. 
Interestingly, the 1980-1981 Annual Report of the IACHR was 
subdivided into categories for rights but did not include a separate 
chapter on the specific situation in Member States. The reason for the 
                                                 
414  Nacimiento, pp. 161, 162. 
415  Notwithstanding, the mentioned resolution referred to economic, social and cul-
tural rights in article 5. AG/RES 543 (XI-0/81): Informe Annual e Informes Es-
peciales de la CIDH, in: OEA/Ser.P/XI.0.2, 24 junio, 1982, Volumen I: Actas y 
Documentos, Volumen I, Textos certificados de las resoluciones, pp. 67-68. 
416  Nacimiento, pp. 161, 162. 
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IACHR to leave out such a particular section on countries remains 
elusive; however, it was most likely related to the increasing conser-
vative composition of the General Assembly and the Reagan admini-
strations first announcements regarding human rights. Unlike the 
1980-1981 report, the report of 1981-1982 was organized as usual and 
even contained a special section on Chile. As a reaction, several 
Member States fiercely protested against the return of the old practice 
at the 1982 General Assembly and Chile even suspended unilaterally 
its relations with the IACHR.417 The resolution on the report, however, 
was disappointing because again no single State was mentioned. The 
resolutions lack of substance partly provoked harsh criticisms from 
the delegations of Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia and 
Trinidad and Tobago. Maybe the strongest criticism on the draft reso-
lution was pronounced by the delegate of Trinidad and Tobago, Victor 
Chrysostom McIntyre, who described the OAS as a big laundry for 
soiled articles. He further rejected the 1982 resolution on the 
IACHR reports as a great big whitewash and felt that the OAS was 
a big great mold.418 
Since 1983, the redemocratization in South America had been 
somewhat notable. The General Assembly resolutions mirrored this 
context by naming States individually again. In contrast to the 1970s, 
the resolutions mentioned Member States only with positive remarks, 
by praising their efforts to (re-) establish democracy. In general, the 
1980s witnessed resolutions adopted by the highest political body of 
the OAS, which avoided naming States in a negative manner.419 
Clearly, much of the 1980s was a lost decade for solid OAS human 
rights policy. 
On the contrary, in the General Assembly resolution on the 1990-
1991 Annual Report of the IACHR, the highest OAS organ en-
dorsed the document.420 In the decades before it had merely opted for 
a taking note of the Commissions Annual Reports. This mainly was 
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the case because of the cumulative developments in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, such as the Sandinistas election defeat, the beginning 
transitions to democracy in Paraguay and Chile, the entry of Canada 
into the inter-American system and last but not least, the end of the 
Cold War. 
In sum, there were some so-called gentlemens agreements that 
affected the human rights issue: until the mid-seventies it was agreed 
upon not to discuss the IACHR reports at the sessions of the political 
main organs of the OAS.421 Another apparent gentlemens agreement 
was that no controversial report should be prepared on the important 
Member States of Mexico and Brazil.422 Although the Commission 
grew into a more important role from 1975, the situation with the 
General Assemblies continued to be a difficult one. As Nobel Peace 
Prize Winner Pérez Esquivel remarks, although the Commissioners 
have the best intentions, the decisions are eventually made by the gov-
ernments.423 The Member States perceived the Commission very dif-
ferently  some States honestly recognized and honored its work, oth-
ers tried to use the Commission, and the ones that were frequently 
blamed attempted to attack it with different but usually not very origi-
nal and convincing strategies. In this context, the Commission always 
had to look for allies. But at the same time, it was indispensable to 
watch out for those who merely sought to use the Commission for po-
litical ends. However, it is necessary to recall that from the mid-
seventies to the mid-eighties, authoritarian regimes often constituted 
majorities in the General Assembly. Moreover, a consistent human 
rights policy should include other procedures than the mere adoption 
of critical resolutions. However, even the latter proved to be difficult 
among many Member States that feared an intervention that threat-
ened the political status quo in their country. 
Thus, besides the relationship between the Commission and some 
political organs of the OAS, the relations between the IACHR and the 
Member States are of extraordinary importance to understand the pos-
sibilities and limitations of human rights protection in the inter-
American system. The Commissions most obvious instrument to 
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highlight human rights abuses was the mentioning of a country in the 
IACHR Annual Reports or in a separate Special Report, which at-
tracted even more attention. The latter was usually based on an on-site 
observation that by itself also frequently enjoyed a high public atten-
tion  not only in the concerned country  and consequently was 
feared by the governments. Further, some governments even sought to 
welcome the IACHR in its territory in order to demonstrate its exem-
plary degree of collaboration, or to show that its human rights practice 
was not vulnerable. 
The Annual Reports of the early 1970s dealt above all with Cuba, 
Haiti, and Brazil, but also with Nicaragua, Paraguay and Guatemala. 
A different proceeding than the Annual Reports was applied in regard 
to the Special Reports, which usually referred to the situation in a sin-
gle country. The concerned State received the country report first in 
order to formulate a response within a certain time limit (90-180 
days). If the government in question did not respond within this pe-
riod, the IACHR decided to declare the alleged violations to be true, 
although occasionally there were extensions of this time limit. This 
method guaranteed for the governments that the complaints were han-
dled quietly and that the opportunity was presented for a friendly set-
tlement of the problems. However, there were also complaints by sev-
eral Member States that the Commission had launched their reports to 
the media before the end of the deadline in order to increase the public 
pressure on the government. Among the most important reports pro-
duced as a result of an on-site visit within the period of this inquiry are 
those on the human rights situation in Chile 1974, Nicaragua 1978, 
and Argentina 1980. 
The most common activity that preceded a Special Report on a 
particular Member State was an on-site observation. This investigation 
in the physical territory of a Member State accused of human rights 
violations constituted a particularly sensitive issue because the proud 
Latin American elite as well as the armed forces considered its institu-
tions and the very native soil of the country as the ultimate symbol of 
national sovereignty.424 Therefore, an investigation carried out by a 
group of foreigners represented a type of interference in the ruling 
classes habit of living their own reality. Ironically, it is even more 
remarkable that no other intergovernmental body for the human rights 
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protection had an experience like the IACHR with regard to on-site 
observations.425 Already the term in-loco visits or in-situ visits was 
criticized because of the positive connotation of the expression visit. 
In contrast, it was seen rather as a kind of control or investigation. 
Therefore, the correct term was not visit but observation. The 
Commissions on-site observations varied in duration, number of the 
participating members of Commission and Secretariat, media interest 
and impact. It is important to note that unlike the case of individual 
complaints, the general situation of human rights in a Member State 
did not require the exhaustion of domestic remedies (see chapter II.1.). 
This in fact was an important provision. 
The Statute provided a legal security for the in-loco inquiries since 
it allowed the Commission to convene a meeting in each of the Mem-
ber States, if the latters government permitted such a gathering. Ac-
cording to the Statute, the Commission was empowered to move its 
headquarters temporarily from Washington, D.C. to any other Mem-
ber State. The Commission also developed other interesting alterna-
tives which were not explicitly covered by the Statute. For instance, 
the IACHR requested Member States permission for a visit of a sub-
committee, a rapporteur for a special case or for the Executive Secre-
tary. This included the advantage that information could be gathered 
without the presence of all members and also meant a financial relief. 
This method provided an advantage for the concerned governments: 
Usually, the visit of a single person or a small group provoked less at-
tention due to the fact that officially, it was presented not as a visit of 
the Commission.  
Nevertheless, until 1975, there was no regulation dealing with on-
site observations. As a result of the difficulties under which the Com-
mission had to operate during its on-site investigation to Chile in 
1974, it prepared a set of regulations for on-the-spot observations. 
This was designed to help the Commission conduct future visits more 
effectively.426 It is important to emphasize that the Commission did 
not agree on any restrictions on its on-site investigations. This fact ex-
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plains that some Member States invited the Commission without a 
subsequent inquiry in loco since the government had insisted on pre-
conditions that were unacceptable for the IACHR.427 Furthermore, 
Luis Reque, the Commissions first Executive Secretary, proposed to 
exclude nationals and citizens of the countries in which an investiga-
tion took place.428 This might have been directed against the Chilean 
Bianchi who was supposed to act on behalf of his countrys govern-
ment since Reques trip to Santiago in October 1973 (see chapter 
III.1.). Vargas Carreño, former Executive Secretary of the IACHR, 
states that the number of participating members and staff lawyers 
mainly depended on the geographic extension of the concerned Mem-
ber State but also of the importance or complexity of its human rights 
problems.429 In the early seventies, the Commission gathered in Chile 
and Colombia by invitation of the respective governments and not in 
order to investigate the human rights situations in those countries.430 
Usually, the Commission issued a press release after its arrival in a 
Member State to inform the public about its presence. This also served 
to encourage possible petitioners to bring their complaints before the 
Commission during its stay in the respective country. Further, the 
Commissioners met with members of the government, and members 
of political parties, the judiciary, the armed forces, the Church, human 
rights NGOs and with representatives of other social groups. The vari-
ety of meetings was designed to obtain an objective perspective of the 
situation in the concerned country. Furthermore, the IACHR members 
and lawyers visited detention camps and prisons and other places 
where human rights violations had reportedly occurred. During its 
transcendental on-site visit to Chile in 1974, conversations with pris-
oners constituted one of the most impressive testimonies of the situa-
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tion of human rights in that country. Before the Commission left a 
Member States territory, it used to transmit preliminary recommenda-
tions to the government and a press release on its preparatory conclu-
sions, including  if provided  the governments comments.431 
During the years of the Carter administration (1977-1980), the 
Commission sent special committees to conduct on-site observations, 
which usually included at least two members of the progressive fac-
tion in the IACHR. This can be seen as an attempt to assure an objec-
tive, or even critical approach and report on the in-situ investiga-
tion.432 On the other hand, the participation of more progressive 
Commissioners in the investigations in loco must also be seen as a re-
sult of the higher level of commitment and the activism of those per-
sonalities.433 During the period between 1974 and 1981, the Commis-
sion mainly visited South American countries (Chile, Argentina) and 
Central American States (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama). During 
the eighties (1981-1990), the on-site investigations realized concen-
trated on Guatemala, Nicaragua, Suriname and Haiti. The reports until 
1981, however, predominantly focused on Member States of the 
Southern Cone region: Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. During the 1980s, the Special Reports covered the human 
rights situation in Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, Paraguay and Suriname. 
In 1990, the Commission conducted three on-site observations be-
tween January and April (Guatemala, Paraguay and Haiti). A year 
later, the changed situation became clear when several governments 
expressed their readiness for an on-site visit of the Commission to 
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take place in their countries.434 This was apparently an attempt to con-
firm the democratic rule in the concerned Member States by an 
IACHR visit. 
Interestingly, Margaret Ball wrote in 1969 that [f]or some reason 
 happily  the protection of human rights has been relatively immune 
from the stigma of intervention which has hampered the activity of 
the OAS in other directions.435 This comment almost seems ironic 
with regard to the battles fought by dictatorial regimes and the Com-
mission since 1973. The nonintervention principle has always served 
as a primordial explanation for all kinds of regimes to reject the 
Commissions findings and accusations. 
In general, military governments often supported each other 
against human rights allegations brought up at the General Assem-
blies. The voting behavior sometimes showed patterns of diplomatic 
agreements. However, the military regimes did not consistently vote 
as a bloc.436 In 1977, when the Carter administration began to fortify 
the IACHR, Mexico assured full support for the Commissions finan-
cial strengthening. Venezuela, however, feared a bureaucratization 
and did not want to create permanent positions within the IACHR Se-
cretariat, but spoke on behalf of on-site investigations. Guatemala 
joined Venezuela in its support for observations in loco, and the dele-
gation of El Salvador had received orders to support the IACHRs 
strengthening as well.437 
The subsequent part summarizes some typical behavior pattern or 
defense strategies of OAS Member States confronted with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. In general, the communica-
tion between the IACHR and the concerned governments was quite 
polite and used the typical diplomatic language. The Commission al-
ways thanked a government, which had allowed an on-site observation 
or cooperated with it in other ways, although the Commission report 
would clearly criticize its practices. Sometimes, however, this diplo-
matic politeness disappeared, in particular throughout the confronta-
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tions at the embattled General Assemblies during the Carter admini-
stration. Here it is useful to add a new expression to the theoretical 
debate on universalism versus relativism of human rights. It merely 
constitutes the tentative introduction of a term that pretends to de-
scribe a sort of typical Latin American relativism. 
One of the reasons for the creation of the IACHR was the situation 
in Cuba. Since the Cuban government had emphatically promoted 
human rights in 1959, it was somehow ironic that later on the country 
became the main target of accusations.438 Many complaints directed to 
the Commission from exiled Cubans in Miami led the IACHR to pre-
pare its first report on Cuba based on testimonies from Cuban refugees 
in Florida. The Cuban government refused to cooperate with the 
Commission due to the fact that Cuba was excluded from the inter-
American system. The expulsion of Cubas present government in 
1962 was not a reaction primarily based on human rights violations of 
the Castro regime  the IACHR played no role for this decision.439 
There were unofficial attempts to initiate a dialogue between the 
Commission and Havana440 and considerations how to reach an invita-
tion for a visit from the Cuban government441, but in general, those ef-
forts were not successful at all.442 The Castro regime did not allow an 
on-site visit and in general rejected all reports without any specific 
comment.443 On the whole, almost all Latin American Member States 
criticized the handling of the situation of human rights in Cuba. In ad-
dition, many of them had requested to reincorporate that Caribbean 
countrys government into the organization. This was the crucial 
point: no few governments represented in the OAS argued that the 
IACHR did not possess a proper mandate to blame Cubas human 
rights situation since the government had been expelled from the or-
ganization in 1962. The IACHR consequently argued that the State of 
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Cuba was still a passive OAS Member although its government was 
excluded from participation in the organization. Furthermore, the Cu-
ban case once more showed that the IACHR depended on petitions  
the strong Cuban exile community in Florida provided plenty of cases 
that could not be ignored.444 Nevertheless, it seems more than prob-
able that the IACHR had to handle the Cuban case in order to satisfy 
conservative critics and to avoid any complaints about a possible lack 
of impartiality. Moreover, the United States frequently imposed the 
unofficial demand to continue monitoring the human rights situation 
in Cuba in order to receive a political instrument to denounce the Cas-
tro government. Reportedly, this requirement occasionally went along 
with a conditioning of additional US financing. However, because of 
the categorical rejections of IACHR complaints on the part of the Cu-
ban government, the Commission could comply with its unwritten 
duty to demonstrate political impartiality without having the problem 
of entering in the sensitive field of tension between rights of the first 
and the second generation. The Cuban reports before the eighties were 
rather poor and dealt with sometimes outrageous legends invented by 
exiled Cubans. The 1983 report, however, was actually a compara-
tively good study that went beyond the legal view. 
Before the coup détat in September 1973, the Commission seem-
ingly kept up relatively good relations with Chile. In early 1972, the 
IACHR meeting took place in Viña del Mar following an invitation 
from the Chilean government. In the opening of that session, Commis-
sioner Sandifer deplored the absence of member Justino Jiménez de 
Aréchaga because of his bonds to Chile where he had studied, ...and 
his regard for the President of the Republic, Dr. Salvador Allende. 
Moreover, Sandifer praised Chiles history and called it ...a nation 
where freedom and the dignity of man are cherished.445 Nevertheless, 
the US Commissioner Sandifer cannot be described as a friend of So-
cialism. In the early years of the IACHR, he stressed the important re-
lation between human rights and the exercise of representative democ-
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racy. After the 1973 coup, the Chilean authorities cooperated with the 
Commission but when the IACHR reports turned to be very critical, 
the Pinochet regime opted for attacking the Commission at the politi-
cal, institutional and also personal level. Until 1976, Chile carried out 
a campaign against Executive Secretary Luis Reque who resigned in 
1976 (see Chapter III.1). In 1980, the Chilean government attacked 
IACHR chairman Tom J. Farer. Further, the government occasionally 
suspended cooperation with the Commission for a certain time as an 
expression of its protest against judgments, which were perceived as 
provocative and biased. In other times, the Chilean government self-
promoted its good relations and exemplary cooperation with the 
IACHR. The Chileans created a human rights division at the Foreign 
Ministry to deal with complaints brought up from abroad, which ex-
plains why the Chilean rebuttals are relatively sophisticated in juridi-
cal terms, compared to other regimes criticism. Generally, the Chil-
ean government always sought to provide information and thus was 
eager to dilute allegations by juridical and diplomatic endeavors. In 
accordance, a former human rights advisor at the Foreign Ministry in 
Santiago judged the relationship with the Commission as normal and 
less politicized. Consequently, the Chileans did not attack the IACHR 
as harsh as it attacked other international human rights entities.446 
Moreover, the highly advanced human rights bureaucracy in Santiago 
attempted to fight the IACHR with proposals to reform the Commis-
sion. Although this attempt was eventually a fruitless effort, the Chile-
ans went further than merely defending themselves against the charges 
by attacking the IACHR at the institutional level. 
Since the Uruguayan military coup in 1973, the IACHR had re-
ceived numerous cases reporting serious human rights violations. The 
governments of Uruguay and Paraguay provided official pseudo-
cooperation and de-facto denial (see Chapter III. 2.). Neither Paraguay 
nor Uruguay permitted an IACHR on-site observation. Both govern-
ments presented different excuses to avoid such an investigation, 
mostly referring to technical or juridical but also to political condi-
tions that would not allow a Commissions visit. As a result, the 
Commission prepared a report on Paraguay and another one on Uru-
guay in 1978  without previous on-site observations. At the General 
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Assembly in 1978, both reports provoked angry reactions and strong 
criticism from the concerned governments. 
In 1978, US president Carter convinced the regime of General 
Romero in El Salvador to permit an IACHR investigation. Subse-
quently, the relations between the Salvadoran governments and the 
OAS or the Commission were also indirectly affected by US policy. 
The relationship between El Salvador and the IACHR during the 
1980s is subject of chapter IV. 3. 
Nicaraguas relationship with the Commission must be divided 
into the periods of president Somozas dictatorship and the rule of the 
Sandinistas. Dictator Somozas regime invited the Commission due to 
the growing pressure from the United States and then was ousted by 
the guerrilla forces also as a result of a devastating IACHR report. The 
Sandinistas initially welcomed the Commission and showed a remark-
able grade of cooperation by permitting two visits. Later on, when the 
IACHR reports became more critical, the relations with Managua 
cooled off.  
There were two Special Reports on Panama: Both had to do with 
US policy. In 1978, the Panamanian military regime under president 
Trujillo invited the Commission to conduct an on-site observation. 
This inquiry also served to distract the conservative opposition in the 
US against the Panama Canal treaties. In 1989, the IACHR published 
another report on Panamas human rights situation, which preceded 
the US invasion against the government installed by Washingtons en-
emy Manuel Noriega. 
The Argentine case is a particular one, which is addressed in chap-
ter III. 3. The Chilean decision to permit an IACHR observation in 
situ in 1974 was seen as a fault in Buenos Aires, which had prevented 
an earlier visit by the IACHR to Argentina. During the 1980s, the law 
decrees on human rights violations during the military rule were dis-
cussed by the Commission. The IACHR dealt with the Argentine laws 
of due obedience and full-stop (punto final) as well as the Uru-
guayan law on caducidad.447 Accordingly, the Argentine case in 
general and the contributions by Argentine NGOs in particular in-
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spired the IACHRs handling with human rights violations of the past 
during the second half of the 1980s.448 
The IACHR did not address Mexico or Brazil the majority of time, 
which were the biggest and politically most important countries to the 
region and the US.449 In regard to Brazil, the Annual Reports focused 
more on individual cases. In the early 1970s, however, the IACHR un-
successfully tried to elevate Brazilian human rights abuses on the or-
ganizations agenda but failed due to an internal power struggle within 
the organization. Within the period of this investigation, the IACHR 
did not prepare any Special Report on Brazil. The significance of Bra-
zil in Latin America coupled with the emphatic resistance of the Bra-
zilian Commissioner, Dunshee de Abranches, further provided pre-
liminary explanations for this deficiency.450 Nevertheless, the Com-
mission approved several resolutions on individual cases concerning 
Brazil despite Dunshee de Abranches opposition, always expressed 
by a dissenting vote. In general, the Commission only handled indi-
vidual cases concerning the dictatorship in Brazil from 1964-1985451 
and did not mention the student massacre in Mexico City that took 
place in 1968.452 Former Secretariat officials explain that within the 
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period of this investigation no Special Report was published on either 
Brazil or Mexico given the urgent situation in other regions.453 In gen-
eral, however, after the fruitless enterprise to highlight the Brazilian 
case in the early 1970s454, the Commission did not cover the human 
rights situation in Brazil as it did in other Member States.455 Mexico 
traditionally defended human rights internationally, while leaving out 
its own domestic situation.456 According to a former Commissioner, to 
address human rights violations in Mexico was really sort of forbid-
den.457 In the late eighties, after a long honeymoon between the 
IACHR and the supporting Mexican governments, the Commission 
discussed how to deal with electoral cases concerning Mexico in the 
mid-eighties.458 It seemed that at first the IACHR shied away from 
working on Mexican electoral cases. In the early 1990s, this prudent 
handling of Mexican vote-rigging changed and understandably pro-
voked harsh criticism from Mexico.459 On the other hand, Mexico 
supported the Commission during its famous phase from 1976-1981. 
This may seem contradictory, because Mexico has been known as the 
strongest defender of national sovereignty, but it actually helped deci-
sively  if Mexico itself was not concerned.460 
Unlike other countries in the region, Venezuela and Costa Rica 
counted as traditional advocates of democracy and human rights. In 
fact, Venezuela was the strongest supporter of human rights at the 
OAS and of the IACHR during the 1970s and 1980s. Costa Rica also 
emphatically backed the Commission and supported the cause of hu-
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459  See, for instance, OEA/Ser. G, CP/ACTA 818/90, 18 mayo 1990, Acta de la ses-
sion ordinaria celebrada el 18 de mayo 1990, p. 40. Washington Post, June 13, 
1990, p. A33/A34 
460  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
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man rights in the inter-American system. However, in the eighties, 
Costa Ricas fear of the Sandinistas at times modified the govern-
ments neutral stand on the issue in Central America. On the other 
hand, Costa Rica hosted the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and even brought a case before the Court against itself. This leads a 
former Commission official to describe Costa Ricas position as an at-
titude of excessive honesty, which ultimately caused problems be-
cause of the priority of worse cases.461 
The relation between the US and the Commission was a very spe-
cial and extremely close one. The mere fact that since the creation of 
the IACHR, it has been headquartered in the US capital Washington, 
D.C. already shows the obvious ties between the human rights institu-
tion and its host. Furthermore, the US member of the Commission was 
always an important figure for the Commission, and was responsible 
for giving it legitimacy within the US and credibility as a true inter-
American body within the Latin American countries. Human rights 
expert Donnelly holds that the success of the IACHR mainly stemmed 
from US support.462 There have been various attempts from US gov-
ernments to use the Commission for its goals. On the other hand, the 
US has also been accused by the IACHR  in particular for complaints 
of minorities brought up by Latin Americans in the US.463 Neverthe-
less, the denunciations against the US government were relatively few 
and far less serious in comparison to those raised against many Latin 
American States during the period of this study. However, it is also 
worth mentioning that the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the OAS have always been widely unknown in the United 
States. The IACHR repeatedly recommended that the General Assem-
bly declare the practice of forced disappearances a crime against hu-
manity.464 This wording was continuously opposed by the US delega-
tion. After the entry-into-force of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, the State Department named provisions regarding the right to 
life and the compensation for victims of injustice as problematic for a 
possible US ratification of the Convention because of the countrys 
                                                 
461  Interviews. 
462  Jack Donnelly  Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca, NY 
1989, p. 216. 
463  See LeBlanc, pp. 138-147. 
464  See, for instance, IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1982-1983, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, doc. 22 rev. 1, 27 September 1983, Original: Spanish, p. 33. 
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federal system and the  ...reserved powers of the states in education, 
marriage and law enforcement.465 A former high-ranking OAS offi-
cial presented a typical description of the US position toward the 
OAS: that they ignored it in general, but at times they used the OAS 
for their own ends.466 Furthermore, Ex-Commissioner Tom Farer sees 
a shift from when the Reagan administration came into office in 1981. 
Farer described the relations between the Commission and the US 
government during his term as IACHR chairman (1980-1982) as 
harsh.467 
Naturally, throughout the years the character of relations between 
the IACHR and the Member States underwent certain alterations. In 
its 1991 Annual Report, the Commission made a relatively brusque 
statement, which might be explained by the circumstances favorable 
for democracy and human rights at that time. It mentioned that it must 
surely be shameful for those States to appear and to continue appear-
ing permanently in this section. The mentioned States were Cuba, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama and Suriname.468 
Such a clear statement would have caused stronger opposition in pre-
vious years, but apparently the mood in the hemisphere had changed. 
On the other hand, those countries did not count as important States, 
neither in their size nor with regard to their geostrategic position. In 
general, there is not much imagination needed to understand that it 
had always been easier for the Commission to accuse small countries 
than the bigger ones. 
 
 
                                                 
465  Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., to all American Republic Diplomatic 
Posts, Subject: ARA Weekly Highlights July 12-19, July 20, 1978, p. 2 (NSA 
files). With regard to this general topic, See: Bruno V. Bitker  The United States 
and International Codification of Human Rights: A Case of Split Personality, in: 
Natalie Kaufman Hevener (Ed.)  The Dynamic of Human Rights in U.S. For-
eign Policy, New Brunswick, New Jersey 1981, pp. 77-99. 
466  Interviews. 
467  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver, Colorado, August 30, 1999. The 
Reagan administration had turned Latin American policy over to people I re-
garded as despicable. 
468  Annual Report of the IACHR 1991, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.81 rev. 1, Doc. 6, 14 Febru-
ary 1992, Original: Spanish. 
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Excursus: Circumstantial relativism  a term for an ambiguous hu-
man rights argumentation 
 
To aid in this discussion, it is helpful to put the human rights foreign 
policy in Latin America into the common theoretical discourse. While 
realists of international affairs hold that human rights should not be 
pursued in national foreign policy because the latter must be seen as 
deriving from national interest defined in terms of power, statism con-
siders ...an active concern for the human rights practices of other 
states inconsistent with the fundamental principle of state sover-
eignty. Finally, relativism criticizes international human rights policy 
as a form of moral imperialism.469 
In this context, the Latin American States have long been statists 
in regards to international human rights. When the United States tem-
porarily abandoned its traditional political outlook of a more realist 
foreign policy and really began favoring human rights, many Latin 
American governments turned to partial relativism. Washingtons in-
consistent human rights policy mostly walked along with the realist 
approach if necessary, while Latin America often employed the statist 
argumentation, sometimes combined with relativist arguments. Thus, 
the US realism defending a foreign policy that partially tolerated hu-
man rights abuses of a friendly government in certain international 
situations was frequently the consequence and often simultaneously 
also the natural concomitant of national statism from repressive US al-
lies in the region. However, the particular pattern of Latin American 
relativism sets the region apart from customary argumentations of cul-
tural relativism. Therefore, the term circumstantial relativism strives 
to describe the tendency to justify temporary violations of human 
rights with special circumstances. 
As seen in the introduction, it is common knowledge that in Latin 
America a discrepancy between constitutional provisions and law 
practice has existed. Human rights is no exception and maybe an even 
more striking example for the gap between the constitutional postula-
tion of rights and its actual substance in reality. While Asian and Afri-
can States tend to defend their sometimes diverging or categorically 
different human rights practice with cultural relativism by arguing that 
                                                 
469  Jack Donnelly  Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca/NY 
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for societies in those regions the Western concept of individual rights 
is not applicable, Latin America somehow distinguishes itself from 
this concept. 
Since the independence of the Latin American countries they have 
steadily built a sophisticated regional system of international law and 
norms that regulated their international and internal political behavior. 
Latin America has the most sophisticated human rights system among 
developing regions compared with the West European-North Ameri-
can concepts.470 The independent States of Latin America have always 
possessed human rights constitutions and as a result they have viewed 
those rights as part of its independent history. The Pan American 
movement that began in the late 19th century built its fundament on 
individual human rights and freedoms as one of its main features. 
Nevertheless, oligarchic repression, traditional and modern (bureau-
cratic-authoritarian) military regimes and the chronic structural vio-
lence in many parts of the region contradict such a positive vision.471 
However, Latin America has rarely argued with the cultural relativist 
aspect, it sees itself too close to Western civilization and Christian cul-
ture to which human rights constitute an important factor.472 There-
fore, it seemed to be awkward  as, for instance, in the cases of the 
Chilean and Argentine juntas  to pretend fighting for Western values 
while suspending human rights in order to save the country from left-
ist subversion and terrorism. 
As seen above, Latin America has known basic human rights of 
the individual since the independent wars and consequently these 
rights also found entrance in almost all constitutions of the subconti-
nent (although the concept of nation was an earlier central thought). 
Nevertheless, Latin America counts to the regions plagued by gross 
human rights violations, often carried out in a systematical way, while 
the authorities in power often simultaneously strove for stressing the 
importance of human rights as a cultural heritage of the regions 
                                                 
470  Peter R. Baehr  The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire/London 1994, p. 140. 
471  Stoetzer emphasizes that the evolution of a democratic inter-American system 
went along with the domestically weak position of representative democracy. 
Stoetzer, pp. 249/250, 256, 294. 
472  Naturally, one has to regard autochthonous indigenous cultures as well, but in 
this context they are not considered due to the practicability of the authors 
search for an explanation model. 
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European roots. Many governments employed explanations for the 
temporary suspension of human rights and even made use of the term 
dirty war to justify own abuses. The main argument was to fight ter-
rorism in an extreme situation with measures not applicable in a 
Rechtsstaat with rule of law but justifiable in circumstances of emer-
gency. The tone prevailed that certain abuses committed by State 
agents should be accepted if the integrity of the very State was threat-
ened and these abuses were necessary to re-establish the full obser-
vance of the rights temporarily suspended or violated.473 In this con-
text, a similarity to the notion of foundational time employed by José 
Zalaquett becomes evident.474 Furthermore, the human rights viola-
tions were not categorically denied; it was common practice to eu-
phemistically gloss over them by playing those abuses down as indi-
vidual excesses that were unavoidable in such a dirty war. In addi-
tion, the violence of leftist guerrillas or terrorists often served as a ra-
tionalization of State repression. The willingly employed reference to 
the generally appalling situation (also regarding human rights) before 
a military government assumed power was presented as a sort of justi-
fication for persisting human rights abuses, as was the case in Argen-
tina, for example. 
The goal is not even to analyze the reasons for this behavior, but 
merely to tentatively provide a new expression for an odd practice that 
actually differs from the Doctrine of National Security. While the 
latter provides a sort of pathetic political concept of the right wing 
military complex including economic policies, circumstantial relativ-
ism was employed by Somoza and Sandinistas alike and hence 
merely constitutes a strategy of defense in regard to accusations con-
cerning human rights violations. Thus, circumstantial relativism also 
contains a conglomerate of a strong State comprehension, a notorious 
reference to the national sovereignty and nonintervention, but above 
all to the circumstances, which should explain human rights abuses. 
                                                 
473  Interestingly, also the structuralist current of the theory of dependency provided a 
somewhat similar explanation model: While the structuralist tendency of the de-
pendencia generally wanted Latin American economies to participate in the 
world market, a temporary isolation was seen as convenient to improve the coun-
tries competitiveness to stand their ground internationally. 
474  José Zalaquett  Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation: Lessons for the International 
Community, in: Cynthia Arnson (ed.)  Comparative Peace Processes in Latin 
America, Washington, D.C. 1999, pp. 346-347, 350. 
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The academic research indirectly supports the notion of circum-
stantial relativism. Usually, the research by and large has distin-
guished between the Western concept of human rights, favoring the 
individual rights against the State, and Socialist approaches preferring 
the socioeconomic rights. Further, a so-called Third World view 
should be added, which longs for goals such as development, solidar-
ity and ecology.475 In addition, mainly governments of the developing 
regions defend their human rights practice with arguments of the cul-
tural relativism. In this context, it is of interest that many authors ap-
parently have difficulties in deciding where to place Latin America: Is 
it a (sub) category of the Western concept, or is the classification of a 
Third World argumentation more suitable? 
Famous political scientist Samuel P. Huntington suggests consid-
ering Latin America either as a sub civilization within Western civi-
lization or a ...separate civilization closely affiliated with the West 
and divided as to whether it belongs to the West.476 In this context, 
the Euro centric notion of the West includes Western Europe but not 
necessarily Latin America, which is geographically located in the 
West and Europe more in the middle of the globe, all depending of 
course on the right perspective. In accordance, Wiarda asks whether 
democracy and human rights are everywhere the same and universal 
and concludes for Latin America and the Iberian countries the answer 
is both yes and no. He argues ...human rights and group rights may 
both be subordinated to the common good or the necessity of main-
taining the unity and integrity of the state.477 The strong comprehen-
sion of State as discussed in the introduction, clearly explains this be-
havior. Equally, Claudio Grossman, a former distinguished member 
                                                 
475  Similarly, Charles Ritterband categorizes three human rights definitions: 1) oc-
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and chairman of the IACHR, points out that in the conflict of values 
between national survival and strict validity of human rights, the the-
ory attempts to save the nation.478 In relation to Crahans conclusions, 
the Catholic belief and the over-exalted State comprehension also 
support the phenomenon of a circumstantial relativism because 
...[t]he rationale was that such individuals [armed rebels] could not 
claim any rights as citizens because they had acted against the com-
mon good.479 Like Wiardas hesitance to describe the Latin American 
human rights tradition with the notion universal, other experts of 
world human rights history have difficulties in appropriately classify-
ing the region following the common categories.480  
Likewise, international human rights expert Jack Donnelly does 
not include Latin America in his basic works as Non-Western Con-
ceptions of Human Rights.481 Accordingly, Kacowicz contrasts Latin 
America to other regions of the so-called Third World because of its 
European roots manifested in similar social, political and economic 
values. Therefore, he considers Latin America as part of the Western 
Christian Culture.482 Similarly, Sikkink sees a long formal tradition of 
Latin American human rights support and further holds that ...the as-
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sumed contradiction between support for sovereignty and noninter-
vention and the promotion of human rights and democracy is not as 
severe as often portrayed.483 Likewise, as the majority of authors, 
González Amuchastegui mentions cultural relativism merely with re-
spect to Asia and Africa.484 In addition, Mols explains that despite of 
all blurred disputes on occidentalismo and tercermundismo, Latin 
America is extremely formed by Western culture that it is necessary to 
take this as a starting point.485 Similarly, Gros Espiell speaks of a 
common legal tradition in the United States and Latin America as far 
as human rights and its relation to the State are concerned.486 How-
ever, Miró Quesada states that although human rights in Latin Amer-
ica have been consistently and systematically proclaimed and institu-
tionalized, a gulf between law and history exists.487 Ermacora de-
fends the same point of view.488 Moreover, in this context, Orrego Vi-
cuña correctly specifies that the transculturization process during 
which Latin America took over the Western human rights concept also 
included the factual human rights practice of France in the Algeria 
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war, the US counterinsurgency as well as German geopolitics,489 thus 
a sort of North American-European relativism.490 
In summary, in the bibliography the assumption prevails that Latin 
America has a particular human rights legal tradition but the authors 
simultaneously emphasize the exceptional discrepancy between some-
times widespread human rights violations and the juridical provisions. 
Because of this, it still remains difficult to classify Latin America. 
Thus, the notion circumstantial relativism shall try to place the 
human rights argumentation in Latin America, particularly during the 
1970s and 1980s, also terminologically between Western individual-
ism and Third World relativism. Consequently, circumstantial rela-
tivism is a phenomenon that has evolved specifically in Latin Amer-
ica. The circumstantial relativist argument is a typically Latin Ameri-
can phenomenon because of the legal tradition of the region that ex-
plicitly contains and even emphasizes the classic human rights con-
cept, and the contradictory reality, which somehow must be forcefully 
adapted to the former  by an argumentation employing the circum-
stantial relativism.491 Circumstantial relativism means to respect (indi-
                                                 
489  Francisco Orrega Vicuña  Domestic policies and external influences on the hu-
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vidual) human rights on principle (at least rhetorically) but to admit 
exceptions that go beyond the limitations included in the respective 
constitutions or international legal instruments. Circumstantial relativ-
ists do accept classic human rights as universal concepts  at least in 
theory. However, they do not guarantee individual and other human 
rights under special conditions, mostly if an actual terrorist threat 
challenges society and State or if such a threat is perceived or often 
exaggerated. Under these conditions of an actual or perceived or con-
structed subversive or terrorist threat, human rights do not enjoy uni-
versal application because these rights as part of the (occidental) cul-
ture, closely linked to the sacrosanct State, must be defended  includ-
ing the temporary violation of human rights of the State enemies. So, 
the circumstances temporarily justify not respecting human rights 
while higher goals are reached first. 
In fact, there are some provisions, which enable governments to 
act under emergency rules, like article 27 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights of 1969. But among the rights that are non-
derogable under any circumstances are the rights to life, to personal 
freedom and personal integrity, the prohibition of torture, the right to 
due process  those rights precisely, which have witnessed the most 
frequent violations during the 1970s and 1980s. So, the argumentation 
of governments to fight a dirty war against subversion or terrorism 
should suggest that in this ugly struggle against State enemies, the 
government also had to carry out some of the terrorists methods in 
order to win the final battle. Nevertheless, unlike cultural relativists, 
these regimes explicitly referred to their real commitment to human 
rights and further hinted to the atrocities committed by the subversive 
forces. Accordingly, the main element of circumstantial relativism is 
to pay lip service to human rights while violating these at least tempo-
rarily. In other words: the argumentation that defends a temporary 
suspension of the universality of human rights (valid at all times, eve-
rywhere, for everyone) constitutes the main feature of circumstantial 
relativism. In simple terms, circumstantial relativism toys with the id-
iom that the end justifies the means: in order to reach a goal, I have to 
                                                                                                         
where this relativism often served as a general argumentation to justify even 
gross and systematic human rights violations that aimed to maintain unjust politi-
cal and economic systems, which habitually violated the socioeconomic rights of 
the populations majority. 
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disregard the goals principles until I succeed. There are two main 
methods to act according to the circumstantial relativism: 1) the at-
tempted legalization of human rights abuses: the government decrees 
special laws that (temporarily) suspend basic rights but further also 
contradict with the national constitutions; and 2) camouflage tactics 
to cover violations: the application of repressive measures of clandes-
tine character such as forced disappearances or actions carried out by 
government agents dressed in civilian clothes to cover up State terror-
ist activities. In contrast to ambitions of Latin American despots to 
cloak their brutal practices pseudo-legally or by the diversion of the 
perpetrators, other dictatorships just did it. Consequently, sometimes 
a relativity of the universality of human rights takes place in Latin 
America, but it does not possess the character of an identity-creating 
fundamental rejection of Western models (democracy, human rights, 
parliamentarianism), though the differences between the claim and the 
actuality of constitutional and political reality are frequently astonish-
ing. Usually, repressive governments used to refer to the reality in 
their countries, which did not broadly permit the full enjoyment of 
human rights at all times. 
The divergence between the constitutional mentioning of human 
rights and the inclusion of human rights as part of the national inde-
pendence, versus the real disrespect or frank violation of the afore-
mentioned rights on the other hand, are explained with the Iberian 
heritage of not strictly enforcing the written law. The difference be-
tween colonial law and actual handling in Spanish America serves as a 
simple explanation since it does not address whether the concerned 
governments actually believed in human rights or not.  
One of the problems for the human rights reality in Latin America 
is that, unlike in Western Europe and North America, in most of the 
Latin American countries there were no enforcement organs or even 
constitutional mechanisms to actually impose human rights. So, the 
questions were: To whom to turn if abuses occur? To the police that 
probably are engaged in the violations themselves? To the question-
able judiciary? To the parliament? Since the emergence of human 
rights groups and through the increasing (international) public pres-
sure on human rights violations, the domestic lack of corresponding 
organs was compensated. Before the 1973 coup in Chile, abusing gov-
ernments were not broadly forced to explain their actions, which ob-
viously contradicted with their vow to protect human rights. After the 
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Chilean Putsch, the international media and public forced govern-
ments to defend their violent actions carried out to defend Christian 
values and culture. Only since 1973 has a real circumstantial relativ-
ism developed and in some cases, become a sophisticated argumenta-
tion pattern. 
If human rights belong to the fundamental basis of a democratic 
system, the frequency of circumstantial relativist actions could indi-
cate the level of rule of law security. From the perspective of interna-
tional relations realism, no government could ever exclude any cir-
cumstantial relativism on principle because it would decisively limit 
its scope for action. Nevertheless, during the period of this inquiry, in 
some Latin American countries circumstantial relativism converted 
into a State doctrine to categorically defend a questionable human 
rights practice. 
In general, this approach is certainly not a new one, but the term 
circumstantial relativism attributes a new quality to it. 
As already mentioned, by employing it as an argumentative rem-
edy, the protagonists of this relativism willingly described a situation 
as (internal) war or frequently as a dirty war through which they 
hoped to gain understanding for the employment of violent measures: 
Una guerra es algo cruel y se violan derechos humanos.492 This quo-
tation made by former Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor was a com-
ment the author heard several times during his interviews with former 
representatives of governments accused of human rights abuses. In the 
following, some examples for argumentations referring to the circum-
stantial relativism illustrate the meaning. 
At the OAS General Assemblies as well as in replies to IACHR 
charges regarding human rights violations, diplomats from accused 
Latin American Member States came up with a series of arguments 
that fit into the circumstantial relativism approach: 
 
1)  The main aspect brought up was the reference to the situation be-
fore a government took power  mostly by a military coup. The 
preceding situation was commonly depicted as one of general vio-
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lence, disorder and abuses mainly attributed to the foregoing gov-
ernment in charge. With the illustration of the abuses of its prede-
cessors, many governments justified their very existence (Argen-
tina, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua etc.). 
2)  Additionally, many regimes that violated human rights tried to jus-
tify its practice by pointing to the prevailing terrorism mostly at-
tributed to Marxist foreign intervention. The link between terror-
ism and human rights enjoyed high popularity among repressive 
regimes since it promised to create at least partly sympathy among 
the population with its own governments unorthodox measures. 
In this context, the term dirty war emerged. It described a virtual 
war between leftist terrorists and the authorities that kept fight-
ing for order. By and large, besides some few cases there was 
hardly an insurgent movement that actually threatened the States 
existence.  
3)  The reference to a countrys traditional role as human rights de-
fender was tactlessly employed by repressive governments in sev-
eral occasions  however, exclusively Member States that actually 
had this sort of human rights tradition, like Chile or Uruguay, used 
to do so. 
 
In the very beginning of the inter-American human rights system, the 
president of the OAS Council pronounced at the approval of the 
Commissions Statute: But to apply [the American Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of Man] in its exaggerated extension entirely, 
would give space for an unjust series of charges that could not resist 
the most solidly protected government, more tightly surrounded by the 
opinion of its people.493 In this context, the IACHRs first chairman 
and former president of Venezuela, Rómulo Gallegos, deplored that in 
various situations the words of law did not correspond with the prac-
tices.494 
                                                 
493  Pero aplicarlo [Declaration] en toda su exagerada extensión daría lugar a una in-
justa serie de reclamos que no podría resistir el Gobierno más sólidamente prote-
gido, más estrechamente rodeado por la opinión de su pueblo. OEA/Ser.G/II C-
a-388 (Protocolar), 13 octubre 1960, Acta de la Sesión Protocolar celebrada el 13 
de octubre de 1960: En honor de los miembros de la Comisión Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos, p. 7. 
494  Ibid., p. 14. Gallegos stated ...a la letra de las leyes no corresponden las prácti-
cas imperantes. 
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Former IACHR member Farer reports on his personal experience 
and concludes that the torturers did not admit their practices but ab-
stractly defended human rights violations as isolated abuses that 
commonly occur in a dirty war: They spoke, in other words, with 
the reticence and evasion of people who, though they feel justified, 
know they are operating outside the formal and moral law of that 
Western Christian civilization in the name of which they conduct their 
wars of extermination.495 They did not doubt their delinquency; but 
in their hearts and among their own kind, they successfully pleaded 
extenuating circumstances.496 
In 1975, the Chilean government rejected the IACHR Report with 
the argument that the previous government of leftist president Allende 
had destroyed the living together in Chile and thus the Chilean people 
carried out the legitimate right of rebellion. In the view of the Chil-
ean authorities, the appropriate view of the IACHR should have been 
to admit the peoples legitimacy for the present government and that 
the abnormality and emergence of the country would justify the 
restriction of certain basic guarantees or rights.497 In the same docu-
ment, the Chilean government again referred to the humanist-
Christian concept of man and society.498 Similarly, the rebuttal 
against the Commissions accusations issued by the Uruguayan gov-
ernment criticized the IACHRs omission to report on foregoing hu-
man rights violations that occurred before 1973.499 
In 1977, the Washington Post made a comment on the General 
Assembly: The militarists came to Grenada armed with evidence of 
Communist conspiracies and terrorism. Apparently intending to take 
                                                 
495  Tom J. Farer  The Grand Strategy, p. 99. See pp. 100-108. 
496  Ibid., p. 99. 
497  Observations by the Government of Chile on the Report on the Status of human 
rights in Chile, prepared by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
OEA/Ser.P, AG/doc. 500/75 add./, 25 February 1975, Original: Spanish, General 
Assembly, Fifth Regular Session, May 8, 1975, pp. 3-6, 10. 
498  Further, the chairman of the Commission on Constitutional Reforms that elabo-
rated a new Chilean constitution, promised to include not only a special emphasis 
on human rights but also social rights, the traditional division of the executive, 
juridical and legislative branches into the countrys new charter. Ibid., pp. 35-38. 
499  República Oriental del Uruguay, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores  Los De-
rechos Humanos en Uruguay, respuesta del Gobierno al Informe de la Comisión 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, de fecha 24 de Mayo de 1977, Montevi-
deo, Setiembre de 1977, p. 5. 
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their lumps on some human rights violations, they demanded OAS 
recognition of their point of view  that some repressions are neces-
sary to combat terrorism.500 At that General Assembly in Grenada, 
the delegation of El Salvador proposed to treat human rights and ter-
rorism topics as one agenda point.501 With a reference to an Argen-
tine502 proposal to request the IACHR to dialogue with governments 
about human rights violations committed by terrorists, the Salvadoran 
representative, González Dubón, further stressed: Unfortunately, 
those who did not accompany this project do not want to understand 
the problem of terrorism that shakes some of the American countries 
like ours.503 Similarly, the Chilean delegate recommended that the 
IACHR stay for a while in the country under scrutiny in order to attain 
a sense of the reality of the actual situation. Likewise, Argentinas 
delegate criticized that terrorism was the big absentee of the General 
Assembly resolutions.504 
At the General Assembly in 1978 the Paraguayan delegate, Luis 
María Argaña, stated that his country naturally would respect human 
rights. Furthermore, he said that through the condemnation of terror-
ism, human rights were indirectly protected.505 The Uruguayan repre-
                                                 
500  The Washington Post also quoted Chilean diplomat Diez: Terrorism and human 
rights are intimately related. Washington Post, June 23, 1977, p. A20. 
501  OEA/Ser.P/VII-0.2, 30 diciembre 1977, Vol. II, Primera Parte, Séptimo Período 
Ordinario de Sesiones, St. Georges, Grenada, del 14 al 22 de junio de 1977, 
Primera Comisión, p. 144. 
502  The Argentine representative, Juan Carlos Arlia, spoke of the rights and duties of 
States concerning economic rights and presented his vision of human rights: La 
definición de violación de los derechos humanos que reconoce como origen o 
causante exclusivo a los gobiernos, pertenece a una concepción filosófica liberal 
obsoleta, de quien detenta el poder en una sociedad que pertenece al pasado, que 
no se ajuste a la realidad en ninguno de nuestros países. (The definition of hu-
man rights violations that recognizes governments as exclusive origin or cause, 
belongs to an obsolete liberal philosophical conception...) OEA/Ser.P/VII-0.2, 
30 diciembre 1977, Volumen II, Segunda Parte, Comisión Primera, pp. 158, 159. 
503  Lamentablemente, quienes no acompañaron dicho proyecto no quieren com-
prender el problema del terrorismo que sacuden a algunos países americanos co-
mo el nuestro. OEA/Ser.P/VII-0.2, 30 diciembre 1977, Vol. II, Primera Parte, 
Séptimo Período Ordinario de Sesiones, St. Georges, Grenada, del 14 al 22 de 
junio de 1977, Primera Comisión, p. 145. 
504  Ibid., pp. 155, 162. 
505  OEA/Ser.P/VIII.0.2, 30 diciembre 1978, Volumen II, Parte II, Octavo Período 
Ordinario de Sesiones, Washington, D.C., del 21 de junio al 1° de julio de 1978, 
Primera Comisión, pp. 90, 91. 
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sentative to the OAS, Carlos Giambruno, stressed his countrys human 
rights tradition as well.506 Further, Giambruno underlined that it was 
necessary to consider the human rights situation in a particular Mem-
ber State within that country.507 At the plenary session of the 1978 
General Assembly, Uruguays representative, Alejandro Rovira, reit-
erated that Uruguay had always respected human rights and always 
would do so in the future because of its tradition.508 This argument 
was repeated by the Uruguayan delegation in 1979.509 
In 1982, IACHR member Monroy Cabra rejected criticisms by the 
Nicaraguan Sandinistas and referred extensively to the situation in that 
country. In reply, the Nicaraguan diplomat Herdocia admitted that 
there had been executions but proclaimed in a very emotional presen-
tation that the immediate period after Somozas overthrow witnessed 
special circumstances but that the situation now was much better.510 
The argument employed by the Nicaraguan representative appears 
similar to the strategies carried out by several right-wing dictatorships 
such as those in Chile or Argentina: to understand the present human 
rights situation it is necessary to take into account the atrocities com-
mitted under the foregoing government. 
At the 1989 Assembly, the OAS representative of El Salvador, 
Roberto Mejía Trabanino, held that guerrilla violence and terrorist acts 
by the FMLN forces would impede a full observance of human rights 
and further considered the IACHR report somehow partial about the 
authentic national reality and that the report did not deal with the vic-
tims affected by the FMLN acts nor the damage of the economic in-
frastructure.511 However, some rejecting reactions to such circumstan-
                                                 
506  Ibid., p. 71. 
507  Ibid., p. 142. 
508  Ibid., p. 251. 
509  OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2, 3 noviembre 1980, Volumen II, Parte I, Noveno Período Or-
dinario de Sesiones, La Paz, Bolivia, del 22 al 31 de octubre de 1979, Sesiones 
Plenarias, p. 317. 
510  OEA/Ser.P/XII.0.2, 29 julio 1983, Volumen II, Parte II; Duodécimo Período Or-
dinario de Sesiones, Washington, D.C., Del 15 al 21 de noviembre de 1982, Ac-
tas y Documentos, Volumen II, Segunda Parte, Actas de las Comisiones (Primera 
Comisión), pp. 96-102, 103-108. 
511  OEA/Ser.P/XIX.0.2, 29 abril 1991, Volumen II, Parte II, Décimonoveno período 
ordinario de sesiones, Washington, D.C., Del 13 al 18 de noviembre de 1989, 
Primera Comisión, p. 163, pp. 163-165 (Jesuit murder). Also OAS ambassador 
Mauricio Granillo Barrera tried to accuse the FMLN of the Jesuits assassination. 
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tial relativist arguments also occurred at the OAS gatherings. A few 
examples will complete this illustration: In 1977, Venezuela opposed 
Chiles proposal to adopt a resolution that linked human rights and 
terrorism and to discuss both topics combined.512 At the same General 
Assembly in 1977, the US delegation pushed a resolution that de-
clared there are no circumstances which justify torture, summary 
executions or prolonged detention without trial contrary to law. 
Likewise, in 1979 Pope John Paul II spoke before the OAS on Octo-
ber 6, 1979, and underlined that no circumstances would permit an at-
tack on the inviolable dignity of the human person and the genuine 
rights that protect this dignity.513 
Circumstantial relativism plays a vital role regarding actual for-
eign policy and human rights. With reference to everyday decisions as 
well as to the innate complexity and the general interdependence be-
tween foreign policies in general and between domestic and foreign 
relations, in the majority of cases decision-makers employed the ar-
guments of the circumstantial relativism. Actually, circumstantial rela-
tivism could be regarded as the natural complementary element to bi- 
or multilateral foreign policy realism. 
Diplomatically, OAS representatives tried to stress circumstances 
that led to declare a sort of internal war situation, thereby justifying 
temporary violations of rights. Further, OAS diplomats used to link 
terrorism and human rights as a single topic because they were eager 
to discuss both items together in order to distract from abuses and to 
justify the governmental employment of violence. Here it is hoped 
that the contribution of this new expression serves as an inspiring 
cause for thought by supplementing the previously made classification 
of US and Latin American in statist, realist and relativist approaches. 
US American Realpolitik has served as the necessary foreign policy 
company that complementarily escorts a domestic circumstantial rela-
                                                                                                         
See OEA/Ser.G, CP/ACTA 798/89, 30 noviembre 1989, Acta de la session e-
xtradordinaria celebrada el 30 de noviembre de 1989, p. 8. See: Pedro 
Armada/Martha Doggett  Dead foretold. The Jesuit Murders in El Salvador, 
1993; Klaas Dykmann  El Salvador: Die Menschenrechte im Visier, Hamburg 
1999, pp. 71-75. 
512  OEA/Ser.P/VII-0.2, 30 diciembre 1977, Vol. II, Primera Parte, Séptimo Período 
Ordinario de Sesiones, St. Georges, Grenada, del 14 al 22 de junio de 1977, 
Primera Comisión, pp. 330, 333, 334. 
513  Tom J. Farer  The Grand Strategy, p. 84. 
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tivism of another repressive government. In concrete terms, the force 
of circumstance of realist US foreign policy somehow justifies an 
abusing government, which has to defend itself against subversion. 
Basically, it seems to be the same behavior patterns as in the realist-
statist model explained before, but with the new term of a circumstan-
tial relativism may be easier to classify typical lines of argumentation. 
 
Summarizing this chapter, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights certainly had its internal shortcomings and institutional and po-
litical difficulties within the OAS bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the 
Commission was able to turn an exclusively declaratory or promo-
tional institution into a highly controversial conscience of the hemi-
sphere514, as some observers comment. This evolution was an internal 
process to which mainly the Commissioners and the Secretariat con-
tributed. However, somewhat ironically, an odd coincidence eventu-
ally strengthened the Commission in the mid-seventies. While military 
governments dominated large parts of the hemisphere and thereby 
could obstruct OAS decisions on human rights, US president Carter 
highlighted this topic. So, the IACHR had the reason for its work with 
the numerous dictatorships and the financial and political backing 
through US support. In contrast to the mainly inglorious function cor-
rectly attributed to US policy in regards to human rights violations in 
Latin America, the US administrations at least partly endeavored to 
strengthen the inter-American human rights system. In general, the 
role of the United States was certainly helpful and had a promoting in-
fluence on the IACHRs emergence, but it was not the only reason for 
the Commissions rise in the 1970s as it was not the sole cause for its 
decline during the 1980s. This will be shown in the chapters III and 
IV. 
Accordingly, in the following chapter, the development of the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights into the most controver-
sial and maybe most influential OAS organ will be discussed. 
                                                 
514  The Ecuadorian representative called the Commission la portavoz de la con-
ciencia de América que ha proclamado  a los cuatro vientos el derecho de los 
hombres a la libertad, a la seguridad individual y a la dignidad humana. Consejo 
Permanente de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, Acta de la Sesión 
Protocolar celebrada el 27 de septiembre de 1984, OEA/Ser. G. CP/ACTA 
584/84, 27 Septiembre 1984, p. 2. 
 
III. The OAS Human Rights Policy in the 1970s: 
Between Dictatorships, Violence, and  
Hemisphere Policies 
 
From a simplified perspective, there were two major tendencies in the 
hemisphere regarding human rights politics during the 1970s: First, 
since 1973 many dictatorships emerged1 whose human rights viola-
tions expanded the issue beyond the region. Second, Jimmy Carter, 
elected as US president in late 1976, elevated human rights to the for-
eign policy status of the soul of US foreign affairs. To explore these 
two tendencies further, it is necessary to first take the global political 
situation into account.2 
The tendency of many military leaders to seize power through vio-
lence could also be interpreted as a result of the international eco-
nomic crisis in the beginning of the seventies. In 1973, three events 
ushered in a critical phase in North-South relations: the Yom-Kippur 
war launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel, the subsequent em-
bargo of Arab oil-exporting States in order to diminish European, 
Japanese and US support for Israel, and the decision of the ensemble 
of Third World oil exporters to raise the price of oil fourfold. While 
the US strengthened their pressure on OPEC members to reduce the 
price of oil, developing countries were for the first time major actors 
in an international crisis. In spite of this shift, the US administrations 
of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford sought to maintain the status quo of 
                                                 
1  Actually, the emergence of military dictatorships began with the Brazilian mili-
tary coup in 1964. However, the Brazilian military rule was not as cruel as those 
regimes led by the armed forces during the 1970s, therefore the author tends to 
view the Chilean golpe militar  though preceded by the Uruguayan coup  as 
the beginning of dictatorial rule in South America. 
2  This chapter covers the period between 1973 and 1980 and preponderantly deals 
with the particular situation in Chile and Argentina, but also mentions the cases 
of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama. It will be of interest to mention the Chil-
ean case, but not to an extent that the material available would allow. Unlike the 
Chilean case, human rights abuses in Argentina and its impact on the inter-
American system have not been a subject of such prolific investigation. The Ar-
gentine human rights record and the OAS system have not been analyzed to a sat-
isfactorily extent and thus might be at least as interesting as the Chilean case. 
Chapter III 182
international economic relations.3 Unlike the tense North-East rela-
tions, the importance of the East-West confrontation had diminished 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, also because France and China de-
veloped autonomous foreign policies. 
The oil price shock in 1973, which unleashed an international eco-
nomic crisis, contributed to the deterioration of the socioeconomic 
situation in Latin America. In the context of these circumstances, the 
increasing guerrilla activity in the region, which had notably intensi-
fied since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, also played a role. Guerrilla 
movements emerged that were inspired by the nationalistic and later 
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary rhetoric of the Cubans. These guerril-
las became a virtual and at times acute threat to the existing order in 
Latin American societies. The highly unfair distribution of property 
and land in many countries seemed to give those movements a legiti-
mate cause. 
 The relations between the United States and Latin American na-
tions were particularly difficult in the beginning of the 1970s. Latin 
America had established ties within UNCTAD, GATT and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund with new Afro-Asian allies in order to cre-
ate a Third World counterweight to the industrialized nations.4 On the 
other hand, the US expressed its unhappiness with the role of Vene-
zuela and Ecuador in OPEC5 and excluded both countries through the 
US Trade Act from the reduction in tariffs through the Generalized 
System of Preferences. Latin American resentments against the US 
Trade Act of 1974 directed against the OPEC members Venezuela and 
Ecuador, and the discovery of clandestine CIA activities in the region, 
exacerbated traditional anti-American sentiment in each country.6 In 
                                                 
3  Robert A. Mortimer  The Third World Coalition in International Politics, Sec-
ond, updated edition, in: Foreign Relations of the Third World, No. 2, Boul-
der/London 1984, pp. 43-45, 162, 132/133. 
4  Tom J. Farer  The United States and the Inter-American System: Are There 
Functions for the Forms? The American Society of International Law, Studies in 
Transnational Legal Policy No. 17, Washington, D.C. 1978, p. 44. 
5  Also Mexico supported OPECs decisions although it did criticize some of the 
organizations decisions as well. The latter might be explained by Mexicos at-
tempt not to offend its major trade partner, the US. Washington Post, May 15, 
1975, p. A4. 
6  The Inter-American Economic and Social Council found that the US Trade Act 
contradicted Kissingers New Dialogue. Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council  X Annual Meeting at CIES at Ministerial Level, 10-15 March 1975, 
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addition, the Peruvian leftist military government under Juan Velasco 
Alvarado that advocated nationalism and anti-imperialism, called for a 
radical reorganization of the inter-American system, including a Latin 
American economic front.7 A further reason for US concern was the 
Latin American support for the 1975 UN General Assembly resolu-
tion, which declared Zionism as a form of racism. Despite of these ob-
stacles  as former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger holds  of-
ficial contacts between the United States and Latin American nations 
were friendlier and more substantive than with other developing coun-
tries, which he describes as an anomaly. However, Kissinger consid-
ered Latin American countries  besides their rhetoric  not as major 
players among the nonaligned nations8 and generally speaking, not 
important in global politics.9 Kissinger  after having served as Na-
tional Security Adviser to US president Richard Nixon  became Sec-
retary of State under the Ford administration in 1974 and announced a 
New Dialogue with Latin America.10 Although in many ways Kiss-
inger attempted to rescue the Pan American idea, which he considered 
moribund at that time11, this new approach did not improve the diffi-
cult US-Latin American relations. 
                                                                                                         
Washington, D.C., The United States Foreign Trade Act of 1974: Aspects of In-
terest to Latin America, OEA/Ser.H/X.24, CIES/3043, 28 February 1975, Origi-
nal: Spanish, pp. 4/5. 
7  Stephen M. Gorman  Peruvian Foreign Policy Since 1975: External Political 
and Economic Initiatives, in: Elizabeth G. Ferris/Jennie K. Lincoln (Eds.)  Latin 
American Foreign Policies, Global and Regional Dimensions, Boulder 1981, pp. 
116, 117. 
8  Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs, 
New York 1999, pp. 732/733. 
9  See: Michael J. Francis  United States Policy toward Latin America during the 
Kissinger Years, in: John D. Martz (Ed.)  United States Policy in Latin America. 
A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge, 1961-1986, Lincoln/London 1988, 
pp. 30/31. 
10  Kissinger demonstrated his new interest in a New Dialogue by attending the 
1975 OAS General Assembly in Washington, D.C. His first step to improve the 
troubled relations between Latin America and the White House was a breakfast 
for the Chilean delegation discussing the IACHR Report on that country. 
Washington Post, May 9, 1975, p. A26. See as well: Washington Post, February 
17, 1976, p. A12. 
11  John Edwin Fagg  Pan Americanism, Malabar, Florida 1982, p. 115. 
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Moreover, by 1972/73 the US Congress had begun to enforce hu-
man rights in US foreign policy.12 In 1974, the so-called Fraser 
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 502B, was 
adopted. This amendment, though not yet binding, tied US security 
aid to the corresponding human rights record of the receiving govern-
ment.13 However, Amendment 502B contained loopholes that permit-
ted aid in spite of a bad human rights performance in extraordinary 
circumstances or when national interests of the United States were 
affected. Despite Kissingers opposition, Congress and President Ford 
finally reached a compromise, which was signed into effect on June 
30, 1976.14 This represented an institutionalization of human rights in 
US foreign policy. Characteristically, the first summary report of the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House of Repre-
sentatives had the title: Human Rights in the World Community: A 
Call for U.S. Leadership.15 
On the other hand, in 1975 several events initiated a period of de-
cline for the OAS as an inter-American forum and as an instrument of 
Latin American unity.16 In 1975, Latin American dissatisfaction with 
its northern neighbor ushered in the creation of SELA (Sistema 
Económico Latinoamericano), an exclusively Latin American eco-
nomic organization that included Cuba. SELA deprived the OAS Eco-
nomic and Social Commission of its function to serve as discussion 
forum for inter-American economic and trade issues. The Latin 
American Economic System, as in its English translation, followed a 
                                                 
12  The Jackson Amendment of 1972 and the Fraser Hearings in 1973 initiated the 
human rights debate, followed by the Harkin Amendment in 1975. Friedbert 
Pflüger  Die Menschenrechtspolitik der USA. Amerikanische Außenpolitik zwi-
schen Idealismus und Realismus 1972-1982, Munich/Vienna 1983, pp. 69-81. 
13  The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (1976), in: 
Laquer/Rubin (Eds.), pp. 341-343. 
14  Iain Guest  Behind the Disappearances. Argentinas Dirty War Against Human 
Rights and the United Nations, Philadelphia 1990, pp. 151-153. See Pflüger, pp. 
65-81. 
15  Christoph Müller  Die Menschenrechte als außenpolitisches Ziel. Das Beispiel 
der amerikanischen Politik der Jahre 1973-1980, from the series: Völkerrecht und 
Außenpolitik, Vol. 37, also Diss., 1984, Baden-Baden/Germany 1986, pp. 14, 33, 
34. 
16  In 1975, a Meeting of Consultation freed the OAS Member States from the trade 
sanctions imposed on Cuba, while the US involvement in the coup in Chile as 
well as the 1974 Trade Act and the US-Ecuadorian tuna wars provoked protests 
in Latin America. Wilson/Dent, p. 32. 
The OAS Human Rights Policy in the 1970s 185
tendency of nationalism and regionalism, which had been promoted 
mainly by the import substitution and regionalism models of the then 
influential UN Economic Commission on Latin America, CEPAL. 
That Commission  under its most efficacious executive director Raúl 
Prébisch  had elaborated a theory of periphery that was the basis for 
the development strategy known as CEPALISMO. Prébischs theory 
served also as one of the fundaments of the structuralist version of the 
mostly popular theory of dependence, better known under its Spanish 
term, dependencia. Though the theory of dependencia was more in-
fluential in the academic and social philosophic areas, than in actual 
economic policies of States, its impact on the perception of US-Latin 
American relations was substantial.17 In addition to SELA, a Latin 
American Free Trade Association (ALALC) was founded, which 
sought also to develop Latin American nations through a strategy of 
regional protectionism combined with import substitution and interre-
gional trade.18 In general, the 1970s witnessed a pronounced Latin 
American consciousness and the regions strong involvement in the 
so-called tercermundismo movement, striving for economic and po-
litical independence from the industrialized countries in general and 
from the predominant United States in particular.19 
The tensions between Latin America and the United States also af-
fected the Organization of American States. Between 1970 and 1973, 
many Member States expressed their dissatisfaction with the organiza-
tion, which mostly dealt with US-Latin American differences and 
whose organs preponderantly discussed economic matters. In 1970, 
Nixons Security Adviser Henry Kissinger requested in a National Se-
curity Council memorandum to ...strengthen the Organization of 
American States and other instrumentalities of the inter-American sys-
                                                 
17  Stuby concludes that the endeavors of the nonalignment and Third World move-
ments as well as the dependencia resulted in the formulation of the third genera-
tion of human rights, the so-called solidarity rights. Stuby, p. 33. 
18  ALALC was accompanied by several subregional trade zones like the Andean 
Pact, the Caribbean Common Market or the Central American Common Market. 
19  Alberto van Klaveren  Die internationalen Beziehungen Lateinamerikas in den 
achtziger Jahren, in: Dieter Nohlen/Mario Fernández/Alberto van Klaveren 
(Eds.)  Demokratie und Außenpolitik in Lateinamerika, Opladen/Germany 
1991, p. 29. Booth, pp. 33/34. Stefan Hertrampf  Panamerikanismus, Interame-
rikanisches System und die Organisation Amerikanischer Staaten (OAS), from 
the series: Dokumente und Materialien No. 21, March 1994, Johannes Gutenberg 
Universität, Institute for Political Science, pp. 21, 22. Brock, p. 228. 
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tem in ways which would be consistent with our overall interests and 
objectives...20 However, the General Assembly in 1972 clearly dem-
onstrated the aforementioned problems when sharp differences be-
tween the US and several Latin American members surfaced.21 In 
1973, William D. Rogers, who later became Assistant Secretary of 
State in the Ford administration, called for a US pullout from the 
OAS. Rogers  who later modified his opinion when he became mem-
ber of the Ford administration  criticized US paternalism and la-
mented the tendency of Latin American States to not discuss internal 
socioeconomic matters in a regional forum due to a growing sense of 
nationalism. Such a withdrawal of the US from the OAS probably 
would have terminated the organizations existence because of the 
strong financial contribution the US made, which at that time made up 
two thirds of the budget.22 Interestingly, it was also Rogers who later 
gave an emphatic speech on the common value of human rights in the 
inter-American system and further appealed to strengthen the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.23 The Latin American de-
sire for political and economic independence from the US resulted in 
different proposals: Some Member States wished to withdraw from 
the OAS, others favored to abolish the organization completely,24 and 
                                                 
20  National Security Council, National Security Study Memorandum 108, Henry A. 
Kissinger, Subject: Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America, Secret, Wash-
ington, D.C., December 10, 1970 (NSA files). 
21  Gabriel Valdés S.  Requiem para la O.E.A., in: Criterio, Buenos Aires, Año 
XLVI, 13 de Setiembre de 1973, No. 1675, p. 473; Washington Post, April 16, 
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noviembre de 1975, Topic: Human Rights and Foreign Policy in Latin America. 
24  In 1973, Valdés wrote that the inter-American system would only serve to aggra-
vate the problems, never to resolve them. Gabriel Valdés S.  Requiem para la 
O.E.A., in: Criterio, Buenos Aires, Año XLVI, 13 de Setiembre de 1973, No. 
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finally, there were voices that called for a withdrawal of the US from 
the organization to turn it into a Latin American institution.25 Propos-
als were made by some Latin American governments to radically 
change the organizations structure because it was perceived as inef-
fective. In general, Latin American proposals sought to decrease the 
dominant US influence in the OAS. For instance, there were members 
who favored to move the OAS headquarters from Washington to a 
Latin American capital  a proposition with symbolic importance that 
would have reduced the US impact notably.26 Besides grievances on 
US-Latin American economic and trade relations, several Latin 
American governments criticized Washingtons stand on hemispheric 
military cooperation and its policy toward Cuba, which was sensed as 
pertinacious and anachronistic.27 In the early 1970s, the Latin Ameri-
can Member States mainly consisted of dictatorships or weak gov-
ernments. Naturally, this also affected the organizations stand on hu-
man rights.  
In the early 1970s, the OAS adopted several resolutions, which 
condemned terrorism. Generally speaking, besides economic matters, 
political terrorism was one of the major topics at the OAS in the be-
ginning of the 1970s. In many ways, political terror against the State 
was an earlier substantial issue in the OAS than human rights obliga-
tions of governments.28 Seemingly, this demonstrated that the OAS 
                                                 
25  The author suggests that if the US had withdrawn or been expelled from the OAS 
or if the Latin American States had decided to create a Latin American organiza-
tion instead, the Organization of American States probably would not have sur-
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authoritarian regimes. 
26  Nevertheless, such proposal also found support in the US. Washington Post, June 
15, 1977, p. A12. 
27  Washington Post, January 4, 1972, p. A4; April 12, 1972, p. A10; June 1, 1972, 
p. A6; April 5, 1973, p. A2; April 6, 1973, p. A4; July 20, 1973, p. A16; Septem-
ber 8, 1973, p. B6. As a reaction to the sympathetic stand for a reintegration Cuba 
into the inter-American system among OAS Member States, in November 1974, 
a bomb, apparently deposed by some anti-Castro militants, damaged the OAS 
headquarter building in Washington. Washington Post, November 10, 1974, p. 
B7. 
28  See, for instance, Washington Post, February 3, 1971, p. A16; OEA/Documentos 
Oficiales/Ser.G. CP/Doc.10/70, 13 abril de 1970, Original: español: Nota UP-68 
(6005) de 13 de abril de 1970 del Embajador Representante de la Argentina en la 
cual propone que el Consejo Permanente estudie una acción condenatoria del ter-
rorismo y secuestro de personas, y de las organizaciones que utilizan dichos me-
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was an intergovernmental organ, which mainly sought to maintain the 
status quo by a statist policy.29 
In 1970, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was 
elevated to a main organ of the OAS by the entry-into-force of the 
Protocol of Buenos Aires. In 1969, there had already been a signifi-
cant step towards human rights in the inter-American system with the 
holding of the Special Conference on Human Rights in San José, 
Costa Rica. At this historical conference, the OAS Member States ap-
proved the American Convention on Human Rights. 
The new main political bodies of the organization, above all the 
Permanent Council and the General Assembly, continued to treat hu-
man rights issues as a field, which was seen more as a protocol than as 
a political matter. The General Assembly used to comment on the An-
nual Reports of the IACHR with a simple standardized formula, with 
which it merely and unspecifically thanked the Commission for its 
valuable work. With this gentlemens agreement, the Member States 
tried to avoid blaming one single country, because generally almost 
every State could be criticized. Besides the vague resolutions concern-
ing human rights issues, even debates on sensitive human rights topics 
were avoided.30 This situation definitively changed with the IACHR 
reports on the situation of human rights in Chile. 
  
                                                                                                         
dios, Washington, D.C. 13 de abril de 1970; OEA/Documentos Oficiales/Ser.G. 
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29  See José Luis Ramírez León  La OEA, los países latinoamericanos y la democ-
racia en el hemisferio, in: Síntesis, No. 21, Julio-Diciembre 1993: El Apoyo In-
ternacional a la Democracia en América Latina, Madrid 1994, pp. 196/197. 
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tive OAS style, a controversial issue is easily kept off the agenda. Washington 
Post, May 18, 1975, p. A2. 
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III. 1. The Human Rights Issue Enters the OAS Agenda: The 
Chilean Case (1973-1976)31 
As LeBlanc argues, the relations between the IACHR and Chilean 
governments until the late 1970s can be divided into at least two peri-
ods. The period prior to September 1973 was marked by few com-
plaints against the Christian Democrat government led by Eduardo 
Frei until 1970. The government of the Socialist Salvador Allende 
Gossens Unidad Popular (1970-1973) though, led to more petitions, 
but those were not comparable with the amount of complaints re-
ceived by the Commission after September 1973.32 This chapter deals 
with the visits and reports of the IACHR as well as with the General 
Assemblies during the years 1973 until 1976. 
The Commission member Jiménez de Aréchaga apparently had 
some sympathy for Allende according to remarks of the Commis-
sioner Sandifer. Also, the Commission met in Chile in 1972, after 
Sandifer described Chile as a place of freedom and dignity for all 
men.33 There may have been some sympathy for the Allende govern-
ment within the Commission, which would explain why it chose to 
address human rights violations of the military regime at a later date. 
The government of Allendes Unidad Popular, elected in 1970, tried 
to implement poorly coordinated economic and social policies. Fur-
ther, the United States had already decided in 1970 ...to maximize 
                                                 
31  The Chilean case is described and analyzed to a prolific extent in Medina 
Quirogas book, published in 1988. Therefore, the author does not attempt to re-
write the Chilean case or even to plagiarize Medinas splendid research effort. 
But it has to be mentioned that Medinas remarkable analysis predominantly re-
fers to official OAS documents. However, it should be stated that this part refers 
mainly to Medinas findings but also pretends to include additional information 
and different perspectives of the case. 
32  Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The OAS and the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, The Hague 1977, p. 147. 
33  IACHR  Report on the Work Accomplished by the IACHR During its Twenty-
Seventh Session (February 28 through March 8, 1972), OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 27, Doc. 
42 rev. 1, 25 May 1972, Original: Spanish, p. 1-3. In addition, OAS Secretary 
General Galo Plaza knew president Allende personally. Letter from Manuel Bi-
anchi to Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, Santiago de Chile, September 27, 1971 
(IACHR files). 
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pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation...34 
Together with the strong domestic right-wing and US opposition 
against Allendes Socialist project, the governments own shortcom-
ings resulted in an increasing social and political polarization to which 
the armed forces attempted to present themselves as the guardians of 
law and order. 
On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military seized power in that 
Andean country. The democratically elected government was over-
thrown by a bloody military coup during which president Allende pre-
sumably died by committing suicide. According to unclassified docu-
ments released in recent years, the involvement of the US in the 
preparation of the coup was more significant than US officials had 
admitted decades before. The military government led by General Au-
gusto Pinochet Ugarte initiated a monetarist and liberal economic pol-
icy and simultaneously suspended many basic rights through the proc-
lamation of a state of siege and installed military courts. In the begin-
ning of the military rule in Chile, thousands of persons disappeared 
and were tortured or detained without charges. In spite of these fla-
grant abuses, the new government under General Pinochet claimed to 
embrace Christian values and the restoration of democracy to defend 
against the growing Communist subversion.35 The Chilean coup led to 
demonstrations in North America and Europe, where anti-Pinochet 
militants rallied against the Pinochet regime. The human rights viola-
tions prevailed upon existing non-governmental organizations to focus 
on Chile and led to the establishment of many new human rights 
NGOs in Chile36, the US and Europe. In contrast to other countries of 
                                                 
34  National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum, Henry A. 
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35  Hugo Frühling  Determinants of Gross Human Rights Violations by State and 
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36  See, for example, Patricio Orellana/Elizabeth Q. Hutchinson  El movimiento de 
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the region, in Chile there were educated middle class members among 
the victims who enjoyed vivid contacts to Europe or North America 
and consequently sought international attention and also sent com-
plaints to the IACHR.37 Prior to this coup, Chile had been seen as a 
symbol for democracy in Latin America, and the fact that a military 
coup could oust an elected government in Chile suggested that now 
this could happen elsewhere.38 Sikkink describes the effect of the coup 
as a ...watershed event in the creation of human rights NGOs.39 Al-
most parallel to the emergence of the human rights movement the 
womens movement began to grow.40 The economic crisis that started 
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and loyal mothers, military rule in Chile brought women 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in Latin America with the OPEC cartels decision to raise oil prices 
prompted social unrest, from which the urban poor and women were 
most often victims. The resistance against military dictatorships also 
led to a solidarization of women.41 Another factor for the rise of the 
womens movement can be found in the effects of the authoritarian 
rule: while it forcibly depoliticized men,42 it led to an unintended mo-
bilization of women who were requesting information on the where-
abouts of their husbands and sons.43  
As a reaction to international criticism, the Chilean Junta began a 
strategy of public relations and lobbying particularly in the United 
States in order to improve its bad image as a human rights violating 
government.44 In the meantime, the United States provided increasing 
assistance and diplomatic support to the junta until 1976.45 Schoultz 
comments that particularly the Nixon and Ford administrations tried to 
counter proposals that the United States halt aid or sanction human 
rights violating governments by downgrading those abuses as merely 
individual excesses.46  
The first reactions of the OAS Member States towards the coup in 
Chile were quite different; while some governments were uneasy, 
other OAS Members openly welcomed the Putsch as a preventive 
measure to avoid a second Cuba in the Hemisphere.47 In 1974, an 
OAS special consultative committee prepared a study on the Marxist-
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45  Frühling, p. 590. 
46  Schoultz, p. 6. 
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Leninist Process in Chile, which served as a justification for the Sep-
tember coup.48 
Medina Quiroga names two factors that led to the first visit by an 
IACHR representative, only a month after the coup: first, the Chilean 
Junta had to prove their promise to restore legal order by at least an 
appearance of legality. Second, the military was not indifferent to-
wards the OAS and the opinion of its Member States.49 In fact, the 
Chilean government never challenged the jurisdiction of the IACHR 
to conduct on-site investigations; but it did criticize the Commissions 
methodology, particularly in relation to the presumed lack of objectiv-
ity of the sources and information used.50 This constituted a typical 
model case of governmental behavior arguing within the logic of the 
circumstantial relativism. 
Probably a letter to the Editor of the New York Times by Prof. 
Thomas Buergenthal prompted US Senator Edward Kennedy to re-
quest a visit of the IACHR to Chile.51 In addition to this, there is rea-
son to believe that Commission members such as the Uruguayan 
Jiménez de Aréchaga or the Venezuelan Aguilar, who emphatically 
rejected the coup out of their deeply felt loyalty to the law, initiated 
the involvement of the IACHR. The activism and dedication of some 
members led the IACHR to speak outwardly with a unanimous 
voice.52 On September 17, 1973 the IACHR requested to send its Ex-
ecutive Director to Chile. The Commission responded fast to the coup 
after having received communications transmitted by Amnesty Inter-
                                                 
48  Special Consultative Committee on Security Against the Subversion of Interna-
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national and the International Commission of Jurists alleging massive 
human rights violations53 and asking for permission to visit the coun-
try.54 The Commissions solicitation was heeded ten days later and 
Executive Secretary Luis Reque traveled to Santiago de Chile  just a 
few weeks after the golpe had taken place. Luis Reque was granted a 
visit to travel to Chile between October 12 and 17, 1973.55 Appar-
ently, the Chilean junta saw itself obliged to permit Reques visit since 
it stood for law and order: By allowing the Commissions Executive 
Secretary to visit Chile, the junta could present itself as committed to 
its international obligations and underline its (ostensible) interest in 
human rights issues. Unlike common published versions, there is also 
another possible explanation for the fact that the Junta allowed Reque 
to visit Chile scarcely a month after the coup. According to several in-
terviews, it was mainly Reque himself who believed that the Chilean 
junta might have thought it had invited a renowned Bolivian General 
with the same name and one of Ernesto Che Guevaras enemies in 
1967, or at least one of his relatives. As Luis Reque Terán also had 
Bolivian nationality, the mix-up was perfect.56 Conversely, the official 
cablegrams sent to the Chilean government to ask for Reques visit 
clearly mentioned that he was related to the Human Rights Commis-
sion  probably an unusual institution for a General.57 Nevertheless, if 
the aforementioned version were true, it would contradict the assump-
tion that the Chilean government immediately and voluntarily cooper-
ated with the Commission. Moreover, it would suggest that the coop-
eration of the Junta with the Commission occurred by accident. 
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Regardless of how this important visit came about,58 following his 
trip, Reque concluded that ...violations were occurring, but that press 
reports of torture were exaggerated ... and that the situation called for 
a Commission visit to Chile...59 As a result of Reques trip to Chile, 
he presented a critical report before the Commission. Accordingly, 
Reques visit to Chile was followed by requests of the Commission di-
rected to the Chilean junta to provide information. The Chilean gov-
ernment did cooperate with the Commission and handed over some 
requested information. This helped to resolve some individual cases 
but could not clarify the general situation of human rights in Chile.60 
Moreover, the provided information contrasted very much from other 
sources, and consequently, the Commission requested an on-site visit 
to Chile.61 In March 1974, 33 US Congress members asked the entire 
Commission to follow up Reques visit.62 It was difficult to obtain the 
permission for an IACHR on-site evaluation, but the Commission dis-
tributed its correspondence with the reluctant government publicly, a 
tactic which worked in its favor. Eventually, the permission for the 
visit was granted.63 The IACHR visit took place from July 22 through 
August 2, 1974. The Commissioners Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, 
Manuel Bianchi Gundián, Robert F. Woodward, Carlos A. Dunshee 
de Abranches and Genaro R. Carrió participated in the in loco obser-
vation. Several staff lawyers and secretaries of the Executive Secre-
tariat assisted them.64 The First Report on the Status of Human Rights 
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in Chile is based mainly on findings and facts of the on-site visit. Dur-
ing the Commissions visit to Chile, its members realized the follow-
ing activities: Interviews with authorities and with representatives of 
the International Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees; receipt of new communications and statements of witnesses on 
communications already being processed by the Commission as well 
as statements on the general situation of human rights in the country; 
visits to detention centers; observation of trials being conducted by 
military tribunals; the study of dossiers of military as well as of ordi-
nary tribunals, and the investigation of the Juntas legislation affecting 
human rights.65 According to Commission member Woodward, 
Commissioner Dunshee was particularly interested in confirming Sal-
vador Allendes suicide, most probably to discharge the allegations 
against the new regime in power for having killed the former presi-
dent.66 
Medina Quiroga considers the visits to detention centers probably 
the most important activity realized by the Commission, though the 
Commissioners could not inspect the five detention centers with the 
worst reputation because they were declared military areas. The in-
terrogated prisoners stated that they had not been tortured but that tor-
ture had taken place in other locations.67 During its visit, the IACHR 
received 575 new communications. 
After concluding a first version of the Commissions findings, the 
IACHR sent a preliminary note concerning the general situation of 
human rights to the Chilean government. But Chiles military Junta 
refused to take the recommended measures. In the final version of its 
First Report on Chile, the IACHR concluded that since September 11, 
1973, extremely serious violations of human rights had occurred in 
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Chile under the present government.68 In the introduction, the Com-
mission stated that it did not consider preceding events related to the 
foregoing government of Salvador Allende.69 This is an important ar-
gument because in the following years, by employing the circumstan-
tial relativism, Chilean officials would argue with the conditions and 
circumstances before the coup that  in their view  made a military 
takeover necessary.70 Interestingly, the report acknowledges that the 
Commission did not witness any public unrest on the streets or else-
where during its visit. This statement enabled possible criticism on the 
reports findings. But it also contradicted with the Chilean justification 
to declare a state of internal war. Likewise, the remarks made by for-
mer Commission member Robert Woodward are of interest in this 
context. Woodward, who participated in the on-site visit, stated that 
the accusations made by prisoners often sounded very similar. The 
doubt arose that those testimonies of torture victims were planned and 
faked.71 On the other hand, the transcriptions of the prisoners reports 
made at the detention camp Ritoque provide very impressive testimo-
nies.72 These testimonies could also face doubts regarding the applied 
methods. In general, the chapter on detention centers and prison con-
ditions is indeed a very important and impacting part of the First Chile 
Report. 
In regard to the different human rights mentioned in the Report, 
the IACHR confirmed that ten months after the coup, 5,500 persons 
were deprived of their personal liberty, the remedies of Amparo and 
Habeas Corpus were absolutely ineffective, the right to due process 
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was seriously affected and political rights had been abolished. Fur-
thermore, the Commission did not state that there was a policy of tor-
ture but that it was certain that the government did not employ an ef-
fective policy against torture either. The freedom of expression and 
communication of thought and of information were seriously affected 
through censorship.73 However, although women were in particular af-
fected by the military rule, the report did not include any special chap-
ter on or mention womens rights or the general situation of women in 
Chile. 
The report concluded that the present Chilean government had 
violated the articles I, II, IV, VIII, XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI, XXII, 
XXV and XXVI of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of 
Man.74 Further, the First Chile Report referred in its introduction to 
the American Human Rights Convention, regarding Article 27, which 
deals with the suspension of guarantees.75 The Report argues that Ar-
ticle 27 represents the most accepted doctrine.76 This reference, 
however, is a difficult issue because the Convention, which was ap-
proved in 1969 and entered into effect in 1978, was not in force and 
not even ratified by Chile at that time. By the declaration of being in-
competent to judge political conditions, the Commission tried to 
discredit in advance any criticism implying a certain political orienta-
tion of the IACHR.77 Obviously, this strategy did not work because 
later the Chilean government reiterated its criticism on the IACHR for 
its lack of covering the events before September 1973. 
The Report on human rights in Chile was the longest and most 
critical publication the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
had published hitherto.78 This report was written in a touching style, 
which contrasts with many of the following Special Reports,79 and the 
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US State Department believed that this report was critical.80 Ini-
tially, it seemed that the Commission approved the First Chile Report 
unanimously. However, later events showed that the approval had not 
been unanimous or that this situation at least had changed. As early as 
in December 1973, the Commissions Chairman Jiménez de Aréchaga 
revealed to Executive Secretary Reque his doubts about the integrity 
of one Commission member  the Chilean Manuel Bianchi.81 Eventu-
ally, on October 26, 1974, the Chilean Commission member Manuel 
Bianchi sent a 25-page letter to the IACHRs chairman, Andrés Agui-
lar, explaining his dissenting vote.82 In that letter, Bianchi pointed out 
mistakes made and omissions committed by the IACHR to the detri-
ment of the Chilean government. Medina Quiroga concludes that 
[t]he letter seems to have been written in some haste, since many of 
the facts it mentioned as having been omitted by the Commission 
were contained in the report. Bianchi, in any case, did not share the 
position of the Commissions majority.83 
While newspapers in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe pub-
lished entire parts of the document after its presentation,84 the Chilean 
government responded critically to the First Report. The junta pre-
sented an unusually detailed rebuttal concerning the reports findings, 
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in which it reiterated the importance of the events before the coup, 
criticized shortcomings and deplored the Commissions preconceived 
conclusions.85 The Chilean representative at the OAS Permanent 
Council Meeting on December 4, 1974, requested Chiles observa-
tions on the report to be sent to the General Assembly. He criticized 
the report harshly and urged a real debate on the report instead of just 
a taking of note. The Permanent Council sent Chiles observations 
to the General Assembly without judgment, though this would have 
been in its competence.86 Probably, the Permanent Council opted not 
to comment on the issue in an attempt to avoid problems with Chile 
and to maintain the organizations non-controversial diplomatic tradi-
tion in regard to human rights. Quiroga summarizes the criticism of 
the Chilean government to the report as follows: a) omission of facts 
which favored the governments position; b) political factors were not 
taken into consideration, also due to the short duration of IACHRs 
visit; c) rejection of the reports criticism on the acting of special leg-
islation under military jurisdiction and finally, d) accusations regard-
ing the right to life or to personal security and liberty made in the Re-
port were impossible to charge since usually the identity of the com-
plainants was not given and facts unproven.87 As Chiles remarks on 
the Commissions report referred more to individual cases and not to 
the general report, Chiles government demonstrated its initial unfa-
miliarity with the rules of the Commission.88 Coinciding with the re-
ports release, in December 1974 the US Congress adopted the Ken-
nedy amendment that halted all military aid to Chile. In 1975, General 
Pinochet also referred to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights when he spoke about international organizations infiltrated 
by a Marxist-Leninist campaign.89 In addition, the Washington Post 
commented that there was without any doubt a campaign to denounce 
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the repression in Chile, organized by Communist and Socialist groups 
outside Chile, and in particular in Western Europe.90 
It is evident that the performance of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights and the later resolutions adopted by the politi-
cal organs of the OAS concerning the Chile case were of historical 
dimension. As Medina Quiroga puts it: 
 
Although  the political organs of the OAS were reluctant to par-
ticipate, the activities undertaken by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights were such that its reports on Chile succeeded in 
breaking the practice of the OAS General Assembly of never debat-
ing the Commissions reports during its meetings. The Chilean case 
thus constitutes a turning point in the development of the inter-
American system for the protection of human rights.91 
 
Wood comments that until the mid- and late-seventies the IACHR had 
been isolated within the General Secretariat and also ignored by the 
Permanent Council and General Assembly. Moreover, the Commis-
sions chairman had not been invited to present the reports of the 
IACHR before the General Assembly until 1976.92 According to 
LeBlanc, who bases his view on newspaper reports, there were many 
who expected the 1975 General Assembly to discuss the Chilean re-
port.93 Before the Assembly took place, many foreign ministers of 
OAS States tried to avoid a discussion on the Chilean human rights 
record. For instance, the foreign minister of Costa Rica, Gonzalo 
Facio, proposed merely to take note of the report without discussion. 
At that time, the election of a new Secretary General of the OAS had 
been postponed and Facio was considered a compromise candidate. 
This abandonment of traditional Costa Rican support for human rights 
could be explained by his ambitions to get the desired position. His 
aspirations to head the OAS might have led him to take a moderate 
and more traditional position on human rights issues to gain the Mem-
ber States support.94 Surprisingly, it was the Chilean government, 
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which forced the issue to the agenda of the General Assembly. The 
junta wanted to discuss the report, which was considered unfair, and 
to deal with the unauthorized passing of the report on to the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission by Luis Reque.95 The Chilean 
OAS delegation put Reques capability and responsibility for his post 
into question and supported an investigation carried out by the Gen-
eral Secretariat. Likewise, the Chilean Representative decided to di-
rect his countrys correspondence to the Commissions chairman, 
Andrés Aguilar, and not to answer requests signed by Reque.96 More-
over, the Chilean Permanent Representative, Manuel Trucco, began to 
send official letters to Aguilars home in Caracas  which was, besides 
the symbolic rejection of Reque as Executive Secretary, also a com-
plication of the correspondence between the Commission and the 
Chilean government.97 Finally, Trucco announced that official corre-
spondence to Aguilar must be sent through the OAS Secretary General 
in order to facilitate the communication.98 
The holding of the Fifth Regular Session of the OAS General As-
sembly in Washington, D.C., from May 8 through 19, 1975, was ac-
companied by criticisms on the ineffectiveness and the high bureau-
cratic expenses of the organization.99 Wood observes that the General 
Assembly in 1975 did not vary very much from the previous meet-
ings.100 Kokott, however, judges the 1975 resolution on the Chile re-
port as a novelty.101 The Washington Post stated that the 1975 Assem-
bly performed a diplomatic dance around the commissions report, 
carefully ignoring its substance. In spite of this fact, US Secretary of 
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State, Kissinger, showed an uncustomary interest in Latin American 
affairs.102 
At the Session of the General Assembly, Costa Rica presented a 
draft resolution on the Chile Report in the First Committee.103 The 
Report on Chile had been debated in a private meeting, of which this 
draft resolution by Costa Rica was the result. The Chilean delegate, 
Sergio Diez, criticized the fact that the report  a reserved document  
had been disseminated and become a sort of bestseller.104 In the As-
sembly in 1975, the chairman of the Commission, Andrés Aguilar, in-
sisted on a vote on his right to present the reports. The Member States 
voted against this proposal, although it would have been Aguilars 
right to speak before the General Assembly. The representative of 
Mexico wanted the Commissions chairman to present the Report in 
the public meeting, but this was prevented by a five-to-seven vote.105 
The representative of the United States, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Latin America, William D. Rogers, supported the Commissions 
report, although the US abstained when the Committee voted on 
whether Aguilar should present the report or not.106 In a speech several 
months later, Rogers further proclaimed to strengthen the IACHR fi-
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nancially and in regards to its personnel.107 Likewise, a US Depart-
ment of State Report stated that it supported the IACHR and wanted 
its report to merit the corresponding consideration of the General As-
sembly.108 Apparently, this position also was an attempt to appease 
both Houses in the US who had forced the government to cut military 
sales and credits.109 The Costa Rican draft resolution was approved in 
the First Committee without a debate and without a roll call, which 
apparently surprised the Panamanian and Mexican representatives. 
The Chilean delegate remained silent, which lead Medina Quiroga to 
assume that he voted in favor of the resolution.110  
Similar to the lack of open controversy at the First Committee, the 
plenary meeting of the General Assembly approved the Report on 
Chile without debate.111 The adoption of a separate resolution on the 
IACHR Report on Chile must be regarded as a significant change. Al-
though the resolution text lacked an evaluation and did not explicitly 
refer to details of the Special Report on Chile, it requested the IACHR 
to continue observing the situation in that country. As in former years, 
the General Assembly adopted a neutral resolution with which it 
thanked the Commission for its Annual Report.112 Therefore, the reso-
lution on a Special Report concerning a particular country has to be 
seen as an opening for the inter-American system in terms of human 
rights policy  also if the publicity effect of an OAS resolution is con-
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sidered.113 Interestingly, during the General Assembly the Venezuelan 
Foreign Minister, Ramón Escovar Salom, stressed his governments 
support for a strengthening of the OAS and called for close relations 
with the United States.114 This statement appeared surprising since 
Venezuela had been one of the fiercest critics of the policies of both 
the US and the OAS and had also supported the creation of SELA. 
In May 1975, shortly after the General Assembly, the IACHR 
considered the possibility of asking the Chilean authorities for another 
on-site observation scheduled for October 1975, but this was not suc-
cessful.115 Apparently, the US government held informal meetings 
with the Chilean authorities regarding the roles of the International 
Red Cross and the IACHR.116 However, the Chilean government tried 
to weaken the Commissions authority by accusing its Executive Sec-
retary of being partial.117 LeBlanc describes this strategy as an ag-
gressive campaign of attacks against the Commission, which finally 
led three Commissioners  Dr. Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, Dr. Ge-
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naro R. Carrió and Dr. Robert F. Woodward  to not seek re-election 
because they were reportedly discouraged by the treatment of human 
rights issues and the inactivity at the OAS.118 According to the Wash-
ington Post, all three members cited the decision to schedule the Gen-
eral Assembly in Chile as the final event, which contributed to their 
decision to withdraw from the Commission.119 However, in an inter-
view conducted by the author, Woodward denied having resigned as a 
result of pressure from the Chilean government.120 Also Luis Reque, 
the Executive Secretary of the IACHR, chose to resign due to the dis-
honorable and sometimes intimidating campaign against him by the 
Chilean government,121 in spite of the fact that the Commission had 
supported him against the complaints.122 Reques resignation was seen 
as a victory for those who wished to limit the Commissions influence. 
General Pinochet had requested Reques ouster months before.123 
However, it seemed to be common knowledge that not exclusively the 
campaign of the Chilean military government  as officially stated124  
caused Luis Reques resignation but also matters of personal behavior 
at work. Whatever the causes for resignation, the Chilean government 
took advantage of the internal investigation carried out against Re-
que.125 While the Commissioners backed their Executive Secretary, an 
internal investigative committee of the OAS decided differently. In 
April 1976, just a few weeks before the symbolic General Assembly 
in Santiago de Chile gathered, Reque resigned. He explained his deci-
sion with the false accusations concerning his behavior with a fe-
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male lawyer at the Secretariat and the wrong denunciations brought up 
by the Chilean delegation against his person.126 
Between the First Report on the human rights situation in Chile 
and mid-1975, human rights violations in Chile continued. As the 
mere dealing with individual petitions was seen to be insufficient, a 
new special report on the general situation was necessary for the 
Commission.127 The resolution of the General Assembly of 1975 had 
requested another report on the situation of human rights in Chile.128 
In response to this request, the Commission prepared its Second Re-
port on Chile, which had to be presented at the Sixth General Assem-
bly in 1976. The report only mentioned those rights which, in the 
Commissions view, there had been achievements. Furthermore, the 
Commission had chosen to request only written information by the 
Chilean government in order to obtain reliable documents on paper. 
On the one hand, this was useful to show the governments level of 
cooperation. On the other, the Chileans answered almost none of the 
IACHRs requests. Another important fact was that the Second Report 
did not include any specific recommendations. The Commission ap-
proved the Second Report with a reservation by the Chilean Commis-
sioner Bianchi.129 Medina Quiroga points out that the Second Chile 
Report was structured differently than the first because its findings 
were not based on an on-site observation.130 It is further noticeable 
that the style in which the first and second reports were written is 
quite different. While the first report tends to appear as a piece of hu-
man rights literature, as mentioned above, the Second Report is, simi-
lar to reports that followed, more legal and characterized by a rather 
sober juridical language. The First Report was primarily authored by 
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Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, who reportedly tried to compose the re-
port rather than to prepare it.131 
As mentioned before, during the preparation of the Second Chile 
Report, the government opted not to cooperate with the Commission. 
Nevertheless, the Chilean Ambassador Sergio Diez was allowed to 
present his statement on the report before the Commission on March 
19, 1976.132 The Chilean military rulers also decided to change the di-
rection of their defense strategy by addressing a proposal to the Pre-
paratory Committee of the OAS General Assembly. The Chilean rep-
resentative requested the creation of a new agenda point regarding 
human rights. Chile tried to change the Statute and Regulations of the 
IACHR regarding its functions to include a requirement that the 
Commission seek a joint affair with the State concerned.133 Though 
this strategy of the Chilean regime did not succeed, it obviously meant 
a threat to the independence and competence of the IACHR. This was 
the first time that an OAS Member State proposed  though with a 
disguised terminology speaking of a reform  a limitation of the 
Commissions powers and functions instead of a broadening of its 
competence. Furthermore, the Chilean government presented observa-
tions on the report, although it had denied cooperating with the Com-
mission during its preparation. The prevailing idea of the govern-
ments observations could be summarized as a perceived international 
Communist campaign against Chile. As had occurred before, a major 
part of the observations dealt with the situation before the military 
coup in 1973.134 Once again, the Chilean military tried to justify their 
actions through prior events, which in their opinion made a golpe nec-
essary to restore order in the country. Particularly in March 1976, 
there was intense correspondence between the Chilean government 
and Alejandro Orfila, elected as Secretary General in 1975, and the 
IACHR. As described above, this occurred because Chile refused to 
communicate directly with the Commissions Secretariat. In spite of 
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this, the Chilean Representative did inform Chairman Aguilar about 
the presentation of an exposition on the human rights situation in his 
country by Ambassador Sergio Diez.135 
A few days before the General Assembly gathered, Alejandro Or-
fila complained about the impossibility of firing any of the 1,500 OAS 
employees in order to make the organization more effective.136 During 
the meeting, US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, also urged cuts 
in the OAS bureaucracy to save the organization from irrelevance. In 
an evaluation elaborated by the State Department, the draft on the re-
form of the OAS Charter was judged as being without any vision for 
the system, leaving the notorious structural deficiencies that plagued 
the organization. Also, the Charter reform draft included the concept 
of collective economic security, which was considered to be com-
pletely unacceptable to the US.137 The State Department document 
confirmed that the question of whether to maintain the OAS at all or 
not had finally been answered: The Member States did consider the 
organization as useful, whereby the existence of the OAS seemed to 
be guaranteed despite the US dominance.138 Furthermore, the US role 
in the OAS provided a better position for the US to deal with Latin 
American countries than an organization such as SELA in which the 
US was not a Member State. Besides, the US regarded the develop-
ment cooperation topic as a crucial and sensitive item for the General 
Assembly by which the Latin Americans would determine US will-
ingness to provide support for the region. In regard to human rights, 
the US State Department was considering a statement in favor of hu-
man rights by the Secretary of State and evaluated possible reactions. 
Also, Chiles proposal to modify the IACHRs powers was seen more 
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as an attempt to weaken the Commission than to strengthen it. In gen-
eral, the US judged the OAS as potentially useful for its interests.139 
Several US Congress members also urged Secretary of State, 
Henry A. Kissinger, not to attend the OAS Assembly in Santiago.140 
Kissinger did not heed these calls though he was informed by a quite 
appropriate report on the situation in Chile describing the repressive 
situation and mentioning some progress.141 However, the US delega-
tion wanted to change the modus operandi by which the reports of the 
IACHR were handled. Apparently, the United States sought to lay 
more emphasis on human rights in the OAS.142 
Though the US, Mexico and Panama opposed, the OAS Member 
States had accepted Chiles proposal to hold the Sixth Regular Session 
of the General Assembly in Santiago. Subsequently, Mexico an-
nounced a boycott of the meeting to express its protest against the 
Chilean military government.143 The fact that the General Assembly 
met in Santiago was considered a political triumph for the military 
junta. The Argentine coup détat had taken place in March 1976. This 
meant that there was a majority of authoritarian rulers present at the 
General Assembly.144 Medina Quiroga points out that the Chilean 
government also expected that the success of hosting the General As-
sembly would be crowned with a mild treatment of the Second Chile 
Report. For Medina, in a way, these hopes were fulfilled,145 though 
Bryce Wood calls the General Assembly in Santiago de Chile a break-
through for the Commissions work.146 
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In fact, the OAS Meeting in Santiago was a turning point to an 
open debate on human rights within the organization. The host gov-
ernment launched the secret IACHR report on Chile to the national 
daily El Mercurio, which surprised the delegates by publishing the en-
tire document and the governments observations during the first week 
of the OAS Meeting.147 The leader of the Chilean junta, General Pino-
chet, opened the Assembly before a banner to commemorate two an-
niversaries of independence. The first referred to the independence 
from Spain in 1810, the second to the coup of 1973.148 Apparently, 
there was no substantial opposition against this absurd and obstinate 
view of the government. Pinochet welcomed the Sixth General As-
sembly, called for a treaty of nonintervention in inner affairs, and re-
ferred in his opening speech explicitly to the human rights issue. 
Likewise, the newly elected Argentine Secretary General of the Or-
ganization, Alejandro Orfila, mentioned human rights in his speech, 
but without taking a clear position.149 Orfila also joined Pinochet in his 
criticism of Kissingers approach towards Latin America, recalling the 
US Trade Act of 1974 that excluded Venezuela and Ecuador from US 
trade benefits because of their membership in OPEC.150 In contrast, 
the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, gave a remarkable speech 
on human rights in the Western Hemisphere, in which he delivered the 
strongest statement against human rights abuses hitherto heard by a 
representative of an OAS Member State.151 It is remarkable that the 
convinced realist Kissinger emphasized the belief of the Western 
Hemisphere that ...human beings are the subjects, not the objects, of 
public policy. Farer wrote that Pinochet had done Kissinger a favor 
by ousting the Allende government.152 Further, Kissinger had been 
known as a radical pragmatist without particular concern for human 
rights issues.153 However, during his speech Kissinger also stressed 
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the importance of the OAS for the United States and called for a re-
form of the organization.154 As the Secretary of State was not known 
as a human rights advocate prior to this point, Schoultz distinguishes 
between the early and the late Kissinger.155  
Although Kissinger described the human rights situation in Chile 
with unusually critical words, he focused more on the situation in 
Cuba. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Kissinger anticipated 
the double function of an US human rights policy later employed by 
parts of the Carter administration: to appear with moral authority and 
to fight Communism at the same time.156 Furthermore, Kissinger pro-
posed to strengthen the IACHR by enlarging its budget and staff and 
by allowing it to begin investigations independently instead of de-
pending on complaints brought before it.157 Observers commented that 
Kissingers significant turn was motivated more by congressional 
pressure than by the Ford administrations true commitment.158 In ad-
dition, several authors suggest that Kissinger told the Chileans not to 
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pay too much attention to his human rights speech.159 If this is true  
and there seems to be reason to believe so  it would completely con-
tradict Kissingers statements and convert a pronounced statement on 
behalf of human rights into a blunt hypocritical lip service. In accor-
dance, an OAS document outlines the US strategy to abandon the 
hemispheric efforts for development by emphasizing human rights.160  
Nevertheless, the Chilean delegation achieved its first success 
when the General Assembly agreed on adopting Chiles proposal to 
discuss the three points referring to human rights jointly as one 
point.161 The chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Andrés Aguilar, presented the Chilean Report before the First 
Committee and was interrupted by interventions of the Argentine rep-
resentative who requested that the former limit his speech to the dis-
cussion of the report.162 Besides a statement on the report by the Chil-
ean delegate, the representatives of Paraguay and Uruguay rhetorically 
supported Chiles proposal. The Chilean envoy reiterated the Com-
missions lack of keeping in mind foregoing events and criticized that 
the IACHRs sources were not impartial. The Paraguayan representa-
tive praised Chiles policy and defended the regime, which in his view 
had liberated that country from Marxist-totalitarian barbarity.163 In 
general, four countries supported the reports findings: Venezuela, the 
United States, Trinidad & Tobago, and Barbados. This support 
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marked a significant change in the General Assemblys practice of the 
handling of the Commissions reports.164 
Besides the Venezuelan support for the Commission, the US rep-
resentative, Robert E. White, stated that the signing of a multilateral 
treaty would redefine a States sovereignty and limit it  a courageous 
speech against the nonintervention argument. Furthermore, White 
pointed out that by rejecting the Commissions report Chile had 
missed an opportunity to see itself as others see it.165 The Chilean 
representative, Minister of Justice Miguel Schweitzer Walters, re-
sponded that the US endeavors to cut or suspend military or economic 
aid to Chile without keeping in mind the events before September 
1973 would not represent reality but constitute an echo of the interna-
tional campaign against Chile.166 The Paraguayan representative also 
emphasized that an international campaign would try to blame Chile. 
In contrast, José María Machín, the Venezuelan representative, clearly 
presented his and his delegations belief that it would be dishonest to 
state that in Chile there were no human rights violations.167 Following 
this discussion, two draft resolutions dealing with the Chile Report 
were presented; Venezuela, the US, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecua-
dor sponsored the first. It strongly urged the Government of Chile 
to adopt procedures and measures for effectively preserving and en-
suring full respect for human rights in Chile and requested a sec-
ond visit of the IACHR. The second draft resolution, however, spon-
sored by El Salvador, Grenada, Uruguay, and Paraguay omitted sev-
eral words to suppress every reference to forced disappearances, and 
blamed the non-existent procedural standards of the Commission for 
Chiles suspension of the cooperation with the former. Furthermore, 
the second draft resolution deleted the request for a new report on 
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Chile and replaced the third operative paragraph with a proposal to the 
Permanent Council to elaborate a new statute for the Commission.168  
A working group was created to find a middle course. This meant 
the second success for the Chilean Junta, because the working groups 
results presented a watering-down of the first draft resolution.169 Nev-
ertheless, the resolution asked to continue monitoring the human 
rights situation with special attention to Chile. Finally, the compro-
mise resolution was approved, with a negative vote from Jamaica and 
abstentions from Brazil and Chile. With the assistance of the Para-
guayan and Uruguayan delegations, the Chileans had sought to avoid 
any resolution on Chile. Finally, the resolution on the Chilean report 
called the government to continue adopting and implementing neces-
sary measures to preserve and secure effectively the validity of human 
rights.170 The Chilean delegation abstained though the resolution had 
been watered down, which led observers to assume that the resolution 
was strong enough to force the Chilean representative not to vote for 
it.171 In contrast, Jamaica explained its negative vote by criticizing the 
resolution as too weak.172 Further, Chiles proposal to limit the Com-
missions competence was refused by the OAS delegations. In short, 
three resolutions on human rights were adopted: one concerning Chile, 
the second reaffirmed human rights as one of the main purposes of the 
organization, and the third dealt with proposals on means to promote 
the respect of human rights. Members of the IACHR, including its 
chairman, Andrés Aguilar, judged the resolutions as an important 
step.173 
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In general, the Assembly was considered a diplomatic and public 
relations victory for the Chilean government, also due to statements 
made by participants of the meeting on the peaceful situation in Chile, 
among those Secretary General Alejandro Orfila and Costa Rican For-
eign Minister Gonzalo Facio.174 Nevertheless, the open discussion of 
human rights topics contributed to a more influential role of the 
IACHR and gave it more public attention. Accordingly, the meeting of 
Santiago converted the Commission into a broadly important but con-
troversial institution. In a short-term perspective, the meeting of 
Santiago might have been a propaganda triumph for the Chilean gov-
ernment. But nevertheless, the work of the Commission was strength-
ened by an increase in public interest, which implicitly affected Chile 
in the years that followed. Also, the IACHR visit and its reports had to 
compensate for a lack of effectiveness at the United Nations.175 An 
UN Mission did not visit Chile until July 1978  almost five years af-
ter the coup.176 The IACHR had a decisive advantage in comparison 
with the Working Group of the UN Human Rights Commission: it 
was perceived more as an intergovernmental body than the UN Com-
mission. Further, the OAS as a regional institution did not include 
pronounced Socialist governments like the Soviet Union in the UN 
Group. Moreover, since the assassination of Orlando Letelier, former 
minister under the Allende government, in downtown Washington, 
D.C. on September 21, 1976, the United States administrations could 
not ignore the Chilean case. These elements meant easier access for 
the OAS Commission to Chile than for the UN body.177  
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Unlike the Chilean case, the Commission did not succeed in mak-
ing public its reports on human rights abuses of the Brazilian military 
government. At the General Assembly in 1974, the efforts by the 
IACHR to draw attention to the torture cases in Brazil failed. Appar-
ently, the United States did not want to confront Brazil without a con-
sensus among Latin American governments,178 but it is likely that the 
geostrategic importance of the largest South American country also 
played a role in the considerations of the US.179 The fact that the Bra-
zilian government did not act as cruel as the regimes in Chile or Ar-
gentina is one possible explanation. Heinz states [t]here was no cen-
trally-planned policy of torture and assassination as in Chile in 1973 
and in Argentina in 1976.180 According to Wood, the Commission 
did not publish any Special Report on Brazil because of its limited 
staff and not due to political considerations.181 There are other basi-
cally convincing and reasonable assumptions, which point to an in-
formal agreement not to blame the big and important countries. 
In general, the termination of the tacit accord to keep quiet on hu-
man rights issues at the meetings of the OAS General Assembly is at-
tributed to a change of US foreign policy towards human rights mat-
ters. The technique of the General Assembly to ignore the Commis-
sions work became sufficiently notorious in 1974. In that year, the 
Committee for Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives 
formally recommended that the State Department propose a strength-
ening of the IACHR by the OAS General Assembly, including an 
open debate on findings of the Commissions reports.182 Wood con-
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cludes that in 1975 the State Department acted as if they had not 
heeded this recommendation but in 1976 the Department of State 
changed its position.183 Since the failure of the General Assembly in 
1974 to condemn or even consider the Brazilian cases, several US 
Congress members and private groups pressured the State Department 
to guarantee a plain discussion of the Commission report.184 Diplo-
macy shifted from quiet talks to a definite observation of human 
rights at the UN or the OAS.185 Accordingly, the US pushed the OAS 
organs to break with its gentlemens agreement not to touch human 
rights issues in public meetings. Generally, however, the foreign poli-
cies of the Nixon and Ford eras in multilateral organizations lacked 
human rights concerns, with the Chilean case the one outstanding ex-
ception.186 Schoultz also observes a change in mid-1975, when the 
Ford administration began to focus more on human rights in its for-
eign policy. Besides the obvious congressional pressure to pay more 
attention to human rights issues, Schoultz states that [t]he impetus for 
this changed rhetoric is uncertain187 The internal circumstances in 
the United States have to be taken into consideration. The civil rights 
movement had gained importance and influence on Capitol Hill along 
with the terrifying experience of the Vietnam War and the Watergate 
scandal.188 The result was a perceived morale vacuum.189 To fill this 
emptiness with human rights seemed to offer a suitable solution.190 
The switch of the Ford administration to regard human rights as an 
important factor in US-Latin American relations and Kissingers 
speech in Santiago in 1976 might also have been part of a counter-
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strategy to put the wind out of the sails of Carters presidential cam-
paign that had began to focus on human rights.191 Accordingly, this 
domestic situation in the United States may have led to policy change 
as well as the broad interest in and the unprecedented international 
media coverage of the Chilean case. In addition, the US was blamed 
for having encouraged and actively supported the removal of the Al-
lende government. In this context, its  at least rhetorically  fierce 
opposition against human rights abuses in Chile could have presented 
an effort to balance its bad image in the domestic and international 
public.192 Further, the US endeavor to focus on human rights viola-
tions in Chile could have been a strategy to avert attention from the 
Brazilian dictatorship. Though the abuses attributed to the Brazilian 
government were by far not as serious as those by the Chilean regime, 
it is apparent that the US tried to avoid open criticism of Brazil, most 
likely due to its geostrategic importance in the region.193 
On the other hand, it could be assumed that the human rights issue 
at the OAS constituted a tool for the US to undermine such phenome-
nons as the Third World movement, in which Latin American nations 
at least rhetorically played an important role. Former Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs Rogers, however, tends to 
marginalize the argument of Latin American solidarity because the 
only agreement Latin American nations had reached was their desire 
to confront the US as a block. Beyond that, Roger plausibly states, 
there has not been a real solidarity among Latin American coun-
tries.194 However, the question remains if this lack of a substantial and 
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enduring Latin American solidarity was more the result of historical 
tensions and problems among the States or also a consequence of US 
efforts to maintain and accentuate such differences among Latin 
American countries.195 Nevertheless, the US could only try to use the 
tensions in Latin America to its advantage since these had already ex-
isted before. 
Traditionally, in the type of international crisis the OPEC actions 
constituted, the US chose between isolationism and unilateral inter-
ventionism. In this case, the human rights issue in Latin America indi-
rectly might have served to separate Latin American and Arabian 
OPEC members (plus Mexico). As the oil price issue affected North-
South and especially West-Middle East/Third World relations, the 
human rights issue promised to appear humanistic while serving as a 
potential moral weapon against the Soviet Union and as an indirect in-
strument to dissolve OPECs unity between Ecuador, Venezuela (and 
Mexico) and the anti-Israel motivated Arabian members through an 
alliance in human rights matters in Latin America.196 Since the strong 
US-Israel alliance did not allow attempts to openly appease Arab 
OPEC members, the target of US efforts to combat the risen oil prices 
shifted to non-Arabian OPEC members. With the emergence of Third 
World countries as major actors in world politics, the 1970s witnessed 
a more multipolar international situation that differed from the stag-
nant East-West bipolar system. This might have encouraged the US to 
implement more indirect and selective foreign policy measures such 
as the human rights issue. The advantage of human rights was that it 
appeased the liberals in Congress and the civil rights movement at 
home, smoothed down the criticism of the US role in the military coup 
in Chile, and restored the domestically and internationally damaged 
image of US foreign policy morality. The obvious shift of Kissinger 
towards human rights must be considered a major change in the atti-
tude of the State Department. As Kissinger has been known for his 
strategic brilliance, he might have planned to employ the emerging 
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human rights issue for his own means before the topic became inevi-
table.197 
One could conclude that the human rights issue had the potential 
to split Latin American countries, since there were some traditional 
democratic nations like Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, as well as, 
with numerous limitations, Mexico, and on the other hand open dicta-
torships especially in the Southern Cone and Central America. This 
could be interpreted as an attempt by the US to battle the increasing 
Latin American nationalism198 at the time, which was in most cases 
accompanied by traditional resentments against their northern 
neighbor.199 Kissinger emphasizes the role of Venezuela, which was 
considered to be ...in a crucial position between the developed and 
the Third World.200 It could be concluded that the United States opted 
to strengthen Venezuelas traditional role of a human rights advocate 
in order to transform it into a moral ally. This aspired alliance pre-
sumably should have caused a decline of the differences between 
Venezuela and the United States caused by Venezuelas at least rhe-
torical strong performance in the nonaligned movement, SELA, the 
Third World Movement, and its membership in OPEC. 
While it can be argued that the strengthening of the OAS was a 
tool for US policies, the OAS seemed to be inclined to disappear or to 
single out the US. The Ford administration might have thought that 
existing organs with a potential US dominance would be worth sav-
ing.201 Likewise, there were tendencies in Latin America to give prior-
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ity to issues like economic cooperation  a very sensitive topic for the 
United States. The human rights issue drew attention to another area 
and split Latin American governments eager to convert the OAS into a 
Latin American development agency sponsored by the US. 
This conspiracy theory is based on a hypothesis that cannot easily 
be confirmed. It is clear, however, that the decision of the United 
States to place more emphasis on the human rights issue in Chile was 
also derived from domestic politics. These domestic interests were ac-
companied by the beginning of an international PR campaign to im-
prove the US image towards Latin America, regarding human rights. 
Moreover, there were strategic goals, among which the battle against 
the increasing nationalism and Third-World conscience were the main 
elements. In addition, the survival of the OAS was a goal of US policy 
that was finally successful. 
The Chilean case constitutes without any doubt a historical mark 
for the inter-American human rights system and in particular for the 
IACHR. The Commission gained publicity and recognition between 
1974 and 1976, but its most prominent phase began when Jimmy 
Carter became US president in 1977. The new president provided the 
IACHR with financial, political and diplomatic support and thereby 
opened the most popular period of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. 
III. 2. The Carter Administration and the OAS Human Rights 
Policy 
Among the factors that advanced human rights in US President Jimmy 
Carters foreign policy were idealistic-moralistic motives, the restora-
tion of US self-confidence, the identification of a world trend on 
behalf of human rights, the stabilization of the alliances with auxilia-
ries, an ideological offensive towards the USSR, the fortification of 
the common Western interests, and the domestic political guardian-
ship of détente policy.202 All these goals affected President Carters 
human rights policy. The research on Carters human rights policy, 
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particularly in Latin America, is divided: The majority of authors con-
cluded that Carter had good intentions, but in practice, his ambitious 
human rights policy lost its impact.203 Nevertheless, Petro finds that 
for some, Carters human rights policy was moral imperialism.204 
Likewise, Weinstein brings up the alleged cultural imperialism of US 
human rights policy in Latin America. He acknowledges cultural dif-
ferences, but also highlights a sort of common heritage regarding 
shared Western and Christian values.205 In 1978, Noam Chomsky re-
marked that the US assistance and diplomatic support contributed to 
human rights violations in the Third World. Further, Chomsky held 
that human rights only served to improve conditions for US compa-
nies in Latin America and that US human rights policy did not amelio-
rate the human rights situation substantially.206 Soviet author Gvozdev 
stated that Carter used human rights to consolidate US domination in 
Latin America, though he could not stop the regions trend toward the 
non-alignment movement. Further Gvozdev blamed Carter for white-
washing dictatorships and choosing to not interfering in countries 
where the US held interests.207 James Petras criticized the US human 
rights policy under Carter since it was selective and did not attempt to 
change socioeconomic conditions.208 Many authors hold that Carter 
only selectively endeavored to improve the human rights situation.209 
Orrega Vicuña concludes that Carters human rights policy was not 
derived from convinced moralism, but out of tactical thoughts, 
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...merely the product of expediency given the circumstances.210 
Farer remarks that despite Carters dedication, his style was noncon-
frontative, essentially centrist, and always considering US national in-
terests foremost; therefore, the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights appeared to have an intrinsic attraction.211 For Evans, 
Carters human rights effort was unsuccessful mainly because of its 
conflict with other foreign policy needs, the impossible reconciliation 
of the ideological imperatives within human rights, the accusation of a 
moral imperialism, and the inherent contradiction.212 Mower con-
cludes that Carter was not criticized for the lack of pragmatism, but 
for his policys deficit of realism.213 In contrast, Wiarda criticized 
Carters human rights policy as uninformed, unsophisticated, and un-
discriminated. In addition, he noted that it further accused right-wing 
regimes and small countries, while sparing left-wing governments and 
big countries.214 Similarly, for the neoconservative, Muravshik, Carter 
focused more sharply on the right-wing than on Communist gov-
ernments, which helped the latter to pursue their propagandistic 
aims.215 Many opponents criticized Carter for focusing more on right-
wing regimes than those of the left-wing  but, conversely, a few crit-
ics claimed the opposite. Usually, the fact that Carters stand on hu-
man rights was criticized either way, by having focused mainly on 
right-wing or left-wing regimes, has been used as proof of the even-
handedness of his policy.216 Finally, Skidmore states correctly that 
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Carters foreign policy generally changed after two idealistic years 
and moved towards the realism in 1979.217 
The author will attempt to analyze to which extent Carters human 
rights policy towards Latin America, particularly within the OAS, was 
motivated by altruism and convictions or by strategic ambitions, or if 
it was by a combination of both. 
The previous chapter noted that Congress introduced human rights 
into the US foreign policy agenda in the early 1970s. Nevertheless, in 
1976, the Democratic Partys candidate James Earl Carter elevated the 
human rights question to a significant level in the US by emphasizing 
this point during his presidential campaign. The increase in impor-
tance of the topic has been explained largely by the need to unify the 
Democratic Party.218 The commitment of the Carter administration can 
be explained by US internal tendencies, which had led to the Ford 
administrations strategic move towards human rights. In accordance, 
the ...loss of moral authority by the Nixon and Ford administrations 
made promotion of human rights as the soul of a new foreign policy 
an astute political move.219 But since Carter himself was also truly 
convinced of the issue, his character and his deep religious beliefs 
have to be taken into consideration as well.220 
Naturally, US policy has not been shaped solely by its presidents 
decisions. While Carter preferred the idea of US idealism, his for-
eign policy crew, Cyrus Vance and Warren Christopher, emphasized 
the problems and limitations of human rights policy  even Kissinger, 
a fierce government critic, applauded this approach.221 Furthermore, 
Carters National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, emphasized 
the strategic value of the human rights issue for US foreign policy. 
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Brzezinski, a committed foe of Communism, argued that a US policy 
based on human rights would show the benefits of the democratic sys-
tem to rising Third-World countries, while similarly responding to the 
Soviet ideological challenge.222 The human rights topic remained a 
philanthropic element of US foreign policy for some; whereas others  
the decision-makers and critics  thought it to be a tool within the 
struggle for moral leadership against the USSR. 
Carters inauguration led to new institutional measures. The ad-
ministration broadened the functions of the Human Rights Office that 
had been established in 1975, and termed it Office of Coordinator for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Further, Patricia Derian, a 
nurse and human rights activist, became the first Assistant Secretary 
of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.223 Since Pat 
Derian was more an activist than a diplomat,224 she took her new post 
as a sort of continuous challenge. During her first months in office, 
she had to fight to acquaint herself with the bureaucratic system and 
employed a provocative, sometimes shockingly direct conversation 
style. Wiarda criticizes Derians blunt diplomacy since her radical 
statements harmed reformist elements, as exemplified in the Argentine 
military.225 In the case of Carters human rights policy, the State De-
partments position often countered the policy of the human rights of-
fice. The human rights offices human rights policy faced bureaucratic 
obstacles within the US State Department.226 In addition, former 
IACHR member Tom Farer remarks that Carters endeavors to pro-
mote human rights in Latin America was undermined by the CIA and 
the military ties between the US and Latin American countries. In 
fact, Carter must have cleaned out the whole Latin American section 
of the CIA to strengthen his human rights policy in the region.227  
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Apparently, the US president did not realize the conflict. The hu-
man rights bureaucracy often clashed with the traditional inter-
American section of the State Department. In particular, in the Ameri-
can Republics Area Bureau (ARA), the regional unit of the State De-
partment for inter-American affairs, a realist view of US relations with 
Latin America prevailed. In general, the ARA was considered conser-
vative and more interested in maintaining the status quo than invoking 
a rigid human rights policy.228 A special commission chaired by the 
Assistant Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, mediated these con-
flicts. This Interagency Group on Foreign Assistance and Human 
Rights, also known as Christopher Committee, furthered the relation-
ship between US aid and human rights records. 
After taking office, however, Carter and his advisors had no con-
gruous concept for a coherent human rights foreign policy.229 The first 
reports authored by Assistant Secretary of State Derian separated hu-
man rights in three categories.230 In April 1977, Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance reiterated the administrations stand on the three catego-
ries of human rights espoused by Pat Derian: 
1)  The right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity 
of the person; 
2)  The right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, 
health care, and education; and 
3)  The right to enjoy civil and political liberties like freedom of 
speech, thought, religion, assembly etc. 
 
                                                 
228  Guest, p. 157. See Pflüger, pp. 230/231. Likewise, Keogh confirmed that the 
ARA sought the maintenance of good relations with governments, while strongly 
opposing the work of Derians Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Af-
fairs. Dermot Keogh  The United States and the coup detat in El Salvador, 15 
October 1979: a case study in American foreign policy perceptions and decision-
making, in: Dermot Keogh (Ed.)  Central America. Human Rights and U.S. 
Foreign Policy, Dublin 1985, p. 25. Also Schoultz comments Todmans perform-
ance as a limitation for Carters policy based on human rights. Lars Schoultz  
The Carter Administration and Human Rights in Latin America, in: Margaret E. 
Crahan  Human Rights and Basic Needs in the Americas, Washington, D.C. 
1982, pp. 310/311. See Pflüger, pp. 230/231. 
229  Pflüger, p. 142. 
230  Iain Guest  Behind the Disappearances. Argentinas Dirty War Against Human 
Rights and the United Nations, Philadelphia 1990, pp. 155-157. 
Chapter III 228
By naming these three rights, Vance presented a definitive list of pri-
orities for the Carter administration, though he added [o]ur policy is 
to promote all these rights. Obviously, the second human rights gen-
eration had been  at least rhetorically  integrated in the new ap-
proach of the Carter administration. Furthermore, Vance promised to 
continue strengthening the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and proposed regular IACHR visits to all members of the 
OAS.231 President Carter himself advised his administration to enforce 
and respect human rights worldwide while considering the different 
characteristics of various nations and keeping other fundamental US 
interests in mind. Further, Carter underlined that basic economic and 
social rights like food, education, shelter or health should be part of 
the US human rights policy.232 In hindsight, the reference to socioeco-
nomic rights was merely rhetorical, though at the time, Carters true 
commitment may have been the promotion of those rights as well as 
individual rights.233 On the other hand, the new emphasized economic 
and social rights is reminiscent of the strategy carried out by the 
Ford/Kissinger administration: to distract Latin American States from 
Third World movements and nonaligned solidarity against the United 
States. 
In general, Carter had a special sympathy for Latin America; and 
unlike his predecessors, he even spoke some Spanish. The new ad-
ministration reviewed the US policy towards Latin America shortly 
after Carters inauguration. In January 1977, the National Security 
Council (NSC) sought to find a new approach to improve the North-
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South Dialogue. Further, the NSC labeled human rights as one of its 
six main agenda points.234 In regards to human rights, the National Se-
curity Council proposed to seek bilateral relations while considering 
the distinctions between degrees of human rights violations and types 
of government. Also, multilateral organizations like the OAS, the In-
ter-American Development Bank, the IACHR and the UN Human 
Rights Commission, as well as nongovernmental entities, were seen as 
institutions in which US human rights policies should be enforced. In 
addition, the NSC memorandum referred to the signing and ratifica-
tion of the American Convention on Human Rights and other conven-
tions.235 In March 1977, in a Policy Review Committee Meeting, 
members discussed the question of whether the US should move away 
from its special relationship with Latin America. Proposals were de-
signed to treat Latin America in an increasing global context as op-
posed to approaching it with a distinctive regional policy. A special 
US policy towards Mexico and Brazil was proposed because of par-
ticular problems with those countries.236 Former Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, Terence Todman, referred to the ac-
cusation of US intervention on behalf of human rights.237 Todman, the 
controversial realist at the head of the ARA, was replaced by Viron 
Vaky in 1978. 
With respect to US relations to military regimes, the White House 
meeting made the proposal to hold ...warm relations with civilian and 
democratic governments, normal relations with nonrepressive military 
regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive govern-
ments.238 This approach neither specified how a nonrepressive re-
gime should be defined nor defined what correct relations toward 
repressive governments meant in practice. In general, the meeting 
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agreed on the necessity to distinguish between different kinds of mili-
tary governments. Obviously, the Brazilian government was seen from 
a different perspective than the Central American dictatorships or the 
Chilean regime. The representative of the National Security Council 
emphasized that the US policy toward democratic and repressive gov-
ernments in Latin America should be the same as policy towards Af-
rica or Asia.239 However, within a few months, the National Security 
Council sought to review US national security interests of its human 
rights policy, considering aspects like US-Soviet détente, friendly 
States and allies, and other fields of strategic importance.240 The 
Committee proposed to define torture and degrading treatment as 
gross violations, rather than the denial of due process, in order to sin-
gle out fewer countries, and enable US human rights policy to have 
some impact. 
In March 1977, the US government considered Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay and Cuba as the worst human rights offenders, while Nicara-
gua, Paraguay, El Salvador and Guatemala were receiving increasing 
attention. Moreover, the report of the US National Security Council 
acknowledged ...a clash between traditional U.S. values (which em-
phasize the rights of the individual humans above all) and those of 
Latin America (which subordinate individual rights to the collective 
good, as expressed by government).241 The NSC document further 
dealt with the problem that some of the worst human rights abusers 
were traditional US allies. It expressed some understanding for gov-
ernments that were actually threatened by guerrilla activities and sub-
version.242 The report also stated that the US administration had al-
ready discussed human rights in private with all governments in the 
Hemisphere  except Cuba  and expressed urgent concern to the 
ones with the poorest human rights records. Conversely, the document 
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admitted that clientelism and conscious or unconscious identification 
with friendly regimes constituted internal obstacles to US human 
rights goals in Latin America. Further, the paper reported the influ-
ence of US human rights concerns in countries where the guerrillas 
had already been defeated.243 This might lead to the assumption that 
only human rights violations in countries without an actual guerrilla 
threat would be targeted by US policy. In addition, the tone of the text 
is astonishing, for instance: Several countries have continued abuses 
long after the threat seems to us to have disappeared.244 Does this 
statement imply a justification, or at least a sort of understanding, for 
human rights abuses committed during times of acute guerrilla men-
ace? If so, the NSC under the Carter administration was much more a 
protagonist of Realpolitik than its conservative critics would have 
imagined.245 
The National Security Council predicted the threat of a formation 
of a bloc of conservative countries which would lead to a divisive 
dynamic in the Hemisphere. 
In regard to the accusations that blamed the US for ignoring the 
economic rights issue, the NSC document clearly states: We do not 
accept the suggestion that the sanctity of the person is less important 
than economic development.246 The possible distinction between 
countries based on their socioeconomic and cultural stage of devel-
opment was an item as well. The option allowing a distinction be-
tween countries, for instance, is meant to expect more commitment to 
human rights from Chile because of its tradition and internal situation, 
than from Haiti or Argentina  countries that still faced a reported vio-
lent insurgency.247 The option A suggested a rigidly equal treatment of 
all countries, but was judged as a very difficult option to apply. Inter-
estingly, as mentioned before, Latin America was perceived as the re-
gion in which US human rights concerns should be implemented more 
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thoroughly as compared to regions without such dependency on the 
United States.248 The document from the NSC also dealt with a ques-
tion of priorities: To favor basic human rights regardless of the politi-
cal system or to emphasize civil rights tied to democratic rule? US 
Congress and US public obviously advocated a preferential emphasis 
on basic rights. The advantage of this approach was that the utility of 
basic rights were opined to transcend national sovereignty, which 
helped to avoid an accusation of an intervention in the sovereignty of 
other States.249 The memorandum also discussed the question of ad-
vancing US human rights goals in Latin America through a multilat-
eral or bilateral approach. The bilateral approach was considered to be 
faster, more confidential and more effective. In regards to the multi-
lateral option, the NSC paper gave priority to the IACHR, and to a 
lesser extent to the UN Human Rights Commission. The multilateral 
approach implied a strategy of cost-savings and the assumption that 
other countries would join the US in its efforts: This is especially im-
portant in Latin America, where unilateral U.S. intervention ranks 
about as low as torture in the range of mortal sins.250 
This is an example of a first approach of the Carter administration 
to clarify whether the US had a special relationship with Latin Amer-
ica.  In addition, it demonstrates the insecurity and hesitation of the 
new administration with regard to its Latin America policy. Neverthe-
less, through the human rights policy of the Carter administration, this 
relationship became special, indeed. 
In general, the majority of Carters human rights policy mainly fo-
cused on Latin America, even though the US advocated no special re-
lationship towards Latin America and claimed to handle the region 
like others. According to many authors, the reason for the concentra-
tion on Latin America was that it was not perceived as a region of vi-
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tal strategic interest during the 1970s. Only countries which had an 
important strategic position for the United States  Mexico and Brazil 
 were singled out. However, Carters human rights policy in other 
regions  in Indonesia or China, for example  was less vigorous than 
in Latin America. In particular, the administration sought to imple-
ment its human rights policies through financial aid and international 
financial institutions. Besides bilateral restrictions on economic aid for 
governments with a concerning human rights record, the US used its 
influence with institutions like the Export-Import Bank, OPIC, the 
World Bank Group and the Inter-American Development Bank.251 
In Latin America, the reactions on Carters human rights focus 
were mixed: While the Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez 
welcomed the new approach as one of the best messages the US presi-
dent could bring to Latin America, the majority of military regimes 
were understandingly unsympathetic. Besides Venezuela, Costa Rica 
and Jamaica expressed its support for Carters policy.252 On the other 
hand, many of the OAS Member States were discontented following 
the Carter administrations announcement to link human rights (in re-
gards to US-Latin American relations) by binding US military aid to 
the human rights situation of each country. Carter suspended military 
aid for Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador and Guatemala due to their de-
plorable human rights records. However, the governments of Brazil 
and Argentina rejected US complaints about human rights violations 
in their countries and refused US military aid.253 
Although the US was eager to strengthen the OAS, and in particu-
lar the Human Rights Commission, the Carter administration initially 
wanted to reduce the US contribution to the OAS from two-thirds to 
one-half. In September 1979, the US government abandoned this en-
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deavor.254 The Carter administration exerted the human rights cause in 
its foreign policy at the United Nations and the Organization of 
American States. An interviewee formerly associated with the OAS 
stated that the US in general used the OAS as a tool, while the Carter 
administration particularly utilized the IACHR.255 After his first 
speech before the UN, Carter spoke to the Permanent Council of the 
OAS: Unlike his predecessors, he did not proclaim a new approach in 
US-Latin American policies, but underlined the existing problems in 
inter-American affairs, during which he particularly emphasized his 
fight against human rights abuses ...of individual freedom, including 
those caused by political, social and economic injustice. Carter fur-
ther stressed [y]ou will find this country eager to stand beside those 
nations which respect human rights and promote democratic val-
ues.256 Accordingly, just as the Ford administration had attempted, 
Carter tried to favor the remaining civilian governments such as 
Venezuela, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia. These countries were 
encouraged by the United States to take position in favor of human 
rights.257 As an important symbolic act, President Carter signed the 
American Convention on Human Rights on June 1, 1977. Although 
the US has never ratified the Convention, Carters demonstration to 
break, at least symbolically, with traditional US unilateralism that ne-
glects to become part of binding international treaties, is worthy of 
mention. 
In the following, the author provides examples of the situation at 
the General Assemblies, as well as the relations between IACHR and 
individual countries. The question always remains to which extent the 
Carter administration influenced the IACHR performances and the 
resolutions on human rights of the OAS General Assembly. In this re-
gard, the most conspicuous cases were El Salvador, Nicaragua, and 
Panama.258 
In 1977, the Seventh Regular Meeting of the General Assembly in 
Grenada discussed three human rights topics; the Commissions An-
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nual Report, the Special Reports on Chile259 and Cuba  plus various 
issues like human rights and terrorism. It was an important meeting in 
relation to human rights because almost three-quarters of the discus-
sion time was spent on human rights, or related topics. This reflected 
the importance of the subject at that time, but it also showed the em-
phasis which the Carter administration placed on human rights in the 
hemisphere. At the Assembly in June 1977, US Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance explained the human rights policy of his government to-
wards Latin America.260 Vance emphatically dismissed Kissingers 
argument that ...human rights abuses were an unfortunate but neces-
sary by-product of the war against terrorism and a justification for 
counter terrorism. Kissinger, Vances predecessor, had taken this 
stand in his early years as Secretary of State.261 At this General As-
sembly in Grenada, the US supported the approval of a resolution that 
stated that no circumstances would justify torture, summary execu-
tions, or prolonged detentions without a fair trial.262 This clearly was 
directed against circumstantial relativism in Latin America and consti-
tuted a step towards refraining from the former US human rights 
Realpolitik. Furthermore, Vance met with almost all foreign ministers 
and reinforced the US desire to implement its human rights policy and 
to condition economic and military aid on human rights records. In 
human rights matters, this meant a significant move beyond the poli-
cies of former administrations. Schoultz suggests that apart from the 
initial endeavors in 1977, multilateral diplomacy through the OAS did 
not turn into a leading instrument for US human rights policy.263 The 
author disagrees with this judgment because the US fiercely supported 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights financially, diplo-
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matically and, most importantly, politically.264 Though the financial 
strengthening and diplomatic assistance could be considered an unilat-
eral action, the political support for the Commission enabled it to act 
freely.265 
The mood created by the US support for the IACHR encouraged 
democratic States  Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia and, with cer-
tain limitations, Mexico  to express their support for or to continue to 
advocate the Commission at OAS meetings.266 On the other hand, US 
pressure on bilateral loans and those by international finance institu-
tions for repressive regimes might have been more important because 
those touched a sensitive area: financial resources. But these endeav-
ors also made the Carter administrations stand on human rights in in-
ternational affairs vulnerable because it repeatedly provoked criticism 
concerning a new type of US imperialism.267 However, in fact, new 
US legislation tied to human rights records attributed the IACHR an 
arbitrary function. 
At the 1977 OAS Assembly, the chairman of the IACHR, Andrés 
Aguilar, presented the Report on Chile before the First Committee 
without additions and the Chilean representative argued similarly to 
his governments observations. Aguilar also mentioned economic, so-
cial and cultural rights but simultaneously underlined that the Com-
mission was obliged by its statute to give priority to the classic basic 
rights.268 This position was not new; it just represented the prevailing 
opinion regarding the priority between individual and socioeconomic 
rights, which had dominated the Commissions performance since its 
creation. The Chilean representative, Sergio Diez, saw an improve-
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ment of the human rights situation in his country and stated that it was 
easy to blame a government with the game of the disappeared.269 At 
the same time, Diez reiterated his governments criticism on the per-
ceived international campaign against Chile, while he justified the re-
strictions of human rights with the need to defend the country against 
terrorism. The Chilean delegate lamented that the Commission would 
not keep these circumstances in mind while preparing its reports.270 
By employing this argument, the Chilean representative again pre-
sented a discourse that the author earlier defined as circumstantial 
relativism.271  
Finally, the Venezuelan, José María Machín defended the IACHR, 
denying its assumed protection for terrorism and pronounced the 
moral concept of a States conduct against internal opposition by stat-
ing: One cannot fight terrorism and violence with counter terrorism 
and counter violence because this would mean to fall into the same 
territory, which we are condemning.272 
The Third Report on Chile as well as the Annual Report of the 
IACHR were approved by the General Assembly without observa-
tions. Nevertheless, the approved resolution did not request the 
IACHR to prepare a new report on Chile. 273 
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IACHR chairman Aguilar also reported on the human rights situa-
tion in Uruguay.274 The Uruguayan representative, Alvaro Alvarez re-
sponded, requesting a depolitization of international human rights 
protection and urged not to protect Communism with the human rights 
issue. Alvarez focused on the reaction to human rights violations in 
Cuba and found that nobody seemed to be worried about the abuses 
committed by the Castro regime. This led the Uruguayan delegate to 
speak of a theory of selectivity in the human rights sector. Here, the 
Commissions institutional necessity to report on the situation in Cuba 
becomes obvious. Furthermore, Alvarez complained that the IACHR 
had hired an independent individual, Robert K. Goldman275, because 
he did not belong to the organization.276 Alvarez also denounced that 
the IACHR had never announced its intention to prepare a Special 
Report on Uruguay and that it had never formally asked for permis-
sion to conduct an on-site observation. Finally, the Uruguayan repre-
sentative underlined the democratic tradition in his country, 
whereby he expected mutual respect between the State and the 
IACHR.277 Andrés Aguilar intervened by responding to the complaints 
about the lack of mention of terrorist acts of violence in the Commis-
sions reports. He asked the present representatives, who would be 
those to turn to for information on the abuses, and gave a polemic 
suggestion: The terrorist organizations? This argument was repeated 
by the IACHR various times, but the concerned governments still used 
this complaint to attack the Commissions supposed partiality.278 
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During the discussion of the IACHRs report on Cuba, many 
Member States, at least rhetorically, supported a re-integration of 
Cuba into the inter-American system. The US representative defended 
the actions of the Commission because  the State of Cuba, not the cur-
rent government, had signed the inter-American agreements supported 
by the IACHR.279 Surprisingly, right-wing governments avowed sup-
port for Cubas re-integration into the inter-American system or re-
fused to accept the jurisdiction of the OAS to criticize Cubas human 
rights record. This might have been a strategy to solidarize left- and 
right-wing fractions in the OAS against the United States and its hu-
man rights policy. But moreover, this behavior presumably also repre-
sented a typical Latin American attitude. At times, Europeans and 
North Americans have problems to understand friendly relations be-
tween authoritarian rulers of opposite ideologies in Latin America. 
One attempt to explain why right-wing dictatorships spoke on behalf 
of Cubas Fidel Castro is to focus on the basic, universal anti-US pat-
terns in the region.280 
Argentina presented a draft resolution, which sought to justify 
governments restrictions on human rights during their battle against 
terrorism.281 Institutionally, such a resolution would have displayed an 
official declaration of the main argument of the prevailing circumstan-
tial relativism  to temporarily suspend basic rights in order to chal-
lenge subversive enemies. Eventually, the Argentine proposal was 
supported by the Salvadoran delegation. In the end, the project was 
defeated; though it obtained eleven votes in its favor, four abstentions 
and only six against.282 Beforehand, the representatives of Venezuela 
and Mexico had argued that the most appropriate solution for such 
kind of terrorist threats would be political freedom. Also, both delega-
tions defended the Commissions position, which did not permit any 
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justification for States to employ the same methods as those used by 
terrorists.283  
In general, representatives of military governments used to em-
phasize the close relationship between human rights and terrorism. 
Therefore, many delegates tried to combine both topics in order to wa-
ter down the State obligations concerning human rights  the author 
tends to describe this tactic as a diplomatic variant to successfully 
forwarding the circumstantial relativist argument. Venezuela opposed 
such attempts to human rights and terrorism in a resolution.284 In con-
trast, the Chilean delegate reiterated his view showing a close connec-
tion between both topics and named some independent institutions 
totalitarian façade organizations because they were based in Social-
ist countries.285  
On the other hand, the US representative, Robert White, together 
with the delegations of Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Dominican 
Republic, proposed a project to financially strengthen the IACHR.286 
Finally, as shown in chapter II. 2., they succeeded. Furthermore, 
Venezuela emphasized the Peruvian observation that there were three 
situations within the member states: first, countries with terrorism and 
without human rights violations; second, countries with human rights 
violations and without terrorism and third, countries with both. Ac-
cordingly, the Venezuelan delegate strongly insisted on a distinction 
between terrorism and human rights. Notwithstanding, the Costa Ri-
can representative, Navas, expressed that his government considered 
organized terrorism as a form of political violence as one of the most 
repugnant forms of human rights violations.287 At the end of the dis-
cussion, it became obvious that Argentina, Chile and Uruguay unified 
as a common front against the IACHR. According to Medina this ex-
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plains that the draft resolution, agreed on in a working group, was eas-
ier on Chile than in the previous year.288 
Higher than the US human rights policy toward Latin America, the 
signing of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977 was a top priority in 
Carters foreign policy agenda.289 The treaties included the handing 
over of the Canal to Panama, which had been constructed and con-
trolled by the United States since 1903. Eventually, the treaties en-
tered into force and in 2000 the US gave the Canal authority back to 
Panama. 
In 1977, the signing of the Panama Canal treaties at the OAS 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. provoked demonstrations due to the 
fact that the majority of the invited heads of Latin American States at-
tending the signing ceremony represented military regimes  including 
Panamanian president General Omar Torrijos. For Mower, the Pana-
manian case constituted an exception of Carters human rights policy 
because in the dialectic between realism and moralism, the administra-
tions synthesis was to back Torrijos in order to conclude the Canal 
Treaties.290 Likewise, Schoultz considered the presence of heads of 
dictatorships in Washington as a black mark on Carters human rights 
policy.291 Publicly, Carter defended the attendance of repressive re-
gimes by noting that his strategy was to pursue an advancement of 
human rights through persuasion and dialogue, rather than by igno-
rance. In private, the US president knowledgeably discussed the hu-
man rights situation in each country with its respective head of State, 
including Chiles General Pinochet and Argentinas president Videla. 
Carter and Vance directly urged the leaders to invite the IACHR and 
to grant it all available sources and liberties.292 Furthermore, the gath-
ering in Washington beseeched several Member States to sign or ratify 
the American Convention.293 This shows that Carter successfully em-
                                                 
288  Medina Quiroga, p. 290. 
289  United States. National Security Council, Policy Review Committee, PRM/NSC 
1, 01/21/1977, Subject, SECRET, January 21, 1977 (NSA files). 
290  A. Glenn Mower, Jr.  Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, p. 30. 
291  Lars Schoultz  The Carter Administration and Human Rights in Latin America, 
in: Margaret E. Crahan  Human Rights and Basic Needs in the Americas, Wash-
ington, D.C. 1982, p. 310. 
292  Washington Post, September 8, 1977, p. A16; Interview with Admiral Oscar A. 
Montes, Foreign Minister 1976-1978, Buenos Aires, May 17, 2000. 
293  Müller, p. 88. Interviews. 
Chapter III 242
ployed the sort of quiet diplomacy praised by his Republican prede-
cessors and successors. However, in the United States, there was a 
predominantly conservative opposition  including Ronald Reagan, 
who called Torrijos a tinhorn Marxist dictator294 against the trea-
ties because the Canal was considered US American property and ex-
tremely necessary to guarantee US national security in the region.295 
The US opposition against the Panama Canal treaties named Pa-
namas government a dictatorship and called Carters human rights 
policy inconsistent since he had negotiated with Torrijos. However, 
several international human rights groups did not judge the situation in 
Panama as poorly as portrayed by treaty opponents in the US. Never-
theless, the treaty antagonists accused General Torrijos of widespread 
human rights violations in order to impede the treaties ratification in 
Congress. Therefore, a week after the signing of the Panama Canal 
treaties, Panamas president Torrijos invited the IACHR to conduct an 
on-site observation in his country. Torrijos declared: I will give you 
the keys to the jails. If you find any political prisoners, I will set them 
free. Further, he expected that the Commissions role would not only 
be to investigate the alleged violations but also to refute the un-
founded charges.296 So, the Panamanian president sought to counter 
attacks against US president Carter and to deliver a positive message 
to US Senate; one that had to deliberate over the treaties potential rati-
fication. According to Farer, it was Carters security adviser Zbigniew 
Brzezinski who inspired Torrijos invitation to the IACHR.297 Farer 
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points out that Panamas invitation to conduct an investigation was not 
welcomed by the IACHR at that time298, most probably due to more 
urgent cases. An IACHR institutional advantage stemmed from Torri-
jos readiness to accept the Commissions new regulations pertaining 
to on-site observations since the Panama visit constituted a precedent 
case.299  
The IACHR Special Commission, which conducted the on-site in-
vestigation in Panama, was composed of chairman Andrés Aguilar, 
Tom Farer and Fernando Volio Jiménez. The staff lawyers Roberto 
Alvarez, Robert E. Norris and Charles Moyer supported the Commis-
sioners. It is interesting that the Special Commission deployed three 
US citizens and that the overwhelming majority of the members and 
lawyers of the Commission were considered progressive. Could 
there have been influence from the Carter administration to guarantee 
a favorable report in order to secure the Canal Treaties? The author 
does not think so, because the progressive members always were ea-
ger to find and accuse abuses so they would have been a factor of in-
security for US interests with respect to the Canal Treaty. On the other 
hand, the US had special influence on the Commission at that time  
at least indirectly through its financial founding. These thoughts war-
rant a reconsideration of the Panama visit, above all, due to the aston-
ishing number of US citizen participants. Before the report was fin-
ished, the Mexican Commissioner, Gabino Fraga, expressed several 
concerns regarding the document.  One, among others, was that it did 
not present a report on the on-site observation.300 Objections like these 
led to postponements of the reports transmittal to the General Assem-
bly, which increased the already high expectations of the US Sen-
ate.301 Whatsoever, the Commissions report concluded that the human 
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rights situation in Panama had significantly improved between 1972 
and 1977, though some abuses remained. The conclusions of the Spe-
cial Report explicitly stated that the IACHR could not confirm sys-
tematic violations of fundamental rights  a clear message to the Ca-
nal Treaty opposition in the US.302  This remark was unprecedented, 
and presumably superfluous, considering the Commissions expected 
impartial position. The US Senate finally ratified the treaties in spring 
1978 and the report came out that summer. Correspondingly, the re-
port was not expected and actually did not have much impact on US 
public. In general terms, however, it was not the IACHRs task to ver-
ify or falsify the accusations of US politicians opposed to the Panama 
Canal Treaties. One might ask if the omission of the aforementioned 
phrase would have made a difference. It surely would have given the 
report a different tone and general character. Furthermore, the argu-
ment arises whether it even was the Commissions mandate to inform 
the public on its findings since the Panamanian case enjoyed much at-
tention, particularly in the US. In other words, the inclusion of the 
sentence could be interpreted as the IACHRs duty to serve a public 
interest. However, the author does not share this view, because it was 
the Commissions main task to promote and observe human rights in 
the Member States, not to act as a public relations agency. Though 
dissemination counted as one of its objectives, it was not the Commis-
sions responsibility to state an obvious message on what did not hap-
pen in a particular country to the public or even decision-makers in 
another Member State.303 Farer remarks that if the Carter administra-
tion had placed more emphasis on the effect of the Panama report, the 
Commission would have had more impact, although this did not hap-
pen.304 Nevertheless, this example shows that in general, US policy at 
times had notable impact on the IACHR. 
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In early 1978, the OAS Member States refused Uruguays invita-
tion to hold the General Assembly in Montevideo. Unlike the decision 
in 1976, the US emphasized its stand on human rights. However, 
twelve countries voted for a meeting in Uruguay, only one vote short 
of the majority needed.305 The Eighth General Assembly of the OAS 
in June 1978, which eventually took place in Washington, D.C., might 
have suited Carters desire to re-emphasize  at least rhetorically  his 
human rights policy in the region. In the preceding months, his ad-
ministration had been criticized for abandoning its strong focus on 
human rights that had begun in early 1977.306 The representatives of 
governments with questionable human rights records had become ac-
customed to diplomatically arguing against the Commissions find-
ings. First, the delegates of the attacked governments expressed their 
general support and their honor to cooperate with the IACHR, but then 
they mentioned their differences with the Commission.307 In reality, 
there were enormous discrepancies between the Commissions opin-
ions and those of the accused governments. Besides typical diplo-
matic rhetoric, the verbal prudence from envoys of repressive Latin 
American governments must have been attributed to Carters strong 
stand on human rights in the region and certainly to the general re-
spect toward intergovernmental institutions like the OAS. 
Paraguays representative, Luis María Argaña, argued that by 
condemning terrorism, his government was indirectly protecting hu-
man rights. The IACHRs chairman, Aguilar, deplored this statement 
because he had hoped to advance the relation between Paraguay and 
the Commission.308 High emotions and mutual fist shaking reportedly 
accompanied the controversy between Argaña and Aguilar.309 In re-
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gards to the Commissions report on Uruguay, the delegate of the con-
cerned country, Giambruno, said that human rights had to be dealt 
with within each country. Nevertheless, the critical IACHR reports on 
Paraguay310 and Uruguay311 were not based on on-site observations 
and were approved with 16 votes in favor, one against and eight ab-
stentions by the military regimes.312 The US delegate, Irving G. 
Tragen, supported the IACHR and its reports.313 
The agenda point Promotion of human rights led to a resolution 
that endeavored for economic and social justice to preserve the human 
dignity and liberty of the individual as stated in the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights. Further, the resolution reiterated that there 
were no conditions that justify torture, summary executions or ex-
tended detentions.314 The resolution was adopted by 21 votes with no 
negative vote and three abstentions by Brazil, Argentina and Uru-
guay.315 When the transition of the IACHR  due to the entry-into-
force of the Convention  was discussed, the Uruguayan delegation 
stressed that the OAS Members that were not part of the Pact of San 
José should be considered under the Charter and not under the Statute 
and Regulations of the Commission.316 This would have placed less 
emphasis on human rights and more significance to the noninterven-
tion argument, or concretely less competence for the IACHR and 
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more emphasis on national sovereignty. Despite the arguments, the 
Uruguayan proposal did not succeed. 
The US delegation perceived the treatment of the terrorism agenda 
item in the First Committee as an ill-humored debate. The Jamaican 
representative argued against the condemnation of terrorism in the 
resolution since he saw it more as people struggling against instru-
mentalities of oppression, comparable to the situation in South Af-
rica.317 Together with Suriname, Jamaica presented an amendment that 
sought to smooth the language of the draft resolution by placing the 
terrorism issue in the Whereas clause. However, despite the US 
backing, the proposal reportedly was abstained to death.318 
Again, the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights was adopted with 21 votes, no abstentions and negative 
votes by Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The adopted resolution 
called on the Chilean government to continue implementing measures 
to preserve human rights and to cooperate with the IACHR. Moreover, 
the resolution requested the Inter-American Juridical Committee to 
prepare a draft convention that condemned torture as an international 
crime.319 
The voting behavior at the General Assemblies clearly demon-
strates that the military governments voted en bloc. If the respective 
delegations considered a resolution as satisfyingly moderate, they ab-
stained instead of voting against it. Likewise, William D. Rogers, As-
sistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (1974-77) ac-
knowledged that there was a faction of countries  above all the mili-
tary regimes in the Southern Cone  that opposed fierce resolutions on 
behalf of human rights.320 Apparently, the diplomatic corps of Argen-
tina, Brazil and Uruguay were the most restrictive in terms of their 
voting behavior. On the other hand, besides the heated debate on the 
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Paraguayan report, the behavior of the delegations from Argentina, 
Uruguay and Chile was markedly toned down. In particular, Uruguay 
and Chile preferred to underline the progress made in the field of hu-
man rights than to battle against the Commissions findings as they 
had done in the preceding years. Argentina also did not dare protest 
loudly against the Commissions accusations and finally invited the 
IACHR to undertake an on-site observation.321 This behavior can be 
interpreted as a result of Carters strong and noticeable support for the 
Commission since it seemed to be useless or even harmful to criticize 
the human rights organ fundamentally, or at least in public. 
Shortly after the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties, the gov-
ernment of El Salvador invited the IACHR to visit the country  
clearly a result of Carters talks with Latin American heads of State 
during their visit to Washington, D.C.322 For almost five decades in El 
Salvador, the armed forces ruled the country in a strategic alliance 
with the powerful agrarian oligarchy. Repression of disobedient peas-
ants was the order of the day in the 1970s when social and political 
polarization climaxed. Real and presumed leftists and an increasing 
number of members of the Catholic Church became victims of State 
terror and business elite-sponsored death squad activities.323 The Spe-
cial Committee of the IACHR sent to El Salvador consisted of vice 
chairman Dunshee de Abranches, Volio Jiménez and Farer. The on-
site visit took place between January 9 and 18, 1978.324 According to 
Farer, Commissioner Dunshee de Abranches arrived first in El Salva-
dor and allowed himself to be photographed, smiling, with the presi-
dent. However, the mood changed when Volio and Farer came to that 
country. Dunshee prepared a draft report, which Farer described as 
disgraceful. Subsequently, Volio and Farer rewrote the text and 
forged ahead with it despite Dunshees resistance. Finally the Com-
mission adopted a very strong Special Report on El Salvadors human 
                                                 
321  Washington Post, July 1, 1978, p. A13. 
322  Washington Post, September 15, 1977, p. A20; Farer  The Grand Strategy, p. 
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rights situation clearly condemning the government of General Carlos 
Humberto Romero.325 
First, an obviously unsuited lawyer who later had to leave the 
IACHR Secretariat prepared the preliminary version of the Report on 
the situation of human rights in El Salvador. Due to his imperfect 
work, the report had to be rewritten.326 This internal problem within 
the IACHR Secretariat must also have caused the delay of the Special 
Reports transmittal to the Permanent Council and the General As-
sembly. Another potential reason for the report transmittals hold-up 
was an internal discussion surrounding the Commissions general ap-
proach toward the preparation of publications like Special Reports.327 
Farer points out that it would have been possible to publish the report 
and attach observations and denials of the Salvadoran government. 
Since Special Reports must be approved by an absolute majority of 
the IACHR, the Commissioners had to long for a solution. Eventually, 
the progressive faction within the Commission won and the Report on 
El Salvador, and subsequent ones, were published without govern-
ment-provided annexes.328 Apparently, this internal debate on the ob-
jections of the Salvadoran government caused a delay in handing over 
the final document.329 Usually, the report would have been discussed 
at the General Assembly in 1978. The fact that a military coup ousted 
the accused Romero regime in 1979 clearly diminished the reports 
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impact. Since October 1979, the representatives of the new junta rec-
ognized all abuses of the former government and the IACHR docu-
ment was stripped of its fierce condemnation of armed and security 
forces that remained in charge despite the change of government. 
Would a report presented at the Assembly in 1978 have provoked an-
other development? Could an earlier presentation of the critical report 
have led to a victory of the insurgents in El Salvador, like in Nicara-
gua? Or would the documents release have helped to improve the 
poor human rights situation in El Salvador?330 Whatsoever, the specu-
lation on whether the reports presentation in 1978 would have con-
tributed to a successful Salvadoran revolution is in vain, because the 
organizational grade of the armed opposition was not sufficiently de-
veloped. The guerrillas were united not before autumn 1980. In addi-
tion, a popular and compelling question surrounding whether the 
United States influenced the delay of the reports transmission appears 
to be worthless because the scenario in mid-1978 was quite different 
than the one of 1979.331 Nevertheless, the US also urged the Romero 
regime to improve the human rights situation before the Sandinista 
revolution in Nicaragua changed the regional situation.332 A discus-
sion of the report at the 1978 General Assembly, however, might have 
had important consequences  particularly taking into account the in-
fluence of the Sandinista revolution in 1979 on the perception of the 
Salvadoran situation in October 1979, when the OAS General Assem-
bly was scheduled to take place in La Paz.333 
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As previously mentioned, on October 15, 1979, a coup led by a ci-
vilian-military junta ousted the repressive government of General 
Romero. The coup led to a strong accusation against the Romero re-
gime embodied in the IACHR report, which probably was one of the 
important tools for the coup leaders.334 The Commission demonstrated 
satisfaction with the new governments announcement to promote and 
guarantee human rights.335 Notwithstanding, the US government still 
was concerned about the human rights situation in El Salvador.336 The 
Commissions contentment, however, also found expression in the 
General Assembly resolution on the Commissions Special Report, al-
though the Assembly requested the IACHR to continue to observe the 
situation in El Salvador.337 In January 1981, the Salvadoran guerrillas 
launched a large-scale offensive against the armed forces just a few 
days before Reagans inauguration as US president. Carter reinstalled 
military aid to the Salvadoran military that had a highly questionable 
human rights reputation. This was the beginning of the transition from 
Carters human rights policy to Reagans new approach, which actu-
ally began with the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. 
In Nicaragua, the Somoza clan had ruled for decades and em-
ployed systematic repression in order to maintain its power and the 
oligarchic system. In alliance with democratic opposition forces, the 
leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) fought against the 
Somoza regime in a bloody civil war and finally succeeded with the 
so-called Sandinista revolution in July 1979. Cerna and Medina 
Quiroga extensively describe the interactions between the Nicaraguan 
government, the Commission, and the OAS political organs.338  
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The widespread human rights violations in Nicaragua did not pose 
a main concern for the IACHR, which until 1978 had focused on indi-
vidual complaints.339 After famous newspaper editor Joaquín 
Chamorro was murdered in January 1978, the president of Venezuela, 
Carlos Andrés Pérez, solicited the US to focus on the human rights 
situation in Nicaragua. In response, Carter promised to persuade So-
moza to allow an IACHR visit.340 The Venezuelan OAS Representa-
tive, José María Machín, requested an IACHR investigation in Nica-
ragua in February 1978.341 Venezuelas proposal and its general oppo-
sition towards the Somoza regime spoiled Venezuelan-Nicaraguan re-
lations. The US State Department also suggested an IACHR visit to 
Nicaragua in February 1978.342 The ARA telegram showed the State 
Departments preoccupation with the situation in that country and that 
a Commission investigation would serve as an outlet for public unrest 
in Nicaragua. The author suggests that the early encouragement, par-
ticularly from the ARA director Terence Todman, mainly focused on 
the prevention of the risk embodied in the increasing guerrilla threat in 
Nicaragua. However, later on, the IACHR report ironically contrib-
uted to Somozas fall and the Sandinista revolution. Besides the pres-
sure from the US State Department and Venezuela, Costa Rica con-
sidered the Somoza government an obstacle and permitted the Sand-
inistas to deposit their weaponry in its territory thereby incurring 
Nicaraguan Air Force attacks.343 In addition, the Jamaican OAS dele-
gation and the Andean Group were supportive of the human rights is-
sue at the OAS.344 
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In June 1978, the government of president Anastasio Somoza 
boldly assured that in its country, human rights were respected and 
promoted.345 In that month, the IACHR directed a request to the gov-
ernment in Managua asking for the permission to visit the country.346 
At the same time, US president Carter presumably committed a mis-
take on June 30, when he issued a letter to Somoza in which he wel-
comed Somozas good intentions and his presumed cooperation with 
the IACHR.347 Nevertheless, pressure from the US government finally 
convinced the Nicaraguan government to permit an on-site observa-
tion by the IACHR. In September 1978, the Carter administration em-
phasized its support for the IACHR in regard to the difficult situation 
in Nicaragua. Meanwhile, a bipartisan Congress group, frequently 
named as the Nicaragua lobby, called Carter to support the tradi-
tional US ally, Somoza, in his governments struggle against the 
Marxist revolutionaries.348 In early September 1978, Somoza did not 
anticipate any OAS decision against Nicaragua because he expected 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Peru and Nicaragua to vote against a resolu-
tion.349 In the same month, Nicaraguas Foreign Minister Quintana 
met with Assistant Secretary of State, Viron P. Vaky. During that 
meeting, Quintana showed interest in inviting the IACHR and Vaky 
urged him to do so as soon as possible.350 
At last, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights con-
ducted an on-site observation in Nicaragua between October 3 and 10, 
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1978, even though the original schedule was for November 1978. The 
Commission advanced the visit twice, primarily due to the recommen-
dation of the OAS Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, 
which Venezuela proposed to discuss the situation in Nicaragua.351 
The IACHR sub commission was composed of six members: Andrés 
Aguilar (chairman), Tom Farer, Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Carlos 
García Bauer, Fernando Volio Jiménez and Carlos Dunshee de 
Abranches.352 The fact that six members participated in the on-site ob-
servation was remarkable and can be seen as a sign of the importance 
of such investigation.353 The Commission did not take into considera-
tion the governments accusations against the Sandinista guerrillas and 
explained this with the Statute and Regulations. According to Farer, of 
six Commissioners, five shared the view that the human rights situa-
tion was extremely bad.354 Staff lawyer Roberto Alvarez and Vargas 
Carreño drafted the bulk of the report in a few days.355 Eventually, the 
final report accused Nicaraguas government of systematic and gener-
alized serious human rights violations and did not include any recom-
mendations  an unprecedented episode.356 This clearly indicated that 
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the Commission considered the government itself as a perpetrator. In 
other occasions, the IACHR requested that the concerned govern-
ments prevent and sanction human rights abuses committed by gov-
ernmental agents and to improve the general situation. In this case, it 
denounced the entire government and the omission of recommenda-
tions presented the ultimate condemnation.357 The Mexican Commis-
sioner Gabino Fraga criticized the absence of recommendations, 
which constituted a clear sign of strongest criticism from the Commis-
sion.358 As the visit already had been advanced twice, the publication 
of the report was also rushed because the IACHR wanted to inform 
the public about the urgent situation in Nicaragua as soon as possible. 
Therefore, the Commission transmitted the report to the Meeting of 
Consultation, bypassing the usual transmission to the OAS General 
Assembly.359 The US State Department sought to support the report 
strongly, which reportedly was perceived as a shocker by the Carter 
administration.360 As a reaction to the IACHR document, the US ve-
toed a $20 million loan from the International Monetary Fund to Nica-
ragua.361 However, in late December 1978, a secret telegram demon-
strated that the US government preponderantly was worried about its 
credibility in the region regarding human rights.362 This partly serves 
                                                                                                         
tuación de los derechos humanos en Nicaragua, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.45 doc. 16 rev. 
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360  Regarding Departments comments on IAHRC Report on Nicaraguan human 
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port for a plebiscite is a device to get Somoza confirmed in power. Telegram, 
Department of State, FM AMEMBASSY Managua, TO SECSTATE WASHDC 
IMMEDIATE, Confidential, November 1978 (NSA files, Original text in capital 
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361  Sara Steinmetz  Democratic Transition and Human Rights, p. 112. 
362  Telegram from AMEMbassy Managua, to SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9578, 
SECRET Managua 6748, Managua, December 22, 1978 (NSA files). Interest-
ingly, that secret telegram expressed pessimism on the OAS ability to condemn 
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to explain why the US abstained from a direct intervention in Nicara-
gua in 1979. 
The Permanent Representative from Nicaragua at the OAS, Gui-
llermo Sevilla Sacasa, informed the Commission about his govern-
ments rejection of the report in January 1979.363 Likewise, Somoza 
himself claimed that the IACHR report to be biased and furthermore 
criticized the US interference and its lack of impartiality in applying 
its human rights policy.364 
In January 1979, the Department of State discussed the handling 
of possible situations at the forthcoming Meeting of Consultation of 
Foreign Ministers where the Nicaragua Report was to be presented. 
Extreme resolutions  recommending Nicaraguas expulsion from the 
OAS or specific sanctions  were seen as very unlikely due to the two-
third vote modus, because ...any resolution will require support from 
a substantial number of southern cone members who are more than 
a little sensitive on IAHRC matters, and who are particularly uneasy 
about procedures followed by IAHRC in issuing its Nicaragua Re-
port.365 Bearing in mind the voting issue, it is even more astonishing 
that the OAS Foreign Minister Meeting agreed on such a strong reso-
lution. In June, the United States requested another Meeting of Con-
sultation, which took place on June 20, 1979.366 The US delegation 
presented a draft resolution calling for the establishment of a gov-
ernment of national reconciliation which takes into account all ele-
ments of Nicaraguan society. Further, the US draft proposed that an 
                                                                                                         
and to diplomatically isolate the Somoza regime  exactly what happened six 
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363  Letter from the Permanent Mission of Nicaragua at the OAS, Ambassador Gui-
llermo Sevilla Sacas, Permanent Representative, to Carlos Dunshee de 
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366  Cable from the President of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs to the Chairman of the Permanent Council, informing him 
of the session to be held on June 20 Wednesday, OEA/Ser.F/II.17 Doc. 29/79, 18 
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OAS peacekeeping force be sent to Nicaragua.367 The US persisted in 
preventing a Sandinista victory, but its efforts came too late.368 Above 
all, the Andean governments and Mexico opposed the US draft and 
supported the Sandinista forces diplomatically.369 Preponderantly, the 
bloc composed by the five Andean Group States  Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela  with the support of Mexico, jointly 
worked hard to break with the organizations political nonintervention 
creed.370 In accordance, thirteen Member States presented another 
draft sponsored by the Andean Group. Finally, the resolution on Nica-
ragua employed the historical call for an [i]mmediate and definitive 
replacement of the Somoza regime, by stressing the poor human 
rights situation.371 Concurrently, with this apparent intervention in the 
domestic affairs of an OAS Member State, many countries broke off 
diplomatic relations with Somozas government.372 By and large, the 
IACHR report, and the subsequent resolution from the Meeting of 
Consultation of Foreign Ministers that called for a removal of presi-
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dent Somoza, impressively mirrored the changed mentality of the 
OAS.373 
On July 7, 1979, the US State Department urged the IACHR to 
mediate in the Nicaraguan case. Seemingly, Assistant Secretary of 
State Viron Vaky personally turned to IACHR chairman Andrés Agui-
lar in Caracas. The US wanted the Commission to handle the difficult 
situation, apparently, in order to prevent a strong Sandinista junta. The 
IACHR, however, insisted on a Nicaraguan invitation and desired to 
act in a noninterventionist manner.374 
Finally, on July 7, 1979 the Sandinistas succeeded with their so-
cial revolution and overthrew the Somoza regime. In addition, the 
FSLN made a promise to hold elections, which would become an em-
battled issue during the 1980s. In his memoirs, Somoza acknowledged 
that the actions of the OAS was a main factor in his resignation.375 Al-
though Nicaragua was not a vital US ally of strategic importance, the 
traditional ties between Nicaraguan business elites, the Somoza clan, 
and US citizens made it difficult to garner full support for Carters de 
facto laisser-faire policy in Nicaragua.376 In fact, the Sandinista revo-
lution mainly guided Carters foreign policy toward a more neorealist 
approach: importance in national security increased, while human 
rights concerns lost some impact in foreign affairs.377 
Doubtlessly, the resolution adopted by a high OAS organization 
requesting to remove Somoza constitutes an almost revolutionary ad-
vancement  particularly if one takes into account elevated positions 
                                                 
373  In July 1979, president Somoza turned to the US Embassy in Managua and ac-
cused the FSLN of killings of his relatives. As a response, the Embassy recom-
mended to send the IACHR immediately in order to have an observation for the 
time when the fighting finished. Telegram, Department of State, FM 
AMEMBASSY Managua, TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1690, and other 
embassies, Secret, Subject: (S) Reprisals against Somoza adherence, p. 2 (NSA 
files). 
374  Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, FM SECSTATE TO AMEMBASSY 
CARACAS etc., Subject: REPRISALS AGAINST SOMOZISTAS, July 7, 1979 
(NSC), pp. 1, 2 (NSA files). 
375  Anastasio Somoza  Nicaragua Betrayed, Boston 1981, pp. 264, 266/267. 
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of governments within the traditionally conservative OAS. Precisely, 
it was the first time, an OAS main organ decidedly and unequivocally 
spoke up against human rights violations in one of the Member States 
and further heeded the advice included in the IACHR Report not to 
seek for reforms within the Somoza system. 
In October 1979, US governmental officials met with representa-
tives of the new Nicaraguan junta and reportedly began to 
...cooperate on human rights issues at the OAS General Assembly in 
La Paz.378 The two delegations even cosponsored some human rights 
resolutions and the United States endorsed Nicaraguas invitation for 
the IACHR.379 Later on, when the Sandinistas established tighter rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, conservatives accused Carter of losing 
Nicaragua to Communism.380 
The Ninth General Assembly of the OAS gathered in the Bolivian 
capital La Paz. Andrés Aguilar, chairman of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, presented the Annual Report of the 
IACHR to the First Committee and referenced  the Commissions vis-
its to El Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua effected in 1978 and the 1979 
in loco observation in Argentina. The Nicaraguan delegate, Leonte 
Herdocia, who represented the new Sandinista government, assured 
the new juntas full cooperation with the Commission. Further, he an-
nounced that Nicaragua was willing to sign and ratify human rights 
instruments and underlined the extended invitation to the IACHR to 
visit his country. 
Then, Commission member Dunshee de Abranches presented the 
Special Report based on the on-site visit to El Salvador in 1978. As 
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noted above, in October 1979, just a week before the Assembly ar-
rived in La Paz, a civilian-military junta had replaced the dictatorship 
of General Romero. The representative of the new junta, Héctor Dada 
Hirezi, argued that  as the IACHR report clearly showed  the human 
rights situation in El Salvador had reached such a breaking point that 
the armed forces invoked the constitutional right of insurrection 
against a government since it had lost its capability to govern with le-
gitimacy of the people. Dada described the first decrees approved by 
the junta, which were related to human rights, as a justification for the 
coup against the Romero regime.381 As proof of its good intentions, El 
Salvador immediately ratified the American Convention on Human 
Rights.382 However, the coup was backed by the United States, which 
feared a guerrilla victory against the Romero regime. The fresh mem-
ory of the Sandinista revolution led the Carter administration to im-
plement what they had tried unsuccessfully in Nicaragua: a Somocism 
without Somoza. This meant that the coup was an attempt to help 
moderate forces in El Salvador come to power by avoiding another 
radical, leftist government in Central America. The schedule of the 
overthrow of Romeros government was clearly determined by strate-
gic concerns: the new junta was able to present itself as the authentic 
defender of human rights proven by its first decrees and its commit-
ment to the American Convention on Human Rights. Later develop-
ments of the early 1980s, discussed in chapter IV, will show that the 
impact of these good intentions in the Salvadoran government rapidly 
disappeared. The resolution on the El Salvador report, however, ex-
pressed hope regarding the new governments first announcements but 
further requested that the IACHR continue to monitor and report on 
the situation.383 
Further, the Paraguayan representative, Mario López Escobar, re-
sponded to the IACHR report on Paraguay. He also replied to a Vene-
zuelan statement and mentioned that he had many denunciations con-
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cerning human rights violations in Venezuela.384 This attack on Vene-
zuela by the Paraguayan delegate meant a new strategy of the military 
regimes: If you accuse me, I can also blame your abuses (or at least 
threaten to do so). Later in the debate, another Paraguayan diplomat, 
Rubén Ruiz, also emphasized that other countries had human rights 
problems as well, even the United States. Ruiz emphatically stated 
that since Paraguay did not represent a strategic interest, it became a 
target for accusations, when in reality it was only trying to defend its 
nation from subversion. Finally, Ruiz said that in these times, a Sa-
cred Inquisition was taking place in the Americas.385 Likewise, in 
1980, the Chilean representative, Mario Calderón, tried to soothe the 
discussion with a biblical reference: In human rights matters, few, 
very few can throw the first stone.386 Thereby, he indirectly acknowl-
edged the desperate desire to return to the old declaratory gentlemens 
agreement style that had prevailed during the General Assemblies be-
fore 1975-76. 
Apparently, the military governments strategy to threaten other 
countries with the exhibition of their human rights records was merely 
a very cheap argument that might have tried to re-establish the tradi-
tional gentlemens agreement in the OAS organs. Nonetheless, it was 
obvious that the abuses that could have been brought up against Vene-
zuela and the United States387 were not comparable neither in exten-
sion nor in seriousness to those committed by military regimes like 
Chile, Argentina, Paraguay or Uruguay. Commissioner Tom Farer de-
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stroyed Paraguays argument by declaring that the reality in that 
country was almost unknown. Farer argued if Paraguay only allowed 
people to visit its territory they would see the reality and understand 
that human rights were well observed. Accordingly, Farer pointed out 
that such a visit was exactly what the IACHR pretended to do.388 
A draft resolution of the IACHRs Annual Report was presented 
by Ecuador, Nicaragua, Suriname, the United States and Venezuela. 
This document named Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay and reiterated 
their requests towards the concerned governments to improve the hu-
man rights situation in their countries. The draft resolution also 
thanked Panama for its collaboration during the Commissions visit.389 
The Chilean representative, Calderón, rejected the draft resolution and 
described it as imprecise, contradictory, regressive and counterpro-
ductive. The Uruguayan delegate, Giambruno, complained that the 
document still called Uruguay to invite the Commission, which he 
considered a sole decision of each State. Giambruno thought that a 
visit by the Commission would generally be no problem, but that the 
present political attitude of the IACHR signified an obstacle to such a 
decision. Further, the Uruguayan representative stated that the time to 
consider a visit had been too short  two and a half years  and went 
on to criticize the hiring of an activist (Robert K. Goldman) to com-
pose the 1978 report.390 Several dictatorial regimes used such delaying 
tactics to postpone any definite decision to invite the IACHR. 
Finally, the First Committee approved the draft resolution with 
two negative votes (Paraguay and Uruguay) and five abstentions (Ar-
gentina, Chile, Guatemala, Brazil and Saint Lucia).391 During the vot-
ing procedure, the military regimes again formed a makeshift bloc and 
tried to avoid any embarrassing resolutions against military govern-
ments. However, the representatives of those regimes did not support 
each other during the session as in foregoing years. The dispute on the 
Beagle Canal between Argentina and Chile might be one explanation 
for this behavior.392 Nevertheless, in spite of the growing climate fa-
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vorable for human rights issues thanks to the endeavors of the Carter 
administration, the governments of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, as 
well as other authoritarian regimes, continued to impede the IACHRs 
work and question its competence. Above all, these three governments 
intended to prevent the General Assembly from turning into a court of 
discussions on human rights violations.393 Mainly two strategies were 
carried out to attack the Commissions activities: one was to empha-
size the issue of domestic jurisdiction, which needed to be prioritized. 
The other attempt entailed watering down the impact of human rights 
debates by proposing to discuss human rights only in connection with 
terrorism. Medina Quiroga resumes that at least the latter argument 
did not have much success.394 
At its forty-ninth session, the IACHR accepted Colombias invita-
tion to conduct an on-site observation, which was carried out between 
April 21 and 27, 1980.395 During its stay in Colombia, the Commis-
sion proved to be an outstanding intermediary between the govern-
ment and leftist guerrillas holding hostages in the embassy of the Do-
minican Republic.396 Finally, a friendly settlement was reached, and 
the IACHR gained attention and respect for its remarkable diplomatic 
efforts.397 
Further, on July 17, 1980, a military coup in Bolivia ousted the in-
terim regime of Lidia Gueiler, which had supported the democratic 
process. The new government, led by General Luis García Meza Te-
jado, reportedly committed human rights violations. Subsequently, the 
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Permanent Council of the OAS asked the IACHR to investigate the 
situation in Bolivia   another novelty.398 
Two weeks after his electoral defeat against the Republican candi-
date Ronald Reagan in November 1980, US president Jimmy Carter 
inaugurated the OAS General Assembly in Washington, D.C. Carter 
expressed his conviction that the cause of human rights would endure 
after his departure from the White House.399 Furthermore, Carter 
stressed the nonintervention principle with regard to the difficulties in 
El Salvador and Nicaragua. Both, Carters hope that human rights 
would continue to be a shaping factor of US foreign policy and his 
advice not to get involved in the Central American conflicts were too 
optimistic. Under Reagan, human rights were politicized  especially 
in the armed conflicts in Central America  to an extent hitherto un-
known. 
The discussion on a resolution concerning the IACHR reports on 
human rights records in six Member States resulted in numerous nego-
tiations in private and in a final marathon debate taking more than one 
night of debate. The concerned countries included Argentina, Chile, El 
Salvador, Haiti, Paraguay and Uruguay. Finally, the Assembly agreed 
to incorporate an article that merely named the reports on the con-
cerned Members and called them to improve the situation of human 
rights in their countries (see chapter III. 3.).400 
 
In sum, initially, the Carter administration agreed to strengthen the 
OAS, although  as it had always been the case  it was judged as a 
slow-working and not well-focused institution. Furthermore, there 
were voices that described the OAS as useless and demanded reduc-
tions in US contributions.  Moreover, some wanted to withdraw from 
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the organization. In addition, in private conversations, some Latin 
American leaders considered the OAS to be useless, but would not opt 
to abolish it.401 These remarks were accompanied by other comments, 
which described the OAS as inefficient and futile. These tendencies 
lead one to assume that highlighting the human rights topic in order to 
strengthen the OAS, specifically the IACHR, was an attempt to bring 
the interest of Latin American countries back to the OAS. This might 
have been a strategy to regain US influence in the North-South dia-
logue with Latin America, which was generally characterized as anti-
US-American.402 The OAS was a virtual medium in which the US was 
in the position to dominate and influence decisions due to its over-
whelming political and economic power in comparison with the other 
Member States.403 Therefore, the original strategic aspects of human 
rights policy did not vary greatly between 1974 and 1976. Presuma-
bly, in addition to humanistic considerations, Carters human rights 
policy adopted similar strategic motives to those of the Ford-Kissinger 
administration. It can be assumed that besides altruistic aims from sec-
tors of Carters administration, the US mainly sought to remove con-
troversial issues like trade relations and economic assistance from the 
OAS agenda and instead to focus on the human rights topic, which 
was considered to be less controversial for the United States.404 On the 
other hand, it was the US delegation that pushed for a reduced OAS 
budget in 1977  with some modest success. Efforts by the United 
States to cut back the bureaucracy, to restructure the system of contri-
butions and to strengthen the IACHR received various levels of sup-
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port. One major problem was that the largest contributors after the US 
were the dictatorships of Brazil and Argentina.  It appeared compli-
cated to strengthen the IACHR since both countries could be potential 
targets of the Commission.405 Accordingly, the financial situation of 
the OAS also played a role. US president James Earl Carter actually 
wanted human rights to become a noticeable issue at the OAS. Never-
theless, the matter also served to draw attention away from Third 
World forums that enjoyed broad popularity in Latin America. Did 
Carters human rights policy constitute an attempt to divide Latin 
Americas solidarity and to smooth down its eternal struggle against 
US hegemony?406 The author does not think so because Latin Ameri-
can solidarity never did exist in an enduring and constructive form. 
Unlike the Ford administration, Carter showed a true interest in the 
region and wanted to implement his basic rights program particularly 
in Latin America  the region he perceived as especially affected by 
systematic violations. However, Farer also saw an alliance between 
the US and democratic Member States407  probably an effort to di-
vide Latin America in a similar manner to the Ford administrations 
attempt portrayed in chapter III. 1. Notwithstanding, the administra-
tions approach was not consistent and too obvious since it tried to use 
the IACHR to implement its human rights policy. The Inter-American 
Commission, though, could make a difference during the Carter years, 
although its independence from US policy was not always entirely as-
sured. Remarkably, however, the IACHR did not degenerate into a 
tool of US policy. As a matter of fact, thanks to Carters strong sup-
port, the Commission grew  institutionally and politically  into a 
role that would permit it to face more difficult challenges. Notwith-
standing, the delays of the publication of the reports in Panama and El 
Salvador as a result of internal debates eventually deprived these 
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documents of a more prominent effect.408 In sum, Carters human 
rights policy within the OAS was most likely driven by a mixture of a 
true commitment to human rights and a dedication to more strategic 
aims. 
Besides the aforementioned cases, the Argentine case is of particu-
lar importance. Due to its size and political importance, the Argentine 
case brought a shift in the IACHRs work. At last, the IACHR visited 
Argentina in 1979 and the legend of the most influential on-site in-
vestigation and Special Report began.  
III. 3. The Carter Administration, Argentina, and the OAS 
(1977-1980) 
The IACHR visit to Argentina (1979) and its report on the human 
rights situation in that country (1980) have been widely regarded as 
the most important and consequential activity of the Commission in 
the period covered by this inquiry.409 This is reflected in the Commis-
sions publication of a second edition of the report in 1999. Seem-
ingly, besides the seriousness and extent of the abuses, the elevated 
significance attributed to the IACHRs performance in the Argentine 
case is linked to the importance and size of the country. Before 1979, 
the Commission had not investigated in the territory of one of the 
big Member States (Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico). Nevertheless, the 
author has attempted to analyze if the Argentina visit and the report 
merely represent a myth. In the following, two leading questions shall 
be answered: Why did it take until September 1979 to carry out an 
IACHR investigation in Argentina and would it have been possible to 
prepare a Special Report on Argentina before  even without a visit? 
Surprisingly, the research has not provided a satisfactory investigative 
effort on this though a recommendable and quite readable work on the 
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role of the United Nations and Argentinas dictatorship exists, au-
thored by Iain Guest.410 
After prosperous years in the beginning of the 20th century, an 
economic crisis aggravated the Argentine situation and the country 
started to experience continuously changing government systems led 
by the armed forces. This political instability known as praetorianism 
 a new military regime replaced the government set up by the armed 
forces  hampered the Argentine society in developing strong democ-
ratic ties.411 According to Marchak, the labor union-focused move-
ment led by the famous populist Juan Domingo Perón also contributed 
to the absence of due process, rule of law and prevalent disregard for 
law and democracy.412 In the 1960s and the early 1970s, Argentina 
suffered from terrorist attacks from the extreme left and increasingly 
also from the extreme right. A civil war situation arose from the late 
sixties: many groups fought for their ends, there were struggles within 
the Peronist movement, sectors of labor unions, the armed forces, left-
wing guerrillas and other groups.413 Since 1970, left-wing terrorism  
exemplified through the assassination of former president Aramburu 
in 1970 by leftist guerrillas414  grew into a serious problem for the 
fragile social integrity of Argentina. However, in 1973 General Perón 
returned to his country after a 17-year exile in Spain and was re-
instated as head of State. In the end of 1973, Argentina began to sense 
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the consequences of the oil price crisis.415 After Peróns death in July 
1974, his third wife, the former dancer and vice president María Estela 
Martínez de Perón became president.416 The tremendous left-wing ter-
rorism417 provoked a response from the extreme right  the famous 
Triple A struck back and so the country was shaken by an escalation 
of violence.418 The government of Isabel Perón reacted with several 
anti-terror measures in order to roll back the terrorist threat: it de-
clared a state of siege in November 1974, ordered to put down the 
guerrilla uprising in Tucumán in February 1975, and in October 1975, 
it issued the well-known decree that called the armed forces to anni-
hilate the subversion.419 
While Torre/de Riz and Waldmann describe the military coup in 
1976 as a natural consequence of the chaos and the general violence, 
other authors do not share this position.420 According to Guest and 
Marchak, in the beginning of 1976, the left-wing terrorism was still 
dangerous, but much less threatening due to several decisive defeats 
suffered by the guerrilla forces.421 Secret statistics expressed the de-
cline of subversive actions, which leads Guest to conclude that there 
existed no justification for a military coup to eradicate left-wing sub-
version. Moreover, while left-wing terrorism was weakened, right-
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wing terror grew.422 Likewise, Andersen views that in early 1976 the 
armed forces had taken over many stabilizing institutions and in-
creased their efforts to present a military coup as imminent.423 How-
ever, it was obvious that Isabel Perón did not possess the ability to 
pacify the torn country and consequently was ousted by a coup led by 
the armed forces.424 
On March 24, 1976, a military junta composed of Lieutenant Gen-
eral Rafael Videla, Brigadier Orlando Ramón Agosti, and Vice Admi-
ral Emilio Massera seized power. The new military junta declared to 
lead the country to stability and saw itself as committed to the Doc-
trine of National Security. The coup was widely perceived as a relief 
because of the previous terrorist acts and general violence from left- 
and right-wing groups. Like the Chilean junta, the Argentine military 
government stressed its desire to defend Western and Christian civili-
zation and its values.425 The political polarization and the prevailing 
climate of violence accompanied by the hatred against Peronism 
among certain intellectuals led to an initial acceptance of the military 
rule. Others just put up with the changed order and kept silent so as to 
not get involved. Besides the de facto censorship, the Argentine press 
welcomed the militarys intervention as well.426 Unlike in the Chilean 
case, the Argentine military coup détat was accompanied by a con-
senting international opinion, which undoubtedly undermined the 
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work of human rights groups.427 According to interviews, the initial 
lack of knowledge of the Commission caused a delay of information 
to the IACHR, which took some months.428 
The new junta started the so-called Process of National Reorgani-
zation, which simply translated, was a total war on subversion  a 
term that was equated with terrorism. Carlos W. Pastor, Foreign Min-
ister between 1978 and 1981, describes the years 1976 and 1977 as the 
most critical in the armed forces battle against terrorism, which was 
massively supported by the population. According to Pastor, in 
1978, the war was won but subversives brought their destructive 
campaign to the exterior and counted with remarkable economic re-
sources, alimenting left-wing press and organizations like Amnesty 
International.429  Especially in the first three years under military rule, 
all sectors of Argentine society were affected by the self-declared 
dirty war.430 The battle against subversion spun out of control as al-
most everyone with any suspicious behavior or connections to suspi-
cious people became a victim of State persecution. Further, the armed 
and security forces at times committed mistakes and punished the 
wrong person. Moreover, the general atmosphere of repression made 
personal acts of revenge possible as well. The forced disappearances 
became a systematic State policy431 and began one of Argentinas 
darkest chapters of history.432 In general, the Catholic Church was ac-
cused of complicity with the junta since many of its members and the 
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official leadership defended the campaign against subversion.433 The 
National Commission on Disappeared Persons described the years un-
der military rule as the worst and most savage tragedy of our his-
tory.434 
The repression carried out by the armed forces resulted in the crea-
tion of several human rights groups. The Permanent Assembly on 
Human Rights (Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos, APDH) 
was founded in 1975 as a response to the Triple A killings.435 Emilio 
Mignone, who unyieldingly and courageously fought for the truth on 
the disappearance of his daughter Mónica, and Raúl Alfonsín, who 
later became president, were both members of the Assembly. Also 
significant is the emergence of the Mothers and Grandmothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo. At the Plaza de Mayo, in the very downtown area of 
Buenos Aires in front of the Executive Building, the Casa Rosada, the 
Madres (mothers) denounced the disappearance of their sons and 
daughters and requested information on their whereabouts. Further, 
the Madres sought to influence foreign governments, mainly through a 
network in the US, to cut military and economic aid for the military 
junta.436 The Grandmothers (Abuelas) of the Plaza de Mayo demon-
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strated on behalf of their kidnapped grandchildren, whose parents pre-
sumably had died in captivity, and who then lived as adopted chil-
dren. All these organizations and others provided information to inter-
national human rights bodies and the international media. At the same 
time, many anti-junta organizations emerged around the world, par-
ticularly in Washington, D.C., Paris and Geneva.437 Indeed, the lobby-
ing of Argentine and international human rights groups presented a 
real threat to the junta, which sought to denounce accusations as an in-
ternational campaign of Marxists against Argentina. The junta hired 
public relations agencies to improve the human rights perception of 
the Argentine government in eight countries, above all in the United 
States.438 
After the military takeover, the navy under Admiral Emilio 
Masseras control took of the Foreign Ministry and was eager to dis-
miss all diplomats found to be ideologically unreliable. Immediately 
in the aftermath of the coup, 30 diplomats were retired and two 
months later another fifty diplomats were fired. Navy officers, who 
were unqualified for diplomatic affairs, replaced the dismissed ambas-
sadors and took over key positions  also at the OAS.439 In March 
1976, IACHR member Genaro Carrió, an Argentine, declared that he 
would not to seek reelection. His decision was attributed to the pres-
sure Chile had placed on the Commission. It is possible as well that 
the military coup in Argentina also led Carrió to choose not to con-
sider a second term. 
By October 1976, the international situation for the junta was ex-
tremely delicate. Carters presidential campaign stressed human 
rights, and members of an Argentine human rights group testified be-
fore US Congress. Further, in Europe and North America, the junta 
was perceived as brutal and faced skepticism and hostility. As a result 
of these pressures, the military rulers decided to permit an inquiry by 
an Amnesty International (AI) team  an NGO formerly described by 
the junta as Marxist but simultaneously as tool of Western democracy. 
Besides other reasons, the junta saw the advantage of such a visit in 
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identifying Amnestys contacts in Argentina and seeing how that or-
ganization functioned  in order to know the enemy.440 The visit 
took place in a hostile atmosphere; the local newspaper reports ex-
ploited the AI presence by describing the team as biased and using 
harsh vocabulary to criticize the foreigners. However, the report was 
published in March 1977 and as a result, the Amnesty International 
on-site visit became one of the most important investigations in loco 
ever conducted by a human rights NGO. Partly as a result of this re-
port, Amnesty International was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize nine 
months later.441 Further, Schoultz considers it difficult to overestimate 
the influence of Amnesty International reports on US policy during 
the 1970s.442 Another human rights activist, the founder of the Argen-
tine NGO Service for Peace and Justice (SERPAJ), Adolfo Pérez 
Esquivel, succeeded Amnesty International and won the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1980.443 If Amnesty International  an NGO without a heavy 
political and financial support at that time  conducted an on-site visit 
to Argentina, why did the IACHR, as a renowned organ of an inter-
governmental organization, not do the same? It could be argued that 
the very realization of the Amnesty International visit made it permis-
sible for the Commission not to press on with their own on-site obser-
vation. The London-based NGO did a good job and drew criticism 
from the Argentine government for it, while the IACHR still was en-
joying relatively good relations with the Argentine government. On 
the other hand, it was surprising that the junta did not allow an 
IACHR visit instead of an Amnesty International mission. Apparently, 
the military regime considered that the likely negative conclusions de-
clared by a nongovernmental group like AI could be easier refused 
and criticized than a report by an OAS organ. Accordingly, the 
IACHR was viewed as particularly threatening in Buenos Aires due to 
its serious and renowned reputation.444 On the other hand, in Novem-
ber 1976, Jimmy Carter had won the presidential elections in the 
United States and turned human rights into a vital agenda point.445 The 
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junta might have feared that an IACHR visit at that time  in 1976 and 
1977 when the disappearances and other abuses were at a peak  to-
gether with Carters support for such an international mission with the 
authority of the OAS, would have meant a much more serious and 
more substantial accusation. However, both reports  the 1977 Am-
nesty and the 1980 IACHR reports  were important and highly criti-
cal ones. The difference was that Amnesty did not belong to any gov-
ernment and so could easily be blamed for being biased and for pursu-
ing political goals. An IACHR visit in 1977 could have placed enough 
pressure on the military junta that it would have been forced to make 
notable concessions.  
In 1976, the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
(UNHRC) found itself in difficult conditions: the UN Secretary Gen-
eral, the controversial Austrian Kurt Waldheim, considered human 
rights to be an embarrassing topic and did not elevate it to a main is-
sue in the UN. However, the UNHRC was composed by some mem-
bers from countries where torture and human rights abuses were the 
order of the day (e.g. Uganda, Iran, Uruguay). The complicated situa-
tion at the UN gave even more importance to the NGOs. In general, 
every year, the composition of the UN Commission and several other 
circumstances affected the UNHRCs performance  sometimes it was 
strongly condemning a regime, sometimes it was incredibly under-
standing and even avoided a necessary mentioning of widespread 
abuses. Further, on August 19, 1977, the Soviet Union and Argentina 
signed a massive trade agreement, which also reportedly influenced 
the countries voting behavior at the United Nations. According to 
Guest, the Soviets also refused many resolutions condemning Argen-
tina in the UN organs, though he does not consider the Soviet-
Argentine alliance a strong one  merely limited to practical issues 
like human rights and trade matters.446 Furthermore, it was Argen-
tinas Ambassador Gabriel Martínez who succeeded in keeping his 
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countrys name from appearing in critical UNHRC resolutions.447 Fi-
nally, Martínez also achieved the dismissal of his principal foe at the 
UN Human Rights Division. The Divisions activist and dedicated di-
rector Theo van Boven was fired by Secretary General Javier Pérez de 
Cuéllar in 1982. In general, Guests book describes the Argentine stra-
tegic and diplomatic maneuvers in the United Nations to a prolific ex-
tent. For this study it is of interest that the UN was blocked by differ-
ent coalitions of the Argentine diplomats  this must have laid even 
more pressure on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
which at that time experienced its greatest influence and major support 
from the Carter Administration.  
The new administration of Jimmy Carter presented a dedicated 
human rights defender who would face the dictators in Argentina: As-
sistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Patricia Derian (see chap-
ter III.2.). Assistant Secretary of State Terence Todman convinced 
Derian to visit Argentina, apparently hoping that such a visit would 
improve her view towards the junta. Todman and the ARA were con-
sidered pro-junta at that time.448 In fact, Derian paid three visits to Ar-
gentina in 1977. Those experiences convinced her even more to fight 
the repression in that country.449 During 1977, Carter began to reor-
ganize his political efforts on behalf of human rights and to focus 
more on the UN and the OAS in order to implement his human rights 
policy.450 
In March of 1977, the Washington Post concluded that the military 
regime in Argentina had gained support due to the criticism on human 
rights abuses brought up by the Carter administration. Sources of that 
newspaper blamed Carters proposal to halve military aid to Argentina 
because this unified moderate elements and falcons in the armed 
forces in a nationalistic uproar. Due to Amendment 502B, Secretary of 
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State, Cyrus Vance, announced the reduction of military aid to Argen-
tina, Uruguay and Ethiopia  South Korea was left out because of its 
strategic importance. This meant a humiliation for Argentina because 
the US did not consider it of strategic significance.451 As a result, Ar-
gentina  along with Brazil and Guatemala  declared not to accept 
US military aid for 1978.452 
Selser states that former Secretary of State, Kissinger, advised the 
Argentine junta in 1977 to go ahead with the disappearances but to be 
fast and to finish it before the US Congress would meet.453 In Novem-
ber 1977, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visited Argentina. He 
sought to follow a more moderate approach of the Carter administra-
tion that had notably smoothed its human rights focused foreign pol-
icy. In addition, Vance came to Buenos Aires to convince Argentina 
to become part of the Latin American nuclear-free zone (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco).454 
In August 1978, the Washington Post perceived an increasing self-
confidence and nationalism in Argentina. As a result of the pride of 
the victory at the World Cup Soccer Championship in June 1978, 
there were several campaigns that sought to defend Argentina against 
international criticism. Among other factors, this nationalistic behav-
ior also contributed to the worsening of US-Argentine relations.455 In 
the US, the atmosphere in Congress was affected by the Allis 
Chalmers case, which concerned a credit of the Eximbank for a firm 
in Texas that provided computerized ID systems for police cars in 
Buenos Aires. During the summer of 1978, the mood in Congress 
shifted from support for Carters human rights policy to worries over 
                                                 
451  See Washington Post, March 31, 1977, p. A17. 
452  Pflüger, p. 230; Guest, p. 164. Argentina rejected $15 Million US aid. Washing-
ton Post, March 24, 1977, p. A14. 
453  See: Gregorio Selser  El Documento de Santa Fé, Reagan y los derechos hu-
manos, Mexico City 1988, p. 92. Wolfgang S. Heinz  Determinants of Gross 
Human Rights Violations by State and State-sponsored Actors in Argentina 
1976-1983, in: Heinz/Frühling, p. 696. 
454  Interestingly, the Washington Post still maintained a certain position toward the 
Argentine military regime, which was characterized by an understanding tone for 
the anti-terror measures employed by the armed forces in charge. The newspaper 
attributed many of the violent acts from the right to sectors over which the gov-
ernment had no control. Washington Post, November 20, 1977, p. C6. 
455  Washington Post, August 23, 1978, p. A17. Recently, old rumors regarding al-
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its price.456 Subsequently, due to the changed mood, the US admini-
stration altered its approach and attempted to lay more emphasis on 
multilateral efforts to enforce human rights. Besides the fact that the 
US could not be blamed easily for unilateral intervention, the multilat-
eral option also provided another important advantage: it was cheaper 
and therefore more attractive to be accepted by Congress. The US 
came up with a proposal: If Argentina invited the Commission and re-
instated the right of option that allowed detainees to select between 
prison and exile, the United States would change its strong position.457 
So, the Commission was awarded an important position within 
Carters foreign policy specifically concerning the difficult Argentine-
US relations. Maybe this scenario also helps to explain why the 
Commission conducted its investigation relatively late: it might have 
been a political decision of the US not to issue a report without an on-
site observation. But this suggestion is merely of hypothetical na-
ture.458 
Already in early November 1976, the Washington Post reported 
that the IACHR had laid ...the groundwork for possible visits to Chile 
and Argentina...459 If this was true, why did it take so long? Espe-
cially if one takes into consideration that the UN was in a weakened 
state at that time, the need to fill the vacuum and the chance for expo-
sure were great for the IACHR. Moreover, unlike the first visit to 
Chile, which took place relatively fast (including Reques instant 
visit), the political and financial support by the US had grown signifi-
cantly.  
                                                 
456  See Guest, pp. 164-172, particularly pp. 170-172. 
457  Guest, pp. 172/173. 
458  Furthermore, it might appear to be helpful to take US resentments against the 
Peronist movement into consideration though the author does not deem this as-
pect very important. Due to Peróns sympathy with European fascism during 
World War II and the obvious anti-US attitude heralded by Peronists, the United 
States were cautious and resentful toward that populist movement. Because the 
military regime was considered to be an enemy of Peronism, it might be con-
cluded that this element also affected US opinion regarding the military junta. 
The author, however, does not consider this argumentation very likely.  See 
Wolfgang S. Heinz  Determinants of Gross Human Rights Violations by State 
and State-sponsored Actors in Argentina 1976-1983, in: Heinz/Frühling, p. 610. 
459  Washington Post, November 9, 1976, p. A16. Also see Washington Post, June 
23, 1977, p. A20. 
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The IACHR received information from Argentine and interna-
tional human rights groups on the situation in Argentina.460 However, 
in the first years of the military junta, the Argentine government re-
jected the request of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights to conduct an on-site observation on the situation of human 
rights in that country. It is likely that the experience of the Chilean 
case was one of the reasons for this refusal by the junta. The junta 
feared the IACHR and some government sources claimed that the 
Commission members shared ...a leftist political bias coupled with 
zealous determination to castigate military governments.461 Neverthe-
less, the IACHR succeeded with some individual cases.462 
In these years, the Commission repeatedly asked Secretary Gen-
eral Alejandro Orfila, himself Argentine, to facilitate a Commissions 
visit to Argentina. It could have been a factor for the delay in the 
IACHR on-site inquiry that the Argentine Orfila sought a reelection in 
1979 and thus had to assure his governments consent.463 According to 
the former Argentine Foreign Minister, Oscar Montes, at the annual 
General Assemblies the OAS and Orfila asked the junta to permit an 
IACHR visit. Furthermore, Montes saw Orfila as under pressure from 
the United States.464 Reportedly, Orfila had a major impact in convinc-
ing the Argentine government to permit a Commission visit.465 It is 
possible that Orfila eventually called the military juntas president 
Jorge Videla and told him that an IACHR report was inevitable  with 
or without a visit. The advantage would be that a report based on an 
on-site investigation would include the governments opinion. Fur-
thermore, Videlas first reaction should have been silence but then he 
reportedly responded Orfila, the Commission shall come.466 This in-
cident  if it is correctly recalled  could prove the effectiveness of 
Orfilas management. 
In 1977, at the General Assembly in Grenada, Secretary of State 
Vance met with Argentinas Foreign Minister Oscar Montes who also 
                                                 
460  Interviews. 
461  Guest, p. 173. 
462  See, for instance, CONADEP, p. 249. 
463  Interviews. 
464  Interview with Admiral Oscar A. Montes, Foreign Minister 1976-1978, Buenos 
Aires, May 17, 2000. 
465  Interviews. 
466  Interviews. 
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conversed with the IACHRs chairman, Andrés Aguilar. Vance and 
Montes mainly discussed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and a possible visit 
of the Commission. Montes, however, rejects the assumption that both 
topics had anything to do with the other.467 Though Montes holds that 
the junta was ready to cooperate, the Commissions skeptical attitude 
proved to be right when an official request for an IACHR on-site ob-
servation was turned down.468 
In that year, 1977, the Commission received news on many cases 
of abuse in Argentina, which by number clearly exceeded those attrib-
uted to the Chilean authorities.469 In comparison, the human rights or-
gan issued three Special Reports on Chile between 1974 and 1977. 
The IACHR Annual Report of 1978 dedicated more than twenty pages 
to individual cases allegedly occurred in Argentina. The Commission 
document mentioned arrests, detentions, torture and disappearances 
and the prohibition of Jehovahs Witnesses.470 Nevertheless, the 1978 
Annual Report section called Development of the Human Rights 
Situation in Various Countries discussed the situations in Chile, Pa-
nama, Paraguay and Uruguay but did not refer to Argentina. At its 
forty-third session (special) in Caracas, between January 26 and Feb-
ruary 11, 1978, the IACHR decided to prepare a report on human 
rights in Argentina.471 Andrés Aguilar directed two letters to Foreign 
Minister Montes in order to inform the junta of its decision to prepare 
a report and to ask for Argentinas permission for an on-site visit. 
Aguilar stressed that the Commission would prefer to be officially in-
vited by the government than to formally request permission for such 
                                                 
467  Interview with Admiral Oscar A. Montes, Buenos Aires, May 17, 2000. 
468  Guest, p. 173. Montes states that he principally told Vance to turn to the govern-
ment in order to invite the Commission. Interview with Admiral Oscar A. Mon-
tes, Buenos Aires, May 17, 2000. 
469  Letter from Andrés Aguilar to Charles Moyer, Caracas, August 16, 1977 (42 
cases attributed to Argentina), Letter from Andrés Aguilar to Charles Moyer, Ca-
racas, August 26, 1977 (Argentina: 20 cases, Chile: 8), Letter from Andrés Agui-
lar to Charles Moyer, Caracas, September 9, 1977 (Argentina: 19, Chile: 5), Let-
ter from Andrés Aguilar to Charles Moyer, Caracas, September 16, 1977 (Argen-
tina: 41, Chile: 18). All letters from the IACHR files. 
470  IACHR  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
1978, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47 doc. 13 rev. 1, 29 June 1979, Original: Spanish, pp. 29-
52. 
471  IACHR files. 
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a visit.472 Obviously, this was the typical IACHR practice. Aguilar 
probably tried to lay pressure on Argentina by saying: We will prepare 
the report anyway, but if you let us in, you can also influence the out-
come. Argentinas Foreign Minister Oscar Montes, however, did not 
welcome the Commissions decision to prepare a Special Report.473 
In June 1978, the OAS General Assembly gathered in Washing-
ton, D.C. US president Carter delivered a speech, which was, accord-
ing to Guest, perceived as remarkably bellicose in Argentina. Guest, 
however, finds that the confidential talks initiated and handled by the 
Argentine OAS Secretary General Alejandro Orfila, who was consid-
ered to be no declared enemy of the junta, smoothed down the impor-
tance of Carters remarks. He sees Orfila as a figure that intermediated 
on behalf of the junta in order to mitigate the pressure on the Argen-
tine government. Orfila invited Aguilar and Montes to his house in 
Washington. During the subsequent session (June 9-23, 1978), the 
Commission received Argentinas Foreign Minister who invited the 
IACHR to visit Argentina to verify the juridical-legal conditions 
prevailing in the country. Notwithstanding, the Commission asked for 
the opportunities granted to the Commission for such a visit.474 The 
IACHR did not accept a visit with such restrictions: the Commission 
found it unacceptable.475 Subsequently, the US State Department de-
cided to turn down the Eximbank funding for Argentina: Montes re-
turned to Buenos Aires from Washington under a cloud, and a bitter 
argument erupted within the Argentinian military over whether to is-
sue an unconditional invitation to the IACHR.476 
Later in 1978, US Vice President Walter Mondale and junta mem-
ber General Jorge Videla came together during the swearing-in-
ceremony of Pope John Paul I in Rome. At those clandestine negotia-
tions, the US and Argentina reached an agreement that enabled the 
                                                 
472  Letters from Andrés Aguilar, Chairman, to Vice Admiral Oscar A. Montes, For-
eign Minister, Caracas, February 3, 1978 (two letters were prepared on the same 
day, IACHR files). 
473  Letter from Oscar A. Montes, Foreign Minister, to Andrés Aguilar, Chairman, 
Buenos Aires, February 17, 1978 (IACHR files). 
474  IACHR  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
1978, pp. 113, 114. 
475  Letter from Andrés Aguilar, to Oscar A. Montes, Foreign Minister, June 23, 1978 
(IACHR files). 
476  Guest, pp. 173, 174, p. 499: footnote 24. 
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IACHR to visit Argentina.477 The US State Department saw itself un-
der pressure to set up a deal with Argentina due to the controversy 
caused by the Allis Chalmers affair.478 In exchange, the US promised 
to provide export licenses for certain points on the munitions list and 
to support the funding of the Export-Import Bank.479 
As an advantage for the United States that was mentioned before, 
an investigation by the intergovernmental body of the OAS further did 
not hamper the revived nationalism in Argentina since the IACHR 
constituted a multinational body and could be presented as a predomi-
nantly Latin American institution. This was  Carters intention when 
he began supporting the IACHR in order to avoid accusations of a uni-
lateral human rights imperialism by the US. 
According to the IACHR files, Argentinas Foreign Minister 
Oscar Montes reiterated an invitation to the IACHR on October 10, 
1978, proposing the second trimester of 1979 for the visit.480 This 
meant that the Commission would have been able to carry out the in-
vestigation as early as April 1979. Officially in November 1978, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights decided to accept Ar-
gentinas invitation for the on-site observation.481 The IACHR pro-
                                                 
477  Former Foreign Minister Montes recalls that he informed the junta members Vi-
dela, Massera, Agosti and the Minister of Interior, Harguindeguy about the talks 
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Buenos Aires, October 10, 1978 (IACHR files). 
481  IACHR  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
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posed to visit Argentina in May/June 1979.482 The Argentine govern-
ment agreed on a visit between May 28 and June 9, 1979.483 
Since October 1978, the Argentine government had not answered 
the Commissions requests concerning individual cases and limited its 
responses to the resolutions adopted by the IACHR. Since August 
1979  the Commissions visit was forthcoming  the junta in Buenos 
Aires provided new and more detailed answers, which explained the 
investigations undertaken by the authorities.484 According to Keck and 
Sikkink, the junta switched from its initial rejection of international 
human rights interventions to a cosmetic cooperation and possibly 
to concrete improvements of the human rights situation as a result of 
the international pressure.485 
Carlos Washington Pastor, former Foreign Minister of the junta, 
stated that the government invited the Commission to clarify the real-
ity in Argentina.486 This was exactly the juntas intention: to invite the 
IACHR in order to verify the normalized and improved situation af-
ter its housecleaning.487 
According to Schoultz, Argentine delaying tactics might have 
been intended to avoid a discussion of a Commission report during the 
General Assembly Meeting in La Paz in October 1979.488 However, 
the entry-into-force of the American Convention on Human Rights 
and its consequences for the institutional proceedings of the Commis-
sion, including the election of new members, were named among the 
main factors  at least during 1979  which led to the postponement of 
the IACHRs visit.489 
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Chapter III 284
The junta delayed its invitation to the Commission until October 
1978, which fed suspicions and rumors that reported killings from de-
tention camps to be visited by the IACHR in order to clean up the 
most questionable centers. As Guest states, those accusations were not 
confirmed but nevertheless, the delay did provide the junta enough 
time to present those camps in a better light.490 It is a fact, that in 
1979, the number of forced disappearances had notably decreased.491 
When the IACHR finally visited Argentina, the worst years of the 
dirty war were already over. 
For the understanding of the impact of the Commissions visit, it 
is necessary to portray a picture of the international context at that 
time. By the end of 1978, the SALT II negotiations on disarmament 
again got under way and the final treaty was signed at the Vienna 
summit in June 1979. The Nicaraguan Revolution had just taken place 
before the IACHR visit to Argentina as well as conservative Margaret 
Thatchers electoral triumph in Great Britain. In July 1979, after 
months of talks, President Carter spoke at the Camp David negotia-
tions with leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
which was widely perceived as a terrorist group at that time.492 In ad-
dition, Irans Islamic Revolution occurred in 1979. As a result, 
Carters popularity went down according to survey results. Further-
more, resignations in Carters administration troubled the govern-
ments stand. Obviously, Carter saw himself domestically under pres-
sure because of the loss of Iran and Nicaragua and the negotiations 
with the PLO. Consequently, these circumstances, problems in his 
cabinet and, of course, pressure from US Congress to stick to tradi-
tional allies, caused the IACHR visit to become a sensitive issue, since 
the Commission must have reflected on whether it could still count on 
the undivided support of the US. 
In the same year, 1979, the Argentine government went ahead 
with a propaganda campaign to influence international public opinion 
with regard to its human rights practice. For instance, the so-called Pa-
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triotic Argentine Association published a booklet on Argentina and 
its Human Rights. Human Rights were not described nor discussed at 
all, but terrorism in the world and in Argentina filled the pages with 
impressive photographs condemning the international campaign 
against Argentina.493 
In July 1979, the OAS representative in Argentina, Roberto Monti, 
and Foreign Minister Carlos Washington Pastor signed a treaty to as-
sure a better cooperation between the organization and Argentina.494 
The fact that Monti was an Argentine was considered as unusual. 
Nevertheless, the Commission expressed its gratitude for the full 
support Monti had provided during the investigation.495 In August, 
the Secretariat estimated the cost of the on-site observation to be $119, 
795.496 
In the end of July, IACHR Executive Secretary Edmundo Vargas 
Carreño arrived in Buenos Aires to set up the agenda for the Commis-
sions observation in loco. The first press reports on the IACHR visit 
demonstrated the medias unfamiliarity with the Commission. Fur-
thermore, the press reported on the forthcoming IACHR investigation 
by linking the visit to pressure of human rights groups and public 
opinion in the United States. 497 An Argentine NGO activist holds that 
already the preparatory visit led many to speak of a whitewashing, 
which would take place when the OAS arrives.498 Likewise, Nobel 
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Peace Prize Winner Pérez Esquivel  who was recently released from 
prison at the time of the Commissions presence in the country  con-
firmed that the junta prepared the detention camps and replaced pris-
oners before the Commission came.499 In fact, the time lapse between 
July and September could possibly have promoted the armed forces 
endeavors to clean up also because after the Executive Secretarys 
visit, the junta knew what the IACHR would be investigating and thus 
was well prepared. Similarly, Acuña/Smulovitz suggest that the junta 
wanted to use the Commission visit to whitewash its image.500 
The Commission arrived in Argentina on September 6, 1979  a 
year after the Videla-Mondale agreement in Rome. The Commission 
members Andrés Aguilar, Chairman, Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro, 
Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Carlos Dunshee de Abranches, Tho-
mas Farer and Francisco Bertrand Galindo participated in the on-site 
observation. They were supported by Executive Secretary Edmundo 
Vargas Carreño and the staff lawyers Edgardo Paz Barnica, Guillermo 
Fernández de Soto, Manuel Velasco Clark and Robert Norris.501 
In comparison with other on-site observations carried out by the 
IACHR at that time, the Argentine visit was extraordinarily well pre-
pared. The question remains as to if the exhaustive and detailed 
travaux preparatoire also contributed to the delay of the visit  a sug-
gestion that cannot be entirely excluded.502 The Special Commission 
undertook a variety of activities during its two-week stay in the Re-
public of Argentina: it conducted interviews with public authorities, 
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former presidents, major religious figures, representatives of human 
rights organizations, political organizations, professional associations 
(particularly bar associations), trade unions as well as commercial, in-
dustrial and business elites. Further, the Commission spoke with 
foundations and individuals like the famous author Ernesto Sábato, 
publicist Jacobo Timerman, and representatives of the media. The 
IACHR Special Commission investigated certain cases, visited deten-
tion centers and received 5,580 denunciations  including 4,153 new 
petitions. In its report, the Commission certified that the junta had co-
operated at all times.503 
At the second day of the Commissions observation, many Argen-
tines celebrated the victory of the national team at the Junior World 
Soccer Championship at the Plaza de Mayo. Negative and provocative 
corals and comments against the Commissions presence in Argentina 
accompanied the celebrations. Obviously, the soccer triumph helped 
the junta as it had in 1978.504 On the occasion of the IACHR observa-
tion, stickers and paper flags provided by the Buenos Aires Provincial 
Bank were distributed saying Los argentinos somos derechos y hu-
manos (We Argentines are upright and human)  obviously a 
mockery on the Commissions presence.505 Furthermore, members of 
the Catholic Church criticized the Commissions endeavors.506 In con-
trast, Ernesto Sábato, one of Argentinas most famous and renowned 
authors, directed a declaration to the IACHR and the press, condemn-
ing all forms of violence.507 On September 14, militants of the Perma-
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nent Assembly of Human Rights demonstrated at the Plaza de Mayo 
where explosions took place.508 This was an incident which helped the 
junta to portray a dangerous situation. 
In general, the newspapers Clarín and La Prensa defended the 
military junta and argued that the roots of violence were in the left-
wing terrorism of the first half of the 1970s. Further, both newspapers 
published a Testimony of the Truth, an advertisement signed by 
hundreds that expressed solidarity with the armed forces in charge and 
refused the judgment of Argentine matters by foreigners.509 In addi-
tion, former presidents Roberto M. Levingston and General Juan Car-
los Onganía disagreed with the interference of the IACHR because 
they argued human rights problems should be solved by the national 
government.510 
Unlike the newspapers mentioned above, the English-speaking 
Buenos Aires Herald struck with an unusual approach. While men-
tioning the actual threat of terrorism, the Heralds editorial defended 
the Commission because of its reputation. That newspaper went fur-
ther and stated that the ...country paid a tremendous price for the vic-
tory over subversion and mentioned ...the thousands of people who 
have disappeared.511 The Buenos Aires Herald considered the Com-
mission visit as helpful to understand the internal war since 1976, al-
though it admitted that only Argentines had to solve their own prob-
lems.512 These commentaries were extraordinarily frank and contrib-
uted to the pressure on the Heralds editor, Robert Cox, who was later 
forced to leave the country. 
At the end of the Commissions stay in Argentina, the junta 
handed over copies of the propaganda document Terrorism in Argen-
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The OAS Human Rights Policy in the 1970s 289
tina.513 By the end of the Commissions visit, the IACHR refused to 
meet with the Argentine League of Victims of Terrorism, which re-
sulted in accusations of a lack of partiality of the Commission.514 The 
IACHR was charged of being partial due to its omission to investigate 
terrorist acts committed by left-wing groups. On several occasions, the 
IACHR members, specifically Chairman Aguilar, tried to explain that 
such an investigation was not covered by the Commissions mandate 
and that it would result in treating governments and terrorist organiza-
tions in the same way. However, these reasonable statements were not 
heeded and the Commission was repeatedly accused for its bias.515 
Certainly, an interview with representatives of groups that denounced 
terrorist attacks would have given the Commissions report more le-
gitimacy, less vulnerability, and a sense of impartiality. Furthermore, 
the mentioning of the abuses attributed to left-wing terrorism could 
have shown the unequal proportions of violence and clarified that the 
juntas justification in regard to the terrorist threat lacked substance. 
At the end of its stay, the Commission submitted recommenda-
tions to the Argentine military junta.516 Reportedly, the Commission-
ers were shocked by the situation in Argentina. The preliminary 
recommendations of the Commission mainly emphasized the status of 
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tos, newspaper reports, manifests of the Montoneros and sometimes other 
sources. The publication always seeks to portray the subversion as especially 
disgusting and cowardly  also the description and emphasizing of connections of 
Argentine terrorists to international Marxism (Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR) was one 
goal. See: Poder Ejecutivo  El terrorismo en la Argentina  Evolución de la de-
lincuencia terrorista en la Argentina, Buenos Aires, Octubre 1980. 
514  La Prensa, Buenos Aires, September 20, 1979, p. 13. 
515  In an interview conducted by the author, former Foreign Minister Oscar Montes 
still rejected this explanation presented by the Commission because it was per-
ceived as discriminatory. Interview with Oscar A. Montes, Buenos Aires, May 
17, 2000. 
516  Two days before the on-site visit ended, the president of the Venezuelan Con-
gress expressed his moral support for the Commission by sending a letter to 
Aguilar in Buenos Aires. This was a clear sign of Venezuelas stand on human 
rights and the IACHR and a vivid support to show that besides the US there were 
also Latin American nations that sought to promote those rights. Letter from 
Godofredo González, Presidente del Congreso de la República de Venezuela, to 
Andrés Aguilar, Presidente CIDH, OEA, República Argentina, Buenos Aires; 
Caracas, September 18, 1979 (IACHR files). 
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the disappeared, requested detailed information on their whereabouts, 
required them to free minors of detained persons or those born in de-
tention, and ensure the right of choice to leave the country. Further, 
the recommendations called the junta to investigate torture charges 
and other denunciations of illegal interrogation methods, to improve 
notably the prison conditions, to assure due process guarantees, and to 
study the military jurisdiction by a commission of jurists.517 In reply, 
the Minister of Interior, General Albano Harguindeguy, declared that 
Argentina had nothing to conceal and condemned infamous lies like 
the existence of concentration camps. Further, Harguindeguy men-
tioned the history and tradition of Argentina, which put it among the 
most advanced nations worldwide in regard to human rights.518 
The visit of the IACHR was judged as one of tremendous impact 
because it drew again international attention to the situation in Argen-
tina.519 During its presence in the country and afterwards, the Com-
missions exchange with local human rights groups also helped the 
latter to gain more space in the Argentine society.520 Only a week after 
the Commission had left Argentina, a terrorist bomb attack threatened 
Economy Planning Minister Guillermo Walter Klein Jr. This act of 
violence provoked a new debate on the justification of the governmen-
tal measures against terrorism.521 The IACHR received press material 
from the Foreign Ministry on the assault to influence its findings on 
the human rights situation in Argentina.522 In October 1979, at the 
OAS General Assembly in La Paz, Foreign Minister Pastor again de-
nied the existence of concentration camps and systematic extermina-
tions and rejected lectures from outside.523 In January 1980, the Ar-
                                                 
517  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, pp. 7/8. 
518  La Prensa, Buenos Aires, September 21, 1979, p. 1. The newspapers front page 
headline cited the Minister: Argentina no tiene nada que ocultar. 
519  Washington Post, September 21, 1979, p. A25. 
520  García Delgado/Palermo, p. 414. Juan Justo, a former prisoner during the dicta-
torship, judged that after the harsh period between 1976 and 1980, the situation 
improved after the IACHR visited the prisons during its on-site investigation  
clearly a tribute to the Commission. Marchak/Marchak, p. 136. 
521  Buenos Aires Herald, September 27, 1979, p. 1. 
522  Letter from Commodore Carlos R. Cavandoli, Subsecretary of Foreign Relations, 
to Andrés Aguilar, Buenos Aires, November 6, 1979 (IACHR files). 
523  OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2, 3 noviembre 1980, Volumen II, Parte I, Período Ordinario de 
Sesiones, La Paz, Bolivia, del 22 al 31 de octubre, 1979, Actas y Documentos, 
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gentine junta was apparently shaken by the still secret IACHR report. 
Particularly the naming of perpetrators of human rights abuses among 
the armed forces caused fear because it was perceived as a potential 
threat to the militarys integrity.524 
The IACHR Report on the situation of human rights in Argentina 
was a product of the entire Commission. Executive Secretary Vargas 
Carreño and staff lawyer Edgardo Paz Barnica had drafted the first 
version, which subsequently was exhaustively reviewed by the Com-
mission. The critical tone and the extensive chapters of the document 
shocked Argentinas junta.525 The Report did not mention the circum-
stances under which the Argentine governments decision to allow the 
observation in loco was granted.526 First, the document described the 
political and legal system in Argentina, stating that since 1930 there 
had been a continuing instability and an increasing terrorist violence 
by the extreme left and the extreme right in the last ten years. The 
military takeover in March 1976 was depicted as an alteration of the 
constitutional system and also of human rights, though referring to 
the validity of Christian moral values, national tradition and the dig-
nity of the Argentine and a full enforcement of the juridical and so-
cial system.527 The main argument of the military government, which 
linked the human rights reality to the need to repress terrorism and 
subversion, was countered by the Commission as follows: 
 
Each government that confronts a subversive threat must choose, on 
the one hand, the path of respect for the rule of law, or, on the other 
hand, the descent into state terrorism.528 
 
Correspondingly, the Commission also referred to one main complaint 
brought up before and during its on-site observation: Why did the 
IACHR not investigate terrorist acts? The Commission Report again 
explained that it was not its mandate and that such a procedure would 
give those terrorist groups an equal footing with governments and 
                                                                                                         
Volumen II, Primera Parte, Actas Textuales de las Sesiones Plenarias y de la 
Comisión General, p. 319. 
524  Washington Post, January 23, 1980, p. A24. 
525  Guest, p. 177. 
526  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, p. 1. 
527  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, p. 18. 
528  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, pp. 23-25, 27. 
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further provides them publicity.529 In regard to the violence employed 
by terrorists and State agents, the IACHR concluded that the State 
forces did more than match the terrorist violence, ...resulting in seri-
ous abuses incurred in its attempt to suppress the subversion by dis-
pensing with all moral and legal considerations.530 This comment 
would have had a more serious impact if it were accompanied by sta-
tistical material  although this represents an extremely difficult sub-
ject particularly in regard to human rights violations or violent acts. 
Further, the IACHR Report on Argentina considered the declaration of 
a state of siege necessary under corresponding circumstances, but this 
would require guaranteeing the basic standards like due process, right 
to life and personal integrity, according to the constitutional rights. In 
another occasion, the document recommends weeding out sadists and 
psychopaths.531 In this case, strong language was used, which obvi-
ously was employed in connection to convincing testimonies about 
cruel mistreatments and torture. The question arises whether the 
IACHR could use such unequivocal statements mainly based on tes-
timonies.532 
The Special Report did not include a reference to womens rights 
or the particular human rights situation of women.533 However, the 
IACHR document provided a detailed and thoughtful chapter on the 
forced disappearances as a method to prevent the application of the 
legal provisions regarding personal freedom, physical security, dignity 
and human life itself.534 For the Commission, the disappearances con-
stituted the most serious human rights problem in Argentina.535 When 
                                                 
529  In summary, those who attack the Commission for not accepting denunciations 
concerning terrorist acts committed by subversive groups, not only ignore the le-
gal norms applicable to bodies such as the IACHR, but implicitly seek to elevate 
the international status of such groups and to help their propaganda. IACHR  
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, p. 25. 
530  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, p. 134. 
531  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, p. 27. 
532  Although the findings later were proved to be correct, the judgment could not 
claim complete reliability at that time. 
533  The report, however, names the personal consequences for the relatives of the 
disappeared  economic, social, psychological and personal problems for 
spouses, children etc. Ibid., p. 137. 
534  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, p. 54 (a refer-
ence to the Commissions 1976 Annual Report). 
535  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, p. 116. 
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the report referred to the term war used by the military junta to de-
scribe its struggle against terrorist subversion, the word was put in 
quotation marks  a clear sign for the Commissions doubts.536 Fur-
thermore, the IACHR report also dealt with the judiciary, the public 
opinion and the Catholic Church. Moreover, the Commissions study 
criticized the laws on the disappeared.537 The Inter-American Com-
mission expressed its opinion on these rights, which where described 
by the junta as practical measures to help orphans and other rela-
tives.538 The IACHR concluded that most of the disappeared were 
dead.539 
The report on the human rights situation in Argentina also de-
scribed unlawful use of force and torture as systematic, accompanied 
by impressive testimonies of former prisoners. Further, the rights to a 
fair trial, due process of law, freedom of opinion, expression and in-
formation as well as labor, political and religious rights were covered 
by the IACHR document. In relation to religious rights, the report 
criticized the prohibition and treatment of Jehovahs Witnesses, but 
                                                 
536  This campaign [against subversion, K.D.] unleashed for the purpose of totally 
annihilating the subversive movement, had its most sensitive, cruel and inhuman 
expression in the thousands of disappeared persons, today presumed dead, whom 
it left in its wake. IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argen-
tina, p. 134. 
537  The Law on Presumption of Death because of Disappearance, issued on Sep-
tember 12, 1979 during the IACHRs presence in Argentina, enabled relatives 
and the State to declare a disappeared persons death. This law, together with the 
 Law on Welfare Benefits where a person is absent (August 28, 1979) was ob-
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Civil Code. IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, pp. 
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and communicating in a timely manner with the family members on the situation 
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are; if they are dead, it is necessary where, when and under what circumstances 
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the presumption of death, among other aspects, included the risk that ...family 
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considered dead. IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argen-
tina, p. 133. 
539  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, p. 137. 
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did not confirm a systematic policy of anti-Semitism, although there 
were reported acts against members of the Jewish community. The 
question whether the junta was carrying out a systematic anti-Semitic 
policy or not still remains.540 Andersen and Heinz conclude that Jews 
were disproportionably affected by the repression.541 Jewish human 
rights organizations like Bnai Birth and also individual complainants 
from Jewish groups or Jewish individuals from Argentina or the 
United States directed letters and petitions to the IACHR between the 
years of 1979-81.542 The controversial case of Jacobo Timerman, an 
Argentine-Jewish publisher, also received attention in the United 
States. Falcoff considers that Timerman was not detained because of 
his religion or his opposition against Argentinas security forces, but 
because of the discovery of his business partners relations to an im-
portant left-wing guerrilla group.543 Generally, it can be assumed that 
                                                 
540  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, pp. 199, 219, 
235. 239. 245, 251-254. In reference to several interviews, Marchak did not reach 
the conclusion that Jews had been affected more than other social groups either. 
Marchak/Marchak, pp. 13/14. In the US, attacks against Jews as well as the dis-
tribution of Nazi literature were well observed by Jewish groups. See: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on In-
ternational Relations. House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second 
Session, September 28 and 29, 1976: Human Rights in Argentina, pp. 59-63; 
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percent of the victims during the dictatorship. See: 1949/1999 Israel-Argentina: 
Encuentro entre 2 Naciones, 50 años de intercambio politico, económico, cultural 
y científico, edited by the Instituto Cultural Argentino-Israeli/Embassy of Israel 
in Argentina (texts by Gabriel D. Lerman), Buenos Aires 1999, pp. 186/187. 
542  IACHR files. 
543  Mark Falcoff  The Timerman Case, in: Howard J. Wiarda (Ed.)  Human Rights 
and U.S: Human Rights Policy. Theoretical Approaches and Some Perspectives 
on Latin America, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington, D.C. 1982, p. 76. Falcoff concluded that for most of the largest Jew-
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a traditional anti-Semitism was evoked during the dirty war, al-
though the question as to whether the governmental policy itself was 
systematically anti-Semitic or not still seems to be unproven.544 
In its conclusions, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights found that the most fundamental rights such as the right to life, 
to personal freedom, personal integrity and security and to a fair trial 
and due process were affected by the Argentine governments policy. 
Therefore, the IACHR recommended investigating deaths attributed to 
State forces, to follow the preliminary recommendations on disap-
pearances (as noted above), the prevention of new disappearances and 
creation of a central register of detainees, and a possible lifting of the 
state of siege because according to the government, the war was 
over. Further, the Commission urged the government to treat prisoners 
well and investigate torture and mistreatment charges. In addition, the 
junta should guarantee a due process as well as legal remedies like 
Amparo or Habeas Corpus. Finally, the recommendations also con-
cerned the rights of opinion, expression and information, and labor, 
trade union association, political and religious rights, and called for 
proper conditions for human rights groups to let them do their work.545 
Unlike other observers, a former member of the IACHR finds that 
the Argentine report was not as strong as it should have been.546 In 
general, the IACHR Report on Argentina mainly refers to human 
rights violations committed in foregoing years. The conclusion ob-
trudes that the Commission possibly felt sort of guilty for not having 
published a Special Report on that country during the worst years and 
therefore decided to prepare a harsh document mainly referring to 
cases that occurred between 1976 and 1978. 
In December 1979, the Argentine report was adopted by the 
Commission and sent to the government.547 This meant that the 
                                                                                                         
ish communities in the world, Argentina ...was not an intolerable place to live. 
Ibid., p. 74. 
544  See Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  Argentina: Six 
Months of Military Government, Report No. 603, September 30, 1976, p. 5. 
Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, Secret. Subject: Secretarys 
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546  Interviews. 
547  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1979-1980, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50, Doc. 13 
rev. 1, 2 October 1980, Original: Spanish, p. 26. 
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Argentine junta would not be able to blame the Commission for the 
lack of time to consider the document as many other governments had 
done before. Argentina released the conclusions of the IACHR report 
several days before the official presentation of the report by the 
Commission. The Argentine government also published its rejecting 
statement. The early release by the Argentine junta sought to mitigate 
the reports impact of the long-awaited study. In a booklet regarding 
critical observations and comments by the government, the junta ar-
gued that the Commissions Special Report did not take into account 
the situation before 1976 and that it did not honor the changed situa-
tion in Argentina. The Argentine government stated that human rights 
could not be applied to every country at all times with the same cate-
gories  a judgment that implicitly refused the universal character of 
human rights in the style of circumstantial relativism. Moreover, the 
comments declared in Argentina, there has not been any generalized 
violation of human rights and further rejected any accusation of this 
nature. The junta described the IACHR document as partial. Its con-
tents were said to be sensationalistic and to have had an emotive im-
pact. Indeed, one might criticize the Commissions use of moving tes-
timonies because it should be considered first of all a report of a ju-
ridical nature.548 In general, the governments observations presented a 
strong refusal of the Commission report.549 As in foregoing publica-
tions on the human rights situation in Argentina, the military govern-
ment enclosed an annex with terrorist acts, which included more than 
thousand crimes attributed to subversives.  
The IACHR found that since the on-site observation, the human 
rights violations and the forced disappearances had been notably de-
creased.550 Keck/Sikkink suggest that the junta, after realizing that the 
Commission could neither be co-opted nor confused, decided to end 
the practice of disappearances, freed political prisoners and reestab-
lished a certain degree of political participation.551 This opinion attrib-
utes an extraordinary impact to the Commissions performance in the 
                                                 
548  On the other hand, the inclusion of those individual reports gave the document a 
sort of humane touch beyond the juridical descriptions. 
549  Observaciones y comentarios críticos del Gobierno argentino al Informe de la 
CIDH sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Argentina, Buenos Aires, 
April 1980, pp. 5, 13, 14, 22, 30, 107-111. 
550  Washington Post, April 20, 1980, p. A18. 
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Argentine case. Likewise, Heinz determines that because of the 
IACHR report and the better information provided by other organiza-
tions, ...the wall of silence began to crack.552 In accordance, Adolfo 
Pérez Esquivel attributes a multiplying and officializing factor to 
the Commissions visit and report.553 
The junta did not allow the distribution of the entire report. Guest 
assumes that the Argentine OAS representative in Buenos Aires, 
Roberto Monti, helped the junta to keep the report from being pub-
lished in Argentina. The IACHR files show that the OAS Mission in 
Buenos Aires received reports but did not distribute them to the NGOs 
that were the supposed recipients. Finally, Emilio Mignone smuggled 
some 500 copies from Washington to Argentina.554 Guest holds that 
the military junta suddenly realized that the IACHR document was 
one of its most grave diplomatic setbacks since the coup.555 Andersen 
equivocally writes that the OAS mentioned human rights abuses in 
Argentina.556 It was merely the OAS organ IACHR and not the whole 
organization  a necessary distinction that became obvious at the Gen-
eral Assembly in November 1980. 
Argentinas military rulers faced the threat of being exposed at the 
General Assembly in 1980 because of the critical IACHR report. 
Notwithstanding, the international context had notably changed  this 
meant a decisive advantage for the junta in Buenos Aires. In 1979, 
Soviet troops had invaded Afghanistan and provoked a US grain em-
bargo on the USSR. Moreover, Vietnam had marched into Kampu-
chea, there was an explosive turmoil in Central America, and the Is-
lamic Revolution in Iran worried the US. In the same year, hostages 
were taken at the US Embassy in Teheran and the tensions between 
Iran and Iraq increased.557 Further, the second oil price shock pro-
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voked a dramatic decline of Carters popularity in the United States. 
As a result of the revived East-West tensions also provoked by the 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the Sandinista revolution, Presi-
dent Carter responded with the boycott of the Olympic Games in 
Moscow in 1980. This scenario meant that US foreign policy now had 
more traditional problems at the international level and found itself 
in a less comfortable situation to promote human rights. On the other 
hand, Washingtons embargo on the Soviet Union as a punitive meas-
ure with regard to the Afghanistan invasion could only have some ef-
fect if the other major exporters of grain cooperated, namely Australia 
and Argentina. Moreover, the United States sought to convince Ar-
gentina to accept the Tlatelolco Treaty to ban nuclear weapons from 
the region. This scenario potentially constituted a huge advantage for 
the Argentine regime.558 
In addition, the priority of US security policies over human rights 
also affected Patricia Derians position, who had been one of the most 
vigorous human rights advocates.559 Apparently, the career diplomacy 
successfully undermined the efforts of the human rights office, par-
ticularly in 1980.560 As the Congressional pressure on human rights in 
US foreign policy also decreased, Carter seemed to regard human 
rights as a luxury that he could not afford.561 
Jimmy Carter lost the presidential elections in November 1980 to 
his Republican challenger, Ronald Reagan. As Reagan was considered 
extremely conservative and consequently more sympathetic with 
right-wing regimes, this meant a vital advantage for the junta in Bue-
nos Aires. In general, the US relations with Argentina were contradic-
tory: while Carter and Derian criticized the junta for its poor human 
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rights record, the State Department was divided and the US Depart-
ment of Treasury more sympathetic with the military rulers.562 
On the other hand, the situation in the region also had shifted: a 
political change in Venezuela and tensions between Venezuela and 
Colombia affected their stand on human rights issues at the OAS. Fur-
ther, the military coup in Bolivia ended with a situation in which the 
Andean nations were no longer unified to defend human rights in the 
OAS. Both developments led to a leadership vacuum for human rights 
matters in Latin America. Nevertheless, both Venezuela and Colombia 
still supported the Commission. The Commissions highly recognized 
performance during the Colombian hostage crisis helped to back the 
IACHR before the General Assembly. In early 1980, the IACHR had 
successfully intermediated and settled a kidnapping in the Dominican 
Embassy in Bogotá by M-19 guerrillas.563 Accordingly, it was the Co-
lombian delegation in particular that emphatically supported the 
Commission during the session.564 
Before the General Assembly met, the IACHR received numerous 
individual letters encouraging the Commission to put the Argentine 
case on the Assemblys agenda. Some of the letters were very touch-
ing and were mainly sent from Argentina and Canada, where a cam-
paign to force the topic on the meetings agenda had been success-
ful.565 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held its 51st 
period of sessions at the time when the OAS Assembly gathered. The 
IACHR received the president of the Argentine human rights NGO 
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Service for Peace and Justice (SERPAJ), Nobel Peace Prize Winner 
Adolfo Pérez Esquivel who did not attend the General Assembly.566 
Before the OAS Meeting took place, the Argentine press discussed 
the strategic scenario of potential vote results on the Argentine report. 
La Prensa considered Argentinas announced withdrawal from the 
OAS unlikely, because of Reagans electoral victory and the assump-
tion that twelve to fourteen Member States would vote against a con-
demning resolution against Argentina.567 Nevertheless, the Argentine 
Foreign Ministry called the diplomatic corps for a meeting before the 
OAS meeting took place.568 As early as April 1980, the Argentine 
Foreign Minister urged several Latin American OAS Members to 
support his government against the IACHR accusations. Apparently, it 
was considered that the Report on Cuba not be presented at the Gen-
eral Assembly, and as a result, the Argentine Foreign Minister advo-
cated for El Salvadors diplomatic support in not presenting the Ar-
gentina report either.569 
At the OAS General Assembly in 1980, attention was focused on 
the Argentine Report.570 The Argentine press reported extensively on 
the Assembly and covered every detail of the developments in Wash-
ington. During the sessions, Argentine human rights groups attended 
the meeting and, according to a former Argentine diplomat, contrib-
uted to a very special political atmosphere. Foreign Minister Carlos 
W. Pastor publicly reconsidered the option of reducing his countrys 
participation in the OAS, specifically in relation to the present finan-
cial crisis of the organization.571 In an article published in 1996, Pastor 
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vember 15, 1980, p. 11; Clarín, Buenos Aires, November 21, 1980, p. 6. Besides 
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wrote that a war is something cruel and human rights are violated.572 
Pastor, who was General Videlas brother-in-law, was a member of 
the armed forces who reportedly preferred to retire from the meeting 
rather than to negotiate the IACHRs criticism. When the General As-
sembly met, OAS employees organized a protest and a strike for 
higher salaries to equal those of the United Nations. This accentuated 
the threat of Argentinas withdrawal from the OAS and the reduction 
of financial support that this would imply. 
After US President Carters last speech at the OAS plenary session 
in which he stressed his human rights policy, Argentinas Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Carlos Washington Pastor, stood up like the other 
delegates but did not applaud as a sign of protest against Carters en-
deavors.573 After emphasizing the nonintervention principle, Pastor 
himself blamed the United States  without mentioning the US by 
name  for its divisive policy that counteracted instead of contributing 
to the regional development. Further, the Argentine Foreign Minister 
stated that the war in Argentina was won and that as a result, de-
mocracy would be installed. Moreover, Pastor threatened that if the 
General Assembly were used for political ends, his government would 
reconsider its forms of cooperation.574  
The chairman of the IACHR, Tom Farer, presented the Report on 
Argentina before the First Committee. According to Farer, there was 
total silence when he exposed the report.575 Farer also mentioned two 
cases to illustrate the human rights reality in Argentina and referred to 
the medias self-censorship in Argentina between 1976 and 1979, 
which contrasted with the broad coverage of the Commissions 
visit.576 The numerous personal letters that had called the Commission 
                                                                                                         
the United States (66%), Brazil and Mexico (each 9,5%), Argentina was one of 
the main contributors to the OAS budget with 8 percent. 
572  Pastor, p. 291. 
573  La Prensa, Buenos Aires, November 20, 1980, p. 1. 
574  OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2, 3 noviembre 1980, Volumen II, Parte I, Período Ordinario de 
Sesiones, La Paz, Bolivia, del 22 al 31 de octubre, 1979, Actas y Documentos, 
Volumen II, Primera Parte, Actas Textuales de las Sesiones Plenarias y de la 
Comisión General, pp. 55-59. 
575  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver/Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
576  OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2, 13 noviembre 1981, Volumen II, Parte II: Décimo Período Or-
dinario de Sesiones, Washington D.C., del 19 al 27 de noviembre de 1980, Pri-
mera Comisión, pp. 70-84. Farer stated that Argentinas Foreign Minister, Carlos 
W. Pastor looked at him  ...and obviously saying to himself, if we only had you 
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to stand up for human rights in Argentina might also have influenced 
his emphatic presentation. 
In the first days, the Argentine delegation was joined by Chile and 
other Member States, which like Argentina threatened to withdraw 
from the organization if the national sovereignty of States was not re-
spected satisfactorily.577 In combination with the existent financial cri-
sis of the OAS that was emphasized through the protesting OAS em-
ployees, these threats could have been perceived as a substantial dan-
ger for the organizations economic survival. Several delegations, 
mainly those of military regimes like Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and 
Guatemala, referred to nonintervention while stressing that the human 
rights issue constituted interference in domestic affairs. Those gov-
ernments complained of the politicization of the OAS.578 
The fact that in bygone years the IACHR had accused numerous 
Member States in its Special and Annual Reports resulted in a hostile 
atmosphere created by military governments, which were additionally 
encouraged to express their criticism by Reagans victory at the 
polls.579 Apparently, the accused governments saw the General As-
sembly as the last battle on human rights. Parts of the US delegation 
were determined to fight for a final decisive resolution on behalf of 
human rights before the Reagan administration took office. 
The Argentine newspapers indicated an increasing confrontation 
between the United States and Argentina, though several unofficial 
meetings between representatives of both States tried to solve existing 
disagreements. When it seemed to be clear that the US would not 
gather the fourteen votes necessary to condemn Argentina, the US 
Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie580 and Argentinas Foreign Minis-
                                                                                                         
in one of our clandestine detention centers, we would know what to do. Inter-
view with Dean Tom Farer, Denver/Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
577  La Prensa, November 21, 1980, p.1; La Prensa, November 25, 1980, p. 2. Bo-
livia, Paraguay and Uruguay  all Member States with right-wing military gov-
ernments at that time  also announced to leave the OAS, if necessary. 
578  La Prensa, Buenos Aires, November 22, 1980, p. 2. 
579  See Torre/de Riz, p. 167. 
580  After Cyrus Vance had opposed a disastrous hostage rescue mission at the US 
embassy in Teheran in April 1980, which also highlighted the difficult relation to 
Carters Security Advisor Brzezinski, Edward Muskie replaced Vance as head of 
the State Department. Dumbrell, pp. 7/8. 
The OAS Human Rights Policy in the 1970s 303
ter Carlos W. Pastor, decided to negotiate.581 Despite these informal 
talks, the US delegation presented a draft resolution, which employed 
a direct tone, singling out each accused government which led to a 
confrontation in the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs. La 
Prensa perceived the IACHRs Chairman, Tom Farer, as being ready 
to fight for a mentioning of Argentina in the final resolution.582 The 
Buenos Aires Herald wrote Argentina, US collide at OAS and on 
November 26, La Prensa described the differences between Argentina 
and the US on the human rights question at a crisis.583 Indeed, sur-
prisingly enough, the US had returned to its original stand on human 
rights. This is even more astonishing because the US paper was pre-
sented when five governments had announced their possible with-
drawal from the meeting if the resolution were to name particular 
Member States.584 The Venezuelan delegation proposed a resolution 
that contained the names of the accused governments, followed by 
fierce negotiations on the resolution text.585 In the course of the dis-
cussion, various nations  Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and 
Uruguay  threatened to leave the General Assembly meeting.586 
These threats created pressure in the meeting to soften the position 
taken by the IACHR, and the delegations of the United States and 
Venezuela. 
After some controversies, the Uruguayan proposal to present all 
IACHR reports at once, and not disjointedly as planned, was ac-
                                                 
581  La Prensa, Buenos Aires, November 23, 1980, pp. 1, 2. These conversations 
where overshadowed by an inner struggle within the State Department between a 
more conservative faction and human rights advocates like Warren Christopher 
and Patricia Derian. Clarín, Buenos Aires, November 23, 1980, p. 4. 
582  La Prensa, Buenos Aires, November 25, 1980, pp. 1, 2; Buenos Aires Herald, 
November 25, 1980, p. 1. 
583  Buenos Aires Herald, November 25, 1980, p. 1; La Prensa, Buenos Aires, No-
vember 26, 1980, p. 4. 
584  At the same time, the US and Soviet delegations clashed over human rights at the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid. Buenos Aires 
Herald, November 25, 1980, pp. 1, 20. 
585  Buenos Aires Herald, November 26 and 27, 1980, p. 1. In regard to the human 
rights issue, the Venezuelan delegation went even further than the US by ques-
tioning the usefulness of the OAS at all. 
586  Already in 1971, six countries left a conference on terrorism in protest against the 
soft attitude taken by the meeting. La Prensa, Buenos Aires, November 27, 
1980, pp. 1, 2. 
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cepted.587 The US position had been to handle the Annual Report of 
the IACHR and each of its Special Reports separately.588 However, 
Argentinas favored strategy to discuss all human rights topics at the 
same time as agenda point 21 eventually succeeded. This tactic had al-
ready been carried out by Chile in 1976. A Working Group was set up 
to prepare a draft resolution on the IACHR reports. This groups dis-
cussions and the following discourse in the First Committee con-
cluded not before dawn of the General Assemblys last day of ses-
sions. Tough negotiations took place within and outside the First 
Committee on Political and Juridical Affairs. The resolution text deal-
ing with the Commissions Annual Report and its Special Reports on 
Argentina, Cuba and Haiti was subject of an authentic diplomatic bat-
tle uninterruptedly lasting more than 24 hours. 
In the end, conversations between US Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs, William Bowdler, and Carlos Pastor found 
a compromise.589 Finally, a resolution was passed that just took 
note of the IACHR reports and only Bolivia was singled out and 
condemned with a separate resolution.590 After its initial resistance 
against any mentioning of Argentina by name, the Argentine delega-
tion made the concession that the resolution referred to the IACHR 
Special Report on Argentina. Thus, the General Assembly reached a 
compromiso latinoamericano,591 which consisted of a limited noting 
of the reports but further mentioned the observations of the corre-
sponding governments.592 However, the US insisted on an additional 
article requesting the governments to comply with the recommenda-
tions of the IACHR, which provoked a strong opposition from Argen-
                                                 
587  OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2, 13 noviembre 1981, Volumen II, Parte II: Décimo Período Or-
dinario de Sesiones, Washington D.C., del 19 al 27 de noviembre de 1980, Pri-
mera Comisión, pp. 36-38. 
588  La Prensa, Buenos Aires, November 20, 1980, p. 4. 
589  Clarín, Buenos Aires, November 28, 1980, p. 1. Clarín titled Aceptaron en la 
OEA la tesis argentina. 
590  AG/RES. 484 (X-0/80): Seguimiento de la situación de los derechos humanos en 
Bolivia. 
591  A former Argentine diplomat states that it was less the US but rather Latin 
American States that discussed the issue because the US stand on human rights at 
that moment was considerably difficult. 
592  AG/RES. 510 (X-0/80): Annual Report and Special Reports of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. 
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tina.593 La Prensa mentioned the influence of the Pentagon and the In-
ter-American Defense Council who reportedly pressed the US delega-
tion to abandon its position. The newspaper found that the resolution 
was the best the junta could get.594 The final resolution represented a 
watered-down version, but the supporters of the IACHR  besides the 
US, other democracies  tried to include two articles which obviously 
referred to Argentina: article 12 called for an immediate end of forced 
disappearances in those countries where it may occur, and article 13 
recommended to the Member States to establish central records to ac-
count detained persons.595 Clearly, the mere taking note of the report 
on Argentina in the resolution was considered a diplomatic victory for 
the Argentine junta. In the foregoing years during the Carter admini-
stration, governments that had been subject of a Special Report of the 
IACHR were explicitly mentioned in the respective OAS resolutions. 
But in 1980, Argentinas diplomatic maneuvers and its threat to with-
draw from the organization if it was mentioned in the resolution text, 
succeeded.596 
The delegates of Argentina and the United States were the last 
speakers in the First Committee. Assistant Secretary of State, William 
Bowdler, expressed his conformity with the consensus and said  in 
Spanish  in one of his last contributions that it was a pleasure for me 
to have participated in this debate.597 The consensus was accepted, 
but harshly criticized for its weakness by the representatives of Gre-
nada, Barbados and Jamaica. Nicaragua was worried too about the fi-
nal document and the Venezuelan representative, Hilarión Cardozo, 
stated that human rights could not be subject of negotiations. Mex-
icos Permanent Representative, Rafael de la Colina, described the 
resolution as weak.598 Also, Oliver Jackman, the Barbadian represen-
                                                 
593  Clarín, Buenos Aires, November 27, 1980, p. 2. 
594  La Prensa, Buenos Aires, November 28, 1980, p. 1. 
595  Washington Post, November 28, 1980, p. A4. 
596  Guest, p. 239. After his return to Argentina, Pastor denied that his government 
had considered to withdraw from the OAS if the General Assembly had adopted 
a resolution mentioning Argentina by name, it had only warned to withdraw its 
economic support. Buenos Aires Herald, November 29, 1980, p. 1. 
597  OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2, 13 noviembre 1981, Volumen II, Parte II: Décimo Período Or-
dinario de Sesiones, Washington D.C., del 19 al 27 de noviembre de 1980, 
Primera Comisión, pp. 280, 281, 282, 288, 301. 
598  Nevertheless, the Mexican delegation was considered to have played a decisive 
role. De la Colina, the old-experienced diplomat of the OAS, headed the negotia-
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tative who later on became member and chairman of the Commission, 
showed his dissatisfaction. In contrast, Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay 
still criticized the IACHR and expressed that they would have pre-
ferred a more global resolution.599 A former Argentine OAS diplomat 
called the resolution pretty acceptable for Argentina and very ac-
ceptable for the Commission. As Foreign Minister Pastor recalls, the 
ambassadors of Brazil, Mexico and Peru were supportive, while Ar-
gentina received extreme solidarity from the Foreign Ministers of 
Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay.600 According to Pastor, Secre-
tary General Alejandro Orfila sent a letter to the Argentine Foreign 
Ministry, saying that he did not doubt that the meeting was one of the 
greatest successes of Argentine diplomacy.601 
When Argentinas Foreign Minister Carlos W. Pastor returned 
from Washington, he depicted the OAS resolution as ...one of the 
most resounding successes of Argentine diplomacy... and was con-
vinced to have ...written a definitive end to the human rights chap-
ter.602 Obviously, this was not the case. However, at the General As-
sembly in 1981 in Saint Lucia, Argentinas Permanent Representative 
Raúl Quijano and IACHRs chairman Farer again argued about the 
Commissions competence.603 
                                                                                                         
tions on the resolution text. Some sources said that Mexico favored the Argentine 
demands in order to solve the problem with two persons, including former presi-
dent Héctor Cámpora, who had fled to the Mexican embassy in Buenos Aires. 
Clarín, Buenos Aires, November 30, 1980, pp. 8/9. Later on, the Buenos Aires 
newspaper La Nación reprinted a photo taken at the Assembly in 1980, which 
showed De la Colina, congratulating Pastor. See: Pastor, p. 292. De la Colina 
acted as mediator, although his delegation was instructed to strongly support the 
Commission. Apparently, the Mexican veteran diplomat reached to modify his 
delegations strong stand and converted it into a conciliatory role. On de la 
Colinas chairmanship of the working group, see: Rafael de la Colina  El debate 
sobre derechos humanos en los órganos políticos de la OEA, in: Human Rights in 
the Americas, Homage to Carlos Dunshee de Abranches, p. 342. 
599  Clarín, Buenos Aires, November 28, 1980, p. 1. 
600  Pastor, p. 292. 
601  Ibid. 
602  Clarín, Buenos Aires, November 29, 1980, pp. 2/3. Cited as in Guest, p. 518, 
footnote 36. 
603  OEA/Ser. P/XI.0.2, 4 diciembre 1984, Volumen II, Parte II, Undécimo Período 
Ordinario de Sesiones, Castries, Santa Lucía, Del 2 al 11 de diciembre 1981, 
Primera Comisión, pp. 65-69. 
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The National Commission on Forced Disappearances acknowl-
edged that the visit of the IACHR provided a valuable source for the 
reconstruction of many cases and helped to identify the systematic 
measures of the regime when democratic rule was reinstalled.604 This 
fact is certainly true, but what impact did the visit and the report have 
on the human rights situation in Argentina during the dictatorship? 
Many factors must be considered to explain the delay of the on-site 
observation. In general, the situation in Argentina was not as clear as 
it was in Chile after the coup in 1973. The domestic situation before 
the coup in March 1976 in Argentina also led several media and indi-
viduals to welcome the Putsch. Accordingly, the IACHR might have 
chosen to wait and see the development of that situation.605 
In addition, the Argentine junta did not want to commit the same 
error as the Chilean regime in 1973 and 1974. It tried to avoid a 
Commission visit and was well aware of the possible effect on na-
tional and international public opinion of such an on-site observa-
tion.606 Also, the systematic employment of forced disappearances 
clearly shows that the junta sought not to appear as a perpetrator of 
abuses. In 1978, the Argentine government could host the Soccer 
World Championship  a public relations victory, which they did not 
want to be affected by an on-site investigation of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights with a likely negative result. On the 
other hand, it is possible that the junta considered its human rights re-
cord in 1979 as presentable because by then, the massive violations 
had ceased. Furthermore, internal considerations within the inter-
American system must be taken into account: In 1976, the IACHR did 
not possess the political-diplomatic and financial support of the US 
administration and Argentina was regarded as an important Member 
State, which contributed eight percent of the OAS budget.607 Also, the 
Chile case was more prominent because of its symbolism, and because 
                                                 
604  CONADEP, p. 445. 
605  In its 1981 report on Nicaragua, the IACHR also showed some understanding for 
the difficult internal situation after the Sandinistas victory. 
606  Interview with Admiral Oscar A. Montes, Buenos Aires, May 17, 2000. 
607  For instance, in a secret National Security Council memorandum of 1970, Argen-
tina and Brazil were named as particular key governments in Latin America. 
National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum, Henry A. 
Kissinger, Subject: Policy Towards Chile, Top Secret/Sensitive Eyes Only, 
Washington, D.C., November 9, 1970, p. 1 (NSA files). 
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the Commission had more information on and experience with the 
Chilean junta. The 1976 General Assembly in Santiago required a 
well-prepared IACHR. Between 1974 and 1977, the Commission pre-
pared three Special Reports on the human rights situation in Chile  
three reports within the first five years of dictatorship. Moreover, the 
trouble within the IACHRs Secretariat and the Commission itself 
(three members announced not to run for another term, see chapter III. 
1.) affected the Commissions radius beyond the troubled year of 
1976. The resignation of Luis Reque was without a doubt a weakening 
factor internally in the Secretariat, but also for the authority and stead-
fastness of the IACHR within the OAS and outside the organization. 
In 1977, the situation in the Secretariat of the IACHR was still far 
from that before March 1976. The unsuitable Executive Secretary 
Emilio Castañon Pasquel (June-December 1976) was finally fired by 
Orfila on the Commissions request and Vargas Carreño filled the va-
cancy in the Executive Secretariat. In the meantime, Charles Moyer 
served as the Secretariats interim director. The fact that Charles 
Moyer was, as a US citizen, only nominated as Executive Secretary 
ad-interim was another issue: Under Moyers temporary leadership, it 
may have been the case that the IACHR was not strong enough to 
confront such a powerful and important country like Argentina. When 
Vargas Carreño took office, he had to become acquainted with the Se-
cretariats functioning because he had not been an expert in human 
rights matters until then. The fact that he had to spend time on learn-
ing how the IACHR worked and how to deal with complaints might 
have resulted in a hesitation in handling such a sensitive case such as 
Argentina. In the following years, the IACHR enjoyed Carters sup-
port. Carter and Derian also confronted the Argentine junta with vari-
ous strategies: conditioned military aid, opposition in international fi-
nance institutions and in the bilateral US-Argentine relations. These 
actions could have contributed to a conviction within the IACHR that 
the US administration itself would address the Argentina case. The 
fact that the juntas invitation was preceded by a secret agreement be-
tween Vice-President Mondale and Videla feeds the assumption that 
the role of the US was important, if not necessary and decisive. The 
US-Argentine relations were particular ones and not comparable to the 
patrimonial role the US played toward smaller countries. 
In 1978, the Commission felt the impact of the Carter administra-
tions influence when it was invited by Panama and El Salvador to 
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visit those countries. The visit and the report on Nicaragua were also 
taking place at this time. The relatively small-staffed IACHR had a lot 
of work to accomplish, and as a result, less time could be devoted to 
the Argentine case. Further, the Commission could argue that it had 
not received an official invitation by the junta, although the IACHR 
had prepared various documents on countries without an on-site visit 
(for instance, the documents on Paraguay and Uruguay; all Cuba re-
ports). On the other hand, a critical report published without an on-site 
visit probably would have guaranteed a permanent refusal of any gov-
ernment permission for a Commission visit. Accordingly, the IACHR 
had to consider strategic aspects  whether or not to issue a likely 
highly critical report on the juntas human rights performance in order 
to draw attention and lay pressure on the governments measures. In 
contrast, the option of waiting until an invitation was extended could 
help  and in fact, it did  the Commission was able to prepare a much 
more comprehensive report. The simple presence of the Commission 
during its visit was widely seen as support for the victims and their 
families and provided them some relief and hope. Further, the de-
crease of violations after the Commissions visit was often mentioned 
as a positive outcome. In summary, there are many reasons that favor 
the Commissions decision to issue a report based on an on-site visit 
and to wait until it received an official invitation. But the question still 
remains: Could an IACHR report before 1979 without a visit have 
helped the victims and might have contributed to a decline of the vio-
lence? 
Naturally, there were institutional factors which presented obsta-
cles for an earlier visit or report: in 1979, the Commission was busy 
with the juridical implications for its Regulations and Statute due to 
the entry-into-force of the Convention. Carters effort to push many 
heads of state during the signing of the Panama Canal treaties to ratify 
the Convention, unforeseeably and unintendedly might have cost Ar-
gentine lives. Nevertheless, it was Carters endeavor that finally en-
abled the IACHR to realize its significant and transcendental visit to 
Argentina. In a way, the Commissions delay of the visit was ex-
plained by the institutional modifications of the Commissions Statute 
and Regulations and thus the necessity of the election of new mem-
bers. However, the Commission had shown more flexibility and faster 
actions in such urgent situations before. The explanation brought up 
by the IACHR lacks of former priorities of the Commission, which 
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had applied less bureaucratic measures to save lives by drawing atten-
tion to deplorable human rights situations. It is difficult to criticize the 
high-profile preparations because on the one hand this naturally 
caused a delay, but on the other hand it helped to carry out a very effi-
cient scrutiny in loco.608 
Ultimately, the IACHR waited with the preparation of a Special 
Report until it was granted the permission for an on-site visit. The fact 
that the diplomatic efforts took until 1978 to reach an agreement on 
such a visit must be regarded as a shortcoming of the Commissions 
strategy because the worst years of the so-called dirty war were over 
in 1979. Further, the IACHR could be accused of having permitted, or 
at least indirectly favoring, a so-called whitewashing of the junta be-
cause it considered the adjustments due to the entry into force of the 
Convention more urgent than the visit. This was an argument that ob-
viously contradicts with previous practical and unbureaucratic actions 
carried out by the Commission or its Secretariat. Apparently, the 
IACHR was aware of the significance of the Argentine case and spent 
much time preparing the visit, a fact which also enabled the junta to 
clean up prior to the IACHR arrival. This postponement caused a de-
layed transmittal of the Report to the General Assembly. In 1980, the 
General Assembly was too weak to approve a condemning report. The 
Commission lost precious time but finally issued an outstanding 
document on State terrorism and helped victims with its presence in 
Argentina and the report as well. Nevertheless, the entire handling of 
the Argentine case by the Commission was not a remarkable success: 
The mystified visit and the elaboration of the report were accompa-
nied by several shortcomings  such as the supposed whitewashing 
and in general the delay of the visit  that partly diminish the value of 
the IACHRs performance. 
In conclusion, the transcendence and the impact, willingly attrib-
uted to the Commissions visit and its report, are exaggerated. In real-
ity, a report on Argentinas human rights situation was overdue in 
                                                 
608  See Wolfgang S. Heinz  Determinants of Gross Human Rights Violations by 
State and State-sponsored Actors in Argentina 1976-1983, in: Heinz/Frühling, p. 
657. See Vargas Carreño, pp. 301, 302. However, a human rights activist under-
lines the cleaning up that was provoked by the Commissions visit. It is true 
that the IACHRs investigation involuntarily speeded up this blanqueo (white-
washing) and indirectly led to additional disappearances or deaths, respectively. 
Interviews. 
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1979 and the handling of the Commissions report at the 1980 General 
Assembly showed that there was no substantial impact in the OAS at 
the diplomatic level due to the changed political circumstances. The 
on-site investigation took place too late, it was postponed with a po-
tentially dramatic effect on numerous detainees in clandestine deten-
tion camps, and the report  though remarkable  could no longer find 
enough supporters at the OAS General Assembly in 1980. Certainly, 
the violations decreased but this tendency had already begun before 
the Commissions visit. 
 
IV. Political Conflicts and Civil Wars in Central 
America 
 
A review of the 1980s reveals two predominate foreign policy cur-
rents: one, the revival of the East-West conflict accompanied by an 
outspoken aggressive-conservative approach of the Reagan admini-
stration reflecting the general conservative climate,1 and two, the 
partly embattled and highly politicized civil wars in Central America. 
Other influential events in the hemisphere included the re-
democratization of several South American countries and the Latin 
American debt crisis that weakened the regions role as a relatively in-
fluential Third World actor.2 A combination of the Cold War unilater-
alism of the Reagan administration and the undermined Latin Ameri-
can position ushered in a financial crisis and an alarming absence of 
OAS activities in the region.3 On the broader international scale, by 
the mid-1980 the decadence of the Soviet empire already began. In 
1991, not only as a result of the end of the East-West confrontation 
but more as the consequence of regional developments, the OAS 
agreed on resolution 1080, which considerably diminished the impor-
tance of the nonintervention principle. 
This chapter begins first with the new human rights concept and 
policy of the Reagan administration and its consequences for the US 
position toward the Organization of American States and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. This section provides the 
reader with an overview of the shifting mood and method of US for-
                                                 
1  See Atilio A. Boron  Becoming Democrats? Some Skeptical Considerations on 
the Right in Latin America, New York/Westport/London 1992, pp. 68, 72, 73. 
2  Accordingly, for instance, Drekonja-Kornat remarks that Mexico had to abandon 
its foreign affairs machismo due to the debt problem. Drekonja-Kornat, p. 53. 
3  An internal OAS paper of 1984 stresses that the organization enjoyed attention 
during the 1970s: the Panama Canal Treaties (1977), the speech of Pope John 
Paul II. at the OAS (1979) and the human rights issue (1975-1980) provided the 
OAS with public attention and interest. During the 1980s, there was no compara-
ble issue that raised high attention. See Memorandum, From: Francis X. Gannon, 
OAS Consultant on Public Affairs, to: Their Excellencies, OAS Permanent Rep-
resentatives and Permanent Observers, Subject: Report on Effect of OAS Activi-
ties on the U.S. Press and Public, May 23, 1984, p. I. See: José Luis Ramírez 
León  La OEA, los países latinoamericanos y la democracia en el hemisferio, in: 
Síntesis, Madrid, No. 21, Julio-Diciembre 1993, pp. 197/198. 
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eign policy toward Latin America and the OAS. Specifically, this 
chapter will examine the human rights situation during the civil wars 
in Nicaragua and Guatemala, the US intervention in Panama, 
Reagans stance on these issues, and the position and acting of the 
IACHR. The relationships between the affected Member States and 
the Commission also demonstrate the scope for action of the IACHR 
in that decade. However, it is not the intent of this section to broadly 
explore the human rights policy of US president George Bush  al-
though there obviously is a lack of academic research on his human 
rights stance  due to the fact that it was not as influential for Latin 
America as the Reagan administration.4 Finally, this chapter will also 
discuss the IACHRs performance with regard to the human rights 
violations during the Salvadoran armed conflict, considered to be truly 
a unique case in regard to the special handling by the Commission. 
IV.1. Redefining Human Rights: The Reagan Administration 
... we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once 
led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.5 
Jimmy Carter 1977 
 
Reagans foreign policy was shaped more by historical and structural 
interests than by circumstances or individual policy makers.6 In gen-
eral terms it is fair to state that under the Reagan administration 
(1981-1989), US foreign policy returned to its traditional unilateral-
ism.7 The administration of US president Reagan focused on the East-
West confrontation and also related events in other regions to the 
                                                 
4  Besides US reactions toward the massacre of Tiananmen in China (1989) and the 
Jesuit murder case in El Salvador (1989), Bushs human rights policy has not 
been subject to prolific investigation as Carter or Reagans. See: Cohn  Human 
Rights, p. 445. 
5  Jimmy Carter  Speech on Humane Purposes in Foreign Policy (1977), in: 
Laquer/Rubin (Eds.), p. 350. Carter stated in an interview that Reagan had aban-
doned the US commitment to human rights. Don Richardson (Ed.)  Conversa-
tions with Carter, Boulder/London 1998, p. 261. 
6  Morris H. Morley (Ed.)  Crisis and Confrontation. Ronald Reagans Foreign 
Policy, Totowa, New Jersey 1988, p. 2. 
7  Larman C. Wilson/David W. Dent  The United States and the OAS, in: David 
W. Dent (Ed.)  U.S.-Latin American Policymaking. A Reference Handbook, 
Westport/London 1995, p. 28. 
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somewhat constructed perception of an exclusively bipolar system.8 
While Carter had confronted revolutionary Third World movements 
with containment and isolation policies, Reagan opted for roll-back 
and liberation strategies. As a result, the military cooperation be-
tween the armed forces of Latin American nations and the armed 
forces of the US witnessed a renaissance. 
Furthermore, the Reagan presidency must be divided into two 
phases: first, the initial period until 1985, and second, his last four-
year term in office. While Reagans foreign policy during his first 
years at the White House was more belligerent, the second phase wit-
nessed some smoothing of Reagans original hard-liner politics.  
In 1985, the conservative publicist Charles Krauthammer report-
edly coined the term Reagan Doctrine.9 This doctrine, which was 
mainly traced to the Central American situation, described US en-
deavors to promote anti-Communist revolutions. Reagan changed US 
policy from preventing Communism to curing it.10 Pastor, Director 
of Latin American Affairs on the National Security Council under the 
Carter administration, mentions that ironically, the Reagan doctrine 
...was a replica of the Communists support of national liberation 
movements.11 
Reagans foreign policy was principally directed against the USSR 
and intended to demonstrate the superiority of Western values of indi-
vidual dignity and freedom. Furthermore, the United States wanted to 
rebuild its credibility in the Third World in order to contain and push 
back Soviet influence, even if it required military force.12 The era of 
                                                 
8  Accordingly, Morley finds that generally, the ...doctrine of the bipolar world has 
been resuscitated by the United States in the 1980s. Morley, pp. 1, 2. 
9  There was a somewhat interesting discussion organized by the conservative think 
tank American Enterprise Institute, which provides a sense for the stand of the 
discussion on the so-called Reagan Doctrine. See: Christopher C. DeMuth/Owen 
Harries/Irving Kristol/Joshua Muravshik/Stephen Rosenfeld/Stephen Solarz (par-
ticipants)  The Reagan Doctrine and Beyond, American Enterprise Institute, 
Washington, D.C./London 1987. 
10  James M. Scott  Deciding to Intervene. The Reagan Doctrine and American 
Foreign Policy, Durham/London 1996, pp. 1, 2. 
11  Robert A. Pastor  Whirlpool. U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Princeton, New Jersey 1992, p. 82. 
12  National Security Decision, Directive Number 75, January 17, 1983: U.S. Rela-
tions with the USSR, Secret/Sensitive, in: Christopher Simpson  National Secu-
rity Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations. The Declassified History 
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Ronald Reagan was accompanied by a strict economic policy consist-
ing of free trade, monetarism, or, as its fiercest opponents termed it, 
neoliberalism. The official outbreak of the Latin American debt crisis 
in 1982 brought a lack of alternatives for the countries of Latin Amer-
ica to the international finance regime of the World Bank and espe-
cially of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This decisively re-
duced Latin Americas sphere of influence and action and amplified 
the political influence of the US in the hemisphere due to its clout in 
the international finance institutions and their decisions regarding 
countries creditworthiness. 
In addition, it is important to emphasize that Reagan viewed the 
failure of the Vietnam War principally as a public relations debacle, 
not as a defeat of political strategy.13 As a result, the new administra-
tion focused prominently on PR endeavors to promote its Central 
America policy. 
Furthermore, opposition to US-supported governments repeatedly 
and categorically was labeled as Communist in spite of overwhelming 
evidence that the resistance was mainly community based and mostly 
moderate, influenced by religious and liberal political beliefs.14 How-
ever, when the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua, the USSR 
forcefully supported the Nicaraguan government as well as the Salva-
doran guerrilla forces, at least indirectly. 
Nevertheless, many authors suggest that the beginning of 
Reagans second term in 1985 represented a reversal of the so-called 
Reagan Doctrine, which was also interpreted as the beginning of the 
end of the Cold War.15 In fact, since 1984/85, US-Soviet relations 
abandoned the heated revival of ideological confrontation that had es-
corted Reagans first years in office. The new reformist approach 
symbolized in terms like Glasnost or Perestroika and even more per-
                                                                                                         
of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991, Boulder, Colorado 1995, pp. 
257, 258. 
13  Jeremy M. Brown  Explaining the Reagan Years in Central America. A World 
System Perspective, Lanham/London 1995, p. 223. In addition, Payaslian finds 
that an investigation of the medias impact on foreign aid decisions is necessary. 
Simon Payaslian  U.S. Foreign Economic and Military Aid. The Reagan and 
Bush Administrations, Lanham/London 1996, p. 117. 
14  Brown, p. 250. 
15  See Beth Fischer  The Reagan Reversal. Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold 
War, Columbia/Missouri 1997, p. 145. 
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sonified in the Secretary General of the Soviet Central Committee, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, led to a much friendlier bilateral atmosphere that 
also affected the US policies on Central America. Accordingly, by 
1987 the US policy that developed from the collision between Con-
gress members and the government echoed more congressional than 
presidential views.16 
Meanwhile, the Iran-Contra scandal17 that became public in the 
mid-1980s further diminished the administrations impact on events in 
Central America. US Congress favored a negotiated solution in Nica-
ragua while some hard-liners in Reagans cabinet continued to urge 
support for the right-wing Contras and a continuation of the fight 
against Communism without negotiating. In addition, the highly un-
popular public opinion concerning US involvement in both El Salva-
dor and Nicaragua contributed to the administrations increasing loss 
of influence in the region.18 This also affected the OAS.19 Neverthe-
less, president Reagan received sufficient Congressional support to 
continue the battle in El Salvador for eight years, though he did not 
get similar support for his plans in Nicaragua.20 
With regard to Reagans human rights policy, particularly in Cen-
tral America, the research can roughly be divided into two main cate-
gories. First, liberals and left-wing authors see a double standard: the 
US only accused leftist regimes and supported (or was more sympa-
thetic with) right-wing allies. The second category is composed of 
right-wing or Cold War writers21 who defend Reagans accusations 
against Sandinistas and Soviets as well as his governments affirma-
tive support for traditional allies in question in order to maintain na-
                                                 
16  James M. Scott  Deciding to Intervene. The Reagan Doctrine and American 
Foreign Policy, Durham/London 1996, p. 152. 
17  After Congresss refusal to approve Reagans request for financial support to the 
Nicaraguan armed resistance, the Contras, the CIA sold weapons to Iran and sup-
ported the Contras with the bargained money. National Security staff member 
Oliver North played a prominent role in this affair. 
18  Frances Fitzgerald  Way Out There in the Blue. Reagan, Star Wars and the End 
of the Cold War, New York 2000, pp. 434, 230. 
19  See Stoetzer, p. 200. 
20  Lars Schoultz  Beneath the United States. A History of U.S. Policy Toward 
Latin America, Cambridge/Massachusetts, London 1998, p. 365. 
21  Fowler would speak of bipolar thinkers with regard to Reagans people. See 
Michael Ross Fowler, p. 47. 
Chapter IV 318
tional security goals and contain or even roll back Communism.22 
Cohn provides a recommendable overview of the academic research 
on Reagans human rights performance and concludes that numerous 
scholars familiar with the topic could not settle on a consensus. How-
ever, Cohn herself most agreeably determines that Reagan employed 
the human rights matter as an instrument in a larger war, not as an 
end in itself.23 This human rights policy genuinely served as the 
sympathetic US foreign policy that seemed to be necessary for the co-
existence of domestic circumstantial relativism in other countries. 
It is clear that the US employed different standards in its human 
rights policy. This had already been the case with the Carter admini-
stration. But under Reagans presidency, the application of this double 
standard became even more marked and based on political aims often 
bereft of any human rights concerns. 
Nevertheless, the strong conceptualization of human rights per-
formances and related US policies, respectively, also underwent a 
change during the Reagan years. During his second four-year term, the 
Reagan administration eventually took a stand on human rights that 
was not that different from the Carter government in 1979/1980. Dur-
ing Reagans last years in office, human rights became less politi-
cized. This was not necessarily the result of a new approach from the 
executive, it was due more to the lack of sympathy in Congress for the 
administrations Central America policy in general and the Iran-
Contra scandal in particular. Furthermore, the lame duck phenome-
non during the presidents last year in office probably affected 
Reagans impact in the region as a whole. 
As seen before, the Carter administration had modified its human 
rights policy toward a more practical approach by 1980/1981. So, 
Reagans new stance on basic human rights was not simply a blunt re-
versal of Carters policy, though Coatsworth correctly argues that the 
new administration at first ignored the human rights issue.24 While 
president Jimmy Carter, his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and 
Carters human rights attorney, Patricia Derian, had presented a three-
category human rights definition, the Reagan administration based its 
                                                 
22  In general, see, for instance, Brown, Morley, LaFeber, Coatsworth, Arnson, Fal-
coff, Kramer, Carothers, Wiarda, and Schoultz. 
23  Cohn  Human Rights, pp. 441, 443. 
24  ohn H. Coatsworth  Central America and the United States, The Clients and the 
Colossus, New York/Toronto 1994, p. 170. 
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human rights policy on a different approach. The Reagan government 
began to highlight the close relationship between human rights and 
democracy.25 Referring almost orthodoxically to an academic article 
by political scientist and Reagans later UN Ambassador Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, the Republican government initially insisted on a distinc-
tion between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.26 Schoultz remarks 
that Kirkpatrick, who was described as Chief sadist-in-residence of 
the Reagan Administration by leftist critic Chomsky27, apparently 
took her theory from Howard J. Wiarda with whom she had worked at 
the conservative American Enterprise Institute.28 Donnelly further 
points out that her approach traces back to Arendt and Frie-
drich/Brzezinski (1950s).29 
According to Kirkpatricks theory, traditional right-wing dictators 
were usually perceived as authoritarian rulers who  though violating 
human rights  left some space in society for certain liberties.30 Fur-
thermore, those authoritarian regimes were traditional US allies and 
therefore allowed for a possible improvement to the human rights 
situation through quiet diplomacy. In contrast to authoritarian regimes, 
all Communist governments were considered to be totalitarian re-
gimes, equating those with the institutionalization of human rights 
                                                 
25  Howard J. Wiarda  Democracy and Its Discontents. Development, Interdepend-
ence, and U.S. Policy in Latin America, Lanham/New York/London 1995, pp. 
73/74. 
26  Jeane J. Kirkpatrick  Dictatorships and Double Standards, in: Howard J. Wiarda 
(Ed.)  Human Rights and U.S. Human Rights Policy, Theoretical Approaches 
and Some Perspectives on Latin America, Washington, D.C. 1982, pp. 5-59 (First 
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27  Noam Chomsky  Turning the Tide. U.S. Intervention in Central America and 
the Struggle for Peace, Boston 1985, p. 8. 
28  Schoultz  Beneath the United States, p. 378. 
29  Jack Donnelly  Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca, NY 
1989, p. 237. 
30  Boron quotes Kirkpatrick with regard to the Carter administrations opposition to 
the military coup that prevented the inauguration of elected Bolivian president 
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have welcomed a coup that blocked a government with a significant Commu-
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rats? Some Skeptical Considerations on the Right in Latin America, New 
York/Westport/London 1992, p. 79. 
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violations. Unlike Communist governments, Kirkpatricks concept re-
garded traditional authoritarian regimes to be able to gradually convert 
to democracy. While authoritarian regimes could improve their human 
rights records, totalitarian (Communist) rule did not offer this possibil-
ity because Communism was seen as the ultimate human rights viola-
tion. The neoconservative approach could be summed up as avowing 
that the short- and long-term interests are best served when the US 
protects their allied right-wing regimes.31 Falcoff defends 
Kirkpatricks article against widespread criticism and holds that she 
did not generalize or present a strategy or even expressed sympathy 
with traditional authoritarian regimes. According to him, her only aim 
was to criticize Carters naive approach.32 The author suggests that the 
historical developments in the last decade of the 20th century, particu-
larly in Eastern Europe, have contradicted the justification for 
Reagans human rights distinction, which argued that unlike authori-
tarian regimes, no totalitarian (Communist) regime had converted into 
a democracy.33 
Apart from the loss of pro-Western regimes in Iran and Nicara-
gua, Kirkpatrick further criticized Cyrus Vances categorization since 
it included the  mainly rhetorical  acceptance of economic and so-
cial rights.34 In general, the Reagan administration rejected including 
economic, social and cultural rights in its human rights concept. 
Reagans philosophy that the private sectors entrepreneurial character 
                                                 
31  Sara Steinmetz  Democratic Transition and Human Rights. Perspectives on U.S. 
Foreign Policy, Albany/NY 1994, p. 5. Ironically, the author of this investigation 
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32  Finally, Falcoff describes Reagans Latin America policy as intelligent anti-
Communism. Mark Falcoff  Latin America: Was There a Kirkpatrick Doc-
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Reagan and the World, Westport, Connecticut/London 1997, p. 400. 
33  See Michael Novak  Human Rights and White Sepulchers, in: Howard J. 
Wiarda (Ed.)  Human Rights and U.S. Human Rights Policy. Theoretical Ap-
proaches and Some Perspectives on Latin America, American Enterprise Institute 
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34  Jeane Kirkpatrick  Establishing a Viable Human Rights Policy (1981), in: 
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should stimulate economic growth and prosperity did not match with 
the concept of socioeconomic rights.35 
While the Carter government had counted  at least rhetorically  
socioeconomic rights as human rights, the new conservatives in Wash-
ington limited the basic rights definition to civil and political rights. In 
contrast, for many Latin Americans human rights also included eco-
nomic and social aspects like the right to adequate nutrition.36 Though 
the US-sponsored counterinsurgency or war of low intensity concept 
contained political reforms and economic support, the idea to expand 
its human rights conception to socioeconomic commitments would 
almost have been felt among the administrations officials as a step 
toward Socialism. 
Although there are different interpretations, womens rights did 
not constitute an important aspect of Reagans human rights concept.37 
The research regarding Reagans first years in office, however, is di-
vided: some authors state that Reagan was actually supportive of 
womens rights, but the main view considers Reagan with a 
...simplistic and unrealistic view of womens role in society.38 
The Kirkpatrick doctrine underwent a revision in the mid-1980s 
related to the modification of Reagans hawkish approach in East-
West relations.39 Meier observes a sort of refinement of the two-
forms-of-regimes theory propagated by Kirkpatrick: now, the mid-
1980s Salvadoran experience resulted in a three-categories scenario: 
1) if Communists are in power, they have to be ousted with violence 
(as happened in Grenada), 2) if authoritarians are in charge who face a 
democratic opposition, the US supports the latter (somewhat as in El 
Salvador in 1979) and 3) if authoritarians are in power who merely 
                                                 
35  A. Glenn Mower, Jr.  Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, The Carter 
and Reagan Experience. In: Studies in Human Rights Number 7, Westport 1987, 
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37  Jeane Kirkpatrick was the only woman with cabinet rank during his first term. In-
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Kirkpatrick  Political Woman, New York 1974. 
38  Janet K. Boles  Womens Rights and the Gender Gap, in: Tinsley E. Yarbrough 
(Ed.)  The Reagan Administration and Human Rights, New York 1985, pp. 57, 
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39  See Washington Post, October 27, 1985, p. A9. 
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face a Communist alternative, the United States backs the regime in 
charge. Accordingly, the second aspect broadened the black-and-white 
scheme of Kirkpatricks model. A new approach was employed in the 
Salvadoran case, since the Christian Democratic president Duarte 
fought against extremists from the left and the right. But Secretary of 
State George Shultz was the only government member who favored 
the new approach. Kirkpatrick used an interesting comparison to dem-
onstrate her point of view: if someone directs a knife to another per-
son, there are two possibilities: in one case it is a murderer who wants 
to stab the other to death. In the other case, it is a scalpel of a surgeon 
who saves his patients life.40 The author leaves this elusive metaphor 
without comment. 
In practice, the Reagan administration tried to pursue its human 
rights foreign policy goals with quiet diplomacy41 and ideologically 
shaped double standards. During the Carter presidency, Patt Derian 
had personified the omnipresent voice of perceptible human rights ac-
tivism. Under Reagan, the strategy to discuss human rights shifted 
back to the bilateral quiet discussion preferred by Kissinger. A first 
memorandum showed the administrations position when it proposed 
to return to traditional quiet diplomacy.42  
Besides Kirkpatricks inflationary cited work on US human rights 
Realpolitik, an initial remark made by Reagans first Secretary of 
                                                 
40  Thomas Meier  Die Reagan-Doktrin. Die Feindbilder. Die Freundbilder: Afgha-
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41  For instance, see Richard Schifter  The United States Governments Commit-
ment to Human Rights, in: Howard J. Wiarda (Ed.)  Human Rights and U.S. 
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D.C. 1982, p. 55. 
42  In a memorandum issued before Reagans inauguration, the incoming administra-
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tational approach. The paper further advised to [s]trengthen human rights for 
the long haul through which are more in keeping with the traditional foreign di-
plomacy: the unpublicized meeting, one to one, decisions on human rights ques-
tions and credit change being those of the Latin American governments them-
selves. Consider policy approaches which emphasize not sanctions against viola-
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State, Alexander Haig, also enjoyed popularity among those who de-
scribed the changed mood concerning fundamental rights in US for-
eign affairs. In a press conference in January 1981, Haig stated that 
the new administrations policy would replace human rights with the 
fight against international terrorism because the latter constituted the 
ultimate form of human rights violations.43 Haig reiterated his stance 
at the Eleventh General Assembly of the OAS, where he presented 
three main goals of US foreign policy: 1) the promotion of democracy, 
2) the creation of a new economic opportunity, and 3) opposition 
against interventionism by strengthening the principles of noninter-
vention and collective security. Reagans first Secretary of State added 
that the concept of democracy would include human rights and further 
stressed: The United States opposes human rights abuses regardless 
of the source.44 During his first appearance at the OAS General As-
sembly, Haig further proposed to apply the collective security treaty 
of Rio while speaking of Nicaragua and Cuba. However, he did not 
specify this point in regard to concrete measures.45 
Elliott Abrams succeeded Patricia Derian as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Abrams, a Democ-
rat who supported Reagan in 1980, preferred quiet diplomacy and 
pragmatism. Before Abrams was accepted, the Reagan administration 
suffered its first political defeat when Congress rejected Reagans first 
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candidate, Ernest Lefever, for the post. Lefever was accurately con-
sidered to be too little concerned with human rights and subsequently 
Congress denied approval of his nomination.46 Moreover, almost a 
year passed until Abrams filled the vacancy  a clear indicator of the 
Reagan administrations position on human rights.47 
Initially, the US Congress rejected the new administrations dif-
ferentiation between authoritarian and totalitarian or, in other words, 
between friendly right wing and adversary Communist regimes.48 Be-
sides liberal opponents among Congress members who spoke on be-
half of human rights, there were singular critics from the extreme 
right-wing area as well, though to a lesser extent. US Congress reacted 
to a critical domestic and international public in regards to human 
rights. In the Salvadoran case, as a result of Congressional pressure, 
the president had to present the famous certifications before Con-
gress, with which his administration absolved the Salvadoran govern-
ments in order to justify and authorize military and economic aid to 
that Central American country. These presidential statements served 
to publicly certify that there existed an improving human rights 
situation in El Salvador. Cynthia Arnson provides a detailed explora-
tion of such certification procedures.49 
Ironically, Reagans new human rights policy animated additional 
efforts from human rights NGOs, thereby contradicting the supposed 
decline of the issues relevance after Carters departure from the 
White House. Instead, the number of Latin American human rights 
groups more than doubled between 1980 and 1990.50 For instance, 
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Americas Watch was created as one of the reactions to Reagan taking 
office. 
In general, Latin America enjoyed less overall attention during the 
Reagan administration. Mainly the Central American crisis and the 
debt problem shaped US-Latin American relations. After Reagans 
electoral victory, US policies toward Argentina and Chile shifted. 
Reagan was more sympathetic toward the Pinochet government in 
Chile and the junta in Buenos Aires. The State Department reports on 
human rights records in different countries consistently described the 
situation in Argentina and Chile as improved, though persisting vio-
lations were mentioned as well.51 As early as in 1981, Ambassador 
Kirkpatrick was sent to Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile. During 
her stay in Argentina, Reagans UN Ambassador refused to meet with 
human rights groups.52 
When Reagan came into office, he considered reestablishing mili-
tary aid to Chile. Further, Reagan ceased to oppose loans to Argentina, 
Chile, Paraguay or Uruguay in international financial forums.53 Con-
gress, however, installed a certification program and conditioned aid 
for Chile so as not to support international terrorism and the Chilean 
cooperation in the case of the assassination of Orlando Letelier.54 
Nevertheless, when the new government approached the military gov-
ernments in Argentina and Chile, the main reason for the new rela-
tionships was not exclusively its sympathy with anti-Communist ide-
ology in Buenos Aires or Santiago, but the geostrategic and economic 
importance of Argentina and Chile in the region as well.55 
On the other hand, US relations with Latin America in general and 
Argentina in particular dramatically worsened in 1982 when Reagan 
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did not support the Argentine armed forces during the war on the 
Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The British-Argentine conflict illustra-
tively showed the authentic commitment of the Reagan administra-
tion: at that time, the US would always stick to its historical transat-
lantic partners and NATO members. To Mexican OAS ambassador 
Heller, the Falklands/Malvinas war appeared to be the coup de grâce 
for the organization.56 It remains interesting to review the Argentine 
juntas misperception or even naiveté to have expected the United 
States to be supportive. The obligations contained in the 1947 Rio 
Treaty on reciprocal military assistance did not help the government in 
Buenos Aires either, because by and large the United States had al-
ways substantially carried out a unilateral policy toward Latin Amer-
ica though sometimes almost masterly disguised as multilateral opera-
tion. The disaster of the foolish Falkland war did not only affect the 
incapable armed forces in Argentina, which consequently lost power 
in 198357, but also negatively impacted inter-American relations. The 
OAS lost its credibility and Reagans alliance with British Premier 
Margaret Thatcher paved the way for exclusively Latin American en-
deavors outside the OAS to compensate the de facto paralysis of the 
Organization. In general, US policy toward its southern neighbors 
sped up Latin American unity and the engagement of middle powers 
in the region to engage diplomatically outside the OAS.58 These 
purely Latin American diplomatic efforts materialized in the Conta-
dora Group and the Esquipulas peace process. In 1983, an exclusively 
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Latin American effort was undertaken to resolve the Central American 
crisis. The so-called Contadora group was followed by the Esquipulas 
peace process, which also counted only with Latin American support-
ers. The OAS demonstrated its lack of influence when it was reduced 
to merely express the firmest support for the Contadora process.59 
The Contadora process was merely a well-intentioned attempt to com-
pensate the OAS incapacity to deal with the Central American con-
flicts but was in the end fruitless. However, the Esquipulas negotia-
tions were a diplomatic success for Latin America against the unilat-
eral US stance on Central America that had affected the OAS per-
formance. Jonas, for instance, perceived the signing of the Esquipulas 
Accord in 1987 as a Central American diplomatic achievement, a 
striking defeat for the Reagan administration, whose major diplo-
matic campaign for seven years had been to isolate the Sandinistas 
from the rest of Central America, while trying to overthrow their gov-
ernment militarily.60  
The Esquipulas peace talks since 1987 (Esquipulas II) helped to 
reach decisive achievements and contributed to pave the way for the 
arbitration of the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan armed conflicts. 
The US military intervention in Grenada in 1983 reaffirmed the 
source of Latin American resentment against its northern neighbor. 
Since 1979, the Socialist Maurice Bishop had governed Grenada until 
the orthodox-Leninist section of the government carried out a violent 
coup. After the killing of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, six Carib-
bean countries asked the US for help. Reagan sent troops to invade the 
island in an operation that was declared a US-Caribbean joint effort. 
The United States justified the military intervention in Grenada before 
the OAS with a reference to the ...anarchic conditions, serious human 
rights violations and the bloodshed in that country.61 Obviously, to 
blame the Grenadian government for human rights violations served 
to gain more domestic and international support for the intervention. 
As in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in Nicaragua during the 1980s 
and in Panama in 1989, the US publicly pretended to intervene on be-
half of fundamental rights. In the case of Grenada, the US government 
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even set up a committee to exploit human rights violations and the 
Cuban role for public relations.62 Consequently, the US administration 
had learned the effectiveness of converting human rights into a top is-
sue for public relations endeavors. 
Fifteen out of the twenty-eight OAS Member States present con-
demned the US invasion, though the OAS did not consider any resolu-
tion on the subject.63 Many Member States opposed the US interven-
tion while six eastern Caribbean nations that supported the invasion 
with their own troops defended the operation.64 The protesting Latin 
American States were only able to include an indirect condemnation 
of any direct or indirect interference in domestic affairs of other States 
into a resolution concerning the Contadora peace process.65 The 
Washington Post harshly commented on the absence of any OAS reso-
lution on the military actions as the organizations ...apparently 
chronic inability to act in times of crisis...66 
Nevertheless, the main region to implement the US administra-
tions new human rights approach was Central America. Reagan con-
sidered the Panama Canal treaties as historically inappropriate. The 
new US government tended to see problems in the Third World in 
general and in Central America in particular through the at times 
paranoid perception of an enduring Soviet expansionism.67 This led to 
a marginalization of endogenous and structural factors mostly respon-
sible for the persistence of deplorable human rights records.68 Accord-
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ing to Browns harsh view, the right wing extremism of the Reagan 
administration, its complete reversion to a reactionary Cold War cos-
mology, was manifested in every dimension of its approach to Central 
America.69 
Reagans first Secretary of State, General Alexander M. Haig Jr., 
distinguished himself by an aggressive tone toward real and perceived 
Marxist influence in the region, especially in Nicaragua.70 His succes-
sor George P. Shultz was a more moderate chief of foreign relations 
but also without a pronounced interest in the region. 
Generally, it is fair to say that the Reagan administration backed 
its allies in El Salvador and Guatemala, while it embitteredly fought 
against the left-wing Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. In this context, 
human rights converted into a highly controversial and even embattled 
issue. Carters inconsequent handling of Somocism between 1977 and 
1979, which finally resulted in the Sandinista revolution, probably 
served as an advice for Reagan.71 Accordingly, the United States was 
more sympathetic with anti-Communist governments like the ones in 
Chile, Argentina, El Salvador or Guatemala, and more belligerent with 
left wing or Socialist countries like Grenada, Cuba or Nicaragua. This 
practical application of the Kirkpatrick concept may be labeled as a 
typical US foreign policy, yet during the Reagan period, fundamental 
rights further became part of the ally-enemy picture. Human rights 
were turned into an instrument within the struggle for democracy and 
against Soviet Communism, which was perceived as the Evil Em-
pire from a Reaganesque Cold War perspective. Accordingly, Chom-
sky finds that the level of violations in El Salvador as in Nicaragua 
dramatically grew with the US involvement, while it seems necessary 
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to suggest that in the Nicaraguan case he apparently referred to abuses 
of the Contras.72 
In 1984, the so-called National Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America, installed by Congress and chaired by former Secretary of 
State Henry A. Kissinger, issued a report on US foreign policy goals 
in the region. In general terms, the so-called Kissinger Commission 
portrayed a relatively balanced picture of the Central American situa-
tion by taking into account socioeconomic roots for the persisting vio-
lence and conflicts.73 The documents view and its conclusions dif-
fered from the Reagan administrations approach since it did not per-
ceive national revolutions in the region as a substantial threat to US 
security interests. The report acknowledged violence and repression 
employed under the first Salvadoran juntas and summed up that the 
...period leading up to the 1982 elections was thus one of both reform 
and escalating political violence. But the report still held up the im-
age of left- and right-wing violence with a victimized center. How-
ever, the Kissinger Report counted more than 30,000 killings of non-
combatants in El Salvador since 1979 by adding in parenthesis: This 
seems to be a generally accepted minimum figure.74 With regard to 
Guatemala, the bipartisan inquiry emphasized that also due to the CIA 
involvement in the coup that ousted president Arbenz in 1954, US-
Guatemalan relations had suffered. Therefore, Washingtons influence 
on the Guatemalan situation was not as powerful as with El Salvador, 
Honduras or Costa Rica. The mostly Cuban-sponsored insurgent 
groups in Guatemala were considered to commit more violent acts 
than their counterparts in the region.75 In relation to Nicaragua, the 
Bipartisan Commission denounced the Special Tribunals that tried 
former National Guard members and focused particularly on Nicara-
guas system and its ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba, in addition 
to the governments strategic aims concerning expansion in the region, 
mainly toward El Salvador.76 As a reaction to the report, one goal of 
US policy became to ...counter the intensive Soviet/Cuban/Nicara-
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guan propaganda campaign.77 In accordance, the human rights policy 
also became absorbed by the war on publicity regarding the Central 
American situation. The Kissinger Commission report did not mean-
ingfully refer to the role of the OAS in the Central American conflict, 
and did not mention any function the OAS could play in resolving the 
conflict. 
Obviously, the US was afraid of a Sandinista intervention in Cen-
tral America78 spreading to Costa Rica and Honduras.79 Jonas sees 
Reagan unwilling to democratize the Sandinistas, he just wanted them 
to disappear: In short, it was not the actions of that government but 
its existence that was intolerable to the Reagan administration.80 
Notwithstanding, a secret National Security Decision Directive of 
1984 proclaimed to seek the implementation of the democratic com-
mitments made by the Sandinistas to the OAS in 1979.81 In accor-
dance with its human rights concept, the Reagan administration even 
must have taken this position of entire opposition against the Sand-
inistas, because with Kirkpatricks theory, the very government of 
Nicaragua could be described as the genuine institutionalization of 
human rights violations. Accordingly, Scott considers Nicaragua as 
the place where the Reagan Doctrine found the most publicized and 
controversial application.82 Therefore, any US attempt to pacify the 
region or negotiate peace seemed not to be sincere, because the 
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Reagan administration was always eager to replace the Sandinistas as 
an almost personal compromise.83 
With the US-inspired counterinsurgency activities, Reagan tried 
both to destroy the left-wing guerrillas in Central America militarily 
and to pursue democratic reforms. Though the new term war of low 
intensity should displace the old notion of counterinsurgency, both 
concepts meant to fight the Communist threat while democratizing the 
concerned countries.84 Reagans counterinsurgency concept empha-
sized to win the hearts and minds of the people that should be liber-
ated. While the military war should crush the insurgents, a democ-
ratic campaign plus economic support should serve to establish new 
alliances. The United States further sought to emphasize the human 
rights pledge of the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces (Con-
tras), mainly because such commitment would ensure support by US 
Congress and in the US public.85 
In El Salvador, for instance, the war of low intensity included 
political and economic reforms, accompanied by human rights educa-
tion for the armed and security forces. Nevertheless, those efforts to 
educate potential perpetrators in human rights standards allegedly 
derived more from public relations intentions than from the hope of 
actual implementation.86 In addition, counter terrorism activities con-
tributed to a remarkable increase of the CIA budget that expanded 
faster than the defense budget between 1981 and 1986.87 
The Reagan administration supported the Salvadoran governments 
with huge military and economic aid. As briefly mentioned above, due 
to the extremely high death tolls, particularly between 1980 and 1983, 
                                                 
83  See: Jorge I. Domínguez  US-Latin American Relations during the Cold War 
and its Aftermath, in: Victor Bulmer-Thomas/James Dunkerley (Eds.)  The 
United States and Latin America: The New Agenda, Institute of Latin American 
Studies, University of London/David Rockefeller Center for Latin American 
Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1999, p. 44. 
84  The war of low intensity should linguistically replace the expression counter-
insurgency, because the latter was perceived with a negative connotation after its 
public relations disaster during the Vietnam War. 
85  For instance, see: Briefing Memorandum for the Vice President. Meeting with: 
UNO Leadership, Thursday, March 6, 1986, Office of the Vice President, Confi-
dential Attachment, March 4, 1986 (NSA files). 
86  Michael McClintock  The American Connection Volume I: State Terror and 
Popular Resistance in El Salvador, London 1985, p. 338. 
87  Morley, p. 8. 
Political Conflicts and Civil Wars in Central America 333
US Congress imposed a procedure with which the government had to 
certify an improvement of the human rights situation in El Salvador. 
Though the certification procedures partly faced strong opposition, 
Reagan succeeded with authorizing US support for the Salvadoran au-
thorities. It is interesting to note that besides the linguistic loopholes 
used by the Reagan administration, all certifications included ac-
knowledgments concerning the imperfect situation of human rights in 
El Salvador.88 
In the US State Department reports the Sandinista Revolution was 
primarily depicted as a result of non-revolutionary or outside forces. 
Actually, the Department of State presented two versions: first, a Cu-
ban-initiated conspiracy caused the victory of the Sandinistas. The 
second variant attributed Somozas overthrow to liberal groups, which 
were provoked by the assassination of liberal publisher Joaquín Pedro 
Chamorro.89 Americas Watch repeatedly stated that the Reagan ad-
ministration attacked the human rights practice of the Sandinistas on 
almost every possible occasion.90 However, Americas Watch also 
made policy with its publications, although it appropriately accused 
the Reagan administrations double standards by explicit reports.91 
Likewise, US criticism of Nicaragua was particularly harsh in regard 
to human rights. US diplomats repeatedly stressed the promise made 
by the Sandinistas in 1979, when they announced to convoke democ-
ratic elections toward the OAS.92 US diplomacy singled out three 
main categories to blame Nicaraguas human rights record: the repres-
sion against the Miskito Indians, the treatment of dissidents, and free-
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dom of religion.93 The Kissinger Commission, referring to Amnesty 
International findings, detected that the most widespread human rights 
abuses were committed against the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Indians 
of the Atlantic Coast.94 UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick called human 
rights violations against the Miskito population the most massive in 
Central America and spoke of concentration camps. Reagan com-
pared the mistreatment of the Miskito Indians with Nazi terror and 
virtual genocide (see chapter IV. 2.).95 In contrast, during the first 
years of the Sandinista regime a quite positive human rights situation 
was attested by important NGOs.96 Former Commissioner Farer de-
scribed the US perception of the Nicaraguan situation somewhat cyni-
cally but accurately as a comic-book version of Nicaraguan reali-
ties.97 
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In Guatemala  as in El Salvador  the right celebrated Reagans 
election, ...anticipating a return to the good old days of close U.S.-
Guatemalan relations.98 For some, Guatemalas dictatorship included 
the worst human rights abusers in the Western Hemisphere. During 
the Carter administration, Guatemala had not received military assis-
tance. Reagan, nevertheless, supported the Guatemalan regimes in 
their battle to defeat left-wing insurgency. With some tricks, Reagan 
provided economic and even military aid to Guatemala and reversed 
Carters opposition to international loans.99 The US saw in Guatemala 
that leftists, supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, acted with vio-
lence, which provoked overreactions from the right. In May 1981, 
John Bushnell, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, declared that with regard to the strong Communist support for 
the Guatemalan insurgency, the US had to assist the government.100 In 
December 1982, Reagan met with dictator Ríos Montt and commented 
the encounter by calling charges of widespread human rights viola-
tions in Guatemala as the famous bum rap.101 
Mower states that the position of the US administration concern-
ing the problematic human rights records of the governments in El 
Salvador and Guatemala caused acute doubts about Reagans dedica-
tion to human rights.102 It remains plausible to highlight the fact that 
the United States applied the so-called Reagan Doctrine when it 
fought against the left-wing Sandinista government in Nicaragua, yet 
it strongly supported the Salvadoran authorities in their battle against 
the Marxist influenced FMLN forces. This example of anti-subversive 
and anti-governmental engagement of the US in the isthmus illustra-
tively demonstrates the implementation of Kirkpatricks concept. In 
this context, the handling of both countries by the IACHR is certainly 
of interest and will be discussed further. 
In 1989 the United States carried out a military intervention 
against Panamas government controlled by General Noriega who had 
                                                 
98  Thomas Carothers  In the Name of Democracy. U.S. Policy Toward Latin 
America in the Reagan Years, Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford 1991, p. 59. 
99  Kramer, p. 237. 
100  Carothers, p. 61. 
101  Kramer, pp. 236/237; Chomsky, Turning the Tide, p. 31. 
102  A. Glenn Mower, Jr.  Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, The Carter 
and Reagan Experience. In: Studies in Human Rights Number 7, Westport 1987, 
p. 36. 
Chapter IV 336
been charged in the US for drug trafficking. It must be emphasized 
that the invasion in Panama, discussed in depth in chapter IV. 2., was 
the first unilateral intervention by the United States that was not moti-
vated by anti-Communism.103 
In general, the character of the Organization of American States as 
a US-Latin American organization shifted to a more diversified insti-
tution when many Caribbean countries that had become independent 
joined the organization in the 1970s and the early 1980s.104 The entry 
of the new mainly Anglophone islands led to rise the number of 
Member States from 21 (1948) to 33 (1990). A Latin American dip-
lomat argued that the entrance of many Caribbean Members caused 
that the OAS lost its character as an American organization.105  
Further, the Reagan administration generally distrusted and with-
drew support from many international organizations, including the 
OAS.106 After taking office, the new US government found that its 
two-thirds quota contribution to the OAS Regular Fund were too ex-
pensive. Consequently, it decided to cut its payment by dropping one 
percentage point each year without consultation of the OAS organs or 
the other Member States. In combination with the reluctant payment 
behavior of other big Member States like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina 
and Venezuela, this caused an even more serious crisis than the 
chronic financial calamities traditionally faced by the OAS.107 Unilat-
eral actions of the United States like the support for Great Britain dur-
ing the Falkland/Malvinas war, the invasion in Grenada, and the ab-
sence of a substantial OAS policy on the Central American conflict, 
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reflected the almost apathetic US position within the inter-American 
system. The US-American indifference toward the OAS was some-
what mirrored by the administrations decision to not host the 1987 
General Assembly as planned in San Francisco  explained by the fi-
nancial shortcomings of the State Department.108 The Assembly of 
1987 was considered to be important because the Esquipulas II Peace 
Plan on Central America was to be discussed. What seemed to be a 
reasonable decision regarding the tight budgetary situation of the US 
State Department facing serious budget cuts resulted simultaneously 
in a diplomatic loss of credibility. Commentators stressed that even 
the small island Saint Lucia had hosted the Assembly in 1981, yet the 
meeting not be set up in San Francisco. This caused an additional loss 
of confidence among Latin Americans in the US support for the OAS. 
In general terms, Reagan was unsympathetic to the OAS in gen-
eral and to the inter-American human rights system in particular.109 As 
former IACHR chairman Tom Farer stated: The big change is from 
Carter to Reagan.110 Likewise, a commentator spoke of a 180-degree 
shift of human rights in US foreign policy with the election of 
Reagan.111 Nevertheless, the incoming administration considered the 
Organization of American States as somewhat useful and wanted it to 
deal with regional issues rather than the United Nations.112 This 
somewhat anemic priority given to the OAS mirrored the Reagan ad-
ministrations initial approach toward the organization and serves as 
an explanation as to why the OAS subsequently lost most of its little 
influence. The United States regarded the OAS as useful but failed to 
support it financially and politically. In the end, the Salvadoran case 
illustrates that with its lack of support for the organization, US policy 
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helped create the scenario it was attempting to avoid: The OAS was 
too marginalized to act, so the United Nations eventually succeeded 
with peace negotiations. A US document of the incoming administra-
tion also proposed merely to show interest in the inter-American sys-
tem, without real commitment. Nevertheless, the new administration 
wanted to draw US and Latin American attention back to the OAS, 
but without any substantial dedication of the US.113 Consequently, the 
operation failed. 
The memorandum prepared before Reagan entered office recom-
mended [a]ll speeches and official statements on Latin America by 
officials of the Human Rights area must be cleared by the ARA Assis-
tant Secretary.114 As mentioned before, the ARA was considered to 
be a more pragmatic institution within the State Department, which 
did not place a high priority on human rights concerns. This document 
emphasized that vital US interests were to be a higher priority when in 
conflict with human rights matters.115 Reagan himself presented the 
main goals of US foreign policy at a meeting of the OAS Permanent 
Council in 1982: He depicted the OAS principles of democracy, self-
determination, economic development, and collective security as con-
gruent with US foreign policy.116 On the other hand, Communism was 
considered the mortal sin and categorically associated with totalita-
rism by the US: 
A new kind of colonialism stalks the world today and threatens our inde-
pendence. It is brutal and totalitarian. It is not of our hemisphere, but it 
threatens our hemisphere and has established foothold on American soil 
for the expansion of its colonialist ambitions.117 
With these strong remarks, addressed to the OAS Permanent Council, 
Reagan unequivocally referred to the leftist governments in Cuba, 
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Grenada and Nicaragua, which had become enemies of his administra-
tion. 
During the 1980s, OAS Member States in which human rights 
violations occurred were not mentioned by name in the General As-
sembly resolutions on the IACHR reports. 
Initially, the Reagan administration suggested highlighting posi-
tive achievements in human rights regarding individual countries 
rather than sanctions for bad human rights records.118 This was pre-
cisely what happened with the OAS resolutions on human rights mat-
ters during the 1980s: no Member State was openly accused; the coun-
tries named in the OAS documents were only mentioned positively, 
such as the resolution sections on South American countries that re-
turned to democracy. In conclusion, deliberately or accidentally, this 
constituted an adaptation of US policy for the Organization of Ameri-
can States. To this end, in 1981 the OAS representative of Trinidad 
and Tobago, Victor C. McIntyre, described the Commission as a 
watchdog, a bulldog for the peoples rights but in consideration of 
the approved resolution on the IACHR reports, it was merely a tooth-
less bulldog, an organ that only had a big bark but no bite.119 
During the Reagan years, the OAS resolutions dealing with human 
rights matters shifted toward democracy, a notion that gradually re-
placed the emphasis on human rights protection regardless of the po-
litical system. Nonetheless, the term democracy was very vaguely 
defined only by the mere holding of elections  a sort of key to enter 
the club of democratic nations.120 
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Furthermore, the General Assembly of 1986 adopted a resolution 
on Human Rights and Democracy. In that document, the OAS reaf-
firmed ...the inalienable right of all the peoples of the Americas 
freely to determine their political, economic and social system without 
outside interference, through a genuine democratic process and within 
a framework of social justice in which all sectors of the population 
will enjoy the guarantees necessary to participate freely and effec-
tively through the exercise of universal suffrage.121 Thus, the States 
right to choose freely its political and socioeconomic system was 
limited to one condition: it must be the outcome of democratic elec-
tions. Moreover, the text reflected Reagans stand on democracy in 
Latin America: while the resolution indirectly condemned Nicaragua, 
it absolved the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala because 
they had allowed elections, in spite of how questionable their organi-
zation and results might have been. In general, this resolution reiter-
ated the US administrations priority to legitimize authoritarian re-
gimes through formal elections by which those States were declared 
democratic. Likewise, in the following year, the General Assembly 
resolution on the IACHR Annual Report proclaimed that ...the de-
mocratic system is essential to the establishment of a political society 
wherein human rights can be fully realized... Despite the expressed 
concern over the persistence of serious violations and the unequivo-
cal support for the IACHR, the document again did not name any 
single Member State.122 In 1989, the main political organ of the OAS 
declared the exercise of representative democracy as the best guaran-
tee of human rights.123 
During the 1980s, the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Minis-
ters, the OAS organ to settle conflicts, did not meet to deal with the 
Central American crisis or with the US invasion in Grenada. It is 
compelling to compare this inaction with the Foreign Minister meet-
ings in 1978 and 1979 in which the Nicaraguan situation was dis-
                                                 
121  AG/RES. 837: Human Rights and Democracy, in: IACHR/IACtHR  Inter-
American Yearbook on Human Rights 1986, Dordrecht 1988, pp. 478/480. 
122  AG/RES. 890: Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, in: IACHR/IACtHR  Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights 1987, 
Dordrecht 1990, pp. 908-912. 
123  AG/RES. 1022 (XIX-0/89): Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights, in: IACHR/IACtHR  Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights 
1989, Dordrecht 1993, p. 886. 
Political Conflicts and Civil Wars in Central America 341
cussed extensively. The incapacity of the Meeting of Consultation to 
adopt substantial measures concerning a friendly settlement in the 
Panamanian case in 1989 eventually ushered in the unilateral US inva-
sion in Panama.124 By 1984, investigations on the so-called Orfila 
scandal took more time and gained more attention than the OAS ef-
forts to look for peace in Central America  clearly a sign of the po-
litically paralyzed and inward focus of the organization at the time.125 
In addition, due to the perceived lack of efficiency and financial ex-
travagancies of officials of the organization, the OAS enjoyed a quite 
negative image in the US but also an increasingly unenthusiastic one 
in Latin American countries.126 Furthermore, the human rights topic 
was not a top priority for the US mission at the OAS.127 In the late-
eighties and early nineties, the OAS faced a serious crisis caused by 
the budgetary calamities and its political marginalization during the 
1980s. However, the decent work of the OAS regarding the obser-
vance of the electoral process in Nicaragua in 1990 and the subse-
quent demilitarization of the Contras helped to restore some respect 
for the necessity of such an inter-American body.128 
Tom Farer, chairman of the IACHR between 1980 and 1982, 
fiercely criticized Jeane Kirkpatricks vision of human rights, particu-
larly with regard to Latin America.129 This affected the position of the 
new US administration toward the IACHR. Since the Reagan admini-
stration took office, the relations between the Commission and the 
United States government had worsened.130 There had been reported 
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attempts of the US government to intimidate and even to oust the bel-
ligerent US member Farer from the IACHR because of his activism. 
In general terms, former Commissioner Farer found that the IACHRs 
influence began to erode ...as soon as the Reagan people were in.131 
Farer points out general indifference, ...if not hostility, stemmed from 
more than the predominance in Ronald Reagans Washington of Cold 
War concerns and a fierce determination finally to win.132 Likewise, 
Mexican Commissioner César Sepúlveda found in 1982 that the 
Reagan administrations approach contributed to a worsening of the 
human rights situation.133 A former IACHR official correctly differen-
tiated by arguing that the Commission received strong support when it 
was convenient and less backing if it was not convenient.134 Of course, 
when the IACHR accused Reagans declared enemy, the Sandinistas, 
the human rights complaints of the Commission were highly conven-
ient. A demonstration of Reagans human rights position was the 
nomination of Bruce McColm who eventually succeeded the confron-
tational Farer (see chapters II. 2. and IV. 2.). 
In a declassified telegram from 1983, the Department of State 
clearly demonstrated its stand on the usefulness of the IACHR: 
THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE USE OF 
THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
(THE COMMISSION) AS A FORUM IN WHICH TO ADDRESS 
HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS. ITS WORK IS A USEFUL 
MEANS OF FOCUSING PUBLIC ATTENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS ISSUES IN NICARAGUA.135 
In addition, the US Secretary of State reportedly sought to denounce 
the Sandinistas with petitions from Nicaraguan Jews against the gov-
ernment. The confidential telegram recommended that claims should 
be brought up from private individuals or non-governmental organiza-
tions. The goal of the State Department was to launch complaints 
against the Sandinista regime before the Inter-American Court of Hu-
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man Rights by a third party, since the US, which was not party to the 
Convention, could not present such a petition.136 This document dem-
onstrates that the US attempted to hold accountable the Nicaraguan 
government from a Jewish point of view. It is possible that this might 
have been a strategy to gain influential support within the US, where 
the Jewish community was considered to be a powerful factor, espe-
cially when taking into account the opinion leading media and deci-
sion-making processes. If this was the case, it should be of interest to 
analyze the respective media concerning its coverage of the Nicara-
guan situation. 
With regard to the above-mentioned instrumentalization of human 
rights, the IACHR commented on the illicit employment of basic 
rights for other ends: In its Annual Report for 1986-1987, the Com-
mission strongly condemned the ...use of the human rights topic as an 
instrument of political struggle, either within the countries or by some 
countries against others... and described this practice as ...serious 
perversion of the international legal system of human rights.137 The 
IACHR did not name countries or other actors involved in this politi-
cal struggle, but it was obviously directed to Central America, and 
most probably to the US. 
In conclusion, Reagans policy was per definitionem more ideo-
logical than Carters. Although Kirkpatricks concept provided a more 
ideological basis for a human rights policy, the latter recalled to Kiss-
ingers realist diplomacy. Central America was perceived as the main 
region to fight expanding Communism. It was believed that El Salva-
dor had to be supported in its efforts to prevent the leftist insurgents 
from assuming power. It is admittedly cynical but not completely ab-
surd to assume that the human rights violations committed by gov-
ernmental forces merely constituted a publicity problem for US pol-
icy. Further, Nicaragua under the Sandinistas became a target of US 
intelligence, military, and political attacks. The concept of human 
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rights became a tool during the 1980s: In US eyes, Nicaragua as well 
as Cuba incarnated institutionalized human rights violators, while El 
Salvador witnessed a continuing improvement in this regard, and 
consequently an enduring US support. The broad attention paid to the 
human rights issue in the 1980s, particularly in the Salvadoran civil 
war, also was a result of the extensive media interest and the involve-
ment of numerous human rights organizations and some questionable 
solidarity groups. In regards to the OAS and the IACHR, the Reagan 
administration tentatively tried to use both for their own ends. How-
ever, the United States finally disregarded the OAS and thus contrib-
uted to its eroding influence. Attempts to influence the Commission 
were not fruitful either, but indirectly the lack of decided support from 
the US also had a negative effect on the Commissions stand during 
the 1980s  it could not play such a decisive role in the Central 
American conflicts as it had done before Reagan took office. 
In accordance, the actions of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in the Central American conflicts will be explored in 
more detail in the chapters that follow. 
IV. 2. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
Central America during the 1980s 
In both Western Europe and the United States during the 1980s, public 
attention was focused on the Central American crisis. Pressure groups 
attempted to influence decision-makers in Washington, D.C. to keep 
the US out of El Salvador and Nicaragua. In particular, the human 
rights violations committed by  or attributed to  the governments 
and guerrillas of these two countries received a high degree of media 
interest and coverage. 
In spite of this, the OAS did not discuss the urgent situation in 
Central America sufficiently. This failure is evident in the peace talks 
of the Contadora process and the Esquipulas peace negotiations, both 
of which ultimately contributed to resolving the armed conflicts in the 
region. When Secretary General Alejandro Orfila announced his res-
ignation in November 1983, he disappointedly described the OAS as 
increasingly irrelevant to regional crisis.138 Furthermore, Orfilas 
withdrawal was accompanied by charges of alleged irregularities: The 
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aforementioned Orfila incident largely dominated the media cover-
age on the OAS but also led to an animated internal debate. Accord-
ingly, in addition to the skeptical perception of the OAS in the US, the 
reputation of the organization deteriorated in Latin America as well.139 
In 1985, the Protocol of Cartagena de las Indias was adopted by 
the OAS General Assembly to strengthen the organization and to em-
phasize its commitment to democracy. The adoption of this reform 
protocol was applauded in Latin America as a new step to strengthen 
the organization. Though the Protocol of Cartagena entered into force 
in 1988, it did not substantially improve the institutional efficiency as 
expected. Ultimately, mainly national or regional developments con-
tributed to settling the conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The 
United Nations eventually strengthened those peace efforts  the OAS 
played a marginal role. 
Throughout the 1980s, the main problem facing the Organization 
of American States was financial: Reagans withdrawal of support 
from international organizations coupled with the financial calamities 
of Latin America caused by the debt crisis resulted in a near financial 
collapse. Since the US was reluctant to pay its quota  two-thirds of 
the Regular Fund  the chronic financial bottleneck of the OAS ended 
up in a serious crisis in the late eighties.140 After the reductions that 
cut the organizations bureaucracy to merely 1,000 workers in the 
mid-eighties, the OAS had to fire another 269 staff employees in 
1988/1989. The financial emergency of the organization also threat-
ened activities within the Central American peace processes.141 
Naturally, the IACHR was affected by the political and financial 
crisis of the 1980s that weakened its position in the hemisphere and 
lessened its impact on the human rights situation in some countries. 
During that decade, the IACHR Special Reports mainly dealt with 
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Guatemala, Nicaragua, Cuba, Chile and Paraguay and particularly 
with Suriname and Haiti, which mostly were preceded by on-site ob-
servations. In addition, the Commission addressed issues like the laws 
of full stop or law of invalidity in post dictatorial countries (in this 
case in Argentina and Uruguay).142 In 1983, the Seventh Report on 
Cuba provoked criticism from anti-Castro militants and the US gov-
ernment since it mentioned Cubas positive record regarding socio-
economic rights, in spite of the fact that it clearly condemned persist-
ing violations of civil and political rights.143  
The Commission also monitored the Chilean human rights situa-
tion, specifically in the case of the 1985 Special Report. This fourth 
report on Chile was prepared without an on-site observation and cov-
ered the development of the Chilean human rights situation between 
1973 and 1985. The highly praised document144 revived the well-
known confrontation between the Commission and the military gov-
ernment of General Pinochet.145 In August 1985, the Chilean govern-
ment sought to attack the Commission again by reducing its compe-
tence.146 At the 1985 General Assembly, the remarkable Special Re-
port on Chile faced decided opposition on part of the Chilean delega-
tion. As the Assembly was approaching, the Chilean government con-
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sulted other delegations in order to prevent a resolution on the report. 
Besides still referring to the historical background, which meant the 
foregoing Allende government, the Chilean delegation also blamed 
the IACHR for its use of mainly biased sources.147 The Chilean mis-
sion insisted on a separate voting on the resolution article dealing with 
the Chile report and ultimately succeeded with keeping out the docu-
ment of the resolution. The Commission had also transferred a special 
document on the human rights situation in Suriname that was not as 
successful as Chile, yet it was mentioned in the General Assembly 
resolution on the Commissions reports. In the end, the General As-
sembly of 1985 merely mentioned the outstanding report on Chile in 
the Having seen section and did not refer to it in the resolution itself, 
though it did name the Special Report on Suriname.148 This led the 
Barbadian delegate to accuse the OAS of discriminating small coun-
tries: If Suriname had been a big Member State, it would surely have 
gathered enough votes to keep its name out of the resolution as well, 
and further ...history will question the basis on which this distinction 
was made. The Barbadian criticism was shared by the delegate of 
Antigua and Barbuda.149 It is true that Chile would not have been able 
to keep its name out of the resolution if it had been a small country. It 
is a fact that the larger countries favored themselves and at times ex-
cluded the Caribbean nations. In this case, the well-prepared Chile re-
port certainly merited an explicit mentioning in the General Assembly 
resolution but it did not happen. In contrast, the IACHR did a good 
job in regards to the human rights situation in Chile, which possibly 
was at times a result of the personal dedication of certain personalities 
on the Commission. However, this dedication was not matched on the 
General Assembly level.  
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The relations between the IACHR and the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (IACtHR) in San José left much to be desired during 
the 1980s. Mainly due to personal jealousies and institutional con-
cerns, the communication between the Court and the Commission was 
officially polite but not substantial  some observers made reference 
to tensions. Some at the Commission feared that the Court would 
compete with the IACHR on its title as human rights champion in 
the hemisphere and seemed to doubt the judges real dedication to the 
cause of human rights.150 Reportedly, the General Secretariat did not 
have any relation to the Court, which may explain the distant relation-
ship of the entire organization to the Inter-American Court.151 In con-
trast, some members of the Court and the Commission attempted to 
achieve a better cooperation between both institutions.152 The Com-
missions reluctance, however, to send petitions to the IACtHR was 
problematic since the Court depended on cases sent to it by the 
IACHR.153 Between 1979 and 1984, the Court only received five 
cases.154 Nevertheless, in 1988, the Court succeeded with a high-
profile judgment on the transcendental case of the disappearance of 
Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez in Honduras.155 It is no coincidence 
but rather an illustration of the relationship between the Commission 
and the Court that the Velásquez Rodríguez case entered the Court by 
accident. It is curious to look at the circumstances that enabled this 
historic judgment: Apparently, the IACHR Secretariat sent a case ran-
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domly to the Court  a symbolic gesture of cooperation between the 
two organs more than anything else. The judges of the Court, how-
ever, took advantage of the disordered files and eventually achieved a 
major step in international human rights law. In the end of the decade, 
the relationship between the two main bodies of the inter-American 
human rights system had improved. A former high-ranking IACHR 
official attributed this improvement primarily to the work of IACHR 
chairman Leo Valladares.156 The IACtHR condemned the Honduran 
government with a historical judgment on the crime and requested the 
authorities to pay compensations to the victims relatives.157 The 
judgment was widely seen as a major improvement regarding the right 
to truth and still serves as a reference point in respect to human rights 
law. 
In general, it is not surprising that the IACHR did not play a sub-
stantial role in the Central American peace negotiations since the OAS 
as a whole was marginalized in that debate.158 By and large, the or-
ganizations sphere of influence and action was mainly reduced to 
contributing supporting statements to the peace talks of the Contadora 
and Esquipulas processes.159 
The 1985-1986 Annual Report interpreted the denial of political 
rights as a factor that fueled terrorist acts against governments. The 
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report reiterated the ...organic relation that exists between representa-
tive democracy and human rights... and found that ...authentic social 
peace and respect for human rights can only be found in a democratic 
system.160 Although these comments hardly contrasted from previous 
judgments of the Commission, a changed atmosphere seems to be no-
table. In the reports of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the IACHR fo-
cused especially on the socioeconomic causes for the prevailing vio-
lence. This emphasis on representative democracy mirrored the pre-
vailing atmosphere in the region. At the same time, however, this ex-
clusive democratic prerequisite for human rights mainly considered 
the political system and not the actual socioeconomic conditions as 
foregoing reports did, particularly between 1979-1981. On the other 
hand, it is possible that the Commission concentrated more on the 
drafting of the Additional Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights than on analyzing the concrete impact of those rights in their 
cases. The emphasis on political participation rather than on socioeco-
nomic rights fitted, oddly enough, in Reagans Central America ap-
proach.161  
 
IACHR performance in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Panama  
The 1978 IACHR Report on Nicaragua and the extraordinarily fast re-
action and transmittal of the report to the Meeting of Consultation 
eventually contributed to the fall of the Somoza regime in July 1979. 
The Somoza clan had traditionally repressed an overwhelming major-
ity of the population and employed systematic human rights violations 
to stay in power. These systematic violations under the Somoza re-
gime continued to serve as a justification for the government of the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) due to the need to rees-
tablish order in Nicaragua after the successful revolution of 1979. Be-
tween July 1979 and 1990, the Sandinistas governed Nicaragua with-
out permitting any real democratic standards or political opposition. 
                                                 
160  Annual Report of the IACHR 1985-1986, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68 Doc. 8 rev. 1, 26 
September 1986, Original: Spanish, pp. 2, 191. 
161  In addition, in February 1984 the Commissioners surprisingly found it more con-
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work. This is astonishing because the Central American conflicts were still pro-
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However, the US economic and diplomatic pressure on the Sandinista 
government combined with its massive support for the right-wing 
Contra rebels and CIA operations contributed as well to a deteriora-
tion of the Nicaraguan human rights situation. Furthermore, the 
United States frequently accused the Sandinistas of serious human 
rights abuses and often tended to replace the Sandinistas categorically 
rather than to democratize them.162 In the struggle for human rights 
in Nicaragua, the violations committed by the Contras also influenced 
the human rights debate because it led to a comparison between vio-
lent acts attributed to the government and the armed opposition.163 
In general, the Sandinista government continued to cooperate with 
the IACHR since its first invitation to the Commission to carry out an 
on-site investigation shortly after the revolutionary victory. However, 
the relationship worsened when the human rights situation in Nicara-
gua became increasingly impaired  mainly as a by-product of the 
growing US pressure.164 Initially, the Commission showed some sym-
pathy and good will with the Sandinista government, which resulted in 
a sympathetic view of violations committed during the first months af-
ter the revolutionary victory.165 With regard to the first Commission 
visit to Nicaragua under Sandinista rule, Farer states that it looked as 
if the Sandinistas were going to make a serious effort to protect human 
rights violations. He further sympathized with the difficult circum-
stances the Sandinistas faced.166 In accordance, some Commissioners 
showed a certain understanding for the new government  this most 
likely had to do with the IACHRs strong report of 1978 and its im-
pact on Somozas resignation. In this sense, another former Commis-
                                                 
162  See Jonas, p. 100. 
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sioner holds that there was empathy on part of some Commission 
members and among staff lawyers.167 Nevertheless, also in the initial 
years, the Commission critically reported on detentions and trials of 
former Somocistas without due process168 and the state of emergency, 
arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions and the inappropriate 
treatment of the Miskito Indians from the Atlantic Coast.169 In general, 
the abuses against the indigenous population of Miskito origin as well 
as the controversial Anti-Somoza Peoples Courts, which exclu-
sively sought to try members of Somozas National Guard for crimes 
committed during the dictatorship, became the main topics on the 
IACHR agenda. 
Later on, the Commissions position toward the Sandinistas 
shifted to a more critical approach. Understandably, this provoked un-
easiness on the part of the Sandinista government, which eventually 
blamed the Commission for carrying out US strategies to weaken 
Nicaragua politically. It is not clear whether or not this change was 
originated in a modified view by the IACHR itself or introduced by 
the pressure of the Reagan administration on the Commission. 
Clearly, the human rights situation worsened also as a consequence of 
the US pressure by military and intelligence operations carried out 
against the Nicaraguan government. Accordingly, in 1988 Commis-
sioner Farer wrote: 
Twice in the years following Somozas fall I visited the country as a 
member of the Human Rights Commission of the OAS. A mere 18 
months into the Sandinista era sharp deviations from the democratic 
model were already apparent. (...) The situation of human rights deterio-
rated seriously since my last visit in 1983. I and others opposed military 
pressure in part because we believed (...) that such deterioration was a 
likely consequence.170 
Farer stressed the impairment of the human rights situation but high-
lighted the presence of military pressure that contributed to the wors-
ening of the situation as well. Furthermore, he considered a compari-
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son between Somozas regime and the human rights situation under 
the Sandinistas as unreasonable: The only meaningful comparison is 
between Somoza and the Sandinistas under stress.171 
In 1984, however, Bruce McColm, journalist and human rights ac-
tivist at conservative Freedom House, New York, was presented by 
the Reagan administration and subsequently succeeded the liberal US 
Commissioner Farer. McColm focused on Nicaragua and fiercely 
condemned the Sandinistas human rights practice. In the same year 
that McColm became a member of the Commission, a US lawyer of 
the IACHR staff was accused for having stolen and destroyed files on 
the Nicaraguan cases. It was ultimately decided that the denunciation 
was unfounded.172 Nevertheless, the mere fact that this type of accusa-
tion arose demonstrates that the issue of human rights in Nicaragua 
was a particularly sensitive one. 
Although McColm repeatedly proposed a mediator role for the 
IACHR in the Central American conflict,173 he also became part of a 
polemical dispute on human rights in Nicaragua. In any case, Bruce 
McColm provoked both left-wing liberals in the US and Nicaraguan 
diplomats with his publications on the Central American conflicts as 
Tom Farer had done with representatives of right-wing regimes. Par-
ticularly Nicaraguas Foreign Minister Miguel dEscoto Brockmann 
and Carlos Tunnermann, the OAS Permanent Representative, were 
among McColms most passionate antagonists.174 DEscoto Brock-
mann wanted McColm to be excluded from reporting on Nicaragua 
because he was allegedly biased as shown by his articles on the issue. 
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Further, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister blamed the US member for 
implementing Reagans policy, which led him to conclude that 
McColm did not have the moral quality nor the requested impartiality 
and independence to serve as a Commissioner.175 Indeed, the articles 
authored by McColm had a Reaganish tone, sometimes even using 
Kirkpatricks vocabulary and were highly critical of the government 
in Managua. In one instance, he proposed to take military actions 
against the Sandinistas including ...special operations, air strikes, 
blockades or a last resort, invasion... Accordingly, Nicaraguas Vice 
Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco accused McColm of violating 
articles 19 (nonintervention) and 21 (no use of force, only in case of 
defense) of the OAS Charter.176 Likewise, Ambassador Tunnermann 
criticized the OAS Permanent Representative of the US, Richard T. 
McCormack177, for blaming Nicaragua for its criticism on McColm 
and argued that the United States should first ratify the American 
Convention before teaching human rights lessons to Nicaragua, which 
was already party to the Convention.178 Eventually, IACHR chair-
woman Russomano informed Foreign Minister dEscoto about 
McColms decision to abstain from voting in general and individual 
cases that concerned Nicaragua.179 
As the Sandinista government was clearly unhappy with the 
Commissions criticism on its human rights record, in all likelihood it 
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wanted to portray the Commission as biased by singling out 
McColm.180 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights conducted its 
first on-site visit in Nicaragua under Sandinista rule between October 
6 and 11, 1980. Quickly after assuming power, the Government of 
National Reconstruction invited the Commission to investigate the 
human rights situation in Nicaragua. Six Commission members par-
ticipated in the observation in loco  chairman Tom J. Farer, Marco 
Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Francisco Bertrand Galindo, Carlos Dunshee 
de Abranches, Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro and César Sepúlveda.181 
Recalling the fact that the number of Commissioners somehow re-
flects the importance attributed to an on-site observation, particularly 
if a small country is concerned, the Nicaraguan visit was clearly a sig-
nificant one. However, it is possible that the Commission also wanted 
to enjoy its popularity in Nicaragua as a result of its transcendental re-
port in 1978. On the other hand, the Sandinistas were eager to demon-
strate their disposition to cooperate with the IACHR and to discharge 
upcoming allegations against abuses committed in the aftermath of the 
victorious revolution. The report based on the on-site investigation in 
1980 was quite comprehensive in its tone.182 Though the document 
expressed the occurrence of several violations, it also maintained a 
sympathetic view of the circumstances in the ensuing period after the 
revolutionary change in 1979. 
This perspective is both surprising and reminiscent of circumstan-
tial relativism. First, the Sandinistas argued similarly in regard to dic-
tatorships of the southern cone, hinting at extraordinary circumstances 
that would inevitably provoke individual abuses but not constitute a 
systematic policy. While this is certainly an appeasing opinion, the 
Commission as an unbiased human rights body must have judged the 
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situation in Nicaragua as it did with repressive right-wing dictator-
ships. On the other hand, the Commission partly fulfilled the Sand-
inistas expectation to downgrade the committed abuses as mainly 
individual excesses  a notion that had already been in use by the 
cruel rightist dictatorships of the 1970s. In the case of the latter, the 
Commission correctly repudiated such arguments. With the Sand-
inistas, the IACHRs practice was different, at least initially. Actually, 
the circumstances in post-revolutionary Nicaragua were not compara-
ble to those on the eve of South American dictatorships, yet this still 
meant a highly political statement. 
At the 1981 General Assembly in Saint Lucia, chairman Farer pre-
sented the Report on the situation of human rights in Nicaragua to the 
First Commission and expressed his gratefulness over the cooperation 
the government provided in Managua.183 With respect to the Commis-
sions criticism on deficits concerning political rights, the Nicaraguan 
Representative, Leonte Herdocia, showed his disappointment that his 
government had ratified the American Convention on Human Rights 
and invited the Commission and asked what the IACHR expected af-
ter decades of dictatorship. It was foreseeable that Herdocia men-
tioned the 1978 IACHR Report on Nicaragua as a justification and 
emphasized that the majority of cases included in the 1981 Report, 
particularly those concerning the right to life, took place during July 
1979. Furthermore, the Nicaraguan diplomat appreciated the mention-
ing of economic, social and cultural rights in the IACHR document. 
IACHR president Farer responded that the Report on Nicaragua was 
appropriate and that there existed a lack of political rights in that 
country.184 At the General Assembly plenary session, the Nicaraguan 
Foreign Minister, Miguel DEscoto Brockmann, accused the United 
States of being an extra regional nation, which nevertheless be-
longed to our organization. Further, DEscoto provided a historical 
                                                 
183  On the other hand, Farer criticized the governments of Bolivia and Guatemala for 
their lack of collaboration. OEA/Ser.P/XI.0.2, 4 diciembre 1984, Volumen II, 
Parte II, Undécimo Período Ordinario de Sesiones; Castries, Santa Lucía, Del 2 al 
11 de diciembre 1981; Actas y Documentos, Vol. II, 2a parte, Primera Comisión, 
pp. 36/37; pp. 48. 
184  OEA/Ser.P/XI.0.2, 4 diciembre 1984, Volumen II, Parte II, Undécimo Período 
Ordinario de Sesiones; Castries, Santa Lucía, Del 2 al 11 de diciembre 1981; Ac-
tas y Documentos, Vol. II, 2a parte, Primera Comisión, pp. 74-77, 85, 87/88. 
Political Conflicts and Civil Wars in Central America 357
survey of US imperialism in Latin America and blamed the interven-
tionism traditionally carried out by the United States.185 
When Nicaragua became member of the UN Security Council in 
1982, despite US opposition, the US decided to turn to the OAS with 
its anti-Sandinista battle.186 Again in the subsequent years, the Reagan 
administration attempted to bring the case of Nicaragua to the OAS 
but in general, these efforts failed because Latin American countries 
opposed the US administrations fundamental antagonism against the 
Sandinistas. As in other cases, these events revealed a type of indis-
criminate solidarity among Latin Americans directed against a per-
ceived US hegemony. At the First Committee session of the General 
Assembly in 1982, the Nicaraguan delegate Leonte Herdocia reiter-
ated his governments cooperation with the IACHR and mentioned the 
bloody atrocities committed under the Somoza regime as a sort of 
justification for the Sandinistas struggle. Ultimately, Herdocia dis-
agreed with the Commissions conclusions but nevertheless reiterated 
his respect and affection for the IACHR and its members.187 
During the General Assembly in 1982, the delegations of Mexico, 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago criticized 
the resolution concerning the IACHR reports as too weak because it 
did not mention any Member State by name.188 The representative of 
the Caribbean country, Victor Chrysostom McIntyre, went further 
when he commented: It makes the OAS something like a big laundry 
where soiled articles come in and after some manipulation, after we 
launder them, they come out clean and further: Sometimes, I feel 
that the OAS is a big great mold. For McIntyre, the 1982 resolution 
was a great big whitewash. Exceptionally, McIntyre also empha-
sized womens rights in this context  an incident that is worth men-
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tioning.189 As a reaction to the weak resolution, the Panamanian repre-
sentative, Juan Manuel Castulovich, proposed not to approve any 
resolution on the IACHR reports instead of accepting the watered-
down procedure.190 At the Plenary Session of the 1982 General As-
sembly, the Ecuadorian and Jamaican representatives too deplored the 
increasing weakness of human rights resolutions approved by the 
OAS.191 
These criticisms once again clarify the highly complicated situa-
tion for human rights in the OAS in the early 1980s. The countries that 
wished to emphasize basic rights in resolutions and naming violators 
explicitly had become the minority. In addition, as previously men-
tioned, the dominating priority of the US to underline the struggle 
against (leftist) terrorism or totalitarism did not allow open accusa-
tions of right-wing regimes with questionable human rights records 
because those were protected as friendly governments. 
Verbal battles between Nicaraguan and US diplomats took place at 
the OAS General Assemblies during the 1980s. The Nicaraguan en-
voys continuously blamed the US for its interventionism and since 
1984, repeatedly referred to the sentence of the International Court of 
Justice.192 In contrast, the delegation of the United States steadily 
stressed the Sandinistas commitment to the OAS of July 1979 to hold 
elections and further stressed human rights violations against the Mi-
skito Indians and the political opposition in general.193 
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In May 1982, the Commission carried out another on-site investi-
gation that addressed the situation of the Miskito Indians on the Nica-
raguan Atlantic coast.194 The Nicaraguan government invited the 
IACHR to help achieve a friendly settlement.195 Historically, the 
mainly English-speaking and protestant Miskito population differs 
culturally from the Spanish-speaking, mostly Catholic Nicaraguans, 
and have long sought to gain independence from the State of Nicara-
gua. The Sandinistas, however, wanted the Miskitos to accept their 
model of society. This provoked opposition among the Miskito popu-
lation and ultimately led to the emergence of an Indian resistance that 
attacked the Sandinista armed forces beginning in 1981. In turn, the 
Sandinista government reacted harshly by searching for Miskitos 
across the Northeast of Nicaragua and then deporting an estimated 
number of 8,500. Miskito villages were burnt down, harvests were de-
stroyed and hundreds of animals shot. In addition, thousands of depor-
tations, forced recruitment and torture against the Miskito Indians 
were reported.196 
The title of the IACHR document based on this inquiry caused 
some discussion among the Commissioners. The Commission agreed 
on the following somewhat peculiar but apparently neutral title: Re-
port on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan 
Population of Miskito Origin.197 The Commission report, which was 
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the first IACHR document translated to an Indian language (Miskito), 
concluded that the claims brought up by Indian organizations, mainly 
by the opposition group Misurasata, could only be supported by inter-
national law in one aspect: the right to preserve their culture, the prac-
tice of their religion and the use of their own language. In contrast, the 
IACHR found that the right to self-determination of political auton-
omy was not applicable. The report also denounced killings of Nica-
raguan soldiers committed by opposition forces crossing the Hondu-
ran border, i.e. the Contras. However, [i]n turn, forces of the Nicara-
guan Sandinista Army killed Miskitos during these border confronta-
tions, and the Commission has sufficient information to hold that the 
Government of Nicaragua illegally killed a considerable number of 
Miskitos in Leimus... Further, the IACHR Special Report promul-
gated on arbitrary detentions, relocation and resettlement of the Mi-
skito Indians. Finally, the Commission put the situation of the Miski-
tos in the regional context by expressing hope with regard to the Con-
tadora peace negotiations. The Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights concluded its report by recommending an amnesty for all 
accused Indian Nicaraguans and proposed to hold a conference with 
representatives of the government and the Miskitos under the supervi-
sion of the Commission itself and other international organizations.198 
In a related resolution, the IACHR resolved to accomplish a friendly 
settlement of the conflict, which had not been reached, ...in part, due 
to circumstances beyond the control of the Nicaraguan government 
and expressed its gratitude for the governments cooperation and the 
compliance with some of its recommendations.199 In effect, the Com-
mission did not coincide with Reagans or even the Contras wishes to 
categorically condemn the Sandinistas. On the contrary, the report 
even expressed a certain understanding for the complicated situation. 
Nevertheless, the Nicaraguan government denounced the report by 
criticizing the Commissions view of the situation as a mere internal 
conflict and blamed it for partiality in the applied methodology since 
more attention was paid to the reports presented by the governments 
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opponents.200 Likewise, the Commission also received allegations 
from groups and individuals outside Central America that blamed 
Misurasata leader Fagoth for threatening dissident Miskito Indians and 
the Contras for atrocities against the Miskitos.201 These examples il-
luminate the politization of the human rights issue in the Miskito case 
 either side wanted to profit from the situation but the IACHR 
seemed to be aware of this risk. Interestingly enough, the Commission 
was more informed on the situation than the UN Human Rights 
Commission because of the large amount of material available. 
At the session of the First Committee of the 14th General Assem-
bly in 1984, IACHR chairman César Sepúlveda presented the report 
on the human rights situation concerning the Miskito Indians in Nica-
ragua. Above all, Sepúlveda emphasized the Commissions mediating 
role between the indigenous population and the Nicaraguan govern-
ment, while emphasizing the occurrence of rapes of women in Nicara-
gua during this time.202 The Nicaraguan delegate, Orlando Guerrero 
described the three visits paid by the IACHR to his country as a proof 
of the governments cooperation. Further, Guerrero rejected the accu-
sations of the report and mentioned sectors interested in denouncing 
Nicaragua before the IACHR. Finally, the Nicaraguan representative 
referred to victims of opposite forces who had testified before US 
Congress. As a reaction, US representative Fleischer criticized Guer-
reros speech for its attacks on the US government. Moreover, 
Fleischer stated that Nicaragua was under Cuban-Soviet-Marxist 
domination and strongly accused the elections held as a fraud. 
Fleischer also reiterated his administrations desire that the Sand-
inistas comply with its commitment of 1979.203 In the tense atmos-
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phere that evolved between the US and the Nicaraguan delegates, the 
latter remarked not to speak about the thousands of persons who suf-
fered from US State terrorism.204 
Conversely, US delegate Fleischer described the IACHR as 
...truly the conscience of the Hemisphere and highlighted the Com-
missions findings on Nicaragua. Moreover, the US representative 
criticized the leaving out of the Cuban human rights record.205 On the 
other hand, Nicaraguas representative Guerrero emphasized his gov-
ernments recognized improvements in the area of economic, social 
and cultural rights.206 Then  in regard to the recently revealed CIA 
torture handbook  Guerrero blamed the US policy toward Nicaragua 
as genocide. The reply from Fleischer was the following: The 
Sandinista Front for National Liberation Government is using the 
United States as an excuse to repress its people.207 Unlike the fierce 
disputes in the First Committee, the Plenary Session of the 1984 Gen-
eral Assembly did discuss neither the IACHR Report nor the Special 
Report on the situation of the Miskito population in Nicaragua.208 Ap-
parently, this was also the case because of the aforementioned unspo-
ken Latin American joint rejection of Reagans drastic anti-Sandinista 
policy. The Reagan administration also wanted the OAS to supervise 
the negotiation processes initiated by the Contadora Group. Neverthe-
less, as in foregoing years, the OAS Member States did not appreciate 
US efforts to use the Organization to implement Washingtons Central 
America policy. When in 1984 a US National Security Council docu-
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ment somehow became public, informing on the administrations in-
terest to block Contadora, the unhappiness with the United States po-
sition grew among OAS States. Accordingly, Vandelaan concludes: 
The OAS had essentially adopted Nicaraguas position.209 
In the Annual Report for 1984-1985, the Commission again dealt 
with the situation of the Miskitos. In general, the IACHR concluded 
that several rights were restricted due to the emergency situation.210 
However, between the lines still a sort of sympathetic understanding 
was noticeable. Nevertheless, the Nicaraguan OAS diplomat Orlando 
Guerrero reminded the Commission of human rights violations com-
mitted by irregular armed groups  the Contras  and as expected fur-
ther blamed the US for CIA actions, the mining of harbors and the 
discovered torture handbook. As always, a Nicaraguans exposition 
provoked a US envoy to respond indignantly (and vice versa): as a 
countermove, US representative Fleischer accused the Sandinistas for 
human rights abuses.211 
The 1985-1986 IACHR report appropriately described the admit-
tedly complex situation of human rights in Nicaragua including the 
involvement of the right-wing Contras and the covert CIA activities. 
The IACHR came to the conclusion: The situation sketched here 
generates a vicious circle which has a severe, adverse effect on the 
human rights situation.212 This deduction somewhat mirrored the 
prevailing attitude of the major faction within the Commission. Al-
though it is an agreeable statement, an international and supposedly 
impartial human rights organ should have balanced more between a 
States human rights performance and influencing circumstances in 
order not to appease violations or justify such abuses by external fac-
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tors.213 In other words, it is highly questionable whether the Commis-
sion was entitled to pronounce such political comments to explain the 
human rights situation in a Member State  in contrast, it did not men-
tion any involvement of the US in the Salvadoran case. In fact, the 
Commission actually rejected the governments argument not to per-
mit an on-site investigation due to the current US aggression.214 The 
aforementioned Annual Report further referred to governmental 
measures against the Catholic Church, criticizing the deplorable con-
ditions in Nicaraguan prisons as an alarming situation. Accordingly, 
the Commission concluded that it was profoundly concerned over the 
serious human rights situation in Nicaragua.215 
While Nicaraguas OAS representative Rita Delia Casco explicitly 
referred to all the items of the Nicaragua section of the IACHR report 
at the 1986 General Assembly, she further mentioned the bloody 
State terrorism and the cruel US war of aggression against her 
country and stressed the International Court of Justice sentence 
against the United States. Nevertheless, she also used a statement con-
tained in the 1981 Special Report, which disclaimed the existence of a 
policy of violation against the right to life against political enemies, 
including former National Guard members.216 This clearly illustrates 
the risk of the Commissions initial sympathetic view of the Sandini-
sta government: now, the authorities in Managua could use positive 
findings  how outdated they might be  to present themselves as 
guardians of human rights. The US envoy, Xenia Wilkinson, however, 
replied with a simple remark: I do not believe that governments can 
be forced to commit human rights abuses against their own people.217 
Undoubtedly, this quote could find consent, but in regard with the ac-
tual US policies at that time and the human rights performance of the 
Contras, the displayed US decency remains an empty human rights 
rhetoric not far from hypocrisy. Further, Nicaraguas envoy Moncada 
additionally emphasized that the Annual Report itself and its presenta-
tion by the very chairman of the IACHR would prove the direct re-
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sponsibility of the US.218 Again, either side politicized the IACHR re-
port. 
The Permanent Representative of the United States, Richard 
McCormack, welcomed the democratic accomplishments in El Salva-
dor and Guatemala and blamed the Marxist guerrillas for the human 
rights abuses. On the other hand, McCormack accused Cuba and Nica-
ragua on their human rights records. The US diplomat further used the 
IACHR reports to prove Nicaraguas bad human rights record by 
stressing ...a systematic pattern of gross human rights violations by 
the Nicaraguan Government.219 Nicaraguas Orlando Moncada re-
sponded by holding the US guilty, stressing the World Courts sen-
tence and the pending ratification of the American Convention on 
Human Rights.220 
In sum, the US delegations always criticized Nicaraguas human 
rights violations and by contrast the Nicaraguan diplomats blamed a 
US genocide that made own abuses unavoidable. 
Although Nicaraguas president, Daniel Ortega, headed his OAS 
delegation at the General Assembly in 1987  an unprecedented 
event221  the same procedure of diplomatic US-Nicaraguan clashes 
took place at that meeting.222 Again, the events of 1978/1979 in gen-
eral and particularly the 1978 Special Report of the IACHR that 
fiercely condemned the Somoza regime, apparently served as a sort of 
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justification or even as a right to exist for the Sandinistas.223 The 
Commissions 1986-1987 Annual Report mostly dealt with the newly 
adopted Constitution and evaluated in detail its impact on the Nicara-
guan human rights legislation, which contained rights of the first as 
well as of the second generation of human rights. Due to reports on 
summary executions by the Sandinista Popular Army and the suspen-
sion of the legal remedies of Amparo and Habeas Corpus during the 
renewed state of emergency, the Commission expressed its deep con-
cern.224 
In 1988, member Marco Tulio Bruni Celli, Executive Secretary 
Edmundo Vargas Carreño and staff lawyer Luis F. Jiménez visited 
Nicaragua. Though the sub commission found the state of emergency 
still in effect, the Anti-Somoza Courts were dissolved and the corre-
sponding cases were being transferred to regular courts. Furthermore, 
the IACHR noted the effects of the Esquipulas peace process, which 
led to the release of prisoners, pardons and a conditioned amnesty. 
The latter, however, was linked to a cease-fire by the Contras. Like-
wise, Foreign Minister dEscoto Brockmann reiterated that the state of 
emergency would end with the cease of the war against Nicaragua.225 
Nevertheless, the Esquipulas peace agreement particularly showed an 
impact in Nicaragua, including the establishment of national recon-
ciliation commissions. In short, the IACHR Annual Report for 
1987/1988 stressed that the situation of human rights experienced 
some significant but precarious advances mostly due to agreements, 
which caused a reduction of the intensity of the armed conflict.226 In 
the subsequent year, the IACHR participated in the process that led to 
the partial release of persons serving prison sentences imposed by 
Special Justice Tribunals of the initial phase of the Sandinista rule. 
Further, members of the Sandinista Popular Army were sentenced to 
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prison terms between five and thirty years because of human rights 
violations. Moreover, the IACHR report for 1988-1989 covered the 
electoral process in Nicaragua and finally hoped with regard to the 
right to life that ...the Government will continue investigating and 
punishing those responsible for the violations reported and will refine 
current law with a view to protecting the personal safety of detain-
ees.227 In a separate chapter of the aforementioned document, the 
IACHR reported on its activities concerning the release of prisoners 
sentenced by Special Tribunals of Justice in accordance with the 
agreement of Sapoá between the Nicaraguan Resistance and the gov-
ernment. The Sapoá accord was reached on March 23, 1988 in the 
context of the Esquipulas process.228 At the 1989 General Assembly, 
representative Guerrero used the debate on the Additional Protocol to 
the American Convention on the Abolition of the Death Penalty to in-
directly accuse the US for not even having ratified the Convention and 
further for executing minors and mentally disabled persons.229 Fur-
thermore, he criticized US president Bushs comment that if opposi-
tion candidate Chamorro won the elections, the US would suspend the 
trade embargo against Nicaragua, as interference in the Nicaraguan 
electoral process and an attitude that contrasted with international 
public law.230 What followed was the known exchange of blows be-
tween US and Nicaraguan diplomats, which further were carried on at 
the plenary session.231 
Contrasting to preceding IACHR documents, the Annual Report 
dealing with 1989/1990 merely dedicated three pages in the countries 
section to the situation in Nicaragua, which mirrored the changed at-
mosphere after the electoral victory of the conservative opposition 
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coalition UNO. Nevertheless, the report also mentioned irregularities 
during the electoral campaign.232 
At the General Assembly of the OAS in June 1990, the hemi-
spheric situation had notably changed: while the Nicaraguan elections 
were a major step to ease up tensions between the United States and 
Latin American countries, the military governments in Chile and 
Paraguay had opened the way for a democratic transition. 
Finally, the 1990-1991 Report dealt with the human rights situa-
tion in Nicaragua since the new government led by Violeta Chamorro 
took office and saw some positive and significant developments, 
though there were still outbreaks of violence. This optimistic view 
was further clouded by persisting democratic deficits, especially con-
cerning the security forces. The latter hampered the new executive be-
cause they acted on behalf of one political party. Although not explic-
itly mentioned, the IACHR obviously referred to the FSLN.233 The 
following 1991 Report brought up similar concerns.234  
In summary, the IACHR accompanied the US-Nicaraguan conflict 
but could neither decisively contribute to an arbitration nor to improve 
the situation. Although it covered the Nicaraguan human rights situa-
tion adequately, the Commission was merely reduced to supervise and 
support the ongoing negotiation efforts. The IACHRs critical stock-
taking of US actions against Nicaragua put the human rights situation 
in that country in a different context. However, this explanation of the 
circumstances aggravating the human rights situation was of a highly 
political nature and included the risk of partly justifying abuses of the 
Sandinistas. 
In contrast to the cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador, there have 
not been many available sources concerning the Commissions han-
dling of the human rights situation in Guatemala. In that country, the 
human rights situation was less determined by the new black-and-
white coordinates imposed by Reagans Cold War prism as in El Sal-
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vador and Nicaragua, but at large, it also seemed to be more complex. 
In general, the oligarchic hierarchy combined with a highly unequal 
distribution of wealth and land characterized Guatemalan society. In 
addition, this unfair allocation affected a disproportionate amount of 
the large indigenous population. Unlike in Nicaragua  save the ex-
ception of the Miskito Indians  and El Salvador, the problem of gen-
eral discrimination and human rights violations against the indigenous 
population had a key role in Guatemala. Notwithstanding, the case of 
Guatemala will not be discussed as detailed as the Nicaraguan and 
Salvadoran situation. In the late seventies, general unrest ushered in 
violence. As Dunkerley distinctively remarks: In a political culture 
such as Guatemalas, the macabre task of disaggregating the death toll 
by party affiliation is often needed to help identify shifts in govern-
ment policy.235 The US-backed coup in 1954, which ousted president 
Arbenz, paved the way for 40 years of military regimes conserving old 
class privileges.236 The perpetual military rule convinced opposition 
reformists of the necessity to fight with arms against the uniformed 
leaders. The URNG (National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala) 
constituted the main insurgent force, while the extent of material sup-
port from the USSR or Nicaragua still remains uncertain. Dunkerley 
further holds that the Guatemalan elite was eager to collaborate with 
the United States.237 In accordance, Guatemalas authorities welcomed 
Reagans victory but relations were also affected by Congressional 
disdain for Guatemalas military and Guatemalan resentments tracing 
back to the US role in president Arbenz overthrow in 1954. Between 
1978 and 1986, the governments in Guatemala were visibly or de 
facto dominated by the armed forces. In August 1982, General Efrain 
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Ríos Montt overthrew the government of Fernando R. Lucas who had 
ruled the country between 1978 and 1982. General Ríos Montt himself 
was ousted in August 1983 by a military coup led by his Minister of 
Defense, General Oscar H. Mejía Vitores. Between 1986 and 1991, a 
democratically elected civilian government headed by the Christian 
Democrat Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo ruled Guatemala though Cerezos 
five-year term witnessed several coup attempts. The IACHR carried 
out investigations in loco in 1982, 1985, 1988 and 1990. 
It is remarkable that the conservative Commission member Fran-
cisco Bertrand Galindo served simultaneously as Salvadoran ambas-
sador to his neighbor country Guatemala. This actually must have im-
plied a certain lack of complete independence and impartiality  at 
least with regard to the Member State to which Bertrand Galindo was 
accredited.238 According to the IACHR files and interviews, there 
were at least serious suspicions that the Salvadoran member did not 
comply with the expected impartiality and confidentiality.239 It was 
reported that the Salvadoran ambassador tried to influence the result 
of the Commissions findings on Guatemala by attempting to encour-
age less critical reports on that country. However, there is no reliable 
evidence to confirm the allegations.240 Whether he deliberately aimed 
to portray Guatemalas human rights situation in a better light or not, 
such attempts were not especially successful: in the end, the Commis-
sion approved three highly critical reports on Guatemala between 
1981 and 1985. 
In January 1980, the Guatemalan government invited the IACHR 
to conduct an on-site observation in its territory. The significance of 
this invitation was minimal, however, when two communications by 
the Commission to set up a date for the visit went unanswered by the 
Guatemalan government. As a result, the IACHR assumed that ...the 
Government of Guatemala is not interested in having the Commission 
observe the human rights situation in situ.241 Nevertheless, IACHR 
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chairman Sepúlveda also expressed concerns about the Commission-
ers personal security in Guatemala.242 The Commission regretted that 
it had to prepare the Special Report on Guatemala without the vital in-
formation it would have obtained during its stay in the country, but ul-
timately such a document was created.243 This report came to the con-
clusion that an alarming climate of violence persisted and political 
leaders of the opposition, trade unionists, priests, lawyers, journalists, 
professors, teachers and thousands of peasants and Indians were 
among the most affected victims. While the Commission stressed 
abuses like illegal executions and forced disappearances, the IACHR 
report also mentioned that socioeconomic disparities contributed to 
generalized violence.244 Likewise, the 1980-1981 Annual Report of 
the IACHR informed that the right to life was one of the most affected 
in Guatemala.245 In the subsequent Annual Report, the human rights 
situation in Guatemala was not specifically mentioned  apparently 
because the 1983 Special Report was being prepared to address the is-
sues, so the IACHR saw no need to mention Guatemala in its report.246 
On May 29, 1982, the IACHR received another invitation to visit 
Guatemala, this time from the new military junta. This on-site investi-
gation took place between September 21 and 26, 1982. Chairman 
Monroy Cabra, first vice chairman Sepúlveda, Dunshee de Abranches, 
Farer and Bertrand Galindo composed the special commission.247 The 
participation of the latter was notable since he had served as ambassa-
dor of El Salvador to the host country. The sub commission inter-
viewed various representatives of the government and other sectors, 
visited detention centers and finally issued its preliminary findings. In 
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its conclusions, the IACHR report states that there was no knowledge 
about government investigations on human rights violations. Though 
the Commission acknowledged a slight improvement of the situation, 
it mentioned that human rights violations continued. Finally, the 
document recommended investigating and punishing violations, com-
pleting the review of trials by the Special Courts and ending the re-
pression in rural areas immediately. The Commission urged to inves-
tigate and to punish human rights abuses against Indians and peasants, 
the main victims of massacres.248 Unlike the 1981 Special Report, this 
report did not include separate chapters on economic, social and cul-
tural rights, though the previous document had identified the socio-
economic disparities in Guatemala as the main source for violence and 
social unrest. The report also mentioned the coup in August 1983, 
which overthrew the government whose human rights practice was 
subject of the report.249 The Annual Report for 1982-1983 mentioned 
that the violence in Guatemala had decreased since General Ríos 
Montt took power in August 1982. Although his regime ...abolished 
the use of paramilitary groups in Guatemala City and other urban cen-
ters..., human rights violations remained in rural regions. The IACHR 
document of 1982/1983 also reported on violations committed by the 
guerrilla forces. Further, the fact that Ríos Montts successor, his for-
mer Minister of Defense, General Mejía Vitores, abolished the Courts 
of Special Jurisdiction was seen as an improvement. Before, the 
Commission had considered these Courts as most significant violation 
of the right to a fair trial and due process.250 
This leads to the question of whether or not an IACHR report on 
the human rights performance of an ousted government had the poten-
tial to indirectly support the new executive to justify a coup due to 
violent practices of the preceding regime. Certainly, this was the case 
in various occasions but it was an inherent risk the Commission had to 
take. 
In May 1985, an IACHR sub commission composed of chairman 
Sepúlveda, members Aguilar, Monroy Cabra, McColm, Assistant Ex-
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ecutive Secretary David Padilla and staff lawyer Manuel Velasco 
Clark carried out another on-site investigation in Guatemala. A large 
part of the Special Report based on such observation in loco was dedi-
cated to the topic of forced disappearances. Further, this Third Special 
Report mainly dealt with the typical Guatemalan issues of the so-
called development polls, inter-institutional coordinators, civil self-
defense patrols and its effects on the rural and indigenous population. 
As in foregoing publications, the IACHR recognized that the latter 
constituted the group that was the most affected by human rights vio-
lations in Guatemalan society. Accordingly, the Commission was wor-
ried about the reporting on the rural and indigenous population and 
their rights to life, personal integrity, security and personal liberty. 
However, the document also mentioned the role of the guerrilla for the 
human rights situation. The IACHR stressed that it could only evalu-
ate the aforementioned governmental programs from a human rights 
perspective.251 Likewise, the 1984-1985 Annual Report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights provided a detailed, well-
informed and appropriate portrayal of the human rights situation in 
Guatemala. Surely, this was because it coincided with the Third Spe-
cial Report based on the on-site visit. As the Special Report, the An-
nual Report also highlighted forced disappearances as the major hu-
man rights problem and criticized negative effects on basic rights of 
the governmental programs mentioned above.252 
The subsequent Annual Report covering the period between 1985-
1986 mainly dealt with the democratically elected government headed 
by Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo who assumed power on January 14, 1986. 
When Cerezo Arévalo took office, the National Constituent Assembly 
ended and the new Congress was established, and the new Constitu-
tion entered into force. Moreover, the Commission applauded the new 
executive when it withdrew Guatemalas reservation  referring to the 
application of the death penalty  made on ratifying the American 
Convention. In general, the Commission observed a notable improve-
ment of the human rights situation once the new government began its 
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work. Even though the new president did not anticipate trials of the 
military, he announced that he would support the Supreme Court if it 
decided to try armed forces members for human rights abuses. Not-
withstanding, president Cerezo Arévalos opinion was not to purge the 
military of all abusers, but to leave this problem behind. As a result, 
the new president was accused for not investigating human rights vio-
lations sufficiently. Nevertheless, in the judgment of the IACHR all 
human rights abuses and violent acts dramatically decreased includ-
ing death squad activities, although forced disappearances did not 
stop. Finally the IACHR concluded that besides the realized advances, 
human rights problems still remained, particularly due to widespread 
violence outside the presidents control.253 In 1986, the OAS General 
Assembly gathered in Guatemala City. With this symbolic meeting the 
organization supported the newly elected government.254  
Nevertheless, the report dealing with the years 1986-1987 found 
that although the government had demonstrated its willingness to im-
prove the human rights situation, serious restrictions regarding the ob-
servance of fundamental rights persisted. The Commission report rec-
ognized that the government of president Cerezo Arévalo ratified the 
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and that Guate-
mala became the ninth country that accepted the jurisdiction of the In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights. The first human rights prosecu-
tor was also sworn in. Notwithstanding, besides the good intentions 
shown and initial measures undertaken by Cerezo, ...a perceptible 
decline in the observance of human rights occurred immediately after 
the first months of his government. The Commission further criti-
cized that no serious effort had been made to investigate the cases of 
forced disappearances while death squads returned to act. Moreover, 
the Commission received reports on illegal detentions and mistreat-
ment of prisoners. In sum, despite of the initial improvement, the new 
government was reluctant to investigate disappearances and anew 
faced the old human rights problems.255 
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In accordance, in its next Annual Report the Commission an-
nounced to request another on-site observation due to the serious 
situation. Nevertheless, the Commission observed a major progress 
of the human rights situation in Guatemala although it expressly con-
sidered the violations of the right to life still as alarmingly great.256 
Furthermore, the Commission expressed its gratification that Guate-
mala finally had a democratic government after a long period of mili-
tary rule.257 Ironically, the aforementioned situation was threatened by 
two coup attempts in 1989. The OAS Permanent Council expressed its 
support to the democratic process in Guatemala with regard to the un-
successful coup on May 9, 1989.258 Also due in part to the Esquipulas 
process, the repatriation of refugees began. The IACHR remained 
concerned with the notorious and controversial massacre of El Agua-
cate, where 21 peasants were killed in 1988. In its 1988-1989 Annual 
Report, the Commission concluded that progress had been made re-
garding the observance of human rights, though forced disappearances 
continued. Further, the report stressed that [n]otwithstanding the ef-
forts undertaken by the civilian authorities, in order for human rights 
to be adequately protected in Guatemala the military and police must 
be subordinated to the judicial authorities... and that violence could 
not be combated with violence.259 
In its 1989-1990 Report, the Commission stated that it received 
fullest collaboration by the Guatemalan authorities. Further, the 
IACHR cheered substantial advancements concerning the consolida-
tion and institutionalization of democracy, though it did mention a re-
vived guerrilla activity. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that 
during 1989-1990, ...the most serious increase in violence and human 
rights violations during the term of President Cerezo had occurred.260 
Accordingly, US Permanent Representative Luigi Einaudi told the 
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General Assembly that his delegation considered the situation in Gua-
temala to be grave.261 
In the subsequent report, the IACHR was even more pessimistic: 
serious human rights violations continued, reports on abused street 
children reached the Commission and attacks on local human rights 
activists took place. Furthermore, sources were mentioned, which hy-
pothesized that Guatemala was on the way back to the dark past of the 
1980s. The IACHR report discouragingly summed up the develop-
ments between 1986 and 1990: 
During the first months of the presidency of Vinicio Cerezo there was a 
perceptible improvement in the human rights situation which ceased as it 
became clear that real power in Guatemala remained outside civilian 
control.262 
At last, the IACHR came to the conclusion that the human rights 
situation in Guatemala had deteriorated and affirmed an alarming 
climate of violence throughout the country. In response to this prob-
lem, the Commission decided to prepare another Special Report on the 
situation in Guatemala.263 In the subsequent Annual Report, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights again highlighted the con-
nection between the critical socioeconomic conditions and the very 
serious human rights situation in Guatemala. In November 1990, 
Jorge Serrano Elías won the presidential elections in the second round. 
During the campaign 20 politicians and two journalists were mur-
dered.264 
Guatemalas civil war had not officially ended before 1996 and a 
certain level of violence continued after the signing of the peace ac-
cords. During the period of this study, the Inter-American Commis-
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sion monitored the events in Guatemala and published three critical 
special reports between 1981 and 1985. Since 1986, the Commission 
demonstrated a more sympathetic view but it noted deficiencies in the 
human rights field as well. 
Besides the organizations role as observers in the Central Ameri-
can conflicts, the Panamanian situation briefly became a main topic at 
the OAS. Ironically, the Panama crisis in 1989 also offered a unique 
opportunity for the organization: since US president George Bush 
wanted to demonstrate his administrations commitment to multilater-
alism, the OAS was perceived as well-suited to handle the problem as 
opposed to the US marines.265 General Manuel Noriega had dominated 
the government in Panama since 1987. His involvement in drug traf-
ficking had seriously damaged US-Panamanian relations. Neverthe-
less, as Stoetzer points out, the 1989 crisis was not exclusively a ques-
tion of drug trafficking problems but could be traced back further to 
the US inability to control the powerful Noriega.266 
General Noriegas forced peace caved in as a result of civilian pro-
tests leading to a serious political crisis in mid-1987. He tried to oust 
his second-in-command, Roberto Díaz Herrera who had publicly de-
nounced Noriega for serious crimes. A broad opposition movement 
emerged around Díaz, seeking Noriegas removal. The president vio-
lently repressed the protests. Conniff summarizes that the 1987 crisis 
exposed the dictatorial nature of the regime and resulted in a re-
proach against General Noriega by the US Senate. This ushered in an 
unusual situation for the US, as it had to cooperate with the Panama-
nian authorities regarding the canal but it simultaneously was begin-
ning to promote the regimes removal from power in early 1988.267 
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The US laid sanctions on the government but Noriega could politically 
survive a coup attempt. When US invasion plans became common 
knowledge and were the subject of discussion, Noriega could gain de-
clared support by almost all Latin American governments that spoke 
out against a US military intervention.268 Conniffs comment is eluci-
dating: Even the most unsavoury and disgraced regime could extract 
political capital from defending national sovereignty. After George 
Bushs success at the US presidential elections in November 1988, 
Noriega hoped to have a friend in the White House since Bush had 
been CIA Director in the 1970s. Noriega had also been working for 
the CIA and had had some personal encounters with Bush. In spite of 
this, the Bush administration supported Noriegas challenger in the 
May 1989 elections logistically and financially. When a likely victory 
of the opposition candidate Guillermo Endara became clear, Noriega 
nullified the elections and thus provoked decided criticism from the 
OAS Member States, particularly from the United States.269 The year 
1989 also witnessed a series of major changes in international politics: 
the Berlin Wall was torn away, the US faced problems with China in-
cluding the massacre at the Tiananmen place which shocked the inter-
national community, and in El Salvador the November offensive of 
the FMLN as well as the assassination of the Jesuits captured attention 
(see chapter IV. 3.). In this context, US-Panamanian tensions were ini-
tially smoothed by the incoming Bush administration through the 
delegation of the conflict to the OAS. In September 1989, Noriega ap-
pointed a façade president who did not get recognition from the US. 
The Bush administration had now decided getting rid of Noriega was 
imperative and tried to convince him to resign, stirred up conspiracies 
and even promoted a coup by dissident officers, which failed in Octo-
ber 1989. After the coup did not remove Noriegas regime, the US fo-
cused on a military intervention to get rid of Noriega.270 The OAS 
Member States were still hesitant to give the United States any sort of 
authorization for intervention. Farer suggests that this behavior ironi-
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cally deprived Latin American OAS Members of any influence on the 
invasion.271 In this context, the stand of the OAS and the function of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights are both interest-
ing; more so because academic research has widely neglected the 
Commissions role. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights prepared a 
Special Report on the human rights situation in Panama based on an 
on-site observation that took place between February 27 and March 3, 
1989. After this visit, another on-site investigation was planned by the 
IACHR. The Commission repeatedly attempted to persuade the 
Panamanian government to permit another visit. In April 1989, before 
the electoral fraud, Panamas Foreign Minister Jorge Eduardo Ritter, 
however, complained to Secretary General Baena Soares that the 
Commission had adopted the oppositions position, which identified 
with the US opinion. Further, Ritter blamed the IACHR for supporting 
the US aggression against Panama.272 
The OAS itself sought to find a solution for the crisis once US in-
vasion plans began to spread. In May 1989, shortly after the Panama-
nian electoral swindle, Venezuelas president Carlos Andrés Pérez so-
licited the OAS to call for Noriegas resignation before the OAS for-
eign ministers gathered. As in other occasions, Venezuela became the 
main speaker to articulate criticism on a government of another Mem-
ber State that did not comply with democratic rules and human rights. 
Along with other OAS members, Pérez stressed that the organization 
should take a similar stand to that during the Nicaraguan crisis in 1979 
 a comparison that received much attention.273 In the same month, an 
OAS Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers convoked by Vene-
zuela considered the outrageous abuses against the opposition274 and 
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set up a mission consisting of three OAS foreign ministers to deal with 
the Panamanian crisis. The conference was overshadowed by the fi-
nancial crisis that, strictly speaking, ushered in the organizations 
formal incapacity to pay for the meetings costs.275 The president of 
the Meeting of Consultation requested that the IACHR undertake a 
new investigation of the Panamanian situation as soon as possible to 
complete and update its information on the human rights situation in 
that country.276 The OAS repeatedly extended the mandate of the me-
diator mission composed of the Foreign Ministers from Ecuador, Gua-
temala and Trinidad & Tobago. The impatient US government did not 
welcome this extension of the diplomatic missions directive.277 The 
three-minister mission unsuccessfully sought to find a compromise 
within the strained relationship between traditional nonintervention-
ism and hemispheric uneasiness about Noriegas conduct.278 The re-
port from the three foreign ministers stated that the mission had re-
peatedly and frequently received denunciations concerning human 
rights violations committed by government agents. Furthermore, the 
missions document accused the US of military maneuvers  pointing 
the finger at US officials and holding them responsible for the break-
down of the mission.279 In the end, the mission failed after three 
months and the OAS efforts to negotiate the situation ended without 
ousting General Noriega  the main goal of the Bush administra-
tion.280 This provoked impatience in Washington with the OAS and 
paved the way for unilateral US action.281 The incapacity of the OAS 
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to settle the conflict further seemed to justify the prevailing reluctance 
among US Congress members to pay the due $40 million to the or-
ganization.282  
Nevertheless, shortly after the inability of the foreign minister 
mission to mediate, the IACHR tried to convince the Panamanian au-
thorities to permit another on-site investigation.283 On September 12, 
1989, the Panamanian Vice Foreign Minister, Norberta Tejado Cano, 
invited the Commission to conduct an investigation in loco from No-
vember 1989 on  a step that was cheered by the IACHR, which pro-
posed a visit between November 6 and 9, 1989.284 Unfortunately, the 
correspondence of the IACHR does not clarify the circumstances that 
finally thwarted the carrying out of an on-site observation.285 The 
IACHR even attempted to convince the Panamanian government to 
permit a visit after the November 1989 General Assembly, nine days 
before the US invasion occurred  without success.286 There is reason 
to believe that the IACHR actually wanted to prevent US military ac-
tion against Panama, though this did not stem from any alleged sym-
pathy for the Panamanian government. It is argued here that it was the 
reluctant Panamanian government that impeded a probably helpful in-
vestigation of the IACHR before December 1989. Regrettably, the 
IACHR could not act as a mediator as it had done in former occasions. 
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Its Special Report on Panama resulted in a predictable politicization 
particularly at the General Assembly of the OAS. 
In its 1989 Special Report dealing with the human rights situation 
in Panama, the Commission mainly highlighted inhumane treatment, 
violence of the police and other abuses. In general, however, the con-
clusions were adequate and not as harsh as one might expect. How-
ever, the report called the government devoid of constitutional le-
gitimacy.287 
At the General Assembly in November 1989, the discussion on the 
Panamanian human rights situation and the IACHR Special Report on 
Panama monopolized the debates of the First Committee. IACHR 
chairman Jackman presented the Panama report before the Assembly. 
He explained that the Commission had sought to comply with the re-
quest of the Consultation Meeting to arrange an on-site visit with Pa-
nama before the General Assembly. Panamas Permanent Representa-
tive, José M. Cabrera Jované, defended his government and the con-
troversial elections in a detailed reply. Cabrera accused the Commis-
sion of interference in domestic juridical decisions and compared the 
situation in other countries. While in other countries in the hemi-
sphere, death squads operated, in the grave Panamanian crisis, there 
were no disappeared citizens. Furthermore, the Panamanian ambassa-
dor called the IACHR document partial with regard to political rights 
and as one of the instruments to condemn us. In addition, Cabrera 
attempted to draw parallels with Nicaragua, which had been the vic-
tim of an aggression for ten years. For Panama, the IACHR wording 
of US diplomatic and economic sanctions was interpreted as a bru-
tal aggression on the part of North-American imperialism.288 Fur-
thermore, the Panamanian representative accused the US of providing 
financial support for the opposition during the electoral process and 
international observers for criticizing the May elections. In reference 
to the Commissions finding that the annulment of the May elections 
ripped the Panamanian government of its constitutional legitimacy, 
Cabrera suggested that the IACHR served as an instrument to carry 
                                                 
287  See: Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76 
Doc. 16 rev. 2, 9 November 1989, Original: Spanish. 
288  OEA/Ser.P/XIX.0.2, 29 abril 1991, Volumen II, Parte II, Décimonoveno período 
ordinario de sesiones, Washington, D.C., Del 13 al 18 de noviembre de 1989, 
Primera Comisión, pp. 204-206 (Jackmans presentation), pp. 206-221 (Panamas 
rebuttal). 
Political Conflicts and Civil Wars in Central America 383
out US foreign policy.289 Chairman Jackman later rejected this harsh 
reproach against the Commissions integrity.290 Also in reply, the US 
delegate, Maisto, rebuffed Panamas accusations regarding a politiza-
tion of human rights by the OAS or the IACHR as an insult to the 
OAS and its Members and made clear that Noriega was the decisive 
figure in that country. For Maisto, the Commission report on Panama 
was suitable; he repeatedly referred to and even quoted the IACHR 
document during his speech.291 This would seem to suggest that the 
US used the IACHR report for its ends  to accuse the Noriega gov-
ernment.292 As a result, the Panamanians accused the US delegate of 
presenting the Commission report on Panama as an indictment against 
the government.293 In reply to the US diplomat, the Panamanian repre-
sentative again scolded the United States for politicizing the human 
rights issue and called the Commission to act impartially in considera-
tion of US endeavors.294 Subsequently, the delegations of Costa Rica, 
Venezuela, Barbados and Argentina explicitly supported the IACHR 
report dealing with Panama. Cabrera, the Panamanian ambassador, re-
plied that he wished to establish democracy but that the US was im-
peding this process. The Panamanian delegation also received assis-
tance from the Nicaraguan representative, Guerrero, who questioned 
why Panama was singled out while worse human rights abusing gov-
ernments were never mentioned.295 
At the plenary session, the controversies and battle of words be-
tween the US and Panamanian delegations continued. A discussion 
evolved on whether to include a separate resolution on the Panama re-
port. Finally, the proposal was approved with 25 votes in favor to one 
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negative vote and no abstentions.296 In accordance, besides mentioning 
of the deplorable Panamanian human rights situation in paragraph 4 of 
the resolution on the IACHR reports,297 the General Assembly adopted 
another document referring to that particular situation in the country. 
This was the first time in a decade that a single Member State was 
scolded by a political OAS main organ with a separate resolution. The 
document on Panama accused the government and clearly expressed 
...deep concern over the serious violations of fundamental rights and 
liberties Furthermore, the OAS resolution distinguished between 
the Panamanian people and the government. Despite the emphasis on 
nonintervention and an explicit call not to intervene unilaterally in 
Panamanian affairs, the aforementioned section furthered US goals by 
expressly separating a human rights abusing government from the in-
nocent Panamanian population.298 In accordance, Luigi Einaudi, US 
Ambassador to the OAS, called Latin American delegations to support 
US endeavors in Panama without inappropriately relying on the non-
intervention principle.299 Unfortunately, from a US perspective, the 
OAS did not do so and thus military force was seen as unavoidable to 
solve the crisis in Panama. On December 20, 1989, approximately 
14,000 assault troops invaded the country and carried out the so-called 
Operation Just Cause installing military control. As expected, the 
OAS condemned the invasion by a 20-1 vote and the adopted resolu-
tion deeply regretted the military intervention. Moreover, the OAS 
urged to withdraw the foreign troops used for the intervention.300  
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A Panamanian OAS representative later described the perception 
of the OAS in Panama after the US invasion, referring to its Spanish 
abbreviation, OEA, as follows: Olvidemos Ese Asunto (Lets forget 
this issue).301 At the extraordinary meeting of the Permanent Council, 
US ambassador Luigi Einaudi defended the military intervention with 
the systematic human rights violations exposed in the IACHR re-
port.302 While Chile, Brazil, and Haiti refused military action, Nicara-
gua fiercely condemned US aggression. Washingtons ally El Sal-
vador was the only Member State that explicitly expressed a sympa-
thetic attitude, because in its view Panama had provoked the US.303 
The Panama invasion constituted the largest action carried out by US 
military since the Vietnam War. Finally, Noriega surrendered and was 
imprisoned on charges of drug-related crimes. The US established his 
challenger of the 1989 elections, Endara, as the new president.304 In 
accordance, at the 1990 General Assembly, the new Panamanian OAS 
representative applauded the IACHR and its chairman for their impar-
tiality and the Commissions support during the crisis.305 Kenworthy 
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notes that US military interventions in Latin America showed an in-
creasing tendency toward unilateralism: While the intervention in the 
Dominican Republic (1965) was formally accompanied by OAS 
troops, and the Grenada invasion (1983) requested and supported by 
members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, the military 
take-over in Panama in 1989 was clearly an exclusively unilateral ac-
tion.306 Furthermore, as pointed out before, the Panama invasion con-
stituted the first US intervention during that period not motivated by 
Cold War concerns. 
In summary, the OAS gave its last demonstration of ineffective-
ness during the period of this investigation since it could have pres-
sured Noriega to permit a substantial IACHR investigation and to fol-
low the Commissions recommendations vigorously. On the other 
hand, the United States once more demonstrated its lack of sensitivity 
to Latin American national sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, the hemispheric situation changed significantly in 
1989/1990 when several events ushered in a less politicized environ-
ment, which directly impacted the human rights issue. The Canadian 
representative took the chair, which had been set out for this North 
American country at the Pan American Union, the OAS predecessor, 
in 1910.307 Canada alleviated the tight financial situation as the second 
largest contributor to the OAS budget, but also remained a human 
rights advocate.308 Further, Canada was seen as a counterpart to the 
predominant and national security focused United States. The OAS 
also had the potential to regain some international respect through its 
electoral observation missions.309 Furthermore, the loss of the Sand-
inistas in the 1990 elections smoothed the Central American tensions. 
In addition, the political battles were gradually displaced by economic 
and trade concerns: the South American customs union MERCOSUR 
and the historic North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
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were created. President Bush, who for the most part abandoned 
Reagans unilateralism toward Latin America at least rhetorically, 
proposed the famous Enterprise for the Americas, which called to 
establish a free trade area covering the entire hemisphere. This was 
surely a remarkable shift for inter-American affairs as well as for pol-
icy issues: trade politics  besides the problem of drug trafficking  
converted into an essential link for US-Latin American relations. Ob-
servers spoke of a capitalist consensus in Latin America that eventu-
ally replaced the last redeemers of the dependence theory.310 Natu-
rally, the return of many dictatorships and authoritarian regimes to a 
democratic transition constituted the major advancement in regards to 
the prevailing pro-democracy climate. 
In this context, in 1991 there glimmered hope for democracy and 
human rights within the inter-American system. At the General As-
sembly in Santiago de Chile in June 1991, the OAS Member States 
adopted resolution 1080, which limited the nonintervention principle 
to a sensitive extent.311 After the regional redemocratization and the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the end of the East-West confrontation also 
decreased rivalries in international organizations. This contributed to 
an elevated willingness among governments to accuse human rights 
violations in other States. With the Santiago Commitment, the OAS 
Members anew promised to strengthen representative democracy and 
to promote the observance and defense of human rights. At the same 
time, the Member States agreed on a mechanism to react collectively 
upon military coups or the interruption of the democratic process, re-
spectively. In accordance with resolution 1080, the Secretary General 
is responsible for initiating a process with which the organization can 
realize appropriate measures such as economic sanctions in reaction to 
a coup within 10 days.312 This meant de facto a sensitive limitation of 
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the once sacrosanct principle of nonintervention. Accordingly, Schna-
bly points out the importance as the firm rejection of any claim 
that a states adherence to human rights norms, or a militarys over-
throw of an elected government, is purely a matter of domestic con-
cern.313 Likewise, former Chilean foreign minister and social scientist 
Heraldo Muñoz regards the democratic commitment of the 1991 gath-
ering as a historic step.314 A Commissioner interpreted such resolu-
tion as a repudiation of the repressive past.315 Besides resolution 1080, 
the OAS Assembly further adopted an action program, prepared by 
the Permanent Council, which outlined the Strengthening of the OAS 
in the Area of Human Rights. Such resolution 1112 recommended 
that the IACHR Annual Reports include an overview on the general 
situation in the hemisphere as well as on one particular right or situa-
tion agreed on by the General Assembly. Furthermore, the document 
called the Commission to consider the activities of irregular groups as 
well as the impact of continuing unfavorable economic conditions 
on the human rights situation. Moreover, the IACHR was asked to re-
gard the rights of minors, women, the handicapped, minorities, irregu-
lar migrants, refugees and displaced persons.316 In general terms, be-
sides the broadening of the Commissions human rights approach, the 
nonintervention principle, the major legal, even semi-philosophical 
weapon frequently used in the battle on human rights, suffered a deci-
sive institutional defeat at the gathering in 1991. 
At the 1991 General Assembly, which often has been called a his-
torical meeting, the Commissions former Executive Secretary, Ed-
mundo Vargas, hosted the OAS community in his country as Vice 
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Foreign Minister after many years in exile. As expected, he promised 
his governments full support to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, not without indirectly praising his role at the head of 
its Secretariat by recalling the reports on Nicaragua, Argentina, Chile 
and other countries.317 The 1991 gathering saw a plenty of goodwill 
speeches on behalf of democracy and human rights as well as several 
resolutions in this respect. 
With regard to the quick OAS action concerning the Haitian mili-
tary coup against elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Septem-
ber 1991,318 Schnably observes a general tendency toward the accep-
tance of interfering in domestic affairs of States to protect human 
rights or democracy.319 The OAS applied resolution 1080 firstly in the 
Haitian case (1991) and then as a reaction to Peruvian president Al-
berto Fujimoris so-called autogolpe (self-coup) in April 1992, when 
he dissolved the congress by decree.320 Moreover, the OAS also pro-
tested against the attempt of a self-coup by Guatemalan president 
Jorge Serrano Elías in May 1993. It is argued here, however, that the 
prevailing view of 1991 was overly optimistic. Human rights received 
more attention during the 1990s at the OAS, but the IACHR was often 
attacked by governments of the Member States for exceeding its 
mandate. 
In summary, the 1980s witnessed a Commission that emphasized 
the natural connection between human rights and representative de-
mocracy. The repeated reference to democracy as a necessary compo-
nent for observing human rights paralleled to a certain extent 
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Reagans reduced notion of democracy, which was preponderantly de-
fined by elections.321 Remarkably, the Central American conflict did 
not play as prominent of a role in the Commissions work during the 
1980s, as should have been expected. 
The IACHR was also affected by the organizations increasing in-
significance largely provoked by financial shortcomings. In spite of 
this difficulty, the Commission made successful accomplishments: for 
instance, besides the drafting of very helpful human rights conven-
tions,322 it reported on the situation in Guatemala, Nicaragua and 
Chile. Nevertheless, the OAS General Assembly did not heed the 
Commission and so contributed to its lack of influence. As a result, 
the tremendous dynamic that had shaped the IACHR performance par-
ticularly between 1974-1980 got lost because important impulses from 
outside were missing. No Member State in Central America was actu-
ally threatened by a condemning General Assembly resolution based 
on a devastating IACHR report  times had changed. 
As seen in the previous chapter, Reagans Latin America policy 
and his administrations human rights concept focused primarily on 
Central America. The United States supported El Salvadors conserva-
tive regime both diplomatically and materially in its struggle against 
the leftist insurgents of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) and combated the Sandinista government in Nicaragua with 
economic sanctions, CIA measures, and logistical and material sup-
port for the right-wing Contras. However, the abuses carried out by 
the Sandinistas were not equal to the human rights violations commit-
ted by Salvadoran governmental forces.323 In this context, although 
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human rights entities such as the IACHR traditionally do not compare 
situations in different countries, a comparison is relevant in this case. 
The situation in El Salvador will be addressed in the following chap-
ter. 
IV. 3. The Commissions Realpolitik: The Case of El Salvador 
(1980-1991) 
The 1978 Commission report on El Salvador based on the on-site in-
vestigation in January 1978 undoubtedly had extraordinary impor-
tance (see chapter III. 2.). Although internal discussions and IACHR 
Secretariat shortcomings resulted in the delay of the General Assem-
blys treatment of the report, it can still be considered as one of the 
most blunt documents prepared by the Commission. Finally, similar to 
the Nicaraguan case in 1978/79, the handling of the report by a politi-
cal organ of the OAS contributed to  or in this case, most probably 
advanced  a radical change of Salvadoran government. So, besides 
the historical impact of the Nicaraguan report, the document on the 
Salvadoran human rights situation presented in 1979 also counts as 
one of the most critical and influential reports ever issued by the 
IACHR.324 
In contrast to the significance of the 1978 document, the Report on 
the situation of human rights in El Salvador published after the civil 
war in 1994, merely relayed the Commissions activities during the 
armed conflict. Nevertheless, it could not explain and did not attempt 
to explain why the IACHR had not issued any Special Report on El 
Salvador between 1979 and 1992, the years of the bloodiest confronta-
tion in the countrys current history.325 During the 1980s, on several 
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occasions, the IACHR insisted on an on-site investigation in Salva-
doran territory. Although the government of El Salvador principally or 
rhetorically agreed to an investigation in loco, such a visit did not take 
place before 1986. Furthermore, the IACHR was not able to present 
such an impressive performance on behalf of human rights  particu-
larly in Central America  as it had been the case in the late 1970s. It 
is even more astonishing that the Commission did not play a decisive 
role during the 1980s in the Salvadoran armed conflict, because El 
Salvador had been party to the American Convention on Human 
Rights since 1978, and even possessed a monist legal system.326 This 
must lead to many questions, among which these prevail: Why could 
the Commission not carry out an on-site observation before 1986 and 
why did it not issue any Special Report on El Salvador until 1994? 
Was it lack of political support, obstacles set up by the powerful play-
ers or even unwillingness among the Commissioners themselves that 
led to such an omission? This chapter deals with a series of failed at-
tempts at an IACHR on-site visit before 1986 and attempts to investi-
gate the reasons for the absence of special reports on El Salvador dur-
ing the 1980s. 
During the 1970s, highly unfair distribution of land and wealth led 
to social unrest in El Salvador and ushered in the establishment of 
various partly armed opposition groups. On October 15, 1979 a civil-
ian-military junta ousted the regime of General Carlos Humberto Ro-
mero and justified its coup mainly with the human rights violations 
committed by Romeros government. In fact, the US-backed coup was 
dispatched to prevent a revolutionary change like the Sandinista revo-
lution. Initially, many Latin American countries and the United States 
welcomed the takeover of the junta. As one of its first encouraging ac-
tions, the civilian-military alliance issued several decrees considering 
human rights enforcement, agrarian reforms and amnesty laws.327 
Subsequently, however, the new government could not halt the nu-
merous and massive human rights violations committed by security 
and armed forces as well as by semi-governmental groups and death 
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squads linked to the military. In 1980, the repression reached its first 
peak and the major armed opposition forces united and formed the 
left-wing National Liberation Front Farabundo Martí (FMLN). In 
1980 and 1981, the war between the Salvadoran government and the 
Marxist-inspired guerrillas erupted. This war lasted nearly 12 years. 
During the conflict, the United States feared a military takeover by the 
Soviet-supported leftist rebels and backed the center-right govern-
ments regardless of their human rights records  also a consequence of 
the Nicaraguan experience. The years between 1980 and 1983 marked 
the darkest period of recent Salvadoran history when reportedly up to 
30,000 civilians lost their lives. Besides the abstract death tolls, many 
prominent cases converted the bloody conflict in the most densely 
populated Central American country into an international public inter-
est arena. In March 1980, the famous human rights defender and cou-
rageous theologian of liberation, Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero 
was murdered by death squads. In November 1980, several opposition 
leaders were abducted, tortured and killed and in December, four US 
churchwomen were kidnapped, raped and slain by members of the Na-
tional Guard.328 The latter case led the Carter administration to sus-
pend military aid for the Salvadoran armed forces. However, Carter 
reinstalled military support for El Salvador in January 1981 to prevent 
a military victory by the FMLN guerrilla forces. In 1978, Carter em-
phasized that the US should not support governmental forces that were 
engaged in serious human rights violations except in extraordinary 
circumstances.329 Apparently, the guerrillas Ofensiva Final of Janu-
ary 1981, which threatened the US-backed government junta, was 
such an exception. Facing the dread of a Marxist guerrilla military 
takeover, Carter reinstalled military aid three days before leaving of-
fice and requested a $5 million military credit for El Salvador.  The 
money was to support the government of Christian Democrat José 
Napoleón Duarte, who had become president of the junta in late 
1980.330 Duarte served as Salvadoran president between 1980 and 
1982 and from 1984 to 1989. The PDC (Christian Democratic Party) 
became the main ally of US endeavors to contain and fight the leftist 
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insurgency.  At the same time, the Christian Democrats helped Wash-
ington maintain the executives air of a presentable civilian govern-
ment. Accordingly, with regard to the military offensive launched by 
the Salvadoran guerrillas, the change from Carters closing Realpolitik 
 influenced by arguments of the domestic circumstantial relativism  
to Reagans sometimes paradoxically pragmatic ideological war, did 
not appear as abrupt as expected.331 In Reagans Central America pol-
icy, El Salvador was perceived as a textbook case of Communist in-
terference.332 Therefore, anti-Communist governments had to be en-
dorsed by the US in order to prevent the fall of the next domino.333 
In accordance, Washington consistently defended the human rights 
practice of the Salvadoran authorities despite injecting informal criti-
cisms of its own. 
The human rights NGO, Americas Watch, noted a propaganda war 
based on human rights led by the Reagan administration against the 
FMLN.334 Consequently, Americas Watch found in 1982 that ...the 
State Department has shown only selective respect for the human 
rights findings of the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador and that the basis 
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for this selectivity appears to be political.335 On the other hand, ac-
cording to US sources referring to FMLN documents, the FMLN be-
gan to activate a so-called humanitarian front and was eager to di-
minish US support for the government.  It did this by exploiting the 
governments human rights violations since 1984 and by providing 
disinformation to international institutions like the UN Human 
Rights Commission and the IACHR.336 Despite Reagans efforts to 
force El Salvadors military and security forces to respect human 
rights minimum standards, his endeavors lacked credibility since the 
United States was determined to prevent a FMLN takeover at all 
costs.337 Likewise, Bonner commented illustratively on the quasi-
vicious circle of US influence on El Salvadors human rights perform-
ance: The Salvadoran armed forces received the human rights lectures, 
but despite the threat of reduced aid if abuses persisted, they continued 
the killings.338 Finally, Diskin and Sharpe conclude that both the 
Carter and the Reagan administrations often overestimated their influ-
ence on the situation in El Salvador.339 Practically, this meant that the 
role of the IACHR was  at least in theory  of more importance, 
since an institution mainly perceived as Latin American would have 
gained more attention among OAS Members. 
Despite several deficiencies, the elections in 1982, 1984 and 1988 
were increasingly democratic and served to present El Salvador as a 
democracy that fought against leftist terrorists and some right-wing 
radicals. The IACHR judged the questioned elections in 1982 as a sign 
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337  How could the Salvadoran military take seriously U.S. threats to cease aid if 
Washington repeatedly made clear its intention to prevent a rebel victory? Ben-
jamin Schwarz  American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador, Santa 
Monica 1991, p. 40. 
338  Raymond Bonner  Weakness and Deceit. U.S. Policy and El Salvador, New 
York 1984, pp. 12/13. 
339  Martin Diskin/Kenneth Sharpe  The Impact of U.S. Policy in El Salvador, 1979-
1985, from the series: Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 27, Berkeley 
1986, p. 1. 
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that there is a desire among the people for a democratic govern-
ment, and a definite solution to the internal conflict340  
So, El Salvador did not appear as a typical right-wing dictatorship 
crusading to eradicate a rhetorically exaggerated, or even imaginary, 
leftist subversion because it actually faced an armed opposition. The 
Salvadoran governments were painted in Christian Democratic colors 
until 1989, though its armed and security forces continued to violate 
fundamental human rights. In other words, among OAS Member 
States, the Salvadoran situation was not as clear as, for instance, the 
one in the southern cone dictatorships. According to this complexity 
and the actual military threat by the Marxist guerrillas, the authorities 
in El Salvador received political support from Christian Democrats in 
Latin America and strategic and military assistance from the United 
States. 
Although the Christian Democrat, José Napoleón Duarte, won the 
presidential elections in 1984 and promised to end human rights viola-
tions, the initial notable improvement did not last and serious abuses 
persisted. However, the fact that Duarte headed the junta since No-
vember 1980 and again in 1984 led to the silent support of Christian 
Democrat allies. In 1989, the right-wing party ARENA (National Re-
public Alliance) assumed power after an electoral victory over the 
Christian Democrats. In November, the assassination of Jesuit priests 
and their housekeepers by members of the armed guerrilla forces re-
vived the heated debate on human rights in El Salvador both domesti-
cally and internationally. 
In the late eighties, a working paper from the Salvadoran Foreign 
Ministry mentioned the following States as friendly governments: 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela341, Honduras 
and Brazil. It further named the direct contact and logistical support 
from the US.342 
                                                 
340  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1981-1982, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57 Doc. 6 rev. 1, 20 September 1982, Original: Spanish, p. 117. 
341  See: Roy Gutman  Banana Diplomacy. The Making of American Policy in 
Nicaragua 1981-1987, New York 1988, p. 162. 
342  Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Plan de Trabajo a seguir con relación al 
mandato sobre El Salvador en la cuestión de los derechos humanos, con avances 
hasta 1989, without date, p. 21 (Files of the Salvadoran Foreign Ministry, FMES 
files). 
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Especially since the situation in El Salvador was more complex 
regarding its regional and international impact, it must be of the high-
est curiosity to learn how the renowned Human Rights Commission of 
the OAS reacted. The research on El Salvadors human rights situa-
tion during the civil war has extensively examined the human rights 
violations committed by government and paramilitary forces. Further, 
the multiple roles of the United States and the mediating efforts of the 
United Nations have been subject to prolific research as well. How-
ever, the positions of the OAS and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) during the conflict still constitute a gap of re-
search. Beyond the expert interviews, the author has had the privilege 
to assemble sources from the National Security Archives, the Salva-
doran Foreign Ministry files and IACHR correspondence concerning 
El Salvador. Accordingly, this inquiry seeks to provide a new perspec-
tive on the role the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
played during the armed conflict. 
Interestingly, the 1978 Special Report on El Salvador was the first 
that included a chapter on socioeconomic rights. The main reason for 
the bitter conflict is attributed commonly to the structural discrepan-
cies in Salvadoran society between landowners and poor peasants. The 
oligarchic elite repressed the farm workers to maintain the unjust so-
cioeconomic system. Consequently, in the 1970s, growing violent re-
sistance against the ruling class tightened the vicious circle of vio-
lence, which thereby became a consequence of the inequality and an 
origin of violent acts itself. Since the Commission also regarded the 
chronic disrespect of such rights as the principal source of the wide-
spread violence in El Salvador, it is interesting to analyze how the 
IACHR considered economic and social rights in the subsequent An-
nual Reports. In its 1979-1980 Report, the Commission made a refer-
ence to socioeconomic rights and dealt with the new agrarian re-
form.343 The Commissions chairman, Farer, also referred to the eco-
nomic and social rights in El Salvador during his presentation of the 
Annual Report at the General Assembly in 1980. As mentioned in 
foregoing chapters, later on  consciously or more likely by accident  
the IACHR reports somehow mirrored the Reagan administrations 
                                                 
343  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1979-1980, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50 Doc. 13 rev. 1, 2 October 1980, Original: Spanish, pp. 
144/145. 
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neglecting of economic and social rights, switching even more in fa-
vor of democracy instead. In 1992-93, however, the Commission re-
ports revisited socioeconomic rights as a main element for the guaran-
tee of human rights.344 Moreover, the adoption of the Additional Pro-
tocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the American Con-
vention during the General Assembly in San Salvador appears some-
how awkward. In regard of the aforementioned socioeconomic situa-
tion, it is highly ironic, if not cynical, to describe the Additional Pro-
tocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1988 as the Proto-
col of San Salvador. This example shows that the questionable har-
monious tendencies within the OAS prevailed over the more prudent 
ideas of political and moral appropriateness. 
Ironically, in May 1979, before the Romero regime was ousted, 
the conservative Salvadoran diplomat Francisco Bertrand Galindo had 
been elected a Commission member.345 Some people familiar with the 
Commission alleged that he had always been a factor of insecurity 
(see chapter II. 2.). Of course, Bertrand Galindo also served for the 
Salvadoran governments as ambassador to Chile and to Guatemala, 
another conflict region during the decade of the 1980s. Former com-
missioner Tom Farer stated that ...we operated thereafter with the 
feeling that we had in our midst someone who was an instrument of a 
government that was among the worst violators of human rights.346 
The IACHR records and the files of the Salvadoran Foreign Ministry 
do not clearly indicate such a notorious betrayal of the Salvadorans 
integrity, but a certain suspicion still remains.347 
Conversely, Farer, the Commissions chairman between 1980 and 
1982  crucial years for El Salvador  confronted Reagans chief hu-
man rights ideologist, Jeane Kirkpatrick, by criticizing her view on 
                                                 
344  IACHR Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc. 28 rev., February 11, 1994, p. 7. 
345  In 1978, Bertrand Galindo, at that time Salvadoran Permanent Representative, 
hold that since Romeros taking power in 1977, El Salvador started to become a 
State with rule of law (Rechtsstaat). OEA/Ser.P/VIII.0.2, 30 diciembre 1978, Vo-
lumen II, Parte II, Octavo Período Ordinario de Sesiones, Washington, D.C., del 
21 de junio al 1° de julio de 1978, Primera Comisión, p. 62. 
346  Interview with Dean Tom J. Farer, Denver/Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
347  Nevertheless, the files of the Foreign Ministry of El Salvador show that at least in 
one occasion, Bertrand Galindo apparently did not fully comply with the Statute 
of the Commission when he advised his government on voting strategies regard-
ing the 1980 General Assembly. See chapters II. 2.; III. 3. 
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traditional military regimes. In contrast to Kirkpatricks view, Farer 
wrote that the military rule in El Salvador had begun in 1932: What 
was the characteristic of this period was not evolution toward de-
mocracy but prevention of that evolution.348 This meant a clear con-
frontation between the Commissioners view and the US position 
backing anti-Communist regimes. 
In 1982, Bruce McColm who would later succeed Farer on the 
Commission, portrayed a fairly realistic picture of the situation in El 
Salvador by focusing on the Soviet/Cuban influence and Marxist sub-
versives, which reflected Reagans obsession with international Marx-
ist expansionism. Although McColm was not Reagans puppet, he ac-
tually shared a similar view of the Central American situation as the 
US administration. Further, in contrast to Farer, he blamed the media 
coverage of the situation in El Salvador as partly propagandistic. Fi-
nally McColm defended US assistance  including military aid  for 
the government of El Salvador in order to prevent extremists from ei-
ther side from taking over control. Clearly, it was obvious that the 
US member on the Commission between 1984 and 1988 generally ar-
gued a position similar to that of the Reagan administration. In addi-
tion, McColm underlined that most Christian Democratic parties and 
governments in the region supported their counterparts in El Salva-
dor.349  
In accordance, other influential members allegedly were sympa-
thetic with the governments led by the Christian Democrat Duarte. 
José Napoleón Duarte had officially won the presidential elections in 
1972 but subsequently was detained, tortured and expelled by the 
armed forces.350 Commissioner Fernando Volio Jiménez and the Ex-
ecutive Secretary were considered by some sources to back Duartes 
government. In addition, the influential Venezuelan chairman Andrés 
                                                 
348  Cited as in Bonner, p. 238. 
349  Christian Democratic parties and governments in Latin America and Europe 
openly support their ideological colleagues in El Salvador. Indeed, most Latin 
American countries which have expressed views on the struggle in El Salvador 
unreservedly support Duarte. R. Bruce McColm  El Salvador: peaceful Revo-
lution or Armed Struggle? A Freedom House Perspective, New York 1982, p. 44. 
350  During the first IACHR visit to El Salvador in 1978, Christian Democratic repre-
sentatives of the Commission used their network to get in touch with Salvadoran 
party members in order to get information on the human rights situation. Tom J. 
Farer  The Grand Strategy, p. 93. 
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Aguilar reportedly did not dare to accuse Duarte openly  the latter 
had gained an enduring respect and support from Christian Democrats 
in Latin America in general, and from Venezuela in particular (where 
he had spent his time in exile after 1972). In general, it seems possible 
that a powerful Christian Democratic faction within the IACHR did 
not want to blame Duartes government with high publicity  neither 
with a visit in loco during the first years nor with a high-profile Spe-
cial Report.351 The emphasis revolves around two words: great public-
ity. Although the Annual Report sections dealing with El Salvador 
certainly accused also Duartes different governments of continuing 
human rights violations, the Commission did not prepare a Special 
Report. Did the IACHR want to avoid even more publicity in the Sal-
vadoran case? The hypothesis of a discreet support for Duartes de-
mocratic project in El Salvador, especially on the part of sympathetic 
Christian Democrats in the IACHR, cannot be dismissed easily. 
In relation to the introductory sentences of the Annual Report sec-
tions, there is a striking difference between the Guatemalan and the 
Salvadoran case. While the Commission stressed its working 
closely on events in Guatemala and Nicaragua, it only monitored 
and reported on the situation in El Salvador.352 This slight idiomatic 
difference  if regarded superficially  might appear insignificant, but 
it demonstrates unequivocally the Commissions different handling of 
the human rights situation in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. 
However, the Commission obviously followed the events in El Salva-
dor.353 So why did it not decide to publish a Special Report? Probably, 
the IACHR chose the same strategy as in the Argentine case: to wait 
for an invitation by the government to visit the country in order to 
prepare a more substantial document. 
                                                 
351  Interviews. 
352  For more than ten years, the IACHR has maintained constant vigilance over the 
situation of human rights in El Salvador, keeping a very close eye on the most 
important events affecting its observance of those rights. That was exactly what 
the IACHR did: most of the time it just kept an eye on the events. Annual Report 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1987-1988, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.74 Doc. 10 rev. 1, 16 September 1988, Original: Spanish, p. 293. 
353  For instance, see Letter from Edmundo Vargas Carreño to Andrés Aguilar, 
Washington, D.C., September 24, 1981. Enclosed to that letter, Vargas sent the 
discourse of the new president of the Revolutionary Junta in El Salvador, José 
Napoleón Duarte, to Aguilar (IACHR files). 
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In the following, some examples of the interactions between the 
Commission and the Salvadoran governments shall help to answer the 
previous questions. 
In 1980, many cases were sent to the Commission, which then 
turned to the Foreign Ministry of El Salvador with requests for infor-
mation.354 Initially, the Ministry categorically replied to the IACHRs 
requests by noting that the newly created Interministerial Commission 
on Social Rights would handle the petitions.355 
In spring 1980, the IACHR decided to prepare reports on the hu-
man rights situation in Guatemala and Nicaragua  countries from 
which the committee had received invitations.356 Likewise, at its 51st 
session in November 1980, the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights considered an on-site observation in El Salvador. In refer-
ence to this, the Commission received the Salvadoran Foreign Minis-
ter, the Christian Democrat Fidel Chávez Mena, during its plenary 
session.357 It is possible that the Commission had already received an 
invitation for an inquiry in loco by a letter issued on October 8, 
1980.358 
As early as in 1980, the Salvadoran government announced that it 
would permit an IACHR on-site investigation. At the OAS General 
Assembly in 1980, the IACHR stated that the visit should take place 
in February 1981.359 It never happened. 
                                                 
354  Already in 1979, five weeks after the coup of the civil-military junta had taken 
place, a famous but also controversial Salvadoran NGO turned to the IACHR and 
deplored human rights violations and 200 murders under the new government 
junta. Letter from the Non-Governmental Human Rights Commission of El Sal-
vador (CDHES) to the IACHR, San Salvador, November 26, 1979 (IACHR 
files). 
355  Furthermore, the IACHR was able to mediate in a hostage-taking in San Salvador 
 comparable to the exemplary solution the Commission reached in the 1980 hos-
tage crisis in Colombia. 
356  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1979-1980, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50, Doc. 13 
rev. 1, 2 October 1980, Original: Spanish, p. 27. 
357  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1980-1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 
rev. 1., 16 October 1981, Original: Spanish, p. 7. 
358  Letter from Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, Permanent Representative, to: Tom J. Farer, 
IACHR Chairman, November 22, 1980 (IACHR files). In that communication, 
Arrieta refers to a letter of October 8, 1980, in which his government apparently 
invited the IACHR. 
359  OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2, 13 noviembre 1981, Volumen II, Parte II: Décimo Período Or-
dinario de Sesiones, Washington D.C., del 19 al 27 de noviembre de 1980, Pri-
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There is evidence that since the assassination of the four US 
churchwomen on December 2, 1980, the US State Department em-
phatically encouraged the Salvadoran junta to invite the IACHR and 
to actually receive the Commission in El Salvador.360 Already on De-
cember 4, 1980, the IACHR received a communication on the disap-
pearance of the three US nuns and a religious worker on that day. This 
note expressed the fear that these nuns could have been killed. The 
case is extensively mentioned in the 1982-1983 Annual Report.361 The 
extensive coverage must be attributed to the media interest and to the 
fact that the victims were American citizens. Firstly, the fact that a pe-
tition was directed to the IACHR shortly after the crime demonstrates 
that at that time, trust and confidence remained with the Commission. 
But why did the Commission publish this information with such a de-
lay? Did it try to avoid even more publicity from this famous case? 
Between December 6 and 9, 1980, a Special Presidential Mis-
sion, composed by William D. Rogers and Assistant Secretary of 
State, William G. Bowdler, stayed in El Salvador and anticipated or-
ganizations like the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to 
investigate the nuns case as well.362 Interestingly, the US State De-
partment wanted an IACHR investigation of the churchwomens as-
sassination to be presented as a sort of preparatory visit for the 
IACHR on-site observation planned for early 1981. A State Depart-
ment cable demonstrates its belief that such an IACHR mission would 
actually serve as an advance mission for an on-site visit in 1981.363 
                                                                                                         
mera Comisión, p. 61. 
360  Document entitled Text which can be used as basis of letter which Chavez Mena 
may send., December 5, 1980 (NSA files); December 12 Statement on the Spe-
cial Presidential Mission to El Salvador  December 6-9, 1980, December 12, 
1980 (NSA files). 
361  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1982-1983, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, doc. 22 
rev. 1, 27 September 1983, Original: Spanish, p. 53. 
362  December 12 Statement on the Special Presidential Mission to El Salvador  De-
cember 6-9, 1980 (NSA files), pp. 2/3. 
363  POSSIBLY THE SALVADORAN RELUCTANCE IS DUE TO A 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE IAHRC VISIT. IN 
ORDER TO AUTHORIZE TRAVEL, THE IAHRC MUST DESCRIBE THE 
REPRESENTATIVES AS AN ADVANCE PARTY OF THE COMMISSIONS 
VISIT PLANNED FOR EARLY NEXT YEAR. IT IS UNDER THIS 
UMBRELLA THAT THE IAHRC REPRESENTATIVES WILL GO TO 
OBSERVE THE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE DEATHS OF THE AMERICAN 
WOMEN. The US wanted the nuns case to be investigated also because a thor-
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The US obviously regarded such a one or two-member mission to in-
vestigate the murders as a preparatory visit for the expected overall 
investigation in March.364  Correspondingly, in January, El Salvadors 
Permanent Representative at the OAS, Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, invited 
the IACHR to investigate the case of the four churchwomen but 
clearly stated that the Commission did not have the competence to 
treat isolated cases.365 Before, the Salvadoran Representative had 
received orders from the Foreign Ministry in this regard.366 The 
United States supported the invitation.367 However, it might be con-
cluded that the Salvadoran government postponed the visit until after 
Reagans inauguration. On the other hand, if the IACHR had carried 
out the preparatory visit straightaway, it would have been more dif-
ficult for the Salvadoran authorities to deny the permission for a gen-
eral on-site investigation. However, this did not happen even though it 
was apparent that the Reagan administration favored an IACHR inves-
tigation in El Salvador. The IACHR had security concerns regarding a 
                                                                                                         
ough inquiry was expected to improve the international reputation of Duartes 
government. Cable, from: Secretary of State, Muskie, to AMEmbassy, San Sal-
vador, Immediate, Confidential, State 338663, December 24, 1980 (NSA files). 
The Maryknoll Sisters, who had lost two of its members at the assassination on 
December 2, clearly urged the members of the Special Mission and US Secretary 
of State, Muskie, to vest the Commissions mandate with a general investigation 
of the overall human rights situation in El Salvador. Letter from Sister Melinda 
Roper, M.M., Community President, Maryknoll Sisters, to: William J. Bowdler, 
Assistant Secretary of State, and William D. Rogers, New York City, January 2, 
1981; Letter from Sister Melinda Roper, to: US Secretary of State, Edmund 
Muskie, New York City, January 2, 1981 (NSA files). 
364  Letter from William G. Bowdler, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, to: Sister Melinda Roper, Maryknoll Sisters, Washington, D.C., January 
15, 1981 (NSA files). 
365  Letter from Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, to Edmundo Vargas Carreño, Washington, 
D.C., January 13, 1981. In another letter from the Salvadoran Ambassador to 
Vargas, which carries the same date as the foregoing one, El Salvador invited the 
Commission to visit the country in March 1981 (IACHR files). The US was 
gratified because of El Salvadors invitation to the IACHR. Department of State, 
Confidential, IMMEDIATE San Salvador, Subject: Military Assistance to El 
Salvador, January 13, 1981 (NSA files). 
366  Radiogram from Alejandro Gomez Vides, Subsecretario del Ministerio de Rela-
ciones Exteriores, to Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, San Salvador, December 19, 1980 
(FMES files). 
367  Cablegram, from: Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., to: AMConsul Rio de 
Janeiro, NIACT IMMEDIATE, INFO AMEmbassy Brasilia IMMEDIATE, 
January 14, 1981 (NSA files). 
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single staff member invited by the government.368 On March 9, 1981, 
Executive Secretary Vargas informed the Salvadoran OAS Mission 
that the Commission accepted the invitation. Vargas Carreño was 
charged with fixing the date for the on-site visit with the OAS Repre-
sentative Arrieta.369 Nevertheless, the on-site observation was not car-
ried out. Interestingly, the available IACHR files show a gap between 
March 1981 and September 1982 in regards to the Commissions cor-
respondence with the Salvadoran authorities and the OAS Mission.370 
At the General Assembly in 1981, the Salvadoran representative, 
Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, informed the Commission that his government 
had to postpone the planned visit.371 In September 1982, the Salva-
doran OAS representative Arrieta Peralta predicted problems with the 
IACHR report: he had found out that the Commission saw the invita-
tion by the Salvadoran authorities as invalid due to the change of gov-
ernment after the 1982 elections. Arrieta recommended a new IACHR 
invitation and for private negotiations to set concrete dates for a visit 
during the forthcoming General Assembly.372  
Arrietas proposal was welcomed in the Foreign Ministry in San 
Salvador, though the government also was aware of the multiplying 
factor with regard to the handling of the human rights issue in interna-
tional organizations.373 These documents apparently corroborate the 
thesis that the Salvadoran authorities occasionally wanted the Com-
                                                 
368  See Cablegram, From: Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, Washington, D.C., to: 
AMEmbassy San Salvador, PRIORITY, CONFIDENTIAL STATE 021923, Sub-
ject: Possible IAHRC Role in GOES Investigation of Killing of US Missionaries, 
January 28, 1981 (NSA files). Although the Department of State considered that 
the IACHR would give El Salvadors invitation priority, the Commission had not 
replied to it by then. 
369  Letter from Edmundo Vargas Carreño, to Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, Washington, 
D.C., March 9, 1981 (IACHR files). 
370  Naturally, this could also be explained by other circumstances such as the deposit 
of letters at the office of the lawyer in charge, which were not available to the au-
thor. 
371  OEA/Ser. P/XI.0.2, 4 diciembre 1984, Volumen II, Parte II, Undécimo Período 
Ordinario de Sesiones, Castries, Santa Lucía, Del 2 al 11 de diciembre 1981, 
Primera Comisión, p. 71. 
372  Cablegram, from Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 
Washington, D.C., September 20, 1982. (FMES files). 
373  Ministry of Foreign Relations, Memorandum, from: Director of International Or-
ganisms, to: Minister of Foreign Relations, Subject: Invitación del GOES a la 
CIDH, September 22, 1982. (FMES files). 
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mission to come to El Salvador. In accordance, on September 30, 
1982, Ambassador Arrieta reiterated his governments invitation to 
the IACHR to visit the country.374 Although the IACHR Executive di-
rector immediately replied to such invitation by asking for permission 
for the observation, an on-site investigation did not take place.375 Ap-
parently, on November 20, 1982, IACHR Executive Secretary Vargas 
Carreño phoned Ambassador Arrieta Peralta to ask for a date of the 
on-site observation. Arrieta, however, refused to determine a visit for 
January 1983 and did not fix a future date. Vargas was told to turn to 
Foreign Minister Fidel Mena Chávez.376 
Again in 1983, El Salvadors OAS Ambassador Arrieta Peralta di-
rected an invitation for an on-site observation in May or June from his 
government to the Commissions chairman Monroy Cabra.377 
Eventually, the Commission was not granted permission to visit 
and did not carry out an on-site investigation in El Salvador during the 
early and worst years of the civil war. Nevertheless, to all observers 
there were efforts to actually receive the Commission at least in Janu-
ary 1981.378 The Commission seemingly had the unique opportunity to 
inquire the human rights situation in El Salvador before Reagan as-
sumed power in the United States. It remains highly speculative 
whether some voices within the IACHR even desired to postpone the 
visit that seemed to be possible in December 1980 and January 1981 
in order to wait until Reagan was sworn in. After Reagans inaugura-
tion, the IACHR could possibly have justified its inactivity in regards 
to an on-site visit so as to not accuse Duartes government publicly. It 
is not clear, however, if parts of the Commission itself played with 
such tactical considerations in order to gain time to silently support 
their Christian Democrat friend in San Salvador. 
                                                 
374  Letter from Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, to Edmundo Vargas Carreño, Washington, 
D.C., September 30, 1982 (IACHR files). 
375  Letter from Edmundo Vargas Carreño, to Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, Washington, 
D.C., September 30, 1982 (IACHR files). 
376  Informe de la Delegación de El Salvador, General Assembly 1982 (FMES files), 
p. 5. 
377  Letter from the Permanent Mission of El Salvador at the OAS, Ambassador 
Ernesto Arrieta Peralta, to Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Chairman of the 
IACHR, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1983 (IACHR files). 
378  Cablegram from Ernesto Arrieta Peralta to Alejandro Gomez Vides, Subsecretary 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., October 8, 1980. (FMES 
files). 
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Besides the question of an on-site visit, it is important to note how 
the general relationship between the Salvadoran executive and the 
IACHR developed during the years. 
During 1980, the governments cooperation with the Commission 
was still high, it responded to many requests  probably a sign that the 
Carter administration still could put some pressure on the new junta.379 
In accordance, the Commission received many cases during 1980 and 
1981 and forwarded requests to the Salvadoran government. Later, the 
cases received notably diminished  most probably this could have 
been attributed to the lack of confidence or influence in the Commis-
sion, especially from victims or NGOs.380 The IACHR Annual Report 
for 1980 tended to describe the situation in El Salvador as a general 
climate of violence without clearly naming those responsible.381 Fur-
thermore, the Salvadoran government refused the proposition to hold 
the 1980 General Assembly due to the serious situation. 
Notwithstanding, at the General Assembly in November 1980, 
chairman Tom Farer criticized the Salvadoran government because it 
did not fight right-wing violence as decidedly as it did the left-wing 
violence. Further, Farer depicted the situation as seen in the Commis-
sion by stressing that the withdrawal of leading civilians from the 
junta between January and March 1980 overlapped with an increasing 
                                                 
379  See: Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1979-
1980, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50 Doc. 13 rev. 1, 2 October 1980, Original: Spanish, p. 
140. 
380  While the IACHR still received 3,402 petitions in 1980, the subsequent years 
witnessed a remarkable decline of denunciations; 1981: 564; 1982: 170, 1983: 
203 (IACHR files). In contrast, the report of the UN Truth Commission of 1993 
cites national human rights groups like Socorro Jurídico or Tutela Legal or the 
Human Rights Institute of the UCA (IDHUCA) with differing statistics: 1980: 
11,903; 1981: 16,266; 1982: 5,962 (in this case figures of Socorro Jurídico). 
These contrasting statistics seem to corroborate the thesis that the Commission 
gradually drifted apart from the events in El Salvador and its human rights com-
munity. See: De la locura a la esperanza. La guerra de doce años en El Salvador: 
Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad, in: Estudios Centroamericanos, San Salva-
dor, No. 533, Marzo 1993, Año XLVIII, pp. 177-196. 
381  The report mentioned terrorist assaults by armed groups of the extreme left 
and the extreme right and affirmed a [g]eneralized violence in recent 
months. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
1979-1980, p. 141. 
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wave of violence and a growing polarization.382 This comment did not 
clearly state who committed violent acts and further employed very 
general terms due to the complicated situation in El Salvador. In gen-
eral, the Assembly of 1980 did not pay much attention to the Salva-
doran case probably because the situation was not as clear as in other 
occasions. Moreover, the Argentine case monopolized the meetings 
attention as shown in chapter III. 3.  
In the exceptional 1980-1981 Annual Report of the IACHR, which 
lacked a chapter referring to various countries, El Salvador was hardly 
mentioned aside from the Summary execution section.383 In October 
1981, voices within the Salvadoran Foreign Ministry mentioned de-
fects and extralimitations attributed to the IACHRs politicization 
with regard to the Commissions denunciations towards Chile.384 Ac-
cordingly, Foreign Minister Mena Chávez deplored the IACHRs 
ideological deviations in some cases and spoke of the instrumen-
talization of human rights.385 
The lack of an open discussion in the OAS on the atrocities com-
mitted in El Salvador seemingly led Mexico in 1981 to issue a joint 
declaration with France in which both governments recognized the 
guerrillas of the FMLN as a political representative force.386 While 
Rafael de la Colina, Mexicos experienced diplomat, defended the 
French-Mexican declaration generated by the massive human rights 
violations in El Salvador, Foreign Minister Fidel Mena Chávez 
stressed that the declaration had been rejected by most of the Latin 
American governments and that only Panama and Nicaragua had 
                                                 
382  OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2, 13 noviembre 1981, Volumen II, Parte II: Décimo Período Or-
dinario de Sesiones, Washington D.C., del 19 al 27 de noviembre de 1980, Pri-
mera Comisión, pp. 60, 61. 
383  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1980-1981, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54 doc. 9 rev. 1, 16 October 1981, Original: Spanish, p. 111. 
384  Memorandum, de: Lic. Michelle Gallardo de Gutiérrez, para: Lic. Oscar Castro 
Araujo, Director General de Política Exterior. Asunto: Opinión sobre la posición 
de Chile respecto de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos, San Salvador, October 
20, 1981, p. 9 (FMES files). 
385  Letter from Fidel Chávez Mena, Foreign Minister, to General Manuel Arturo Vi-
vero Avila, Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario de Chile, San Salvador, 
October 22, 1981 (FMES files). 
386  La Declaración Franco-Mexicana, in: El Diario de Hoy, San Salvador, August 
29, 1981, reprinted in: ECA 395, September 1981, Año XXXVI, p. 916. 
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openly welcomed this step.387 Accordingly, the OAS resolution on the 
IACHR reports, mirrored a reaction against the bipartisan declara-
tion.388 The OAS supported the announced elections in El Salvador by 
a 22-to-3 vote, only Mexico, Nicaragua and Grenada opposed while 
Panama and three Caribbean States abstained.389 The resolution was 
counted as a clear encouragement for the Salvadoran government.390 A 
US diplomat quoted in the Washington Post said that a major aim of 
the resolutions backers was to vote differently from the preceding 
weeks United Nations General Assembly, which had expressed cer-
tain sympathy for the guerrillas cause.391 
The Commission report for 1981-1982 stated that the right to 
life continues to be the right that is under the greatest attack and that 
the IACHR regularly received lists of civilians killed by government 
agents that were not actively involved in subversion. Furthermore, that 
document referred to sources like the US Embassy, the Legal Aid Of-
fice of the Catholic Church and even to an Associated Press report. 
This reference to second-hand sources and even media reports could 
be seen as the loss of the Commissions direct contact to NGO sources 
in El Salvador and as a proof of the victims loss of trust in the 
IACHR.392 Moreover, the fact that according to the Foreign Ministry 
and IACHR files, very few individual cases were received and han-
dled by the IACHR supports this assumption. Accordingly, a confi-
dential report by the Salvadoran delegation at the 1982 General As-
sembly of the OAS claimed that the IACHR reports did not require 
                                                 
387  OEA/Ser.P/XI.0.2, 4 diciembre 1984, Vol. II, Parte I; Undécimo Período Ordina-
rio de Sesiones, Castries, Santa Lucía, del 2 al 11 de diciembre de 1981, Actas y 
Documentos, Vol. II, Primera Parte, Actas textuales de las sesiones plenarias y de 
la Comisión General, p. 185. 
388  Washington Post, December 7, 1981, p. A22. The Assembly adopted a resolution 
on the Situation in El Salvador, which was not very concrete and merely repu-
diated violence and terrorism  without naming responsibles  but also refused 
any act that constituted a violation of the non-intervention principle. AG/RES. 
551 (XI-0/81): Situación en El Salvador, in: OEA/Ser.P/XI.0.2, 24 junio, 1982, 
Volumen I: Actas y Documentos, Textos certificados de las resoluciones, pp. 
78/79. 
389  Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago as well as Panama abstained. 
390  US State Department, Telegram, Confidential, December 22, 1981 (NSA files). 
391  Washington Post, December 9, 1981, p. A18. 
392  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1981-1982, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57 Doc. 6 rev. 1, 20 September 1982, Original: Spanish, pp. 
115/116. 
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any more respect.393 Besides the Commissions lack of direct contact 
with the events in El Salvador, this could also be interpreted as a result 
of Reagans overwhelming influence with regard to the case of Cen-
tral America. Correspondingly, the resolution on the IACHR Annual 
Report was very general, no single Member State was mentioned, as it 
became the common practice during the 1980s. Nevertheless, in 1982 
this procedure still caused disappointment and protests by many dele-
gations. A statement made by the Mexican delegate José Luis Vallarta 
in 1982 is of particular interest in this context: 
For known reasons the IACHR has abandoned the practice of preparing 
Special Reports on Member States whose governments notoriously en-
gage in grave human rights violations.394 
Apparently, in consideration of the Mexican interest in El Salvadors 
human rights record and its recognition of the armed opposition, Val-
larta could have been referring to the omission of a Special Report on 
the human rights situation in El Salvador. The fact that the Commis-
sion had prepared Special Reports on Guatemala and Nicaragua sup-
ports this interpretation. Nevertheless, the known reasons mentioned 
by the Mexican diplomat that led to this omission by the IACHR are 
not clear. Did he refer to US influence on the Commission? There is 
reason to believe so, because in these years, Mexico became a major 
player in the Central American conflicts and indirectly, but visibly, 
antagonistic of the US approach for the region. 
In 1983, the Commission returned to its practice of 1981 to not to 
include a chapter on particular countries in its Annual Report. Never-
theless, the report expressed the IACHRs concern over the contin-
ued climate of violence in El Salvador, which was mainly attributed 
to security forces and paramilitary groups who would seem to be 
acting with the Governments tacit consent.395 At the 1983 General 
Assembly of the Organization of American States, El Salvadors rep-
                                                 
393  Informe de la Delegación de El Salvador, General Assembly 1982 (FMES files), 
p. 5. 
394  Por razones concocidas la C.I.D.H. ha abandonado la práctica de preparar in-
formes especiales sobre los Estados Miembros cuyos gobiernos incurren noto-
riamente en graves violaciones a los derechos humanos. (English translation by 
the author). OEA/Ser.P/XII.0.2, 29 julio 1983, Volumen II, Parte 1, Actas Textu-
ales de las Sesiones Plenarias y de la Comisión General, p. 243. 
395  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1982-1983, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61 Doc. 22 rev. 1, 27 September 1983, Original: Spanish, p. 11. 
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resentative Sara Ventura de Nosiglia energetically rejected the Com-
missions remark that illegal executions and disappearances in her 
country were committed by security forces acting with impunity. She 
called those abuses individual excesses. Further, Ventura showed 
some inventiveness when she claimed that guerrilla sabotage and the 
destruction of the economic infrastructure constituted a violation not 
only of socioeconomic rights but of the right to spiritual tranquillity 
of the entire people of El Salvador.396 
In 1984, the Commission deplored the non-cooperation of the Sal-
vadoran government. But at the same time, the 1984 report praised the 
victory of Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte in the presiden-
tial elections. Notwithstanding, the text still reported on death squad 
activities, assassinations, kidnappings, indiscriminate bombings of the 
civilian population, disappearances and illegal detentions.397 The Sal-
vadoran government had invited the IACHR to be present at the elec-
toral process in March 1984, but the IACHR did not take advantage of 
this indirect opportunity to inquire into the countrys human rights 
situation.398 While Executive Secretary Vargas Carreño explained his 
personal indispensability with his commitment to the Commission on 
Forced Disappearances in Buenos Aires399 before his expected testi-
mony, chairman César Sepúlvedas rejection of the supervising man-
date is not explained. Furthermore, the fact that the Salvadoran OAS 
Ambassador sent invitations to the executive director and the Com-
missions chairman supports the theory that it would have been possi-
                                                 
396  OEA/Ser.P/XIII.0.2, 14 noviembre 1983, Volumen II, Parte II, Décimotercer 
período ordinario de sesiones, Washington, D.C., del 14 al 18 de noviembre de 
1983, Primera Comisión, pp. 99, 100. 
397  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1983-1984, 
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398  Letter from Oscar Castro Araujo, Permanent Representative, to Edmundo Vargas 
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ble to send the vice chairman (or any other Commission member) to 
supervise the elections while monitoring the human rights situation. 
Since the elections on March 25, 1984 did not designate a clear win-
ner, the second ballot on May 6, 1984 offered another opportunity for 
monitoring. However, this opportunity, as apparently others before, 
was missed. 
Considering the high absence of governmental replies to IACHR 
requests, the Commissions recommendations in the 1984 Annual Re-
port surprisingly did not call for an improved cooperation.400 This can 
be interpreted as a sign of resignation or realism. In the report for 
1984-1985, however, the Commission urged the General Assembly to 
consider the fact that the Salvadoran government had increasingly 
failed to cooperate. Moreover, the 1984-1985 report declared that 
Duarte, who had promised to improve the human rights situation, did 
not achieve much in this regard  a clear distinction from the appeas-
ing US position. The Salvadoran government of José Napoleón Duarte 
was not able to fight the human rights violations in that country effec-
tively. One and a half-years after his inauguration as the first elected 
civilian president in fifty years, Duarte could not keep his promises. 
Furthermore, the document clearly indicated the armed forces as the 
major perpetrators of human rights violations, though it did not hold 
the guerrillas immune from accusations of violence.401 Finally, the re-
port presented Salvadoran death toll statistics without identifying its 
sources.402 
The reports perspective was the appropriate view of the situation 
in El Salvador at that time. However, during the lecture on the annual 
reports, the author was given the impression that the Commission was 
revealing that they would be impotent to play a mediating role in the 
Salvadoran conflict. Naturally, the Commission did not explicitly ex-
press this, but it seemed to have accepted its subordinated role as a 
mere spectator of events in El Salvador. Likewise, at the 1985 General 
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tober 1st 1985, Original: Spanish, pp. 139-141. 
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Assembly, chairman Aguilar mentioned the governments lack of co-
operation in some cases. Aguilar expressed his hope that this situation 
would improve.403 
In 1986, the Commission conducted an on-site observation and 
subsequently mentioned the positively changed situation in regard to 
the governments increased level of cooperation.404 Chairman Luis 
Adolfo Siles Salinas and vice chairman Marco Tulio Bruni Celli were 
accompanied by staff attorneys Manuel Velasco Clark and Luis F. 
Jiménez. After the visit, the Salvadoran government promised to in-
vestigate the cases regarding information that was lacking and to re-
spond accordingly.405 The question arises whether it was necessary 
and possible to prepare a Special Report on the on-site investigation. 
Without any doubt, it would have been necessary, but seemingly it 
was not possible, nor desirable, to issue such a document at that time. 
Nevertheless, in a 1986 Salvadoran Foreign Ministry document, the 
government stressed the importance of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights. Further, the hope was expressed to positively 
change the chairmans impressions on the human rights situation in El 
Salvador during his visit.406 
The IACHR Annual Report for 1985-1986 identified the persisting 
war as the main source of violence, but also named a substantial im-
provement in view of diminished abuses. Finally, the document con-
cluded that during the period covered by this report, the Commis-
sion has found that significant progress has been made in El Salvador 
in the observance of human rights, although there are undoubtedly 
important restrictions and limitations on the full exercise of those 
                                                 
403  OEA/Ser.P AG/Com.I/ACTA 2/85, 5 diciembre 1985, Textual: Primera Co-
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404  See: Letter from Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, IACHR Chairman, to Lic. Rodolfo 
Antonio Castillo Claramount, Foreign Minister, Washington, D.C., April 15, 
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September 1986, Original: Spanish, pp. 32, 33. 
406  Memorándum, de: Dirección de Organismos Internacionales, para: Lic. Rodolfo 
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rights.407 In accordance, the Salvadoran OAS representative at the 
General Assembly, Mario Rivera Mora, by and large praised the 
Commissions work.408 In that year, the Salvadoran government con-
sidered the possibility of ratifying the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Sanction Torture but the Foreign Ministry refused the 
idea.409 
The following year, staff lawyer Manuel Velasco Clark traveled to 
El Salvador with the consent of the government and conducted an on-
site observation between February 15-19, 1987. He presented his re-
port to the Commission in March 1987.410 The fact that only one staff 
attorney conducted the investigation at first suggests the relatively mi-
nor significance of the Salvadoran case for the IACHR, however, it is 
very likely that the Salvadoran government could have insisted on a 
one-person visit in order to limit the publicity. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible that the tense budgetary situation of the IACHR did not permit a 
more extensive scrutiny.411 
At the General Assembly, the Salvadoran delegation criticized the 
Annual Report for 1987. Representative Mauricio Granillo Barrera 
wanted to clarify the documents findings because the latter consti-
tuted some terms, which allegedly reflected a false idea that could 
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generate a deformed image of the situation in El Salvador. While 
Granillo presented his government as willing to improve the human 
rights situation and to talk with the FMLN, he blamed the guerrillas 
for the violence. Further, he spoke of NGOs that purportedly were as-
saulted only in order to try to use these attacks to blame the govern-
ment.412 
In contrast to the hopeful message of the findings in 1986-87, the 
1987-1988 Annual Report again confirmed a worsening human rights 
situation413, though the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs had asked the 
IACHR chairman Siles Salinas not to transmit some cases concerning 
El Salvador to the General Assembly.414 
Then, in 1988, the Commission requested the governments per-
mission for another inspection visit to El Salvador in order to con-
sider individual cases  without a positive reply.415 Nevertheless, in 
that year, the OAS Ambassador directed an invitation to the IACHR 
and invited two Commissioners to observe the electoral process that 
occurred on March 20, 1988.416 The chairman of the Commission, 
Marco Tulio Bruni Celli, lamented that the IACHR was not able to 
accept the governments invitation because the Commission would be 
in session until March 25 and every member was indispensable and 
must attend the meetings.417 Again, the Commission would have had 
the possibility to use such invitation for an undeclared investigation, 
but did not do so. According to its Statute, the Commission could have 
transferred its meetings to San Salvador, as it had done before in pre-
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vious occasions in which it had taken advantage of this provision, and 
so met in a Member State. 
In 1988, the OAS General Assembly gathered in San Salvador, 
which signified a valuable recognition and support of the Salvadoran 
government.418 As the Chilean meeting in 1976 and the 1986 Assem-
bly in Guatemala City backed the host governments, the General As-
sembly in 1988 also meant international relief and a demonstration of 
respect for the government in San Salvador.419 At the session of the 
First Committee, the Salvadoran representative and director of the 
governmental human rights commission, Benjamín Cestoni, criticized 
the Commission report. He dismissed terms like irregular forces, 
guerrilla or subversive forces and made clear that the only name 
the FMLN deserved was terrorist groups. Further, Cestoni implored 
that the IACHR Annual Report not mention FMLN violence and sabo-
tage acts, and blamed the opposition forces for suspending the dia-
logue with the government.420  
In 1989, the newly elected president, Alfredo Cristiani from the 
right-wing party ARENA, met with the Commission in Washington, 
reportedly in a climate of cordiality and frankness.421 According to 
an internal IACHR paper in 1989, the Commission received almost 
daily denunciations of horrible assassinations alleged to military and 
paramilitary groups.422 In November of that year, the FMLN initiated 
a massive military offensive (ofensiva hasta el tope) against govern-
mental troops. In the course of the struggles, members of the armed 
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forces killed six Jesuit priests, one cook and her daughter at the Cen-
tral American University (UCA)  a crime that provoked high interna-
tional attention. During the military confrontations, OAS Secretary 
Baena Soares stayed in San Salvador where he had intended to pursue 
peace talks.423 The OAS Permanent Council gathered immediately, 
and at first glance, seemed to be more concerned about its Secretary 
Generals fate than about the civil victims of the struggles.424 The US 
representative to the OAS, Einaudi, criticized the FMLN and, as ex-
pected, backed the government in its efforts to expand the rule of 
law and to fight for human rights.425 
At the 1989 Assembly the OAS representative of El Salvador, 
Roberto Mejía Trabanino, claimed that FMLN violence and terrorist 
acts would impede a full observance of human rights and further con-
sidered the IACHR report somehow partial about the authentic na-
tional reality because it did not deal with the victims affected by the 
FMLN acts nor the damage of the economic infrastructure. In addi-
tion, Mejía denounced the IACHR reports omission of the govern-
ments efforts to construct houses for the poor and other projects ad-
vancing economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, the represen-
tative followed the governments instructions and blamed the FMLN 
for the killing of the Jesuits at the UCA.426 In accordance, US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Af-
fairs, Paula Dobriansky, labeled the insurgency as the main obstacle 
for human rights in El Salvador and blamed the FMLN for wide 
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1999, pp. 71-75. 
Political Conflicts and Civil Wars in Central America 417
spread horrifying acts of violence.427 In addition, a letter by 14 mem-
bers of the US Congress was read before the First Committee of the 
General Assembly in reference to the Jesuit case. The document urged 
the Assembly to work with the Salvadoran government to invite the 
IACHR to investigate the assassinations.428 In general, at the Perma-
nent Council sessions and the General Assembly meeting in Novem-
ber 1989, the delegations of El Salvador, backed by the US mission, 
sometimes battled polemically with the Nicaraguan diplomats on hu-
man rights matters between these two Central American countries. 
The November 1989 military offensive launched by the FMLN 
and the assassination of the Jesuits were the main topics of the Annual 
Report section on El Salvador covering 1989-1990. The Commission 
expressed its deep concern in relation to the state of human rights in 
El Salvador and was worried about the escalation of the armed con-
flict that contributed to the worsening of the situation. Besides this 
adequate finding, the Commission provided a comment that must have 
sounded almost cynical in view of the atrocities in the early eighties: 
The Commission must note that it has decided to prepare a special 
report on the human rights situation in El Salvador.429 At that time, 
there were voices in the IACHR Secretariat that perceived El Salvador 
as the country with the worst human rights problems, whereby it 
would need special attention by the Commission. Unfortunately, indi-
viduals with such opinion could not make themselves heard and less 
so gained a majority. 
The government disliked the section on El Salvador in the 1990 
Report and criticized the omissions. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry 
considered the possibility of accepting the offer for a Commission 
visit as a measure of dealing with the IACHR. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment wanted to present an internal candidate for the election of 
new Commissioners in 1991.430 This leads to the assumption that the 
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government was eager to have a loyal representative on the Commis-
sion in order to get informed and influence the decisions of the 
IACHR.431 
At the 1990 General Assembly in Asunción, the Salvadoran repre-
sentative rebutted the section on his country of the Commissions An-
nual Report. The envoy, Roberto Mejía, described the passage on El 
Salvador with the notorious terminology as incomplete, partial, false 
and generating a distortioned view of the country. He also de-
nounced that the acts of the FMLN were only mentioned in two para-
graphs.432 Likewise, the 1991 Annual Report was criticized at the 
General Assembly by representative Benjamín Cestoni since the 
document was rejected as not reflecting Salvadoran reality in regards 
to human rights and was once more denounced as incomplete, distor-
tioned and prepared with false data.433 
On June 8, 1990, the Salvadoran government proposed that the 
IACHR visit El Salvador, although it was merely an oral offer men-
tioned in a conversation and not issued by a formal letter.434 Conse-
quently, the visit did not take place. In autumn 1990, a faction within 
the Commission, which did not want to interfere in the ongoing peace 
talks, decided to postpone the elaboration of the planned Special Re-
                                                                                                         
tro, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Asunto: Consideraciones al Informe sobre 
El Salvador presentado por la CIDH, San Salvador, May 25, 1990 (FMES files). 
431  At the 1991 General Assembly, the Salvadoran delegation withdrew its candidate 
for the IACHR, the rightist intellectual and poet David Escobar Galindo. Appar-
ently, as the Assembly was approaching, the Salvadorans realized that Escobar 
Galindo would not get the necessary votes. OEA/Ser.P/XXI.0.2, 6 abril 1992, 
Volumen II, Parte I, Vigésimoprimer período ordinario de sesiones, Santiago, 
Chile, Del 3 al 8 de junio de 1991, Sesiones Plenarias, p. 257. 
432  OEA/Ser.P/XX.0.2, 17 mayo 1991, Volumen II, Parte II, Vigésimo período ordi-
nario de sesiones, Asunción, Paraguay, Del 4 al 9 de junio de 1990, Primera Co-
misión, p. 168. The US representative, Luigi Einaudi, however, identified a dis-
heartening record of events since the Commissions last report on El Salvador. 
Ibid., p. 189. 
433  OEA/Ser.P/XXI.0.2, 6 abril 1992, Volumen II, Parte II, Vigésimoprimer período 
ordinario de sesiones, Santiago, Chile, Del 3 al 8 de junio de 1991, Primera Co-
misión, p. 118. 
434  See: Letter from David J. Padilla, to Mauricio Granillo Barrera, Permanent Re-
presentative of El Salvador, Washington, D.C., June 11, 1990 (IACHR files). See 
OEA/Ser.P/XX.0.2, 17 mayo 1991, Volumen II, Parte II, Vigésimo período ordi-
nario de sesiones, Asunción, Paraguay, Del 4 al 9 de junio de 1990, Primera Co-
misión, p. 199. 
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port on El Salvador. Further, the Commission kept hoping for an on-
site visit to support such a reports findings. In mid-1991, the Salva-
doran government rejected the IACHRs proposal to prepare a Special 
Report covering the period since 1978 as inappropriate, especially in 
regard to the national reconciliation process. The IACHR would open 
wounds with such a report and would bring back many painful memo-
ries, which allegedly had been forgotten by the Salvadorans. Further, 
the government of El Salvador accused the Commission of not being 
informed about the most relevant cases.435 Nevertheless, as president 
Cristiani had invited the Commission to conduct an observation in 
loco,436 on March 21, 1991, the new Executive Secretary, Edith 
Márquez Rodríguez, requested to carry out an on-site investigation 
from April 22 to May 3, 1991.437 Finally, the Commission did not 
even conduct an on-site observation in El Salvador in the early 1990s, 
mainly because of the governments reluctance to permit such a 
visit.438 
However, since the decision in 1990 to prepare a Special Report 
covering the decade of the 1980s, the IACHR has collected material 
supporting the document.439 Furthermore, the available IACHR files 
                                                 
435  OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc.2176/91 add. 5, 9 mayo 1991, Original: español: Observa-
ciones de la Misión Permanente de El Salvador sobre el Informe Anual de la 
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 1990-91, hechas en la sesión ce-
lebrada por la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos el 25 de abril de 1991. 
See OEA/Ser.P/XXI.0.2, 6 abril 1992, Volumen II, Parte II, Vigésimoprimer pe-
ríodo ordinario de sesiones, Santiago, Chile, Del 3 al 8 de junio de 1991, Primera 
Comisión, pp. 118-124. 
436  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1990-1991, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79 rev. 1 Doc. 12, 22 February 1991, Original: Spanish, p. 435. 
437  Letter from Edith Márquez Rodríguez, Executive Secretary, to Mauricio Granillo 
Barrera, Permanent Representative, Washington, D.C., March 21, 1991 (IACHR 
files). 
438  The on-site investigation eventually should take place between April 26-29, 
1993, more than a year after the signing of the peace treaty in 1992. Even on that 
occasion, the Salvadoran government surprisingly informed that scheduled inter-
views with officials in charge could not be realized due to previous engagements 
of the latter and proposed another postponement of the visit. Consequently, the 
on-site observation was cancelled. IACHR  press release, Washington, D.C., 
April 21, 1993. In the end, the 1994 Special Report on El Salvador could not base 
on another on-site investigation. See Annual Report of the IACHR 1994, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88 Doc. 9 rev., February 17, 1995, Original: Spanish, p. 183. 
439  See, for instance, Letter from Edith Márquez Rodríguez, to José Manuel Pacas 
Castro, Foreign Minister, Washington, D.C., November 19, 1991 (IACHR files). 
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indicate that after the astonishing small number of correspondences 
between the Commission and the Salvadoran authorities during the 
1980s, the IACHR began to receive more material since 1991. This 
was clearly a result of the successful peace process in El Salvador, but 
probably also a consequence of the changed regional and international 
situation. Nevertheless, the new information mainly concerned issues 
such as the amnesty law of 1993, the death penalty, and the investiga-
tions of the UN Truth Commission, which, between 1992 and 1993, 
examined human rights violations and violent acts during the civil 
war. 
In the end, two questions remain to be answered: Why did the 
Commission not visit the country before 1986 and why did it not pub-
lish a Special Report on El Salvador before 1994? 
Generally, the changed atmosphere since the Reagan administra-
tion assumed power in January 1981 constituted a substantial aspect: 
the Salvadoran government might have felt more confident in con-
tinuously postponing the IACHR visit due to the strong US support. 
Nevertheless, it comes in handy and, in this case, is probably too fit-
ting to blame the United States in a reflexive manner. Naturally, the 
strong US backing of its endangered Salvadoran ally in its troubled 
backyard, combined with Reagans unilateralism that weakened the 
OAS, surely diminished the IACHRs impact. Notwithstanding, par-
ticularly in the Salvadoran case, it is necessary to review the internal 
situation of the IACHR as well. 
Farer stated that there were many reasons, which led the Commis-
sion to not visit El Salvador until 1986. Among those was the public-
ity that the human rights violations in El Salvador had already drawn 
onto itself.440 This constitutes a crucial point: The IACHR might pos-
sibly have felt that the deplorable human rights situation in El Salva-
dor was satisfactorily covered by international groups like Amnesty 
International, Americas Watch, the UN Human Rights Commission, 
and so forth. In addition, since the nuns murder case, the leading me-
dia in the United States uninterruptedly reported on the state of human 
rights in El Salvador. In conclusion, the Commission could have ar-
gued that it would have been imprudent to get involved due to the 
deep engagement of the US. Also, such a commitment would have 
provoked criticism towards the IACHR and possibly limited its space 
                                                 
440  Interview with Dean Tom Farer, Denver/Colorado, August 30, 1999. 
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to handle other cases as well. In fact, in the Salvadoran case, the 
IACHR was replaced by NGOs, and in the late-1980s the UN Mis-
sions filled the vacuum the Commission had left.441 
It is the authors impression that both the government of El Salva-
dor as well as the IACHR in some occasions actually pursued a Com-
mission investigation in loco during the worst years between late 1980 
and 1983. Notwithstanding, the willingness of both to agree on a visit 
did not temporarily or technically coincide. It is reprehensive but quite 
understandable for a government involved in human rights abuses to 
refuse an on-site observation by a human rights surveillance organiza-
tion. In contrast, the commission either had to accept the invitation for 
an inquiry  and if such a scrutiny in loco were impossible (due to se-
rious limitations imposed by the government), a special report without 
on-site observations must be prepared. 
Accordingly, considering the difficult role the US played in Cen-
tral America, it would have been necessary to prepare an IACHR Spe-
cial Report on El Salvador, particularly in the years 1980-1983. It is 
helpful to understand the Commissions practice in regards to Nicara-
gua and Guatemala. One could conclude that the IACHR saw itself as 
forced to apply the same initial sympathetic patience, which prevailed 
in the first report on Nicaragua under Sandinista rule, also to the Sal-
vadoran situation  in particular because, similar to the Nicaraguan 
case, the 1978 report on El Salvador also played a role for the change 
of government in 1979, which gave reason for hope at first. The Sand-
inistas initial collaboration with the IACHR nourished certain sympa-
thies among the Commissioners. In contrast, the lack of a concrete 
permission by the Guatemalan government in 1980-1981 did not im-
pede the Commission to prepare a Special Report on that country  
without an on-site observation.442 So, the Salvadoran case remains an 
exception in the IACHR history during the 1980s. 
In general, especially in the early 1980s, the IACHR was excep-
tionally busy with events in other countries. In 1980, the OAS Perma-
                                                 
441  Illustratively, the Organization of American States could merely proclaim its sup-
port to the peace negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General  
obviously an expression for the organization's actual lack of influence. CP/RES. 
564 (865/91): The Situation in El Salvador, OEA/Ser.G CP/RES. 564 (865/91), 
13 September 1991, Original: Spanish. 
442  IACHR  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Guate-
mala, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53 doc. 21 rev.2, 13 October 1981, Original: Spanish, p. 6. 
Chapter IV 422
nent Council solicited the Commission to investigate the situation in 
Bolivia after General Luis García Meza Tejados coup détat against 
president Lidia Gueiler.443 In addition, the entire year 1980 witnessed 
high-profile preparation efforts to present and to defend the Argentine 
report in November before the General Assembly. Furthermore, the 
IACHR resolved the hostage crisis in Colombia, prepared a report on 
Guatemala and had to visit Nicaragua after the Sandinistas invitation. 
Particularly the Argentine on-site observation and the subsequent re-
port resulted in an impressive increase in petitions, including a wave 
of personal letters urging the Commission to present the Argentine 
situation authentically at the forthcoming General Assembly. The 
Commission received letters and petitions concerning the Argentine 
case until 1983.444 Nevertheless, the tight agenda of the IACHR in 
1980 still permitted some members and lawyers to attend seminars in 
Mexico City, San José and Bogotá.445 
The argument that in the early 1980s the Salvadoran government 
did not permit an acceptable investigation might be a plausible expla-
nation for the absence of a Special Report. But nevertheless, in the 
years after the worst bloodshed, the Commission must have felt the 
obligation to write at least a similar report as it did in 1980 after the 
overdue on-site observation in Argentina. Unlike the Chileans and the 
Argentines, the Salvadoran governments could also count on a con-
tinuous faithful US support, on a favorable view from Christian De-
mocrats in the region and even on certain sympathy from parts of the 
Commission itself. 
The Commission waited until the Salvadoran authorities granted 
permission to visit the country. Certainly, the Salvadoran authorities 
were hardly cooperative.446 Likely, this strategy of waiting for a visit  
                                                 
443  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1979-1980, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50, Doc. 13 
rev. 1, 2 October 1980, Original: Spanish, p. 31. 
444  In accordance, an active involvement in El Salvador probably was expected to 
have led to comparable amounts of petitions as in the Argentine case  at that 
time, the IACHR might have been eager to avoid even more work regarding a 
country case that was already covered by a widespread media interest and other 
human rights entities. 
445  IACHR  Annual Report of the IACHR 1979-1980, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50, Doc. 13 
rev. 1, 2 October 1980, Original: Spanish, p. 34. 
446  A. Glenn Mower, Jr.  Regional Human Rights. A Comparative Study of the 
West European and Inter-American Systems, New York/Westport, Connecti-
cut/London 1991, p. 19. 
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as in the Argentine case  was intended to avoid giving away the im-
portant public attention instrument of the on-site investigation. In ac-
cordance, the Commission would have been able to prepare such a 
document after its on-site observation in 1986, but it did not publish a 
Special Report based on such investigation, either. 
At long last, it would have been tremendously necessary for the 
IACHR to issue a visible Special Report on the human rights situation 
in El Salvador  if not between 1980 and 1984, at least until 1988-89 
 because all other entities reporting on the Salvadoran human rights 
record, with the exception of the United Nations, could be accused of 
bias by the governments of El Salvador and the US. But apparently, 
although the Commission did not share the entire US view of the Sal-
vadoran situation, it agreed on not accusing the lesser of three evils: 
it favored the center-right government in contrast to the right-wing 
death squads and the leftist guerrillas, though the governments mili-
tary and security forces were not completely immune against the right-
wing evil. This lack of desirable alternatives to the  nominally  
PDC-led government until 1989 must be taken into account, particu-
larly in view of the Christian Democrats of the IACHR and some 
members personal attitudes towards president Duarte. The author 
tends to conclude that the Christian Democrat faction within the 
IACHR sought to avoid an open condemnation of the junta led by 
Duarte  although this did not prevent critical sections in the Annual 
Reports. This hesitance or even the sympathy with the interim-
governments until 1984 later made it impossible for the Commission 
to work with El Salvadors human rights community and to play a de-
cisive role in the numerous peace talks. It can be concluded that it was 
difficult to work with El Salvador due to an initial reluctance on the 
part of the Commission, though they would have liked to play a role 
later on. 
In contrast to other cases, where there apparently was some chance 
to get the permission for a visit (like the Argentine case), the situation 
in El Salvador was different. After several delays between 1981 and 
1983, the Commission did not insist on an on-site observation and did 
not prepare a report, due to the permanent aversion of the Salvadoran 
governments to extending a formal invitation (as happened in the 
cases of Paraguay and Uruguay in 1978, or Guatemala in 1981). This 
was highly unusual for the Commissions practice and can only be ex-
plained by the circumstances and the IACHRs internal developments. 
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In conclusion, the 1994 Report was an embarrassing document 
that attempted to minimize the IACHRs lack of influence by summa-
rizing the Annual Report sections and listing the few individual cases 
published in order to convince the reader that it actually did something 
during all these years.447 This report was an attempt to compensate for 
inaction but turned out to be proof of the Commissions lack of self-
criticism, especially in regards to the Salvadoran case. 
One could even tend to see the Commissions performance in the 
Salvadoran case as a sort of Realpolitik by employing a type of cir-
cumstantial relativism: apparently, the Commission internally argued 
that parts of the governmental forces were to be held responsible for 
numerous serious human rights violations, but the alternative  Marx-
ist guerrillas or right-wing hard-liners  would be worse. The differ-
ence between Reagans El Salvador policy and the Commissions atti-
tude was that no one expected Reagan to be a human rights champion 
while the IACHR actually was a human rights organ. In this case, the 
Commission somewhat deviated from its mission to impartially pro-
mote human rights. 
                                                 
447  See: Cecilia Medina  The Role of Country Reports in the Inter-American Sys-
tem of Human Rights, in: Harris/Livingstone, p. 118, footnote 13; pp. 123, 125. 
V.  Philanthropic Endeavors or the Exploitation of 
an Ideal? An Evaluation of the Human Rights 
Policy of the Organization of American States 
 
On the whole, as an inter-American institution, the Organization of 
American States has been portrayed as an important link between the 
US and Latin America. At times, this relationship has been a difficult 
one, with neither the US nor the Latin American States viewing the 
OAS with complete satisfaction. Often, the US blamed the organiza-
tion for inefficiency, at times criticizing typical Latin American tradi-
tions of more bureaucracy and diplomatic show than policies with an 
actual impact. In Latin America, the perception of the OAS was gen-
erally more varied. Brazil, due to its size, did not have particular inter-
est in the OAS, even though a Brazilian became Secretary General in 
1984. Mexico often used the OAS to present itself as a main speaker 
against US hegemony in the Americas, and Chiles performance dur-
ing the human rights conflict with the IACHR demonstrated that the 
Pinochet regime was not indifferent toward the OAS. In general, Latin 
Americans shared the view that the OAS was somewhat inefficient, 
but above all, criticized the hegemonic dominance of the United States 
within the Organization. On the other hand, the OAS was also seen as 
a very practical institution for Latin American goals. Nevertheless, the 
reality illustrates that the OAS has served more to strengthen individ-
ual nations positions and to divide Latin Americans than to contribute 
to a Latin American solidarity front against strong US interests. When 
this became clear, as impressively demonstrated during Carters hu-
man rights battle launched using the inter-American system, the gov-
ernments reacted with a protesting attitude or with a lack of interest  
but this was only a temporary phenomenon or a mere outward show. 
In fact, the Latin American governments came to the conclusion that 
the OAS was too important to let it disappear. Although often not 
more than an institutional vacuum, it was still a symbolic link to the 
superpower US. All in all, the OAS was not seen as efficient but it 
constituted an important organization in which Latin America and the 
US had institutionalized, at least diplomatically, a potentially helpful 
relationship. Within this delicate construct, the human rights issue 
turned into an exceedingly controversial topic. 
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Generally speaking, the inter-American system of human rights 
has undergone quite an exceptional development with its institutional 
turning points  in 1948, 1959, 1965, 1969/70, 1978/79, and in 1991. 
These turning points were often not the result of a congruent and lin-
ear evolution or of a strategic concept, but rather, consequences of 
sometimes surprising or coincidental events. While the human rights 
topic was kept under diplomatic prudence in 1948 as well as in 1959, 
the actions of the emerging Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights not only changed the very Commissions character, but also 
contributed to advancing the system itself. 
During the period covered by this work, the human rights policy 
clearly witnessed different phases. From 1970 to 1973, the inter-
American human rights system was relatively dormant. In contrast, 
the new brutal form of authoritarianism, first unleashed in 1973, fu-
eled a highly passionate human rights agenda within the Commission 
until the early 1980s. During the 1980s, various difficulties in the re-
gion, within the OAS, and due to the Reagan administrations Cold 
War unilateral policies, decisively reduced the range of the inter-
American human rights policy. 
The principal element of the inter-American human rights system 
was the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Commis-
sion became one of the outstanding organs for the protection of human 
rights in the Western hemisphere. The elevation to an OAS main or-
gan in 1970 assured the institutional security of the IACHR. After the 
entry-into-force of the American Convention on Human Rights in 
1979, the Commission was awarded double competence, becoming 
the institution responsible for OAS Members and for those States that 
had ratified the Convention. Maintaining the IACHR as a human 
rights body for both OAS Member States bound to the Charter and 
those parties to the Convention, was not a natural occurrence at all, 
since many governments in question opposed the activities of the 
Commission. As a result, the 1979 decision strengthened the Commis-
sion politically within the OAS. Nevertheless, the IACHR had always 
had an extremely small staff and a relatively tight budget to carry out 
the gigantic tasks of promoting and defending human rights in the en-
tire hemisphere.1 Its budget did grow constantly, yet it never provided 
                                                 
1  A comparison with the European Human Rights Commission seems to be inap-
propriate since that institution had decisively more financial resources, members 
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sufficient resources to cover the human rights reality in up to thirty 
Member States. Some courageous members took advantage of the 
right moments, which provided an opportunity to extend the Commis-
sions competence. Together with some fortunate developments, these 
individuals  Commission members but also lawyers of the Secre-
tariat, including the Executive and Assistant Executive Secretaries  
were able to compensate for the lack of dedication, commitment, or 
even will among others at the IACHR. Without the strong position and 
devotion of these proactive individuals at the IACHR, the human 
rights issue would not have gained as much attention and the strength-
ening of human rights in the inter-American system would not have 
been advanced. As is normal for any institutional activity, it was a few 
personalities who made the machine of the IACHR work and thus 
made the difference.2 Generally, the Commissioners of the OAS hu-
man rights organ did what initially nobody expected them to do: they 
decisively advanced not only the promotion but also the defense of 
human rights in the hemisphere. 
In regard to economic, social and cultural rights, the Commission 
made a turn in the late 1970s towards a more active promotion of such 
rights. In spite of this shift, during the highly politicized civil wars in 
Central America socioeconomic rights were not specifically ad-
dressed, even though the unequal distribution of wealth and land was 
seen as a catalyst for these conflicts. Likewise, the Commissions 
work did not address a specific gender-based perspective of abuses or 
womens rights during the period covered by this investigation. 
As in every institution, and especially in international organiza-
tions, there were several sins of omission by the Commission. How-
ever, these omissions appear perhaps graver due to their nature and 
because they affected the victims of human rights violations, indi-
rectly costing human lives. Yet, it is not appropriate to proportionally 
compare failures and successes of the Commission. Instead, the main 
question remains, what would have been the human rights situation in 
Latin America without the IACHR? Undoubtedly, there would have 
been even more abuses and less hope for the victims. In fact, it is fair 
to state that the IACHR acted as an authentic conscience of the region, 
                                                                                                         
and manpower. At the same time, it faced less serious and less widespread and 
systematic human rights violations as compared with the OAS Commission. 
2  For the early years of the Commission, see Schreiber, p. 162. 
Chapter V 428
particularly during the period between 1974 and 1980. Nevertheless, 
between 1980 and 1989, the Commission enjoyed its reputation in the 
redemocratized South American countries, while, at the same time, it 
could not cope with the highly politicized Central American armed 
conflicts. During this time, it was forced to accept its secondary role.3 
On the other hand, the Organization of American States has al-
ways been blamed for being just a futile inter-American organ which 
neglected to advance substantial matters in the hemisphere. In this re-
gard, the Commission is a clear exception. The IACHR contributed to 
improving the reputation of the OAS in the hemisphere. In this regard, 
it is important to distinguish between the Commission and the OAS, 
given the fact that the OAS was not wholeheartedly concerned with 
human rights during the entire period covered in this inquiry. This fact 
makes it even more astonishing that the IACHR could play such an 
exemplary role. Of course, the decisive support of the Carter admini-
stration assured financial resources and political backing, all of which 
were absolutely vital for the Commissions institutional development. 
Without the improvements and institutional reinforcement, which oc-
curred during the Carter years, the Commission would have played an 
even more marginal role during the Central American conflicts of the 
1980s. 
In general, the human rights policy of the OAS was mostly re-
duced to the actions of the IACHR. The OAS General Assembly 
adopted resolutions on the Commission reports but did not carry out a 
human rights policy that went beyond diplomatic statements. Accord-
ingly, the adoption of resolutions on IACHR documents could not be 
seriously interpreted as the implementation of an OAS human rights 
policy, but rather, as an evaluation of the Commissions work that 
provoked varying degrees of public interest. The rather harmless reso-
lutions  with the exception of the 1979 resolution on Nicaragua  ex-
pressed the will of the Member States of the General Assembly, but 
generally, the distribution of the IACHR reports represented the true 
propagation of a human rights policy which was attributed to the 
OAS. The justification of the IACHR reports was the main task of the 
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refers to the prominent cases of military dictatorships (1970s) and the Central 
American crisis (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 1980s). The Commission 
did play an influential and sometimes helpful role in the cases of Haiti, Suriname 
and Chile, for instance. 
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Commissioners during the OAS meetings. IACHR members as well as 
supportive OAS delegations never tired of referring to human rights as 
a hemispheric ideal, and to the existent legal instruments in the inter-
American system, while the accused Member States usually brought 
in the exceptional circumstances and thus attempted to defend their 
questionable human rights practices. 
There is no doubt that the Chilean case was a milestone for aware-
ness of human rights in general and for the Commissions position 
within the inter-American system in particular. The coup in Chile of 
1973 led not only to an unforeseen strengthening of the IACHR, it 
also resulted in a change of procedure for the OAS General Assembly 
concerning sensitive human rights issues. The fact that the IACHR 
could embarrass the Pinochet regime before the Carter administration 
pronounced its fierce support for human rights and the Commission 
demonstrates this even more. Although the actual reasons that enabled 
the IACHR to highlight its second Chile report at the 1976 General 
Assembly in Santiago have not been entirely investigated, it is clear 
that the position of the United States government was decisive. How-
ever, it remains difficult to determine if it was ultimately the doubtful 
commitment of the Ford/Kissinger administration to underscore hu-
man rights in US diplomacy, or a policy of appeasement addressed to 
a Congress inspired by the civil rights movement or  as this work 
suggests  other large-scale strategic policies directed against Third-
World consciousness and Latin American solidarity in particular. 
Most likely, the explanation rests in a combination of these interacting 
factors. The fundamental incentives and strategies for the new space 
given to human rights in US foreign policy, eventually paved the way 
for the OAS to discuss human rights. 
During the Carter administration, human rights became a sensitive 
issue and the OAS Member States became even more polarized on the 
topic. However, it was the Latin American countries that pushed 
through the historical resolution of 1979 calling for Somoza to resign. 
In fact, this was the only exception that abandoned the historically ex-
aggerated creed on nonintervention in domestic affairs. The important 
IACHR reports on Nicaragua and El Salvador of 1978 were highly 
critical and both advanced or contributed to a change of government. 
The 1978 report on Panama, in contrast, failed to have a major impact 
on the charges brought up by Canal Treaties opponents in the US  
potentially a result of the Commissioners reluctance to serve for US 
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domestic policy. In general, Carters oath to strengthen human rights 
in Latin America saw some success, but the Argentine case clearly 
demonstrated the limits of human rights policy when confronted with 
vital economic and strategic interests of the US. Eventually, the US 
administration did help the IACHR to get into Argentina. Once there, 
the Commission demonstrated its potential, though it was also not en-
tirely successful given the unfortunate delay of the on-site investiga-
tion. Ultimately, human rights advocates at the OAS lost their final 
battle in December 1980 when the General Assembly resolution was 
passed, which merely mentioned the critical report on Argentina with-
out referring to its findings or conclusions. 
It is argued here that it was one of the goals, or at least a welcome 
byproduct, for both the Carter and Ford administrations to preserve 
the OAS through substantial support of the Commission and the hu-
man rights issue.  When Reagan assumed power, it quickly became 
evident that his administration would unilaterally prefer to favor au-
thoritarian, anti-Communist regimes rather than to criticize their bad 
human rights records. As a result, the OAS seemed to lose its impact 
entirely. In addition to the debt crisis, Latin American disinclination to 
accuse one another became part of the organizations weakness when 
it came to human rights. Furthermore, in the context of the new re-
gional situation shaped by the politicized Central American conflicts, 
the new Secretary General did not clearly support the Commission. 
His Argentine predecessor, surprisingly, had been able to walk the 
fine line of passive support despite his alleged pro-junta leanings. The 
Commission now dealt with Guatemala, Nicaragua, Suriname, Haiti, 
Paraguay and Chile. After a while, the partly understandable, partly 
accusable, initial sympathy with the Sandinistas was gradually re-
placed by a more critical and appropriate view on the part of the 
IACHR. On the whole, the Guatemalan case was handled in a com-
paratively good manner, probably also a result of modest US pressure. 
In contrast, the Annual Report sections on El Salvador  though 
critical  did not compensate for the Commissions unexplained omis-
sion of a Special Report on the disastrous human rights situation in 
that country. In the Salvadoran case, some reliable sources claimed 
that from 1980 to 1983, 30,000 people were assassinated. The Repub-
lic of El Salvador counted approximately five million inhabitants at 
that time  less than the city of Buenos Aires. Media interest drew 
public attention to the events in El Salvador, but the Salvadoran case 
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clearly demonstrated the limits of publicly denouncing a violating 
government. Instead, it would have been necessary for the Commis-
sion as an intergovernmental institution to issue a country report on 
the devastating situation in El Salvador, a State bound to the Conven-
tion. 
Finally, the performance of the OAS in the 1989 Panama crisis 
showed anew the organizations paralysis in regard to regional prob-
lems. The uneasiness and impatience on the part of the Bush admini-
stration combined with traditional Latin American unwillingness to in-
terfere in domestic affairs of another Latin American country resulted 
ultimately in the US invasion. At first glance, the role of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights seems to be a minor one. 
However, a second IACHR visit between May and December 1989 
could have helped the Panamanian political class to ease up the situa-
tion and minimize the eagerness of the new US administration to flex 
its interventionist muscle in Panama. Such a possible compromise, 
along with authentic reforms, might have prevented a military inva-
sion. This is admittedly pure speculation, but the Commission was ea-
ger to mediate in the Panamanian case. It was mainly the vacillating 
OAS that nearly provoked a unilateral military solution for the prob-
lem, which was perceived as a major obstacle for the United States 
since the Bush administration first had sought to deal with the prob-
lem within the OAS. 
The historical General Assembly in 1991 eventually adopted 
resolution 1080. This resolution reduced the nonintervention principle 
and prepared the ground for the diplomatic scolding, which followed 
for the non-democratic incidents in Haiti, Peru and Guatemala be-
tween 1991 and 1993. This was a new aspect for OAS policy because 
the organization finally dared to accuse single Member States. In spite 
of this development, strictly employed sanctions were not easily im-
posed, and a different handling of large and small countries continued. 
In the end, four major questions remain to be answered: How is it 
possible to terminologically define the Latin American human rights 
reality, which presents a hybrid between universalism and relativism? 
Was the OAS human rights policy a success or a failure? What role 
did the US play regarding the human rights debate within the OAS? In 
conclusion, given the historical context of the tension between Pan 
Americanism and Bolivarism, one must consider the last question: Did 
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human rights play a part in this conceptual antagonism between Latin 
American solidarity and inter-American cooperation? 
First, it has been suggested here that a new term be used to de-
scribe the obvious discrepancy between Latin American human rights 
legal tradition and the abuses that characterized large parts of the 
1970s and 1980s. The expression circumstantial relativism helps to 
place Latin America somewhere between Western individualistic hu-
man rights comprehension and the cultural relativism advocated in Af-
rica and Asia. Circumstantial relativists, particularly in the period of 
this inquiry, rhetorically argued with the necessity of temporarily sus-
pending basic rights in order to secure Western culture. The transi-
tional branching off the path of universalism did not automatically 
lead to cultural relativism because in public circumstantial relativists 
argued that their practices would eventually protect human rights and 
of course, would also battle terrorism. Although this relativism was a 
particular phenomenon of Latin American dictatorships of the 1970s 
and 1980s, some of its features are still in practice  not only in Latin 
America. Given these facts, the notion circumstantial relativism 
helps to categorize Latin Americas exceptional human rights reality 
in the 1970s and 1980s. 
One of the most important questions raised here is whether the 
OAS policy on human rights succeeded or not. To address this, the au-
thor cites some illustrative comments on the subject made in 1990. 
During the General Assembly of that year, Uruguays Foreign Minis-
ter and former judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Héctor Gros Espiell, concluded that the conscience of the Americas 
was not the IACHR but the Organization of American States. By 
means of its Charter and the American Convention, the two instru-
ments of the OAS, the Court and the Commission, would only validly 
take decisions within the strict framework of competencies fixed by 
the OAS Charter, the Convention and its Statutes. He argued, Out-
side of these, they have no other competence.4 In response, Paul 
                                                 
4  OEA/Ser.P/XX.0.2, 17 mayo 1991, Volumen II, Parte II, Vigésimo período ordi-
nario de sesiones, Asunción, Paraguay, Del 4 al 9 de junio de 1990, Primera Co-
misión, pp. 132-134. Gros Espiell originally said: La conciencia de los derechos 
humanos en América no es la Comisión; es la Organización de los Estados Ame-
ricanos a través de la Carta, de la Convención, y sus dos órganos que sólo toman 
válidamente decisiones en el marco estricto de las competencias que les fijan la 
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Spencer, the representative of Antigua and Barbuda, replied: At a 
time when the name of the OAS left much to be desired, it was the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights which kept the flame of 
the Organization burning.5 It is clear that in regard to the decades of 
the 1970s and 1980s, Gros Espiells position is untenable. Although 
his remarks were a discouraging preview for some of the Commis-
sions future work during the 1990s, it is necessary to emphasize that 
had such a position become commonly accepted, especially during the 
1970s, the IACHR would not have been as effective as it ultimately 
was.6 If the Commission had respectfully obeyed the nonintervention 
argument, no effective and substantial human rights work would have 
been possible within the given system. 
In many ways, the OAS human rights policy during the period of 
this investigation was almost nonexistent  with the sole exception of 
the 1979 resolution of the Meeting of Consultation that called to re-
move Somoza.7 If one might speak of a human rights policy carried 
out by the organization as a whole, it would be at most a laissez-faire 
attitude toward the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. No 
step other than a condemning resolution blaming Somoza gained rec-
ognition  sanctions were not to be expected from a genuinely non-
confrontational institution such as the OAS. Nevertheless, some 
Member States energetically supported the IACHR  specifically 
Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, the United States, Trini-
dad & Tobago, Jamaica and Barbados. However, not even all of those 
supporting Member States demonstrated a consistent policy. The Cen-
tral American conflicts, particularly the cases of El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, led some traditional promoters of fundamental rights to 
                                                                                                         
Carta, la Convención y sus Estatutos; fuera de eso no tienen ninguna otra compe-
tencia. Ibid., p. 134. 
5  OEA/Ser.P/XX.0.2, 17 mayo 1991, Volumen II, Parte II, Vigésimo período ordi-
nario de sesiones, Asunción, Paraguay, Del 4 al 9 de junio de 1990, Primera Co-
misión, p. 135. 
6  Accordingly, a former IACHR official states that the only reaction to the massive 
violations in the 1970s came from the Commission. Interviews. 
7  Even the adoption of that extremely critical resolution could have been the prod-
uct of an angry, Latin American reaction to the appeasing effort of the United 
States, which sought to support the moderate forces in Nicaragua in order to 
promote the famous Somocism without Somoza. The proposal of the United 
States must have revived the memory of the US invasion in the Dominican Re-
public in 1965, later on disguised as OAS operation. 
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turn to a more human rights Realpolitik. Besides the organizations 
strong respect for national sovereignty, it must be recognized that dur-
ing the 1970s through the mid-1980s, the OAS General Assemblies 
were composed of many authoritarian regimes and dictatorships, 
which disrespected human rights. At times, the majority of the OAS 
General Assembly consisted of military regimes or governments con-
trolled by the armed forces. Unlike the typically conservative OAS, 
the IACHR was able to create a dynamic that persuaded old-fashioned 
disciples of nonintervention to consider human rights concerns while 
simultaneously leading representatives of repressive regimes to con-
cede to compromises on behalf of human rights. Thus, while the 
Commission confronted permanent opposition and struggle, by and 
large it justified its very existence as necessary by carrying out the 
Sisyphean task of putting out fires that continued to flare up elsewhere 
in the region. This is  despite of all the omissions cogently mentioned 
in the foregoing chapters  the main achievement of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. Ironically, its very perform-
ance indirectly established a goal that might have been considered as 
secondary during the years of the worst bloodshed: to create aware-
ness for human rights among the peoples of the hemisphere. Thanks to 
the IACHR, many victims and their relatives became aware of the 
human rights they were entitled to demand, countless victims experi-
enced relief and hope, and some even found a way to save their lives 
through the remarkable endeavors of courageous and dedicated Com-
mission members and staff lawyers. Consequently, from a historical 
perspective, the Commission  though neither infallible nor entirely 
innocent in its efforts to advance human rights  was one of the au-
thentic consciences of the hemisphere. In contrast, the OAS as a 
whole did not carry out a consistent, successful human rights policy, 
even up to the turning point in 1991. Until then, though, the organiza-
tion remained primarily a preserving sanctuary for a traditional diplo-
macy of eloquent noncommitment. 
Furthermore, the role of the United States had a major impact on 
the human rights topic at the OAS. While the Ford/Kissinger admini-
stration eventually strengthened the Commission as well as the issue 
of human rights at the OAS, Carters presidency safeguarded a his-
torical shift  at least for the Commissions standing and the popular-
ity of the item at the organization, including the entry-into-force of the 
Convention. Conversely, Reagans reluctance to deal with the OAS 
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and the Commission caused the latters marginalization in the larger 
OAS in respect to the politicized Central American conflicts. 
As discussed in chapter III, the Ford and Carter administrations 
also pursued their human rights policy in the OAS with the goal of 
preserving the organization as an inter-American institution. Mainly 
the Kissinger/Ford administration and  with a different approach  
the Reagan administration, utilized human rights for their own ends. 
The strategy of Kissinger/Ford was to divide Latin American States 
and to maintain the OAS, while Reagan used human rights as a tool to 
accuse the Sandinistas of abuses and simultaneously to justify atroci-
ties against subversives carried out by friendly governments. Although 
Carter was also eager to reach other foreign policy goals with his em-
phasis on basic rights at the OAS, the existent degree of an instrumen-
talization was lower and a supposed exploitation of the idea of human 
rights cannot be confirmed.8 
The US strategy to save the Organization of American States 
through the human rights topic leads to the last question. In the end, in 
this broad historical perspective, human rights did in fact play an im-
portant role for the tense relation between Pan Americanism and its 
virtual counter concept, Bolivarism. 
As addressed in chapter III, both the Ford/Kissinger and the Carter 
administration reinforced human rights thematically and institutionally 
at the OAS. In concrete terms, the US administrations supported dis-
cussions on human rights problems at the General Assembly and deci-
sively strengthened the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
during the 1970s. This emphasis on human rights in the inter-
American system also strategically served to give the OAS a new right 
to exist. The new human rights activity of the IACHR appeased the 
US public which had grown weary of the very existence of the OAS, 
as it was perceived as being highly inefficient. At the same time, the 
human rights issue divided Member States between those that were 
                                                 
8  Nevertheless, the aspect of moral imperialism still constitutes a vivid argument 
against Carters human rights approach in Latin America. Already in 1900, the 
famous writer José Enrique Rodó criticized in his memorable essay Ariel the 
ambitions of the US American Caliban (a reference to William Shakespeares 
The Tempest) to universalize its cultural and moral ideals: Hoy, ellos aspiran 
manifiestamente al primado de la cultura universal, a la dirección de ideas, y se 
consideran a sí mismos los forjadores de un tipo de civilización que prevalecerá. 
José Enrique Rodó  Ariel, Madrid 2000, p. 214. 
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democratic and those that were authoritarian or dictatorial rulers and 
often the violators of basic rights. Consequently, the human rights 
question split the Latin American solidarity manifested in forums 
like SELA that had been obviously directed against US hegemony. In 
this context, the apparent Latin American tendency to withdraw from 
the OAS or to transform it into an exclusively Latin American organi-
zation constituted elements of a reanimated Bolivarism. In contrast, 
the OAS symbolized the very institution of the renewed Pan Ameri-
canism, now described as inter-American system. The US seemingly 
regarded the OAS as worth maintaining because otherwise it might 
have lost not only potentially important connections to Latin Ameri-
can governments but also a helpful contact to the so-called Third 
World movement in general.  
In sum, the use of human rights within the OAS somewhat re-
sulted in the US-inspired Pan Americanism triumphing over Latin 
American Bolivarism. During the Reagan administration, traditional 
US unilateralism prevailed. This provoked exclusively Latin-
American reactions to the incapability of the OAS with dealing with 
the central American conflict However, due to difficult circumstances 
such as the debt predicament, these endeavors did not lead to a com-
plete Bolivarist solution.9 The Reagan government did not want the 
OAS to disappear, but the reduced US contributions seriously weak-
ened the organization. The decline of the organizations position in in-
ternational politics was further nourished by the neglected role of the 
IACHR in Central America during the 1980s. While the human rights 
issue and the acting Commission had assured media presence of an 
OAS institution and the General Assemblies during the 1970s, the 
press rarely covered meetings and decisions of the OAS in the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, during the 1980s, the Latin American trend towards 
Third World alternative concepts that had prevailed in the foregoing 
decade diminished determinedly. There was no realistic scenario of a 
potential confrontation between bolivarismo and Pan Americanism. 
The very maintenance of the OAS could be interpreted not as a victory 
of Pan Americanism but certainly, in combination with the debt crisis 
                                                 
9  However, Kacowicz regards the establishment of the Contadora and the Rio Sup-
port Group as a result of a revived Bolivarism. Arie M. Kacowicz  Latin Amer-
ica as an International Society, in: International Politics, A Journal of Transna-
tional Issues and Global Problems (The Hague), Vol. 37, Number 2, June 2000, 
pp. 148/149. 
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and the subsequent loss of a sense of solidarity, as an indicator for a 
decisive and possibly terminal defeat of Bolivarism at the end of the 
20th century.  The human rights topic, although not totally instrumen-
talized, supported the US in pursuing its goal to preserve the OAS as 
an institutional link to Latin America and to developing countries in 
order to secure its influence potential. 
In summary, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
aside from some failures, advanced a philanthropic concept. In con-
trast, the larger OAS had merely a few moments in which it became a 
true defender of human rights. The creation of a system for the protec-
tion of human rights does not necessarily reflect well on the OAS, as 
the Commission was originally considered as merely decorative and 
later was subject to fierce opposition by many Member States. Gener-
ally speaking  despite some exceptions like the 1979 resolution on 
Nicaragua  the OAS did not effectively pursue a human rights policy 
out of a philanthropic motivation but more from an egocentric and 
traditionally domestic perspective of the respective Members, follow-
ing the maxim of live and let live. Though there were some Member 
States  mainly Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, the US 
and some Caribbean nations  that more or less battled continuously 
for human rights, as a whole, the organization did not implement a 
vigorous or consistent human rights policy. 
In conclusion, the OAS human rights policy points out some re-
markable successes, primarily with regard to the Commission. In gen-
eral, however, the politicization and use of the issue for other interests, 
preponderantly by US strategic concerns, leads to the conclusion that 
it was not necessarily the exploitation of an ideal but at least the atro-
phy of a highly moralistic claim contained in the notion of human 
rights. This dwindling of the honorable standards of human rights has 
occurred in varying degrees throughout world history, wherever so-
called human rights policies were carried out. 
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1978  1979  Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches 
(Nov. 1978 through May/June 1979) Brazilian 
 
1979  Andrés Aguilar 
(May/June through December 1979, 
then Aguilar resigned)   Venezuelan 
 
1979  1980 Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro 
(since December 1979 1980) 1  Costa Rican 
 
1980  1982 Tom Farer (until May 1982)  US citizen 
 
1982  1983 Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra  
(June 1982 through June 1983)  Colombian 
 
1983  1985 César Sepúlveda 
(June/July 1983  June 1985)  Mexican 
 
1985  1986 Andrés Aguilar 
(June/July 1985  April 1986)  Venezuelan 
                                                 
1  Referring to Art. 5 of the IACHR Regulations, the Vice Chairman took the office 
after the resigning of the Chairman) 
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1986  1987 Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas 
(April 1986  March 1987)  Bolivian 
 
1987  1988 Gilda Maciel Correa Russomano 
(March 1987 through March 1988) Brazilian 
 
1988  1989 Marco Tulio Bruni Celli 
(March 1988  April 1989)  Venezuelan 
 
1989  1990 Oliver Hamlet Jackman 
(April 1989  May 1990)  Barbadian 
 
1990  1991 Leo Valladares Lanza 
(May 1990 through February 1991) Honduran 
 
1991  1992 Patrick Lipton Robinson 
(February 1991 through Feb. 1992) Jamaican 
 
1992  1993 Marco Tulio Bruni Celli 
(February 1992 through March 1993) Venezuelan 
 
1993  1994 Oscar Luján Fappiano 
(March 1993  1994)   Argentine 
 
1994  1995 W. Michael Reisman 
(1994  February 1995)   US citizen 
 
1995  1996 Alvaro Tirado Mejía 
(Feb. 1995 through Feb./March 1996) Colombian 
 
1996  1997 Claudio Grossman 
(Feb./March 1996  Feb./March 1997) Chilean 
 
1997  1998 John S. Donaldson 
(Feb./March 1997  December 1998) Trinidadian 
 
1998  1999 Carlos Ayala Corao 
(Jan. 1998  February 1999)  Venezuelan 
 487
 
1999  2000  Robert K. Goldman 
(February 1999 -2001)   US citizen 
 
2001  Claudio Grossman   Chilean 
 
 
 
 
Executive Secretaries of the IACHR 
 
 
Luis Reque (1960 until June 1976) 
 
Emilio Castañon Pasquel (June 1976 through December 1976) 
 
Charles Moyer (January to September, 1977, Dr. Moyer held the post 
ad-interim) 
 
Edmundo Vargas Carreño (September, 1977 through March, 1990) 
 
David J. Padilla (March 1990  June 1990, Dr. Padilla held the post 
ad-interim for several months) 
 
Edith Márquez Rodríguez (June 1990  Feb./March 1996) 
 
Jorge E. Taiana (March 1996-2001) 
 
Santiago Cantón (since 2001) 
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Development of human resources at the IACHR Secretariat  
1974-1992 
 
Prepared by Klaas Dykmann, September 2000 
 
 
Year Lawyers Vacant Posts Frozen Posts Administrative 
Posts 
     
1974: April 1 4 - - 5 
1974: September 3 1 Senior 
Specialist 
- 5 
1974: November 3 1 Senior 
Specialist 
- 5 
1975: January2 3 - 1 Senior Specialist 6 
1975: March 31 3 - 1 Senior Specialist 6 
1975: October 1 4 - 2 Senior 
Specialists 
5 
1975: December 31 4 - 1 Senior Specialist 5 
1976: April 30 4 - 1 Senior Specialist 4 (2 vacancies) 
1976: October 19 5 - - 4 (2 vacancies) 
1976: December 31 5 - - 6 
1977: March 31 5 - - 5 
1977: April 30 5 - - 5 (1 post 
frozen) 
1977: June 30 4 1 Advisor3 - 5 
1977: September 
30 
5 - - 5 (1 vacancy) 
1977: December 5 - - 5 
1978: April 8 1 Principal 
Human Rights 
Specialist 
- 7 (1 vacancy, 1 
post frozen) 
1978: July 7 2 Human 
Rights 
Specialists 
- 6 
1978: October 6 3 Senior 
Human Rights 
Specialists/ 1 
Acting 
Executive 
- 7 (1 vacancy) 
                                                 
2  December 1974/March 1975. 
3  In April 1977, former Executive Secretary, Castañon Pasquel, was listed as 
Advisor. Accordingly, after he had left the Secretariat, this post of an advisor 
remained vacant. 
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Secretary 
1978: December 6 2 Principal 
Human Rights 
Specialists / 1 
Senior Human 
Rights 
Specialist 
- 7 (1 vacancy) 
1979: March 8 2 Principal 
Human Rights 
Specialists 
- 8 
1979: June 9 - - 8 
1979: September 8 1 Principal 
Human Rights 
Specialist / 1 
Secretary 
- 8 
1979: December 10 (9)4 - - 8 
1980: March 9 (8)3 1 Assistant 
Executive 
Secretary 
- 8 
1980: June 10(11)3 - - 8 (1 vacancy) 
1980: September 10 - - 9 (1 frozen 
post) 
1980: December 10 - - 9 (1 frozen 
post) 
1981: March 10 - - 9 (1 vacancy) 
1981: June 9 - 1 Senior Human 
Rights Specialist 
7 (1 vacancy, 1 
post frozen) 
1981: September 9 - 1 Senior Human 
Rights Specialist 
8 (1 vacancy, 1 
post frozen) 
1981: December 9 - 1 Senior Human 
Rights Specialist 
10 (1 post 
frozen) 
1982: March 8 - 1 Eliminated post5 7 (1 post 
frozen) 
1982: June 8 - 1 Eliminated post 7 (1 frozen, 1 
eliminated) 
1982: September 8 - - 8 
1982: December 8 - - 7 (1 post 
frozen) 
1983: March 9 - - 8 
1983: June 9 - - 8 
                                                 
4  Between December 1979 and June 1980, one Secretary was listed under the 
lawyers code, but since September 1980, he was counted under the category of 
administrative personnel. This explains the number in parenthesis. 
5  In the salary lists it appears as ELIMINATED POST DUE TO 
REORGANIZATION. 
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1983: September 9 - - 10 
1983: December 9 - - 10 
1984: March 9 - - 9 
1984: June 9 - - 11 
1984: September 9 - - 11 (1 post of a  
clerk vacant) 
1984: December 8 1 Human 
Rights 
Specialist 
- 10 
1985: March 7 1 Principal 
Human Rights 
Specialist/ 1 
Human Rights 
Specialist 
- 9 ( 1 vacancy) 
1985: June 8 - - 10 (1 post 
frozen) 
1985: September 7 1 Assistant 
Executive 
Secretary 
- 9 (1 vacancy, 1 
post frozen) 
1985: December 7 1 Assistant 
Executive 
Secretary 
- 9 (1 vacancy, 1 
post frozen) 
1986: March 31 6 1 Assistant 
Executive 
Secretary 
1 Senior Human 
Rights Specialist 
9 
1986: June 30 6 1 Assistant 
Executive 
Secretary 
1 Senior Human 
Rights Specialist 
9 
1986: September 
30 
6 1 Assistant 
Executive 
Secretary 
1 Senior Human 
Rights Specialist 
9 
1986: December 31 6 1 Assistant 
Executive 
Secretary 
1 Senior Human 
Rights Specialist 
8 
1987: March 31 7 1 Senior 
Human Rights 
Specialist 
- 8 
1987: June 30 7 1 Senior 
Human Rights 
Specialist / 1 
Human Rights 
Specialist 
- 8 
1987: September 
30 
8 1 Senior 
Human Rights 
Specialist 
(appointment in 
progress) 
- 8 
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1987: December 31 9 - - 8 
1988: March 31 9 - - 7 (1 vacancy) 
1988: June 30 9 - - 8 
1988: September 
30 
9 - - 8 
1988: December 31 8 1 Human 
Rights 
Specialist: 
POST NOT 
FILLED 
- 8 
1989: March 31 7 - - 6 
1989: June 30 9 - - 5 
1989: September 
30 
8 - - 5 
1989: December 31 8 - - 5 
1990: MISSING6     
1991: January 31 9 - - 6 
1991: June 30 9 - - 7 
1991: September 
30 
9 - - 7 
1991: December 31 8 - - 7 
1992: January 31 8 - - 8 
1992: June 30 9 - - 6 
1992: September 
16 
10 1 Human 
Rights 
Specialist: 
Post NOT 
FILLED 
- 7 
1992: December 31 9 - - 7 
 
Sources: OAS, Personnel Register Documents from 1974-1992 (except 1990) 
 
 
                                                 
6  The author did not get access to the files concerning the year 1990. Apparently, 
those documents are missing. 
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Developments of the OAS and IACHR Budgets 
 
 
YEAR OAS BUDGET7 IACHR BUDGET7 Difference 
1960 $7,235,544 $34,200  
1961 $8,323,382   
1962 $10,111,885 $62,133  
1963 $13,153,920 $65,960 +$3,827 
1964 $14,634,239 $70,727 +$4,767 
1965 $14,980,080 $81,400 +$10,673 
1966 $15,127,354 $84,893 +$3,493 
1967 $17,207,921 $85,400 +$507 
1968 $17,207,921 $139,000 +$53,600 
1968/69 $19,162,763 $143,356 +$4,356 
1969/70 $20,265,594 $206,115 +$62,759 
1970/71 $23,724,421 $193,940 $12,175 
1971/72 $26,836,539 $255,505 +$61,565 
1972/73 $23,123,600 $270,600 +$15,095 
1973/74 $30,550,600 $288,200 +$17,600 
1974/75 $24,973,094 $303,100 +$14,900 
1975/76 $26,139,862 $319,100 +$16,000 
1976 $41,500,300   
19778 $42,480,532 $358,500  
1978 $48,322,000 $891,100 +$532,600 
1979 $48,688,000 $800,800 $90,300 
1980 $51,929,000 $858,200 +$57,400 
1981 $52,418,000 $937,000 +$78,800 
1982 $63,580,100 $1,044,000 +$107,000 
1983 $63,580,100 $1,010,400 $33,600 
1984 $63,154,200 $1,049,000 +$38,600 
1985 $64,980,100 $1,119,000 +$70,000 
1986 $64,980,100 $1,074,200 $44,800 
1987 $64,980,100 $1,071,700 $2,500 
1988 $66,054,500 $1,083,700 +$12,000 
1989 $66,054,500 $1,168,900 +$85,200 
1990 $60,060,100 $1,305,500 +$136,600 
1991 $60,060,100 $1,367,100 +$61,600 
1992 $65,398,200 $1,487,600 +$120,500 
1993 $70,956,300 $1,617,100 +$129,500 
                                                 
7  Approved Budget without adjustments. 
8  In 1977, there was a transitional budget of $63,720,800 that covered a 18 months 
period. The budget for the fiscal year which appears in this table represents two-
thirds of that amount. 
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1994 $72,945,200 $1,734,100 +$117,000 
1995 $83,952,900 $1,734,800 +$700 
1996 $84,333,500 $2,830,600 +$1,095800 
1997 $84,333,500 $2,854,600 +$24,000 
1998 $79,990,100 $2,846,800 $7,800 
 
Sources: Reports of the Department for Program-Budget and the Department of 
Finance. 
 
Prepared by Klaas Dykmann. 
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On-site observations of the IACHR 
 
 
Nº Dates Place Observations 
1 22-29 October 1961 Dominican Republic First on-site visit 
2 2 January 1963 Miami, Florida Visit to Cuban refugees 
3 5-9 May 1963 Dominican Republic Second on-site visit 
4 11 June 1965  1 
June 1966 
Dominican Republic Third on-site visit 
5 4-7 July 1969 
8-10 July 1969 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
A special Delegation from the 
Commission remained in both 
countries until October 25, 
1969 
6 22 July  2 August 
1974 
Chile First on-site visit  
7 29 November  7 
December 1977 
Panama First on-site visit 
8 18 January 1978 El Salvador Second on-site visit 
9 16-25 August 1978 Haiti First on-site visit 
10 3-12 October 1978 Nicaragua First on-site visit 
11 20 September 1979 Argentina First on-site visit 
12 21-28 April 1980 Colombia First on-site visit  
13 6-11 October 1980 Nicaragua Second on-site visit 
14 3-6 May 1982 Nicaragua Third on-site visit 
15 7-9 May 1982 Honduras Visit to the Miskito refugee 
camp in Mocorón 
16 28-29 June 1982 United States - 
Puerto Rico 
Visit to the Haitian refugee 
detention centers in Florida 
and Puerto Rico 
17 5-6 August 1982 United States Visit to the Haitian detention 
center in Brooklyn, New York 
18 21-26 September 
1982 
Guatemala First on-site visit 
19 2-8 January 1983 Mexico Visit to the Guatemalan 
refugee camp in Chiapas, 
Mexico 
20 12 June 1983 Honduras - 
Nicaragua 
Visit to the Miskito region on 
both countries 
21 20-24 June 1983 Suriname First on-site visit   
22 6-10 May 1985 Guatemala Second on-site visit   
23 12-17 June 1985 Suriname Second on-site visit   
24 10-16 August 1986 El Salvador Second on-site visit   
25 20-23 January 1987 Haiti Second on-site visit   
26 15-19 February 
1987 
El Salvador Third on-site visit   
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27 5-9 October 1987 Suriname Third on-site visit   
28 3-7 January 1988 French Guyana On-site visit to the Surinamese 
refugee camps 
29 25-28 January 1988 Guatemala Third on-site visit   
30 20-22 January 1988 Nicaragua Fourth on-site visit   
31 2-30 April 1988 Nicaragua Review of the case files of 
former National Guardsman 
(1,834 cases) 
32 29 August - 2 
September 1988 
Haiti Third on-site visit   
33 13-16 December 
1988 
Suriname Fourth on-site visit   
34 27 February  3 
March 1989 
Panama Second on-site visit   
35 6-12 May 1989 Peru First on-site visit   
36 29 January  3 
February 1990 
Guatemala Fourth on-site visit   
37 7-9 February 1990 Paraguay First on-site visit   
38 17-20 April 1990 Haiti Fourth on-site visit   
39 9-13 July 1990 Panama Third on-site visit   
40 14-16 November 
1990 
Haiti Fifth on-site visit   
41 3-7 December 1990 Colombia On-site visit   (preliminary) 
42 12-14 August 1991 Dominican Republic Fourth on-site visit   
43 28 October  1 
November 1991 
Peru Second on-site visit   
44 4-6 December 1991 Haiti Sixth on-site visit   
45 19-21 April 1992 Peru Third on-site visit   
46 27-30 April 1992 Nicaragua Fifth on-site visit   
47 4-8 May 1992 Colombia Second on-site visit   
48 11-12 May 1992 Peru Fourth on-site visit   
49 2-6 November 1992 Guatemala Fifth on-site visit   
50 17-21 May 1993 Peru Fifth on-site visit   
51 23-27 August 1993 Haiti Seventh on-site visit   
52 6-10 September 
1993 
Guatemala Sixth on-site visit   
53 9-10 March 1994 Guatemala Seventh on-site visit to 
Guatemala to verify the 
situation of the "Communities 
of Peoples in Resistance" 
(CPR)" 
54 16-20 May 94 Haiti Eighth on-site visit   
55 22-27 May 94 Bahamas First on-site visit   
56 24-27 October 1994 Haiti Novena on-site visit   
57 7-11 November 
1994 
Ecuador First on-site visit   
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58 1-5 December 1994 Guatemala Eighth on-site visit   
59 7 December 1994 Jamaica First on-site visit   
60 20-23 March 1995 Haiti Tenth on-site visit   
61 3-5 May 1995 United States On-site visit to the Lompoc 
Federal Penitentiary, to verify 
the detention conditions of the 
Mariel Cubans 
62 30 de May 1995 United States On-site visit to Leavenworth 
Penitentiary, Kansas 
63 5-10 July 1995 Guatemala Ninth on-site visit   
64 4-8 December 1995 Brazil First on-site visit   
65 26 April 1996 United States On-site visit to Allenwood, 
Pennsylvania, to verify prison 
conditions of the Mariel 
Cubans 
66 12-18 May 1996 Venezuela On-site visit to verify prison 
conditions 
67 15-24 July 1996 Mexico On-site visit   
68 9-10 December 
1996 
United States On-site visit to Marksville and 
Amite, Louisiana to verify 
prison conditions of the 
Mariel Cubans 
69 28 April  2 May 
1997 
Bolivia On-site visit   
70 16-20 June 1997 Dominican Republic Fifth on-site visit   
71 20-22 October 1997 Canada On-site visit to verify the 
situation of refugees  
72 1-8 December 1997 Colombia Third on-site visit   
73 7-9 July 1998 United States On-site visit to Los Angeles 
and San Diego, California to 
study the situation of migrant 
workers and the families 
74 6-11 August 1998 Guatemala Tenth on-site visit   
75 9-13 November 
1998 
Peru Sixth on-site visit   
76 7-9 July 1999 United States On-site visit to El Paso, Texas 
77 28-30 July 1999 Paraguay Second on-site visit   
 
Source: http://www.iachr.org/visitas.eng.htm  
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Selected Interviews (July 1999-October 2000) 
 
Tom J. Farer, Denver Colorado (USA), August 30, 1999. 
Member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1976-1983) 
and its Chairman (1980-1982) 
 
José Miguel Vivanco, Washington, D.C. (USA), August 23, 1999. 
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, Americas Division 
 
Richard T. McCormack. McLean/Virginia (USA), January 6, 2000. 
Former OAS Permanent Representative of the United States of America 
 
David J. Padilla, Washington, D.C. (USA), July 20, 1999. 
Former Assistant Executive Secretary of the IACHR 
 
Luigi Einaudi, Washington, D.C. (USA), November 18, 1999. 
Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States, US 
Permanent Representative to the OAS, 1989-1993 
 
Robert K. Goldman, Washington, D.C. (USA), September 9, 1999. 
Former Member and Chairman of the IACHR 
 
Edmundo Vargas Carreño, San José (Costa Rica), November 24/25, 1999. 
Former Executive Secretary of the IACHR, 1977-1990 
 
Mario Calderón, Santiago de Chile (Chile), June 2000. 
Former Human Rights Advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Chile 
 
Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Buenos Aires (Argentina), June 16, 2000. 
Founder of human rights organization SERPAJ, Nobel Peace Prize Winner 
1980 
 
Roberto Alvarez, Washington, D.C. (USA), November 17, 1999. 
Former Lawyer of the IACHR Secretariat 
 
Domingo E. Acevedo, Washington, D.C. (USA), December 15, 1999. 
Former Assistant Executive Secretary of the IACHR 
 
Claudio Grossman, Washington, D.C. (USA), September 29, 1999. 
Former Member and Chairman of the IACHR 
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Pedro Daza, Santiago de Chile (Chile), June 8, 2000. 
Former Permanent Representative of Chile to the OAS; 1979-1984 
 
Bruce McColm, Alexandria/Virginia (USA), September 3, 1999. 
Former Member of the IACHR 
 
Robert E. White, Washington, D.C. (USA), September 24, 1999. 
Former US Ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador, former OAS 
Representative 
 
Alejandro Orfila, San Diego (CA), January 2000. 
Secretary General of the Organization of American States, 1975-1984. 
 
Francisco Bertrand Galindo, San Salvador (El Salvador), October 27, 2000. 
Former Member of the IACHR 
 
William D. Rogers, Washington, D.C. (USA), November 9, 1999. 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1974-1977 
 
Oscar A. Montes, Buenos Aires (Argentina), May 17, 2000. 
Admiral, Minister of Foreign Relations of Argentina, 1976-1977 
 
Raúl Quijano, Buenos Aires (Argentina), May 18, 2000. 
Permanent Representative of Argentina to the OAS, 1969-1975 and 1979-
1984 
 
Hebe de Bonafini, Buenos Aires (Argentina), April 26, 2000. 
President of the human rights NGO Madres de Plaza de Mayo 
  
 
Photo Gallery 
 
 
 
 
Photo 1: Quinta Reunion de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores (Santiago, Chile 
1959). With the Permission of the General Secretariat of the Organization of Ameri-
can States. 
Source: OAS/IACHR. 
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Photo 2: Primera Reunion de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 
(1960). With the Permission of the General Secretariat of the Organization of Ameri-
can States. 
Source: OAS/IACHR.
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Photo 3: Angela Acuña, Gabino Fraga y Justino Jimenez de Arechaga. Delegados de 
la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en la Conferencia Especializada 
en la cual se firmo la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Teatro 
Nacional, San José, Costa Rica (noviembre 1969). With the Permission of the General 
Secretariat of the Organization of American States. 
Source: OAS/IACHR 
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Photo 4: Con el deposito del 11o instrumento de ratificación, por parte de Grenada 
entra en Vigor La Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (19 de julio de 
1978). With the Permission of the General Secretariat of the Organization of 
American States. 
Source: OAS/IACHR. 
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Photo 5: Argentina deposita su instrumento de ratificación a la Convención Ameri-
cana sobre Derechos Humanos (septiembre 5, 1984). With the Permission of the 
General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. 
Source: OAS/IACHR. 
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Photo 6: 25o aniversario de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (sep-
tiembre 1984). With the Permission of the General Secretariat of the Organization of 
American States. 
Source: OAS/IACHR. 
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Photo 7: Miembros y personal de la secretaria ejecutiva de la CIDH. 25o aniversario 
de la comisión (septiembre 1984). With the Permission of the General Secretariat of 
the Organization of American States. 
Source: OAS/IACHR. 
 
 
 
 
